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**We wish to be civilized: Ottawa-American political contests on  
the Michigan frontier. (Volumes I and II)**

McClurken, James Michael. Ph.D.

Michigan State University, 1988

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WE WISH TO BE CIVILIZED:  
OTTAWA-AMERICAN POLITICAL CONTESTS ON THE MICHIGAN FRONTIER

By

James Michael McClurken

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Anthropology

1988

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ABSTRACT

WE WISH TO BE CIVILIZED: OTTAWA/AMERICAN  
POLITICAL CONTESTS ON THE MICHIGAN FRONTIER

by

James Michael McClurken

Following the War of 1812, the Michigan Ottawa faced serious political and economic problems caused by the extension of United States jurisdiction into their homelands. A large influx of Americans disrupted the Ottawas' horticulture, fishing activities, and adaptation to the Euroamerican fur trade by challenging the Indians' political autonomy and usurping ever larger shares of the regions' natural resources. During the Jackson and Van Buren administrations, the Indian removal policy even threatened the Ottawa's right to remain in Michigan. The Ottawa, however, did not become passive victims. When faced with dispossession, they adopted an internally generated program to conform to American definitions of "civilized" living. By so doing, they won the right to remain in their homeland and reached a culturally satisfying accommodation with the Americans.

This ethnohistorical work examines the process of Ottawa adaptation from a world system perspective. Following the lead of Richard White, Carol Smith, James Scott, and Sherry Ortner it analyzes the Ottawa mode of production as a key mechanism by which the Indians created a place for themselves in Michigan frontier society. It contributes to ongoing theoretical discussions by identifying the local factors that limited

the success of United States attempts to dominate the Ottawa. Further, it works from an actor-oriented perspective to see the influence of individuals in shaping nineteenth century Michigan society.

Between 1820 and 1855, Ottawa leaders became involved in a series of political contests in which they maintained access to a significant portion of their traditional lands and their natural resources. They convinced their constituents to adopt key elements of American culture, including new male and female roles in the division of labor, landownership, Christian rites, and a new range of material goods. By defining change as including a continuation of historic patterns of production and exchange they successfully accommodated their cultural emphasis on provisioning the Euroamerican economy to the American market. They became successful friends, neighbors, and relatives of prominent Americans whose interests entwined those of with the Indians and helped defeat efforts to implement the removal policy.

To Brian

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For what is good in this dissertation, I owe a great many debts. First I wish to acknowledge my dissertation committee for guiding me through the process of problem formation, research, and writing. Dr. Charles Cleland of Michigan State University chaired my committee. Throughout my graduate career I have benefited from his lectures on Great Lakes Indians and from his counsel. Dr. James Clifton of the University of Wisconsin -- Green Bay and Dr. Richard White of the University of Utah accepted the challenge of teaching historiography to an anthropologist and honestly and insightfully critiqued my ideas. Dr. Clifton financed a great deal of my research with a grant from National Endowment to the Humanities. Dr. White and Dr. Harry Raulet of Michigan State University guided me through much of the anthropological theory on which this dissertation is based. Dr. Loudell Snow, also of Michigan State University, gave me encouragement at times when I needed it badly.

I have also benefitted from the comments of several friends who have received little reward for the many hours they worked on my texts. Dr. Margaret Holman read every draft of this dissertation -- and there were many. Dr. Robert McKinley helped me through the most difficult passages of the dissertation. Dr. William Lovis also reviewed the manuscript. Keith Widder made valuable corrections about the social milieu of Mackinac. These readers deserve special thanks. When I began writing I

had an Ottawa friend who shared my desire to create a coherent picture of his people's past. His knowledge of nineteenth century Ottawa people, the events of their lives, and the culture they shared is unmatched by any other person I know. I do not understand what went wrong with our friendship, but I wish to acknowledge him for the excitement our conversations generated.

My research was facilitated by a number of dedicated archivists. Gordon L. Olson, City Historian of Grand Rapids, Michigan, gave me my first research leads in 1976 and has since made his extensive collections readily accessible. I also received substantial help from: Dr. William Mulligan and his staff at Clarke Historical Library, Central Michigan University; LeRoy Barnett of State Archives of Michigan, Lansing, Michigan; Galen Wilson of the William L. Clement Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Alice Daligan at the Detroit Public Library; Helmi Raaska of the Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Mary Lou Stewart at the Kalamazoo Public Museum; and Robert Kvasnicka and Tom Carrier of the National Archives, Washington D.C. Sally Hiddinga Stebens and Sue Liddell of the Microforms Library, Michigan State University Library greatly facilitated every phase of this work. I shall miss the expert services of MSU inter-library loan specialist Dr. Michael Bennett, another talented man lost to AIDS.

My interest in Ottawa history began in 1959 when Janet Vormittag Meana and I first collected "arrowheads" and "pottery" from an Ottawa camp called Nadowaynong. I wish to thank Janet's parents, John and Gertrude Vormittag for being patient with the neighborhood children who

trampled their crops. Their farm has produced several Ph.D.s.

I also wish to thank my parents, Joanne R. and James W. McClurken, my Grandmother, Pearl McClurken, and my brothers, sisters, nieces and nephews for drawing my attention back to reality when academia threatened to claim all my attention. Most of all I wish to acknowledge the contribution of my partner, Brian Mavis, who has given me emotional support during my writing and purpose in my life.

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
**Michigan Ottawa villages.** Shaded area indicates the range of Ottawa territory after the War of 1812. Cross-hatched areas are hunting and fishing territories shared with the Chippewa

Between 1812 and 1856, the Ottawa inhabited the following large, permanent villages between Mackinac and the south shore of Little Traverse Bay: a. Cross Village (Ah-numa-wau-tink-unmig, or Pray Tree Place); b. Middle Village (Ahp-tun-wa-ing, or Half Way Place); c. Harbor Springs (Wee-kwi-ton-sing, or Bay Place); d. Petoskey (Bee-dahss-ah-ga-ing, or Approaching Light Place); e. Cheboygan Village, later called Burt Lake Village

Southern Ottawa villages were: f. White River Village; g. Muskegon River Village; h. Fori Village; i. Mackatosh's (Blackskin's) Village; j. Bowzing (Rapids); k. Nongee's (or Thornapple River) Village; l. Cobmoosa's (or Flat River) Village; m. Maple River Village; n. Middle Village (also called Shingobeeng); o. Misheminikoning (Apple Place or Orchard); p. Prairie Village.

The above villages were places of permanent residence. The Ottawa inhabited many other seasonal sites for collecting maple sugar, fishing, and hunting.

# MICHIGAN LAND CESSIONS



## INTRODUCTION

Following the War of 1812, the Michigan Ottawa had to cope with a people who demanded far more than the economic and political cooperation sought by the French and British for nearly two hundred years. The United States claimed not just cooperation but political jurisdiction over the peoples, lands and resources of the western Great Lakes. At first, the Ottawa, their Metis kinsmen, and British merchants outnumbered the few Americans who came to Michigan. Within forty years, however, the federal government gradually secured political and economic hegemony. It strengthened its military presence along the international boundary with Canada, purchased title to Indian lands, and encouraged American citizens to settle in the newly-formed territory. In the few short decades between 1812 and 1860, the number of Americans came to greatly outnumber Indians in Michigan.

The Ottawa became encapsulated: a formerly autonomous people who now lived within the boundaries of a nation-state and were subject to its direct intervention in their affairs. Further, the Ottawa now had to compete with American citizens for the natural resources they had always relied on for subsistence. This does not imply, however, that the United States freely imposed its political will upon these Indians. Between 1812 and 1855, the Ottawa used every inch of political leverage and all the tactics at their disposal to secure a portion of their

Michigan lands and a role in the developing American political and economic complex.

This study examines the historical process of state expansion into Michigan and Ottawa responses to the American challenges. Unlike many Indian peoples who faced the pressures of the United States growth during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ottawa did not become culturally demoralized or completely dependent upon Europeans for their material needs. The vitality of their culture was most evident between 1829 and 1842, the years of the Jackson and Van Buren administrations, when federal policy called for removal of all Indians then living east of the Mississippi River to western lands. Although the United States succeeded in pushing all but a few Indian communities out of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, the Ottawa remained in their traditional Michigan homeland. Many won legal American titles to village sites they had occupied for centuries. To do so, the Ottawa launched a series of political actions designed to thwart government-sponsored removal. These actions are the central focus of this monograph.

In their response to increasing American hegemony, Ottawa leaders had two goals. First, they had to maintain access to the natural resources they had traditionally used for subsistence and to control production from them. Without this there could be no continuity of their indigenous culture. Second, to survive as a distinct cultural entity, the Ottawa had to incorporate their subsistence practices into the American market economy in a manner that assured their own social and cultural integrity.

The outcome of the political contests in pursuit of these goals

rested, in part, on the nature of the socio-political structures and values of Ottawa and frontier American societies. Decentralized Ottawa political organization discouraged the kind of political manipulation that could have proved detrimental to Ottawa interests. Further, divided Euroamerican political interests and actions on the frontier offered Ottawa leaders ample opportunities to press for their own agenda. In addition, features of the Ottawa's environment, such as proximity to an international boundary and the limited potential of their core territory for market agriculture, facilitated the achievement of their goals.

This study is, of course, an ethnohistorical one, based on historical documents and archival collections. The particular nature of this data required a theoretical framework that could exploit its wealth of detail. Obviously, in studying the interactions of the Ottawa and the new American nation, one is dealing with the asymmetrical relations between a dominant power -- a capitalist, industrial state -- and a local indigenous people. And yet, it is clear from the historical record that the Ottawa were not simply passive pawns in this relationship; they were vital actors with their own goals and well-developed strategies for achieving those goals. Furthermore, the data themselves generally lack reference to political and social structures as clearly bounded, tightly articulated units. Instead, the material is rich with descriptions of individual actors pursuing what appear to be their own private interests. On the American side, these include Indian agents, soldiers, political leaders, and common settlers who promoted or opposed government policies. On the Ottawa side, there are Ottawa individual

actors and their kinsmen and leaders, egalitarians maintaining individual and often conflicting ideas on how to deal with the new regime. In other words, the data presents not political units but people in all their individuality. I needed, therefore, a perspective that could lead to an understanding of how the relationships between Americans and the Ottawa were played out without losing the richness of the material.

Although the American-Ottawa relationship could be described as one of "core" and "periphery," the world system theory that introduced these terms is too heavily biased toward the economic and toward a unidirectional viewpoint to articulate well with the data used here. The work of Richard White, Carol Smith, James Scott, and Sherry Ortner, although grounded in world system theory, has modified and expanded it to include factors that are necessary to understanding the historical relations between the Americans and the Ottawa. White moved beyond the limitations of world system models by viewing culture as a complex of symbolic understandings and ascribing them a greater role in shaping interaction between expanding states and indigenous peoples. Cultural understanding motivates his actors, offers solutions to the problems posed by a dominant culture, and at the same time limited the range of potential responses on both sides of the contests.<sup>1</sup> Smith views the incorporation of indigenous peoples into a state level politico-economic complex as a two-way process. She states that non-capitalist people make their own history, creating local-level institutions that are often opposed to the interests of capitalism. The most successful groups resist incorporation to form a "particular" kind of capitalism which functions on the periphery of the dominant society.<sup>2</sup> Scott, too, examined the ways

in which indigenous peoples in unequal relations with state societies resist domination. Scott believes that, although armed resistance would be suicidal, tactics such as "foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage and so on. . . ." are also effective tools for resisting a powerful state apparatus.<sup>3</sup> My major debt, however, is to the work of Ortner and the research paradigm she calls "practice analysis."

The methods employed in this work derive directly from practice analysis as outlined by Ortner.<sup>4</sup> First, the study examines political interaction in terms of the human actors who participated in the contests caused by American expansion. The cultural values that motivated these actors are assumed to be those displayed in everyday life. For nearly two hundred years of interaction with Euroamericans, from the 1650s through the mid-1830s, the Ottawa maintained a successful economic adaptation of crop raising, fishing, and to a limited extent, hunting both for subsistence and for sale to non-Indian neighbors and fellow participants in the Great Lakes fur trade. These activities yielded influence, prestige, and economic security for the Ottawa. They continued these practices and maintained the cultural underpinnings and values that supported them throughout the nineteenth century.

Second, this study assumes that leaders made conscious decisions about political policies their people should pursue and the nature of cultural change they could accept based on their own cultural values. Ortner's discussion of the mechanisms of cultural change is a most important unifying theme. Locked into the complexities of an expanding American political and economic system, Ottawa leaders worked to pre-

serve a land base and political autonomy. They redefined but did not abandon traditional modes of production and associated values to meet the needs of a market economy. In Smith's terms, the Ottawa developed their own kind of capitalism.<sup>5</sup>

Third, this study examines the socio-political structures of Ottawa society, as well as those of Euroamericans with which they eventually articulated, to discover the degree to which they influenced the outcomes of ongoing political contests. To conduct actor-oriented analysis from an Ottawa perspective, it is important to understand the actual structure of the Indian society from which political leaders drew their support and the nature of their authority. In a decentralized society based on cooperation and the daily interaction of kinsmen, each political act had immediate, intensely felt repercussions that often went beyond mere political movement and spurred emotions that were themselves powerful motivational forces. Hence, this study details the nature of Ottawa society and its daily life, its values and ideals, and the constraints it placed on Indian and American leaders.

This study also incorporates the perspective that the actions of indigenous peoples forced changes in the structure of the dominant power by their political activities. For example, the Ottawa's key political tool of modifying subsistence patterns and buying land secured their fields and essential resources and formed the basis of a new legal relationship with the state and federal governments. They used the powerful American symbol of individual rights based on landownership -- the privilege of each individual to enjoy his/her own property without interruption from the state regardless of national or ethnic heritage --



to create an ambiguous position for themselves in Michigan society. As tribal Indians owning land in common they could be removed; as individual Indian landowners they could not. This conflicting structural dilemma went far towards ending the threat of removal.

The nature of the Ottawa's decentralized social organization and their division into two relatively equal structural-demographic segments allowed me to incorporate a methodological technique designed to examine the degree to which various factors affected cultural change. For example, the Owashshinong or southern division lived nearest to the line of American settlement. Thus, the effects of American expansion and their reactions to it differed from those of the Waganagisi or northern division. The varying interests and political factionalism between and within the major Ottawa divisions also proved an important political variable which both hindered and aided their long term political agenda.

This work is organized chronologically to show the interaction of individuals and societies over time in response to the varied situations they faced. Chapter One places the Ottawa in time and space. It identifies the natural resources they exploited, their traditional subsistence adaptation, and the nature of their traditional socio-political organization and the values essential to its continuation. A historical summary of French and British intervention in Ottawa affairs demonstrates that the Indians successfully adapted their traditional practices to European colonial economy long before Americans first came to the Great Lakes. Two hundred years of interaction with non-Indians provided the Ottawa with knowledge of mercantile, if not market, politics and economy and the skills to effectively deal with the newcomers.

Chapter Two discusses the early years of American settlement in Michigan. It defines the policy of "civilization," or assimilation pursued by federal and territorial officials to maintain peaceful coexistence with the Ottawa and other Michigan Indians during the early years of their political tenure. The removal policy and its first influence on the Ottawa are then introduced. A detailed demographic analysis of the Ottawa communities lays the foundation for discussion of inter-village and inter-regional political conflict and cooperation in political responses. Lastly, this chapter discusses the distribution of natural resources in Michigan and the effect they exerted on the American settlement patterns to which the Ottawa responded.

Chapter Three details the minimal cultural constraints that affected the Ottawa actors in the political contests that on the Michigan frontier. It then identifies the key Ottawa, Metis, and Euroamericans actors in anti-removal contests. By discussing the nature of political linkages between the Ottawa and their Metis relatives, it lays important groundwork for interpreting ways in which Indian leaders overcame dictates of the federal government. It also introduces the central theme of the analysis, the Ottawa-conceived plan of adopting civilization and the way they manipulated the interpretation of their own history and symbols to win support for culture change. The distinctions between the northern and southern communities emphasize the effectiveness of this movement and, at the same time, outline divisions in community interests that shaped political interactions on all levels.

By 1836, American politics and economic pursuits left the Ottawa little choice but to negotiate a legal settlement to conflicts that had

arisen over natural resources and their future in Michigan. Chapter Four follows the political events and maneuvers that produced the Treaty of 1836. The role of Ottawa leaders in making this agreement is central to the analysis. The political accommodations and financial terms they concluded became the issues that motivated Indian and American contests for the next twenty years. The narrative focuses especially on the long term goals of Ottawa leaders in their efforts to avoid removal to lands west of the Mississippi River and continues the discussion of their "civilization" program.

Contradictions in the 1836 treaty and increased pressure from American government officials for removal heightened the intensity of American and Ottawa contests between 1837 and 1855. Chapters Five and Six follow the progress of Ottawa efforts to secure their land and resources. They examine Ottawa progress toward incorporation into Michigan institutions and social life. They especially focus on the effort of Ottawa leaders to buy land near their home villages and redefine their political status by becoming United States citizens. The nature of Ottawa political linkages to frontier American residents who opposed government removal policy and united opposition against those who encouraged its implementation show the techniques the Ottawa used to alter American attitudes and, thus, American-Ottawa relationships.

Chapter Seven emphasizes cultural and socio-political continuity in Ottawa society during forty years of dealing with Americans to show how their political contests culminated in a culturally meaningful adaptation on Ottawa terms. It focuses attention once again on the continuing seasonal cycle of kin based economic production -- the daily

actions within which traditional values and socio-political organization continued to unite the decentralized Ottawa. Again the differential development and market inclusion of the northern and southern communities are noted to make concluding observations about internally- versus externally-generated culture change.

The propositions discussed and the historical analysis presented in this work contribute to the ongoing theoretical discussion of core/periphery interaction in a world system by identifying factors that limited the success of the United States in dominating the Ottawa. A single case study does not permit broad generalizations about the spread of the capitalist industrialist complex and the range of solutions indigenous peoples made to the problems it created. This work may, however, indicate directions to be examined in future studies as the analytical techniques of actor-oriented ethnography progress toward a more coherent body of theory.

## CHAPTER 1: TRADERS OF THE WESTERN GREAT LAKES

Understanding how the Ottawa met the challenges imposed by an expanding American political system and economy requires an examination of their pre-contact ecological adaptations and a survey of the consequences of two centuries of French and British colonial intervention. During this period, the Ottawa adapted their pre-contact skills in fishing, farming, and to a lesser extent hunting to the European market economy. These skills, coupled with cultural emphasis on the political relations of trade allowed them to build a working relationship with Europeans, acquiring knowledge that prepared them for nineteenth century dealings with Americans.

Seventeenth and eighteenth century Ottawa history can be divided into four periods. The first period, 1615 through 1650, encompasses the years between French contact and the first historic Ottawa migrations, the move from the Georgian Bay region of Ontario into the Upper Peninsula of Michigan and northern Wisconsin. During the second period (1650-1700), the Ottawa assumed an important middleman position in the Great Lakes fur trade. The third period includes the six decades, from 1700 through 1760, the final years of the French era, when the Ottawa expanded to their full nineteenth century territorial range, and in the end lost their dominant position in the fur trade. In the final period, the Ottawa allied with the British from 1760 through the War of 1812, the Ottawa joined their Indian and European neighbors in military con-

frontations with Americans aimed at preserving tribal hegemony over their territory.

#### The Georgian Bay, 1615-1650

There are few first-hand descriptions of Ottawa activities for this period. Although Samuel de Champlain met 300 men on the French River in 1615, he did not visit their villages. He did so the following year, however, when the Ottawa feasted him in one of their large winter villages.<sup>1</sup> No other European wrote of the Ottawa until 1623, when Gabriel Sagard spoke of their nomadic life, corn planting, and trade contacts.<sup>2</sup> Neither Champlain nor Sagard left documentation sufficient for detailed reconstruction of early seventeenth century Ottawa socio-political organization. Nonetheless, given the nature of their physical environment and known economic strategies, we may make some inferences about Ottawa life in this early period.

The Ottawa occupied the Bruce Peninsula and Manitoulin Island in present Georgian Bay, a transition zone between the major plant and animal communities of the Carolinian and Canadian biotic provinces. This environment provided a diverse array of subsistence resources with a surplus sufficient for trade with neighboring peoples. Ottawa economy has been characterized as "diffuse" or as one of "relative flexibility," implying an organization sufficient to efficiently exploit the many resources in their natural and social environments.<sup>3</sup>

This flexibility was central to the Ottawa ability to produce directly from their natural environment by two subsistence cycles. The first cycle was based on horticulture supporting large semi-permanent

villages surrounded by fields from which the people produced storable surpluses of corn and vegetables. The second cycle involved dividing into small parties to hunt large game and trap smaller furbearers found in northern reaches of their territory.<sup>4</sup> These animals included moose, woodland caribou, deer, bear, beaver, and a host of animals of lesser importance. Both of these subsistence activities were supplemented by intensive spring and fall whitefish, lake trout, sturgeon, and sucker fisheries, as well as by gathering plant foods such as maple sap, nuts and berries.

When Champlain first visited them, the preferred Ottawa subsistence pattern resembled that of their sedentary southern neighbors, the Huron. Unlike the closely related Chippewa to the north, the Ottawa produced crops that could be stored through the winter; a successful harvest precluded the necessity of splitting into small groups each winter when provisions ran low. When Champlain visited the Ottawa in the winter of 1616, he wrote of a feast prepared for him and described the Ontario Ottawa as being:

very numerous and the greater part are great warriors, hunters and fishermen. They have several chiefs who take command, each in his own district. The majority of them plant Indian corn and other crops. They are hunters who go in bands into various regions and districts where they trade with other tribes distant more than four or five hundred leagues. . . They are great people for feasts, more than other tribes. They gave us very good cheer and received us very kindly.<sup>5</sup>

This cultural emphasis on corn production and fishing distinguished the Ottawa economy throughout the historic period, primarily because corn and fish were relatively reliable sources of storable food. Their Huron neighbors raised flour corn which matured in 130 days and a flint corn which ripened in 100 days. In most years the Ottawa probably raised

both of these varieties and produced abundant yields. When the flour corn failed because of frost damage or drought, flint corn could be counted on. Because the technology permitted the working of only light soils which tend to dry out easily, the Huron averaged at least one serious drought every decade, as well as one or two less serious; this must have been true for the Ottawa as well. The Ottawa supplemented their corn with native squash, beans, and sunflowers, but corn comprised as much as sixty-five percent of their diet.<sup>6</sup> When the Ottawa's cultivated crops failed, their production skills would have allowed them to leave their larger villages and spread across their domain to live on the secondary hunting and gathering subsistence system.<sup>7</sup>

The Ottawa's location between the highly specialized, sedentary, horticultural Huron communities southeast of them and the nomadic Chippewa hunters in the north provided them an opportunity to develop expertise in trade. By their commerce northern meats and furs were traded to southern farmers in exchange for agricultural produce. The Ottawa's middleman position in the native trade system became a primary distinguishing feature of their society.<sup>8</sup> The name Ottawa itself means "to trade" and emphasizes the prominent role this activity played in the economic and political lives of the people.<sup>9</sup>

The Ottawa's position in the proto-historic Great Lakes trading network was probably as important as agriculture and fishing in shaping their culture. There is little information on the workings of the Ottawa trade system before disruption of the original configuration by European contact, but some understanding of its importance can be drawn from comparison with the better documented Huron trade.



In the native system, conducting trade depended on ownership of a route, which included both spatial and social dimensions, the geographic pathway and a set of culturally defined trading partners. The trade relationship was expressed in terms of fictive kinship, often cemented by affinal ties. Anyone wishing to use such a route had to first obtain permission from the leader of the kin group that controlled it. Although Huron trade was most often conducted by men in the prime of life, the more important trade routes were held by elders or Ogemuk -- a term which in Odawa translates as "the Leaders." The wealth that passed through traders' hands along these routes and the gifts that accrued from tribute payments further increased a leader's status, allowing him to distribute more goods to his supporters to build a stronger political position for himself. Similarly, trade for the Ottawa was probably not merely an economic transaction. It was an important means to achieve a higher ranking among peers in a basically egalitarian society and formed the basis for broad networks of political alliances throughout the Great Lakes region.<sup>10</sup>

We know that by 1650 the Ottawa consisted of four named, localized groups. These were the Kiskakon or "Cut Tails" (referring to the bear); the Sinago or "Black Squirrels;" the Negaouichiriniouek or "People of the Fine Sandy Beach," also known as the Sable; and the Nassauaketon, or "People of the Fork." The first three are known to have inhabited Ontario, but the Nassauaketon are more difficult to place.<sup>11</sup> They may have maintained a village along the south shore of Michigan's Upper Peninsula as early as 1634 to facilitate trade in the Green Bay vicinity.<sup>12</sup>

The exact socio-political organization of these Ottawa groups is unknown. Cadillac spoke of them as "four different tribes. . . included under the name Ottawa." He then ranked them by numerical strength with the Kiskakon the largest group, followed by the Sable, the Sinago, and the Nassauaketon. "These four tribes are allies and are closely united, living on good terms with one another, and now speak the same common language."<sup>13</sup> Cadillac's description is corroborated by the Kiskakon Otaotiboy who said:

I speak in the name of the Four Otaoaes Nations to wit: the Otaoaes of the Sable, the Otaoaes Sinago, the Kiskakons and the people of the Fork who have sent me expressly here. . ."<sup>14</sup>

Scholars have interpreted these groups as band level, single-clan villages, linked by common custom and language; however, the broad terms "band" and "clan" obscure the complex internal structures and workings of Ottawa society.<sup>15</sup> It is essential to make finer terminological distinctions to better describe continuity and change in Ottawa society before nineteenth century American intervention.

#### The Structure Of Ottawa Society

Full reconstruction of the intricate form and dynamics of the Ottawa socio-political system during proto-contact and early contact periods is impossible because of the paucity of historical documentation. The corporate unilineal descent group has most commonly been used to describe the socio-political organization Great Lakes peoples.<sup>16</sup> Much of this analysis is couched in evolutionary terms, with a society's structural complexity dependent on varying adaptations to natural environments. In its prototypic and least complex form, the

unilineal descent group is characterized by a collection of extended families linked by rules of either matrilineal or patrilineal descent. The group is characterized by small, mobile, exogamous bands that lived in single clan villages whose members practiced cross-cousin marriage to form external political links.<sup>17</sup> More stable resources, it is believed, allowed horticulturists to live in larger, more permanent villages. When people were forced by warfare or other external relations to form broad-based alliances, cross-cousin marriage prescriptions which restricted the number of potential marriage partners ceased to be functional, and corporate lineages developed. Lineage members could share local residence or live dispersed in "segmented lineages" which maintained a common identity through genealogical connections. Lineages and segmented lineages were often linked by a well developed clan system, local or dispersed, and these were further united by cross-cutting phratries and moieties.<sup>18</sup>

There are difficulties in applying unilineal descent group terminology in specific instances. Many structural variations are subsumed under the general terms "descent group," "lineage," "corporate group," and "clan." For example, there is general agreement concerning the definition of "descent" as continuity from an ancestor. The term "descent group," however, implies a bounded socio-political unit where people may be clearly identified as members or non-members. The most common means for determining the limits of the group is genealogical, either matrilineal or patrilineal. Bilateral and non-unilineal systems do not produce clearly bounded groups and hence, do not fit the model of a standard "descent group." Even though the term was applied to

describe units linked by alternate rules, the units they created were not true unilineal descent groups.<sup>19</sup>

There are other theoretical difficulties in distinguishing unilineal descent groups in historic, non-observable populations. Lineages are generally defined by their corporateness, but the term "corporate group" is used eclectically to include any social unit with economic, political, or religious functions.<sup>20</sup> Fortes, whose work was central to developing unilineal descent group models, countered looseness in the concept of corporateness by stating that "unilineal descent groups are not of significance among peoples who live in small groups, depend on a rudimentary technology, and have little durable property."<sup>21</sup> According to Fortes, inheritance patterns provide the best evidence for unilineal descent groups. If property or political rights are inherited from sibling to sibling -- beginning with the males and extending to females -- before being passed to the succeeding generation, then descent is judged the crucial determining factor, "for a sibling is closer to the source of the deceased's 'estate' -- a common ancestor -- than is a son or daughter."<sup>22</sup>

The general confusion of definitions compounded as speculation developed to explain aberrant forms in terms of evolutionary change. For instance, the form of clan described for post-contact Chippewa totemic affiliation, which functioned to provide hospitality in foreign territory, differed significantly from that of southern Algonquin horticulturists.<sup>23</sup> In the south clans had a strong role in linking lineages, controlling marriage, and maintaining important ritual property. Yet, these significantly different social units are both referred to in the

literature as "clans." A plethora of finer terminological distinctions was created to articulate conceptual unilineal social constructs with living cultures. Rather than correcting an often inappropriate model, the anthropological constructs were imposed to describe all lineal affiliation -- whether formal lineages existed or not. Folk conceptions of socio-political organization were often obscured or ignored.<sup>24</sup>

In addition, the examination only of structures that regulate formal political or legal transitions in a culture, led to the neglect of rights, statuses, and roles called to play in the daily internal workings of society. Fortes developed the theoretical concept of "filiation" in response to an overemphasis on unilineal descent groups in anthropological literature.<sup>25</sup> The concept of filiation assumes that unilineal descent groups exist, but are not as frequent as reported. Where they do occur, the lineage is viewed as: 1) a juro-political structure with well defined legal and political rights shared by its members; 2) a unit with perpetual existence regardless of deaths of its members; 3) a unit containing members who share joint rights in material or immaterial property (i.e. juro-political rights) or differential privileges which are the property of the lineage; and 4) a unit with a structure of authority based on succession of generations.<sup>26</sup> Hence, from an external point of view, the lineage appears to be a closed structure. Units that do not meet these criteria are not unilineal descent groups.<sup>27</sup>

Filiation focuses on the affective and moral bonds linking generations in daily life rather than on descent group membership. Its starting place is the relationship between an individual and his/her

legitimate parents. Each parent has formally defined moral, affective, and jural rights and responsibilities to his/her children which are passed on by similar links to their own nuclear or extended families. This set of bilateral -- or equilateral -- relationships occurs in systems with well defined unilineal descent systems as well as in ambilateral and cognatic systems.<sup>28</sup> In unilineal groups, where substantial amounts of material wealth are transmitted by inheritance, descent rules define the type of "pedigree" a person can use to establish juro-political rights to lineage property.<sup>29</sup> Where there are no unilineal descent groups, jural-political rights, property, and status are vested directly in individual kin relationships and kin links rather than in a lineage structure. These individual relationships, in the absence of more inclusive structures, are not merely bridges to the jural-political domain but are directly responsible for maintaining legal rights as well as the affective ties.<sup>30</sup>

Even where formal lineages do not exist, a pattern may be established where either mother's or father's line most regularly serves as the jural avenue by which familial property, rights, and status are passed. Among the Ottawa, this was most commonly the patriline. There might or might not be post-marital residence prescriptions favoring the line. Over time this process of serial matrilateral or patrilateral affiliation may produce kin groups that resemble lineages, but their jural responsibility and rights rest firmly in individual kin relationships rather than in a corporate lineage structure seen as a formal division of society.<sup>31</sup>

The strongest evidence for or against any theoretical

reconstruction of Ottawa socio-political organization rests in an assessment of their occupations in the transition environment. Like the Huron, the Ottawa maintained a socio-political organization capable of organizing a large number of workers for farming. In 1615 Champlain estimated the Ottawa population at 1,200. This estimate may have been too low, for that year he met 300 Ottawa men in a single location. At a ratio of four additional persons for every mature male, the Ottawa population would have numbered 1,500. This number, plus perhaps another 500 to 1,000 more divided between at least three, and possibly four, major divisions gives the Ottawa a far larger population per square mile than that of their northern neighbors.<sup>32</sup>

Although the Ottawa lived in large, semi-sedentary villages, there is little evidence of characteristic unilineal descent group features. There are no discussions of Ottawa descent or marriage rules in Champlain, in Sagard, or in the Jesuit Relations to indicate the existence of corporate lineages by which claims to rank, status, and material property were inherited.<sup>33</sup> Only Cadillac implied a system of unilineal descent when he said the Ottawa counted their genealogies matrilineally.<sup>34</sup> In a horticultural society where women were important producers for subsistence and trade, this assessment seems plausible. It seems especially given Ottawa proximity to and known interaction with the matrilineal Huron. There are, however, no references to Ottawa matrilineal affiliation in any other credible seventeenth, eighteenth, or nineteenth century documentation.<sup>35</sup> This together with the general trend of Algonquin groups to patrilineal orientation seems to contradict Cadillac's assessment.

It is generally believed the Ottawa and Chippewa prehistorically shared a common northern hunting and gathering focus, and hence, that they also had a common socio-political organization.<sup>36</sup> Despite their linguistic proximity and a well known eighteenth century tendency of both peoples toward serial patrilineal filiation, however, there is no evidence of the patrilineal descent reckoning and only scant nineteenth century linguistic indicators of the cross-cousin marriage pattern usually associated with Chippewa social adaptations.<sup>37</sup> As mentioned previously, the Ottawa did not disperse from their villages during the winter, a feature that distinguished them from the Chippewa. From Champlain's early account, they clearly lived in larger, more permanent communities than did the northern Chippewa hunting bands. Cross-cousin marriage, which would have been important to dispersed hunters, would have seriously limited the level of integration required to maintain large Ottawa villages.

Lack of rigid socio-political organization may indicate that the Ottawa had developed a social adaptation well suited to production in their environment, and, more importantly, to conducting inter-tribal trade. In a trade network conducted within the physical bounds and terminology of kinship, adherence to a strictly defined socio-political organization might have precluded convenient trade between the patrilineal northern Algonquin bands and the matrilineal southern societies. By emphasizing neither descent line and by maintaining non-rigid marriage and residence rules, the Ottawa system could better interface with their neighbors. They could participate more readily in political and economic activities to the north and south by marrying into several



culturally distinct societies and forming trade alliances within the idiom of kinship and reciprocity.

This is the perspective from which I have chosen to view Ottawa society. In the lack of any substantial documentary evidence to the contrary, it is not useful to impose the unilineal descent group model. By viewing jural rights and responsibilities, property rights, and statuses as vested in individual kinship links, we obtain a picture that accords with the evidence rather than attempting to force the data into preconceived structures. This perspective also has the virtue of focusing on the relationships operative in the daily workings of the society rather than on formal structures, a focus consistent with the nature of the historical data.

What, then, were the primary units of organization in Ottawa society. Cadillac explicitly stated that, "each tribe has its own district and each family marks out its piece of land and its fields."<sup>38</sup> He, thus, described the largest land-holding unit as the "tribe." What Cadillac referred to as the tribe was most likely one of the four named groups, the largest local residential group consistently identified in French records. Champlain and Cadillac reported the "tribes" or named groups were divided into families which were headed by "chiefs."<sup>39</sup> The existence of leaders in a kin-based, decentralized society without formal lineage structures implies a network of extended families and larger kin groups organized around common interests in production, trade, and warfare. These extended families were each politically represented by a respected household leader in village and inter-tribal affairs. Cadillac noted that when an Ottawa man married a woman with children, he

became the "father" and "chief of the whole family."<sup>40</sup> Thus, when he spoke of an Ottawa "chief," Cadillac referred to a male head of a household.

The extended family would have been sufficient to organize Ottawa horticultural production and trade. Horticulture was the responsibility of Ottawa women, as was gathering such trade items as berries and the weaving reed mats for which they were famous.<sup>41</sup> These tasks required productive cooperation well beyond the bounds of the nuclear family, but as Cadillac noted, the work was conducted by the "family." Polygyny was a regular feature of Ottawa culture, so a household often consisted of more than one wife and their children, all of whom were valued producers.<sup>42</sup> Freedom to associate with both maternal and paternal kinsmen and form larger kin groups would have further increased the number of people who could be mustered for work or defense of territory.

The wealth in corn and other products contributed by the extended family was essential for trade. Success in commerce translated into prestige for the household and its leader as he redistributed wealth outside the household. If the Ottawa followed Huron trade rules, the head of each household had the right to trade, though men of the highest wealth and prestige actually maintained ownership of the routes.<sup>43</sup> As there was no known rule for inheriting route ownership, this property can not be cited as sufficient evidence for the existence of unilineal descent groups. There is some documentation of leadership positions being passed from father to son but no recorded instances of trade routes or material wealth passing through all siblings before being inherited by the succeeding generation.<sup>44</sup>

It is more likely that the success a man achieved in trade, in warfare, and in the production of his household throughout his lifetime won him followers. The few men who were most respected for their skills were known as Ogemuk or leaders. Although they had no power to make binding decisions on behalf of their constituents, the Ogemuk formed a council of "elders" who convened for discussion and to bring about a consensus among household heads on matters most important to several households or to the named group.<sup>45</sup> By controlling marriages, heads of extended families formed alliances and maintained political ties between Ottawa families and between named groups. The successful Ogeema used control of marriages to form political ties with neighboring tribes as well with other Ottawa groups.<sup>46</sup> Even though ties between leaders and followers were bolstered by kinship responsibilities, the capacity of an Ogeema's extended family to produce sufficient goods for redistribution and the Ogeema's continued success in trade were crucial to maintaining these fragile ties.

There is little evidence, even in the better documented eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for clans or cross-cutting sodalities -- more formal socio-political structures that would have united Ottawa extended families more firmly than the bonds of individual kin relations. Through the mid-eighteenth century, individual Ottawa families continued to be identified primarily by affiliation with one of the four major named groups. By the nineteenth century, there is evidence the Ottawa had developed totemic eponyms resembling those used by the Chippewa. These have been characterized as:

peripheral to the social structure and their functions  
are limited to . . . a "clan grid" that extends kin-

ship only within certain contexts. Kinship terminology has not been affected. There are no formal lineages, and clans have no corporate character beyond a few comparatively unimportant features limited to certain bands.<sup>47</sup>

Obligatory hospitality between persons bearing the same totem, was the most important, if not the only feature of this "clan grid."

The sources that report the use of totems among the Ottawa are too vague to reconstruct the exact workings of the system.<sup>48</sup> Only one source discusses Ottawa totems separately from those of the Chippewa. The nineteenth century French priest Dejean described totemic marks as:

like the coat of arms of each family and like some kind of gods. Those who have the same totem, or coat of arms never ally together by the links of marriage. Each newborn receives a name which is never the name of the father but the totem never changes.<sup>49</sup>

While totemic symbols may have been common during the period of peak Ottawa mobility in the late eighteenth century, it is difficult to see antecedents of totemic clans in earlier accounts of Ottawa life or to trace their development over time. From the standpoint of an evolutionary model of social organization, it may be argued that seventeenth century named groups were indeed single-clan villages which dispersed as a result of European contact. Nevertheless, even using the broadest definition of a clan as a kin group with perceived descent from a common ancestor, it is difficult to classify the Ottawa named groups as clans.<sup>50</sup> The names Kiskakon and Sinago both refer to animals and may follow a clan organization pattern, but, the Sables and the Nassauaketon both refer to places of residence and indicate no apparent descent concept. Given the Ottawa's lack of corresponding lineage structures, it

is unlikely that even these tenuous precursors to the nineteenth century totemic eponyms ever denoted political units equivalent to central Algonquin clans.

Unlike the Chippewa, who continued to rely upon this totemic hospitality system throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottawa seemingly maintained no supporting mythology to give their totems a political ranking. For instance, there are no statements linking the Crane totem to the station of Speaker or the Loon totem to positions of influential leadership as are reported for the Chippewa.<sup>51</sup> Two nineteenth century sources relate that the Moose was the original Ottawa totem. This is an interesting though probably unreliable observation since the Moose was not even discussed as one of the four major groups in seventeenth century documents.<sup>52</sup>

The value of totems was minimal by the early nineteenth century. The usefulness of a totem identification system was limited in the first place by the Ottawa's emphasis on a semi-sedentary fishing, farming, and limited hunting cycle. During the opening decades of the nineteenth century, even the small numbers of Ottawa who travelled long distances to Red River, Manitoba, to hunt had become more sedentary. By the 1820s, Ottawa movement had become so confined to their home territory that totem use was further restricted. At best the totemic unit probably never developed beyond a secondary socio-political unit among the Ottawa. There is no evidence that totemic distinctions affected Ottawa/American political interactions and will not be discussed further in the following analysis.

To summarize, this work will suggest that despite historical

changes in Ottawa social environment, the extended family remained the essential unit of socio-political organization. Extended families were linked by the rights and obligations of kinship to form larger groups to cooperate in production, trade, and warfare. These links could be matrilineal or patrilineal though patrilineal links were more common. These kin groups were not formalized like lineages with firm rules of descent and inheritance. They remained fragile alliances under the leadership of a recognized family head. Family heads who showed the greatest skill in promoting production or trade became Ogemuk or leaders of power and prestige beyond the bounds of their extended families. Their advice was respected in local and inter-tribal councils but they had no authority to impose opinions on their constituents. The Ottawa maintained this socio-political and economic flexibility throughout the historic period.

#### Diaspora and Florescence, 1650-1700

From the first decade of the seventeenth century, the Huron held the right to make direct trade contacts with the French. In their middleman position, they controlled the westward flow of European goods and, for some years, thus enhanced their prestige throughout the Great Lakes. Fueled by French and British competition for furs, the Iroquois launched an all-out attack on Huron territory in 1649. Within a few months, many Huron died or were taken captive and sent east to be adopted by Iroquois families. The minority of Huron who survived joined their Ottawa trading allies, and together they abandoned Ottawa villages on the Georgian Bay in 1650-1651. With the buffer between themselves

and the British-backed Iroquois destroyed and facing possible extermination themselves, the Ottawa moved into present-day Michigan.<sup>53</sup>

The Ottawa found themselves in the most favorable position of any native Great Lakes society to take up the Huron trade. Their social and political organization remained intact, and they left Ontario with no large war losses. Hence, they were better prepared to cope with the rigors of beginning life in a new location than were the Huron and Petun remnants who accompanied them.<sup>54</sup> The Ottawa moved into territory in which they had hunted, fished and traded for many years, if not centuries. They already controlled the technology necessary for life in a variety of the micro-environments in this new area. They had maintained relations with the northern and western fur producers in the lakes and were also masters of canoe transportation through the Great lakes drainages.<sup>55</sup>

The Ottawa moved continually during the twenty years following their departure from the Georgian Bay because of disputes arising from competition for the rights to establish fur trade routes from Lake Superior to the French settlements on the St. Lawrence River Valley.<sup>56</sup> In 1649, a group of Ottawa (further unidentified) already maintained villages near Mackinac. The Kiskakon, the Sables, the Huron and others moved to the Green Bay region in 1650, while still others remained temporarily at Thunder and Saginaw Bays in Michigan.<sup>57</sup>

The diaspora of the Ontario Indians pushed the main arena of the fur trade westward. The French need for fur to support their colony continued unabated as did both the desire of Ottawa Ogemuk to enhance their status and the demand for manufactured European goods by interior

Indians. In 1654 the Ottawa at Green Bay, possibly under the Sinago Ogema Le Talon, had organized their first trade brigade to French settlements on the St. Lawrence River. Along with their Huron and Nipissing allies, they announced their intention to reopen the trade. Fifty canoes landed loads of furs and began a near continual flow from the interior to French ports.<sup>58</sup>

After the visit of these western allies, French officials, to save their colonial economy from collapse, made concerted efforts to reclaim control of St. Lawrence valley trade from the Iroquois and their British allies. Between 1653 and 1663 the Ottawa participated with their Huron and Algonquin allies in full scale summer raids on the Iroquois. Although most skirmishes took place along trade routes to the French towns on the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes Indians were on occasion forced to fight the Iroquois in the western Great Lakes region. In the summer of 1653 the Iroquois attacked the allied tribes of Wisconsin, including the Ottawa. The allies built a fort named Me'chingan and withstood what Perrot called a two year siege, eventually defeating the invaders. Most of the retreating Iroquois were eventually dispatched by the Algonquins.<sup>59</sup>

During this same period, the potential of trade led some Ottawa to join the Huron in an attempt to establish relations with the Mdewakanton Dakota, and they moved to Lake Pepin on the Mississippi River in the late 1650s. The relations between these peoples became strained when the Huron persuaded the Ottawa to join them in a war to drive the Dakota from their own country. The Dakota won the first battle, and subsequent raids forced the Ottawa to retire from this western venture to safety at



Chequamegon on Lake Superior.<sup>60</sup>

In the 1660s the Huron continued their warfare against the Dakota. Although they made frequent raids on Dakota territory, the Huron were unsuccessful in conquest and were forced to withdraw to Chequamegon to once again enlist Ottawa aid.<sup>61</sup> Badly outnumbered by the Dakota in the ensuing foray, all but one man of the Huron and Ottawa were taken captive. Some were killed, and others were sent home. The Ottawa decided to end this conflict with the Dakota and remained at peace with them throughout the decade.<sup>62</sup>

Again in 1662, the Iroquois attacked the Ottawa and Chippewa near Sault Ste. Marie but were once more defeated.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, the pressures of British, Dutch and Iroquois competition with the French and their Indian suppliers never ceased, and the Iroquois raided along the Ottawa River waterway. The raiding became so intense that in 1665 and 1666 the French sponsored military operations into Iroquois territory. Although the French and their allies opened the route for trade, Iroquois attacks remained a constant threat which limited its use.

Peaceful coexistence with the Dakota ended in 1670 when the Huron convinced the Ottawa Ogema Sinago to kill and eat a Dakota chief who had been his personal ally and who was a guest in his village at the time. Following this incident, the Ottawa and Huron left Chequamegon in 1670 for Manitoulin Island and Mackinac where Ogema Sinago and the Huron prepared yet another expedition against the Dakota. This time a party of more than 1,000 Sinago and Kiskakon Ottawa, Huron, Sauk, Fox, and Potawatomi successfully attacked Dakota villages. They were hotly pursued by Dakota survivors who killed many of the party. The Sauk,

Sinago, and Huron covered the retreating Kiskakons, Potawatomi and Fox. Sinago and his Sauk brother-in-law, the two Ogemuk who led the defenders, were captured, and in return for their treatment of the Dakota chief who had earlier visited the Ottawa village, they were forced to eat their own flesh until they died.<sup>64</sup> This ended Ottawa and Huron attempts to expand into Dakota territory.

Despite nearly two decades of migration and unrest, there is little evidence that Ottawa socio-political organization or subsistence patterns underwent substantial changes. During the 1660s, most Ottawa lived at Chequamegon, beyond the convenient reach of the Iroquois. Upon their arrival there, the Ottawa had rapidly reestablished their horticultural practices of corn growing and supplemented their produce with fishing.<sup>65</sup> Again, the Ottawa villages were occupied year around.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps because of threats of Dakota and Iroquois attack, the Ottawa maintained a single joint village in 1666. By 1669, however, there were four separate villages, probably resulting from redivision along lines of the original names groups and replicating the Ontario village patterns.<sup>67</sup>

When the Iroquois threat subsided in the 1670s, the Ottawa continued their migrations as large kin groups or entire named groups returned to their abandoned territories in the east. In 1670-1671 some unidentified Ottawa returned to Manitoulin Island. The Sinagos divided, with a number moving for some years to Green Bay. The Kiskakons, in order to maintain contact with Jesuit missionaries, moved first to Sault Ste. Marie in 1671 and then joined the Huron at St. Ignace in 1676. By 1695 segments of the Sinagos, Sables, and Nassauaketon had also settled

at the Straits of Mackinac.<sup>68</sup> The temporary division of named groups during the migration period does not necessarily imply devolution of Ottawa organization, for juro-political functions and polity remained based on extended families -- singly and grouped by kin ties -- and was stable throughout the period. Further, there is no indication of identification by any appellations other than those of the four named groups.

Between 1650 and 1667 the Ottawa received the greatest return for their investment of time and effort in the fur trade. The French had not yet penetrated the interior in large numbers, so the Ottawa and their closest Huron, Nipissing, and Chippewa allies held a virtual monopoly on trade and transport. Iroquois raiding along the transportation route increased hazards and helped assure the Ottawa a more secure hold on their new position by discouraging other inland peoples from making the journey to the French settlements on the St. Lawrence. The Ottawa quickly recognized this advantage and used it. Between 1656 and 1684 at least ten large brigades arrived on the St. Lawrence. During the peak years of the late 1650s and 1660s, Ottawa men, alone or accompanied by the Huron, Nipissing, and Chippewa annually conducted between fifty and 100 canoe loads of furs to the French cities.<sup>69</sup>

Seeking to expand their political influence and trade networks, the Ottawa continued to intermarry extensively among surrounding peoples. For example, while the Ottawa were gathering allies for a war expedition against the Dakota, Perrot noted:

Their forces were increased along the way: for Chief Sinagos had for a brother-in-law the Chief of the Sakis, who resided at the Bay: and the Poutecuatomis and the Renards were his allies. As the Otaouas had brought them all the goods which they had obtained with the French in trade, they made presents of these

to the Pouteoatomis, Sakis, and Renards, who formed a body of over a thousand men, all having guns or other powerful weapons of defense.<sup>70</sup>

By maintaining this strong set of alliances through distribution of the French trade goods most desired by their allies and kin, the Ottawa sustained high respect and political leverage in the Great Lakes and Upper Canada. Hence, their village at Chequamegon became a center for trade and political counseling.<sup>71</sup> By the time of their 1670 move to Saint Ignace at the Straits of Mackinac, the Ottawa strengthened their claim to the major trade route from Lake Michigan and points west, placing themselves directly between western groups who sought middleman positions for themselves.

Consolidation of French posts in the Great Lakes region during the 1670s somewhat reduced the Ottawa role in trade. French traders could carry goods to the interior peoples as cheaply as could the Ottawa and could then transport furs to market themselves, saving Ottawa "mark-ups" and shipping costs. Other western tribes -- particularly the Potawatomi of northern Wisconsin -- eventually acted for a short time as middlemen to peoples still uncontacted by the French.<sup>72</sup> Nonetheless, the Ottawa claimed a share of the furs passing through the Straits of Mackinac along their trade route as a toll.<sup>73</sup> They also controlled part of the fur trade through their marriage alliances with surrounding peoples. Though it is doubtless an overstatement, one contemporary observer estimated that until 1683 the Ottawa conveyed two thirds of all furs produced in New France.<sup>74</sup>

The Ottawa's concentration at the Lake Superior-Lake Huron straits allowed them to continue traditional subsistence patterns of farming and

fishing to maintain their large, year-around villages. Corn and fish continued to be their staples.<sup>75</sup> Although they were well within the 100 to 120 day frost-free limit for corn agriculture, the reliability of their crops may have been somewhat less than it had been in Ontario.<sup>76</sup> Fishing at the Straits of Mackinac became crucial for sustaining the large population. Fish were abundant and could be harvested throughout the entire year with standard native technology, including hook and line and gill nets that could be used beneath the surface of ice.<sup>77</sup>

The stability of these food sources did not obviate the need to hunt for food and furs, though Ottawa mobility was more restricted than that of even the most settled Chippewas. La Pothrie noted, for instance, that the Chippewa at Sault Ste. Marie disbanded their central village for winter hunting and fishing. The Sinago, Kiskakon, and Nassauaketon, in contrast, stored corn to feed the permanent population at their Mackinac villages, from which they sent out smaller parties of hunters.<sup>78</sup> In 1688, Lahontan met four to five hundred Ottawa returning from a beaver hunt along the Saginaw River valley. With a total Ottawa population of 1,300 at the Straits of Mackinac, and assuming a minimal population ratio of four additional persons for every adult male, this number is too large to represent only men.<sup>79</sup> This indicates that large kin groups or entire named groups may have left the main village together to exploit their secondary subsistence set. To maintain their large settlements, the Ottawa made an important economic change. Being located along the most heavily used navigation route in the upper Great Lakes, the Ottawa were able to compensate for revenue lost in their diminishing middleman role by selling provisions to French traders who

passed through the Straits of Mackinac en route to the region along Lake Superior. Couriers de bois arrived at Michilimackinac from Montreal either in the spring or in mid-September, taking on provisions and leaving for Lake Superior. They returned to Mackinac again about mid-July on their way to Montreal, again needing provisions for the journey.<sup>80</sup>

This service became crucial to the French as they expanded into the northwest, and it was a reliable source of income to the Ottawa. La Pothrie described the Ottawa at Mackinac this way:

Michilimackinac, which is three hundred and sixty leagues from Quebec, is the general meeting-place for all the French who go to trade with stranger tribes; it is the landing-place and refuge of all the savages who trade their peltries. The savages who dwell there do not need to go hunting in order to obtain all the comforts of life. When they choose to work, they make canoes of birch-bark, which they sell two at three hundred livres each. They get a shirt for two sheats of bark for cabins. The sale of their French strawberries and other fruits produces means for procuring their ornaments, which consists of vermilion and glass and porcelain beads. They make a profit on everything. They catch whitefish, herring, and trout four or five feet long. All the tribes land at this place, in order to trade their peltries there. In summer the young men go hunting, a distance of thirty to forty leagues, and return laden with game; in autumn they depart for the winter hunt (which is the best [time of the year] for the skins and furs), and return in the spring laden with beavers, pelts, various kinds of fat, and the flesh of bears and deer. They sell all of which they have more than enough. They would be exceedingly well-to-do if they were economical; but most of them have the same traits as the Sauteurs.<sup>81</sup>

This passage implies that when dealing with the French and perhaps with other peoples who were not defined as kin, the Ottawa produced and sold their goods for cash or its equivalent, and that profit was a motive. The balanced reciprocity of pre-contact trade served to reinforce important alliances, as well as to distribute important subsis-

tence and less essential luxury goods. Goods were also circulated within kin groups by generalized reciprocity -- sharing with the expectation that all members of the group would contribute for their mutual benefit over time.<sup>82</sup> As La Pothrie noted, the Ottawa could have increased their production by intensifying labor and collecting capital to finance increases in production. The profits of the trade, however, rested not only in the value of the goods, but also in their sociological value of uniting kin and allies. Within these groups, the Ottawa continued earlier patterns of distribution, but a profit motive characterized Ottawa financial dealings with non-Ottawa from the earliest eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth.

Even though neither the seventeenth century subsistence nor their trade activities were totally new to the Ottawa, the middle to late seventeenth century was a time of great change in their social environment. Their westward movement and expanded trade role brought them in closer contact with the Chippewa, Potawatomi, Sauk, Fox, Menominee, and even the Winnebago than they had been in their Ontario home. The Ottawa shared common villages with the Chippewa, Huron, and others at Chequamegon, Mackinac, Detroit and elsewhere. This mingling of peoples called for more intermarriage, greater diplomacy between groups to quiet rivalries caused by trade, and eventually led to broader mechanisms of inter-tribal integration for political and military action.

More importantly, by the 1660s the Ottawa had to cope with direct European intervention in their daily affairs as French priests and traders took up residence in their villages. In 1654 when the Ottawa reopened the Ottawa River trade route, they had followed the earlier

Huron example of inviting Frenchmen to live in their villages, but it was 1660 before Father Rene Menard and eight other Frenchmen journeyed to Ottawa villages at Chequamegon to reside there.<sup>83</sup>

It was clear from the beginning of Menard's stay at Chequamegon that his presence was not welcomed by the majority of Ottawa and that they did not intend to accord him privileges based on his priestly status or nationality. Menard and his compatriots were compelled to paddle their own canoes and portage their belongings like other brigade members. They were provided with such limited provisions during the winter that they were forced to fish. Menard's tenuous position did not deter him from preaching against the evils of traditional Ottawa life. The foremost sin he disapproved of was polygyny -- one means by which Ottawa men expanded alliances, increased productivity of households, and elevated their status. Menard's sermons won him the enmity of Ogema Le Brochet (The Pike), the most influential Sable man at Chequamegon.<sup>84</sup> Le Brochet himself had four or five wives and responded to the clergyman's criticisms by driving him from the village.<sup>85</sup> Menard continued his preaching but converted only three persons, all of whom were elderly people who had no status to lose and who stood to gain by allying themselves with the churchman. The mission ended with Menard's death in 1661 while on a journey from Ottawa villages to open what promised to be a more fruitful mission with the Huron.<sup>86</sup> Nothing is known of the other Frenchmen who moved to Chequamegon. It may be assumed that they carried few of the clergyman's preconceptions concerning sexual propriety and may have married Ottawa women, making themselves useful affinal kin.

While Menard's mission had little effect on the fabric of Ottawa



society, Father Claudius Allouez, who next visited Chequamegon created dissension. There was strong Ottawa opposition to the visit of this priest and six additional Frenchmen to the back-country. The Ottawa brigade Allouez travelled with attempted to abandon him en route to Chequamegon. When he overtook his hosts, Allouez made his position clear to them. "How is this?" he said. "Do you thus forsake the French? Know you not that I hold Onnontio's [Lieutenant Governor General Tracy of New France] voice in my hands, and that I am to speak for him through the presents he entrusted me to all your nations?"<sup>87</sup> If the Ottawa harmed him, their alliance with the French would be endangered. The Ottawa understood the implications of this threat to their vocation and allowed the Frenchmen to continue with them. Allouez too was compelled to paddle, but his lack of skill made him the butt of Indian jokes and his belongings were stolen before arriving at Chequamegon on October 1, 1665.<sup>88</sup>

Like Menard, Allouez firmly condemned Ottawa polygyny. He also attempted to end all sacrifices, feasts, and native rituals. Allouez, however, won a limited acceptance in the Ottawa community. Six young men had been burned when a powder keg exploded. Allouez, repulsed by the healer's methods, brazenly interrupted a healing ceremony being conducted by a most powerful Ottawa shaman. Only one of the patients, however, would allow the priest to pray for his cure. This person was eventually healed while most, if not all, of the others died. Allouez did not win converts to his theology, but he gained a reputation as a healer. Parents brought their sick children to be baptized.<sup>89</sup> Thus, the Ottawa incorporated the priest into their society on their own terms

and in a role which they could understand. Although Allouez interpreted the number of Indians who came to his lodge to learn the Pater and Ave chants and prayers as potential Christians, the Ottawa may well have believed they were learning the powerful incantations of a strong healer.<sup>90</sup> Further, as a representative for the Lieutenant General of New France, Allouez participated in councils of leading Ottawa Ogemuk.<sup>91</sup> Still, after three years of labor among the Ottawa, Allouez had made few converts and threatened to leave their village to join the Chippewa at Sault Ste. Marie.

In 1668, faced with losing their French allies, Kiskakon leaders risked social ostracism by publically abandoning the polygyny, sacrifices, and rituals that the priest deemed evil.<sup>92</sup> There is no information indicating the degree of their commitment to Christianity or the changes the Kiskakons adopted. They did, however, become the favorites of Allouez and the clergymen who followed him to the Ottawa Mission, clearly more so than the Sinago, "who are very far from the Kingdom of God because of its attachment above all the other nations to indecencies, sacrifices, and jugglery" and the Sables who, "declare themselves boldly saying that it is not yet time." Allouez made no pretense about the favoritism he showed. He told the Ottawa and Huron associated with his mission that he had come only to them, that they would never be forsaken -- that they would be treated more warmly than other nations. He noted that the Ottawa listened with pleasure.<sup>93</sup> Throughout the Mackinac years, 1670 through roughly 1750, the Kiskakon benefited from efforts of the Jesuits on their behalf in competitions with Ogema of the other named groups for French trade.

The Expanding Domain, 1700-1760

Rivalry between the French and British for control of North American empires, including Ottawa lands, intensified between 1700 and 1760. The Ottawa, their Chippewa and Potawatomi allies, and many other Algonquin speaking peoples throughout the Great Lakes region were drawn more deeply into international intrigues and the developing North American market economy. As a result of this competition and their relationship with the French, the Ottawa expanded their permanent habitation from the Straits of Mackinac into Michigan's Lower Peninsula.

It is important to note that like the early Jesuits, French political officials never achieved a position in the Great Lakes secure enough to impose their will upon the Ottawa. Colonists in all of New France were outnumbered by the Indians. In 1666, there were only 3,200 French people in North America. The population increased rapidly and doubled to 6,700 by 1673, but after 1675 few immigrants arrived. The total French population was still only 76,000 in 1750, and the largest portion remained concentrated along the St. Lawrence River.<sup>94</sup> As a result, they relied on the Indians to fight against the British and their Iroquois allies. The Ottawa and their allies also remained the principal producers of furs, the mainstay of the French colonial economy. Thus, during the early eighteenth century, the Ottawa developed a working relationship with French clergymen, government officials, and the traders who lived in their villages. These relationships were formed within the context of egalitarian Ottawa values regarding the appropriate rules of interaction between human beings, including the

activities of alliance and trade.

The French were not conquerors, they were partners who were contributed to the Ottawa's own interests. Ottawa involvement in European politics and economy encouraged leading Ogemuk to further enhance their reputations and prestige in production and trade. They maintained alliances with the French representatives who could best further their goals, be they clergymen, government officials, or individual traders. The drama of the founding of Detroit illustrates the nature of Ottawa and French interactions and also the dynamics of internal Ottawa politics.

In 1701 Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac, who had previously been the Commandant at Fort de Eaud at St. Ignace, founded the fort and trading post at Ponchartran (present-day Detroit) in an attempt to monopolize and better control trade routes to the upper lakes. His plan included centralization of trade by having Indian producers bring their own furs to his post where he could dictate the rate of exchange, thus bypassing not only Indian middlemen but *couriers du bois* as well. At the same time, he encouraged the Ottawa, Huron, Miami, Potawatomi, Chippewa, Fox and others to relocate near the fort as a permanent population to block British inroads into the western Great Lakes.<sup>95</sup>

Cadillac also wanted to close the mission and Mackinac post completely, thus to rid himself of Jesuits who criticized his methods of administration and to guarantee himself the full benefit of Ottawa trade.<sup>96</sup> The Jesuits opposed this move, hoping to remain outside the immediate region of Cadillac's political jurisdiction.<sup>97</sup> The Ottawa were divided regarding Cadillac's proposal for a new trade relationship.

Some Ottawa resented Cadillac's attempt to centralize French administration at Detroit, the farthest limits of their traditional territorial claims. They also resented Cadillac's efforts to bring rival tribes to Michigan. In 1702 Father Joseph J. Marest at St. Ignace reported that:

the savages of this place having seen the quality of land at Detroit and having found, as they say, that there is no fishing there or very little, and that the hunting will not be long in falling off there as more people assemble, near to one another are thereupon showing an inclination, which it will not be in our power to change.<sup>98</sup>

In addition to the insufficient resources, another impediment to Cadillac's plan was local Ottawa politics which mitigated against such a move. In fact, the dispute between Cadillac and the Jesuits added to prevailing tensions between the Kiskakon and Sable, creating strong divisive disputes between these two largest and most powerful Ottawa divisions. It also spurred rivalries between the household heads and Ogemuk as they vied for favored trade positions with various representatives of French authority.<sup>99</sup>

In 1703 Father Marest held a council at Michilimackinac and asked the Indians their opinion on moving to Detroit. He reported that, after three days of deliberation all the Kiskakons "had resolved to die at Michilimackinac, and that even if they left it, they would never go to Detroit."<sup>100</sup> The Sinago had the same opinion. Cadillac replied that Marest was not correct in his assertion, that the Sinago had secretly sent a wampum belt and told him they would arrive to settle in Detroit after harvesting their corn and that six large houses of Kiskakons had also promised to relocate.<sup>101</sup>

By 1705 Sable Ogema Otontagen, or Jean Le Blanc, was recognized by the French as the most powerful leader among the Sable, Kiskakon, and Sinago at Detroit.<sup>102</sup> Le Blanc claimed a special relationship with the French because his father, Le Talon, had first reopened the fur trade after the diaspora.<sup>103</sup> Another Sable Ogema called Le Pesant by the French, who was the equal of and perhaps held status superior to Le Blanc, maintained his primary residence at Mackinac. Le Pesant was nearing seventy years old and maintained alliances with almost all tribes in the Upper Great Lakes region. Among the Mackinac Kiskakon chiefs were Onaske and Koutaoulibois, who were directly supported by the Jesuit Marest as the most able leaders.<sup>104</sup> Other less prominent Ogema who also held political influence at the time were Sakima, Nanakouens, and Manidowabe.<sup>105</sup>

The Kiskakon generally received preferential treatment at Mackinac, perhaps because they were among the first to accept an alliance with Christian priests at Chequamegon and to return to Sault Ste. Marie at the end of the Iroquois threat in the 1670s and finally to move to St. Ignace in 1676.<sup>106</sup> A number of Kiskakons chose to remain at Mackinac and support the Jesuits in their conflict with Cadillac. They petitioned Governor Vaudreuil several times requesting that a new commandant be sent to Mackinac.<sup>107</sup> Cadillac specifically sought to break the Ottawa hold over trade routes and relationships by encouraging rivalry and thus dividing the Ogemuk of the larger named groups. We do not know what he offered Le Blanc and his Sable followers, as well as the Sinago and the small group of Kiskakon, to induce their move to Detroit. It is likely that he promised lesser Ogemuk special trade relations at the

southern post. By secretly agreeing to move to Detroit, Le Blanc may have sought to maintain a favored trade relationship with Cadillac, one he did not wish to share with the Kiskakon and other Sable Ogema and their constituents at Mackinac.

The historical record indicates that neither Cadillac nor the Jesuits received full Ottawa support. In the end, the conflicts that arose from competitions they created severely disrupted trade they wished to encourage. In 1705 and 1706, the Ottawa were in direct conflict with the Huron both at the Straits of Mackinac and at Detroit. The tension and threat of violence extended even to the French; their role in the conflict was so great at Mackinac that Catholic missionaries were forced to leave St. Ignace.<sup>108</sup> Violence flared at Detroit when the Le Pesant and his followers killed seven Miami chiefs to prevent a rumored attack on their own villages.<sup>109</sup> A Recollet missionary and one French soldier were also killed in the affray.<sup>110</sup> The Ottawa at Detroit blockaded themselves into their palisade until help came from Mackinac and facilitated their escape.

As a result of this incident, Governor Vaudreuil and Cadillac demanded that Le Blanc deliver Le Pesant, the most powerful Sable chief at Mackinac, to Detroit for punishment. The officials saw this as a means to further divide the Sable and end their opposition to the Cadillac's plan.<sup>111</sup> Cadillac hoped that, if Le Pesant were removed, other Mackinac chiefs would not be able to consolidate their influence and that their people would then move to the southern post. But, in council with Cadillac in 1707, Le Blanc replied:

If I were to say my father - 'I will give you the head of the great bear [Le Pesant. This name possibly re-

fers to his large size.] up there' - it would be impossible for me to keep my word with him, and I should be grieved to have lied to him. I dare not promise you, my father, to do what you ask of me, for this great bear is allied to all the tribes of the upper country.

It is not that I should fear him, if it were he only; nor that any of us love him, for it is he who is guilty. But as he has allies all round the lakes I fear, my father, the consequences of this affair, and that all his allies may not only prevent me from bringing it here to you, but may also do to me what I would do to him.<sup>112</sup>

The Mackinac Ottawa were in no position to ignore Cadillac's demand for Le Pesant's surrender. Their corn crop had failed, leaving them short of stored food for the winter. This coupled with the withdrawal of traders from the Mackinac region, meant that Ottawa survival could have depended upon placating Cadillac.<sup>113</sup> During the council, Onaske and Koutaoulibois, Kiskakon Ogemuk from Mackinac, came to Detroit to trade furs and attended a council where Cadillac stated his demand. Cadillac was angry because these leaders who supported the Jesuits and who had refused to move to Detroit dared to appear.<sup>114</sup> He said their condition was God's punishment for their crime and threatened to deny them future trade. At this Onaske took a more conciliatory stance, agreeing to use his influence to unite the Mackinac Ojema and force Le Pesant to surrender. He boasted:

Well! Ontontagon, my nephew Le Pesant is your Flesh. Kinouge, Le Pesant is your flesh. Be firm, both of you. It is right that this dog who has bitten us to the bone should be destroyed. Who is there who can advance any matter among my tribe better than I? I have the ear of Maintouabe [Manidowabe], Koutaouliboy [Koutaoulibois], Sakima, Nanakouens; I am strong. . .  
 .115

At the request of the Ottawa Ogemuk, Cadillac sent a boat to



Mackinac for Le Pesant. Despite Cadillac's hopes of destroying Ottawa political cohesion, the Kiskakon and Sinago Ogemuk were united in declaring that if Le Pesant should refuse to embark, they would kill him on the spot.<sup>116</sup> Le Pesant did board the vessel and went to Detroit where Cadillac detained him, but Cadillac did not wish to alienate such lucrative and important trade partners as the Sable Ottawa and allowed Le Pesant to escape.<sup>117</sup> Le Pesant returned to Mackinac with his life, but because his trade relationship with the French was strained, he had less political power.<sup>118</sup>

These events allowed some Ogemuk to achieve greater prestige than that to be had as heads of competing extended families and kin groups. One of these was the Sable Le Blanc. Even though the French won support from some Sable Ogema, they still could not convince the majority of Ottawa to join the Detroit settlement. The Kiskakon remained opposed to the move.<sup>119</sup> Cadillac came to realize that he could not dictate terms of trade and alliance and that the continued good will of Ottawa Ogema who, even in difficult economic situations could refuse to obey French orders with impunity, was important to him.

In 1712 the Ottawa and Potawatomi secured their claims to the Michigan territory militarily, thus protecting their share of business with the French. Before his dismissal from office in 1710, Cadillac had invited the Wisconsin Fox to settle at Detroit. Old friction between the French allied Indians and the Fox now erupted in violence when the latter were joined by the Mascouten and moved to Michigan against the wishes of the resident Indians and the new French commandant. The opening blow occurred when the Ottawa and Potawatomi attacked a winter

hunting camp of Mascoutens on the St. Joseph River, killing or capturing fifty people. The French then claimed that the Fox intended to destroy Detroit and rallied their allies. The Fox withstood a nineteen day siege before they were able to escape during a storm; they were then pursued and fought for another four days. Of the Fox who surrendered the women and children were allowed to go free, but the warriors were killed. Some Fox made their way back to Wisconsin and remained enemies of the French and their Indian allies throughout the opening decades of the eighteenth century.<sup>120</sup> After the flight of the Fox from Michigan, at least some of the Ottawa abandoned Detroit and moved to Manitoulin Island, but the Detroit experience had inadvertently encouraged the expansion of substantial Ottawa settlement throughout the Lower Peninsula of Michigan.

From 1712 to 1743 there was peace between France and England, allowing the French economy and the fur trade to flourish, further abetting Ottawa expansion. Then, in 1714, it was discovered that French fur supplies had been destroyed by vermin in the warehouses, driving up the value of furs. To increase their stores, the French reestablished their center of trade at the Straits of Mackinac, a move which helped support the large Ottawa population in the region. One hundred canoes of voyageurs and trade goods passed through the Straits of Mackinac in the spring and fall of 1714 en route to the western fur producing regions, with the Ottawa playing a major role in their provisioning.<sup>121</sup> By 1730, other Ottawa maintained villages on the St. Joseph River, but there is no clear evidence of permanent Ottawa settlements on the Grand River before 1755. In 1755 the right to trade in the Grand River Valley was

granted to a prominent Mackinac resident, and by the time of the American Revolution, there were well established villages with corn-fields producing enough to feed the native population, French traders, and -- the British suspected -- to provision American troops if they entered Indiana or Illinois. This level of production implies a lengthy major occupation, perhaps dating from the 1730s or 1740s.<sup>122</sup>

There are few documented references to individual Ottawa leaders between 1710 and 1740. As French allies and competitors in the fur trade, some participated in a series of raids against the Fox in Wisconsin in the 1730s. Others ranged further, cooperating with the Cree in a slave trade in which Dakota captives were brought to Mackinac and sold to French authorities for farm work in the east.<sup>123</sup> In 1742, the majority of Mackinac Ottawa left unproductive fields at the straits and moved to the region the French called L'Arbre Croche, between the south shore of Little Traverse Bay and the Straits of Mackinac. The Ottawa called this region Waganagisi, or Crooked Tree. There they continued to provision the growing straits population with garden produce, meat, and to some extent furs. Those Ottawa living in the most southern portion of Michigan's Lower Peninsula maintained alliances with peoples living in northern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. By the 1750s, at least one Ottawa band had settled on the Maumee River in Ohio, allied themselves with the Wyandot, and traded with the British. Within a decade, others lived in scattered villages around the southern end of Lake Michigan among the Potawatomi, and by the opening decade of the nineteenth century, these people had become assimilated Potawatomi.<sup>124</sup>

There are also few references to a new social class that was

growing at the Straits of Mackinac and Detroit during these prosperous years -- the Metis. The Ottawa political practice of creating allies by making them affinal kin was not practical with celibate priests nor is there evidence of regional French officials taking Indian wives. There is no doubt, however, that some of the thousands of courriers de bois who passed through Mackinac sired children by Ottawa women. There is no information regarding the assimilation of these children into Ottawa society. Given the Ottawa's historical emphasis on bilateral filial rights, there is no reason to believe that they were not identified as Indian children who inherited rights from both sides of their families.

By the 1750s Charles-Michel Langlade, the son of a French man and an Ottawa woman, achieved acclaim throughout New France as a skilled military leader. Langlade lived at Mackinac throughout the French regime. Although he made his living by trading with his Indian relatives and was identified as a member of the French speaking community, Langlade maintained ties with his Ottawa relatives and married the sister of La Fourche or Nissowaquot (Fork of a Tree), a then powerful Waganagisi Ogema.<sup>125</sup> Langlade maintained his reputation as a war leader and broker between Europeans and the Ottawa well into the British period.<sup>126</sup> Although he was the most influential Metis at Mackinac, it is certain that Langlade was not the only person whose kin ties bridged two cultural systems. The world created by this merger added stability to Ottawa life and continued well beyond the French regime.

The War of Austrian Cession, or King George's War, began in 1744 and soon spilled over to the New World breaking the relative peace in the Great Lakes region. From this war -- one of a series known as the

French and Indian Wars -- until the end of the French regime, Ottawa men found increasing employment as paid soldiers for the French. King George's War ended with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 but peace did not return to the Ottawa domain for another sixty-seven years. Keenly aware that the future of New France rested on the French ability to secure the Ohio Valley, the territory between the northern and southern branches of their North American empire, Governor Roland-Michel Barrin, Marquis de la Galissoniere, initiated a series of policies aimed at preserving the French domain. Galissoniere's policy was to surround and contain the English colonies on the east coast.<sup>127</sup> In 1749 he sent an expedition of 230 Canadian militia and allied Seneca under Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville to drive the Anglo-American traders from the Ohio valley and reclaim the region for Louis XV of France.<sup>128</sup> The Shawnee, Delaware, and Miami, who had established a successful trade with the English, were not inclined to end their lucrative practices merely upon the threats of a few Frenchmen, especially when the French could not offer equivalent terms of trade. Thus, the French were forced to leave hurriedly the Miami town of Pickawillany.<sup>129</sup>

A new Governor General of New France, Ange de Menneville, Marquis Duquesne, continued efforts to secure the Ohio Valley. In 1752 he ordered all English traders from the territory although the Indians there were still officially allowed to trade wherever they saw fit. A noted Ottawa military success came during this campaign to remove the British traders. In 1753, Charles Langlade led some 250 of his kinsmen against Pickawillany, the Miami town that had so forcefully declared its alliance with the British in 1749. Their success in taking Pickawillany

was celebrated with a feast of defiance in which the Miami chief La Demoiselle was served up as the main course. This brief but effective campaign, reinforced with a string of French forts built along the eastern side of the Ohio valley, dampened the Ohio Indians' interest in supporting of the British. In 1748 several of the most prominent Virginia families and London investors formed the Ohio Land Company. British colonists lost their Indian supporters entirely when the Indians received news that the company intended to plant settlements in the Ohio Valley.<sup>130</sup>

In 1754 the first shots of the French and Indian War proper were fired. The battle pitted the French and allied Indians against George Washington near Fort Duquense, with the latter taking the loss.<sup>131</sup> This was followed by the defeat of Major General Edward Braddock and his more than 2,000 troops, also a few miles from Fort Duquesne, in 1755 by fewer than 800 French and Indians.<sup>132</sup> Charles Langlade and his Indian soldiers, including his Ottawa kinsmen, were credited with planning and executing this English defeat.<sup>133</sup> Despite the long list of successful Indian-fought battles along the English frontier, French losses of ships and provisions at sea and unfortunate decisions by the French leaders brought the war to an end. At the final battle in 1759 the British, under Major General James Wolfe, defeated the troops of Louis-Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm, at Quebec. Following this engagement, the French were no longer able to protect their interests or those of their Indian allies, opening much of North America for British colonial expansion.<sup>134</sup>

The trade that supported the Michigan Ottawa flourished even during the most active years of the British and French campaigns. In

1758 over two hundred Frenchmen left Montreal for western posts. The following year, despite British armies surrounding the city, over one hundred traders made the journey west.<sup>135</sup> Alexander Henry reported that one bushel of hominy corn was considered a general ration per man for one month. Estimating that each voyageur required provision for ten months for a circuit of the lakes, one thousand bushels of surplus corn were required by voyagers during this war year with its reduced travel. The provisions received from Ottawa production must have been substantial. Besides the agricultural produce, standard trade goods included dried meat, dried fish, and maple sugar.<sup>136</sup>

As remarked earlier, the Ottawa loss of their intermediary position in the French fur trade resulted in extended families and ad larger kin groups increasing the emphasis on production for exchange. This shift developed gradually between 1700 and 1760 and is evidenced by the descriptions of directed, divided control of those natural resources used in exchange, especially hunting territories and sugar maple groves, as well as by increased seasonal mobility, with smaller numbers of people remaining in the large farming villages during the winter.

The seasonal cycle that had been established in the eighteenth century continued into the opening decades of the American period. Throughout the British regime, the Ottawa continued to maintain large villages on major waterways where the climate was suitable for corn production and where there was seasonal abundance of fish. The year began with the collection and processing of maple sap for sugar which was used for food and exchange. For this activity, a number of extended families left large villages to occupy their regular territories.

Fishing and gathering spring plants were predominant activities until the threat of frost ended. At this point, the Ottawa extended families who had left the major village once again rejoined those who had remained behind; planting took place in the late spring. During the summer months, small groups of related males left the large villages for local hunts, visiting and trading in other regions, and for war. Women, children, and those not able to travel remained at the home village to tend crops. Following fall harvest of crops and fishing, small parties -- sometimes entire extended families -- once again left the larger villages for winter hunts.<sup>137</sup>

As a result of greater mobility caused by warfare and increased hunting and increased contact with tribes who shared their territory and villages, the Ottawa developed the system of totemic eponyms discussed earlier. These meshed with clan structures of their neighbors. Rules of hospitality between persons sharing the same totem marks assured a person of aid and provisions during travels to almost any part of the Great Lakes region and westward as far as Manitoba.<sup>138</sup> By the opening years of the Anglo-American period, 1763-1812, the Ottawa were comprised of largely autonomous regional units with several villages each. These villages were linked by networks of kin with the extended family and larger kin groupings continuing to be the most important units of socio-political organization. The largest concentrations of Ottawa villages were at Waganagisi and on the Grand River, or Owashshinong (Far Away Place), though others were located throughout the western half of Michigan's Lower Peninsula, Ohio, and Illinois.<sup>139</sup>

Following the collapse of the French regime the Ottawa's political



position in Michigan and their role in British trade were open for negotiation. They anticipated a post-war increase in trade, with a greater flow of British goods and a decrease in prices, but to Lord Jeffery Amherst, the newly appointed governor of the region, the Ottawa and their allies seemed no political threat. They lacked French military backing and, he believed, the supplies required to launch attacks on well garrisoned British forts in the region. Amherst opposed the expensive practice of gift-giving from British stores of domestics, tools, rum, and ammunition to preserve Indian alliances. From the opening days of his administration Amherst adopted a laissez faire policy toward Indian trade. Hundreds of unlicensed traders flooded Ottawa territory charging extortionate prices and creating chaos with increased flows of alcohol. Not only did the Ottawa fail to get favorable trade partners in the British, but also their basic needs for European manufactured goods were not met under the new regime.<sup>140</sup>

Amherst seriously miscalculated the kind of relations that had characterized Ottawa and French interaction. He acted as though the French had dominated these and other native peoples, making them submissive and dependent subjects, and failed to see that the Ottawa conceived of the relationship with the French as an alliance for mutual benefit. On the basis of this erroneous reading, Amherst set about to ignore the Ottawa. When confronted with British arrogance, the Ottawa exerted their influence once again. Their efforts to achieve a more favorable political and economic position began in earnest in May of 1763, when they, the Chippewa, the Potawatomi and other Great Lakes and Ohio Valley tribes launched a series of attacks promoted by the Ottawa Ogema

Pontiac. The Indians quickly captured nearly all British posts in the northwest. Only Fort Detroit and Fort Pitt withstood the attacks of the confederated tribes. Once peace was restored, British trade and settlement policies were revised. The Indians had made their point: British presence in the Lakes region depended to a marked degree upon the goodwill of the native inhabitants.

With the Proclamation of 1763, colonial settlement was forbidden west of the Allegheny mountains, but more important to the Ottawa, the Crown assumed direct responsibility for licensing traders to assure more fair trade practices. They also reinstated the practice of providing gifts of important commodities such as ammunition.<sup>141</sup> In 1766 Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, held council at Oswego, New York with the opposing Indians and concluded a peace agreement, at which time he assured the western tribes of fair trade and increased access to British goods.<sup>142</sup> Although the attempt to license trade failed, the Ottawa continued exchanges with the British for essential commodities on more reasonable terms well into the opening decades of the nineteenth century.

In the Quebec Act of 1774, the British government declared the land north of the Ohio River an Indian reservation and stated that all land purchases from Indians in that region since 1763 were invalid. The Northwest was specifically reserved as an Indian territory and fur trade empire.<sup>143</sup> Unlike the tribes of Ohio, however, the Ottawa were not directly threatened by American settlement of their lands. Hence, when the hostilities opening the American Revolution began at Lexington in 1775, Ottawa leaders apparently felt little immediate reason to aid the

British in their contest with the colonials. The first records of their involvement do not appear until two years after the Declaration of Independence.

In 1778, Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton of Detroit, held a council at Detroit hoping to secure a general alliance of the Indians throughout Michigan and the Ohio Valley. He received little favorable response from the Michigan Indians. In October he called on Charles Langlade to once again raise troops among the Ojibwa Ottawa to help stop the American march under Colonel George Rogers Clark into the Illinois country. The Ottawa stalled, responding that they had not laid by enough provisions to last them the winter and could not aid the British until spring.<sup>144</sup> Since Langlade had married the sister of Nissowaquot of Waganagisi, he was more successful in his recruiting among the northern Ottawa. The Ojibwa Nissowaquot, Augooshoway, and Keewaycooshcum were all persuaded to offer marginal support to the British cause. Nissowaquot and Keewaycooshcum remained in the field as late as 1782.<sup>145</sup>

The Treaty of Paris of 1783, which ended the American Revolution, made no provision for the Indians of the Great Lakes region and the Ohio Valley. It ceded to the United States the same region -- especially in the Ohio Valley -- that so many Indians had fought to maintain as a homeland. Although the reasoning of British negotiators is debatable, officials in Canada had no intention of alienating the Indians and exposing their borders to either Indian or American attack. They attempted to convince the Indians through a series of councils, including one at Detroit in 1783, that the British had not abandoned

them and would preserve the integrity of their Ohio River boundary. To protect their own settlements in the northwest, the British refused to surrender the military posts in the Great Lakes region and again proposed making the entire territory a buffer state inhabited by Indians. The Americans claimed that both the British and the Indians were defeated in the war and hence had forfeited all the lands in question. The Americans were not pleased with British persistence but did not have enough military or diplomatic strength to oppose them in the northwest. Thus, both the military posts and Indian loyalties remained in British hands.<sup>146</sup>

During the military lull that followed the Treaty of Paris, the American government in 1784 negotiated with the Iroquois the Treaty of Fort Stanwick, purchasing their claim to hunt territory north of the Ohio River. In 1785 some factions of Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa and Ottawa, probably from northwest Ohio, signed the treaty of Fort Mackintosh, acknowledging the "protection of the United States" and giving up their claim to the Ohio country. Both of these treaties were ignored by the tribes, especially the Shawnee, Delaware and Miami, who continued to attack settlers moving onto their hunting grounds.<sup>147</sup> The Iroquois Joseph Brant, hoping to build another coalition of the tribes like that of Pontiac, went to England in 1785 seeking support. The British offered him nebulous speeches implying their desire to aid but at the same time instructing officials in America to give the Indians no aid to wage war.<sup>148</sup> Nevertheless, the British continued to give the Indians presents at the western posts to assure their allegiance should open warfare begin between themselves and the Americans.

Between 1783 and 1815, the British were fighting the Napoleonic Wars and did not wish to risk spreading the conflict to North America by openly abetting Indian hostilities or by continued occupation of the western posts claimed by the United States. They did, however, aid the Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomi who joined an Indian military coalition, fighting to prevent American settlement northwest of the Ohio River valley. The Indians defeated large American armies under General Joseph Harmer in 1790 and under General Arthur St. Clair in 1791.

In 1794, England and the United States negotiated Jay's Treaty, by which the British agreed to withdraw from the western posts. Although the British were reluctant to give overt military aid, they continued to offer the Indians promises of support. That year the Potawatomi, assisted by Ottawa and Chippewa warriors participated an attack against the supply line of General Anthony Wayne near Fort Recovery in which fifty Americans were killed or wounded and 500 horses were captured. In mid-summer the Ottawa again fought against General Anthony Wayne at the Battle of Fallen Timbers where they and the Wyandot bore the brunt of American charges. There are no accurate counts of the dead on either side in this battle. Estimates of American dead range between 133 to 300, thirty to forty Indians were found in the forest, though a few more were probably killed. It was not the number of dead, however, that decided the outcome of this battle. The potential for Indian recovery from their defeat was lost when the British at Fort Miami, under strict orders from Great Britain, refused to allow the retreating Indians entry to their post and withheld ammunition and other supplies.<sup>149</sup>

The British failure to aid the Indian war efforts despite earlier

promises of support, severed Indian and British military cooperation and scattered the participants in the Indian coalition. The disillusioned Indians, including the Ottawa Ogemuk Augooshaway and Chemokoman (Long Knife), were a minority among the many allies who negotiated the Treaty of Greenville with Wayne in 1795, by which the Americans sought to make a peaceful settlement with the Indians and end the frontier war. By this document, the Indians recognized the sole right of the United States to acquire their lands through treaty negotiations, while the Ottawa surrendered their claims to Ohio lands, reserving only a fraction of their territory on the Maumee River. They also ceded their claims to valuable lands around Detroit. In return they received a small annuity.<sup>150</sup> Although the treaty reflected the superior position of the recently victorious Americans in the Ohio Valley, it remained unchallenged only until the Indians believed they could militarily press their political and economic demands with military force. They so did in the War of 1812.

In the years leading to the Treaty of Greenville, the greatest portion of the Ottawa homeland was under no immediate threat from American settlers. While the Ohio Indians sought to protect their territory against American intrusion, the Ottawa seemed more intent on economic matters. This entailed a show of support for the British cause to preserve their trade relationship. At a 1787 council with John Dease, British Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs at Mackinac, the chiefs Nissowaquot and Le Grand Souril through their speaker Keewaycooshcum said:

Our Lands are exhausted, our hunts are ruined, no more  
Animals remain to call us out to the Woods. The only

resource left to us for our subsistence is the cultivation of these sandy plains, and what we can procure from the water. . . .

Father, We sincerely thank you for the large supply of Clothing & other presents you have brought us. our old men, women, and children will now be comfortably cloath'd, we particularly thank you for this large bundle of netts on which we can place our principal dependence for our subsistence we gratefully acknowledge this distinguished mark of your Bounty, such a one we have not heretofore experienced.<sup>151</sup>

Keewaycooshcum then complained that Ottawa trade had been restricted when the British closed all posts except Mackinac and that even at that post the Ottawa were not always received. Despite the ritualized plaintive tone employed by Keewaycooshcum in his petition, the Ottawa successfully continued in their traditional subsistence patterns. They were, however, aware that the Americans could interrupt the trade that supplied them with important manufactured goods.

The British ended their political tenure in Ottawa territory after the Treaty of Greenville and the ratification of Jay's Treaty, whereupon the Americans took possession of Fort Detroit on July 11, 1796.<sup>152</sup> This did not end British influence in Michigan, however, nor did it assure the Americans a change in Ottawa allegiance. The Ottawa witnessed the effect of American settlement in the Ohio country and did not willingly embrace extension of the frontier to their homeland. The British moved their posts to Amherstburg, across the St. Clair River from Detroit, to Drummond Island, and later to St. Joseph Island near Sault Ste. Marie. From these posts they traded and issued presents of guns, ammunition and cloth to the Ottawa and their neighbors. Although the British proved at best unreliable allies in war, they continued to offer trade of considerable economic importance, and unlike the Americans, they did not

then demand cessions of territory.

The economic importance of the British alliance is explicitly marked in Jay's Treaty. In the first five paragraphs of Article III in this document are the words:

It is agreed that it shall at all times be free of His Majesty's subjects, and to citizens of the United States, and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said boundary line freely to pass and repass by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the two parties, on the continent of America, (the country within the limits of the Hudson's Bay Company also excepted) and to navigate all the lakes, rivers and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other .

and in the third paragraph:

No duty of entry shall ever be levied by either party on peltries brought by land or inland navigation into the said territories, nor shall the Indians passing or repassing with their own proper goods and effects of whatever nature, pay for the same any impost or duty whatever. . . .153

Although they possessed political sovereignty over land in the 1783 boundaries and the exclusive privilege of purchasing Indian rights to occupy and use the territory, Americans could not penetrate the Ottawa homeland with goods required for Indian subsistence. Hence, they could not intervene in Indian trade and complete their take-over in the lakes until the nineteenth century.

Through the first decade of the nineteenth century, issues of international trade during the Napoleonic Wars kept relations between the United States and Britain tense. The United States wishing to profit from the European war, claimed a neutral status along with the right to trade with belligerents. The British, however, wanted this French supply line stopped. They seized American ships on the sea and often



conscripted sailors from American vessels. By 1807 the British were again making overtures to the Michigan Indians and those of the Ohio Valley in case hostilities should arise on Canadian and United States boundary.<sup>154</sup>

More than 5,000 Indians visited Fort Malden at Amherstburg in 1808. Among these was the Shawnee Tecumseh who sought British aid in forming another Indian coalition to maintain control of the Ohio country. In 1810, 200 Ottawa, Potawatomi, Winnebago, Sauk and Shawnee announced to Matthew Elliott, British Indian agent at Amherstburg, their intention to attack the Americans and their expectation that the British would provision them. Through the summer of 1811 the British tried unsuccessfully to discourage this frontier war, but in November of that year, Governor William Henry Harrison engaged the Indians at Tecumseh's camp of Prophet's Town. The confederated Indians were defeated and scattered to their home territories. The following year, Tecumseh rebuilt his army at Prophet's Town, and following the declaration of war between the United States and Britain in June 1812, successfully routed the Americans in several important battles.<sup>155</sup>

During the War of 1812, Ottawa warriors were present at the taking of Fort Mackinac and the surrender of Detroit. Although they saw little fighting at these places, their numbers, exaggerated by rumors, helped convince the Americans that battle would be disastrous. In 1813 they fought with Tecumseh at Fort Meigs. Despite British and Indian successes in the western country, however, the British supply line was severed by Lieutenant Oliver H. Perry, who defeated the British fleet under Captain Robert Barclay on Lake Erie in September. American troops

under Harrison were advancing on Detroit when General Henry Proctor decided to withdraw from that fort and Fort Malden. Without provisions the forts could not be held. Seeing little reason to retreat with the British many Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Wyandot and Shawnee remained in Michigan, but Tecumseh and his remaining Indians, including several Michigan Ottawa Ogemuk, protected the rear of the retreating British troops. While fighting Kentucky Mounted Volunteers at the Battle of Moraviantown, Tecumseh and thirty-three of his Indians were killed.<sup>156</sup>

Although the engagement at Moraviantown was brief, it had great effect on the Michigan Ottawa. With the death of Tecumseh the Indian dream of a new war coalition to drive the Americans from their territory ended, and the Ottawa were never again to defend their interests by military force. Those Ottawa who remained with Tecumseh returned to their homes and were soon to meet the Americans outside of battle as the frontier expanded into Michigan.

#### Summary

For 200 years before the Americans came to the western Great Lakes, the Ottawa adapted their specialized subsistence skills and their cultural emphasis on trade to demands of a complex, continually changing social environment. Residence in the transitional biotic province during the pre-contact and early historic period provided the Ottawa an opportunity for intensive corn agriculture and year-around fishing. Both of these activities yielded surpluses, which permitted semi-sedentary village life and, perhaps more importantly, facilitated their participation in a far-reaching system of trade. Other aspects of

life changed during the French and British regimes, but this stable economic base continued as the mainstay of Ottawa economy. During all their migrations, the Ottawa remained within the limits of corn agriculture and placed their villages near the richest fishing grounds of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior. Even in dangerous years of the Iroquois threat, between 1650 and 1670, the Ottawa quickly replicated their Ontario residence patterns and made new fields.

The Ottawa's proto-historic economic base and preference for year-around habitation of large villages implies that they had a complex and highly structured socio-political organization like that of their Huron and southern Algonquin neighbors. There is, however, little historical evidence to support reconstructions that include formal lineages, clans, sodalities, or other similar socio-political structures among the Ottawa. Lacking this data, it is more useful to view the Ottawa as a highly decentralized people whose primary organization rested firmly, and perhaps exclusively, upon relations between members of extended families, the only component unit of the four large Ottawa named groups repeatedly noted by seventeenth and eighteenth century observers. This helps account for confusion concerning matrilineal and patrilineal affiliation in historic literature by emphasizing the bilateral personal associations in daily life, thus allowing for mixed observations by early reporters. It accounts for ambiguity of socio-political patterns as individuals forged highly personal relationships within their own and other extended families to form larger filial groupings to meet political and production needs. Given the nature of the Ottawa subsistence system, the extended family--

especially when expanded broadly by strong polygynous marriage patterns -- was sufficient to meet the needs of economic production.

This highly flexible model of socio-political organization accords with the Ottawa's geographical position and their cultural propensity toward exchange in the native trade system. Native trade, according to the Huron model, rested on ownership of a trade route, a geographical pathway and a series of personal relationships that linked the participating parties in terms of kinship, either fictive or cemented by marriage. Because the Ottawa lived between and traded with both matrilineal horticulturists and patrilineal hunters, a rigid system of socio-political structures would have inhibited intermarriage and the formation of important alliances.

Lack of a rigidly defined socio-political organization and emphasis on various kinds of kin relations remained an important means of integrating members of other tribes following the Ottawa flight from their Georgian Bay homes. Because the extended family continued to be the basic productive unit in Ottawa society, their organization was not severely disrupted by the diaspora. After the fall of Huronia, Ottawa technology, skill in trade, and prior network of alliances allowed them to assume the role of middlemen in the European fur trade. As evidenced by the social position of Charles Langlade, the practice of creating trade partners and allies by marriage was extended to the French by the early eighteenth century.

In the historical record, seventeenth and eighteenth century Ottawa trade and political relations are manifest in the behavior of individual actors who attempted to shape their political world to meet their own

culturally defined interests by the formation and protection of alliances. This was the case as Ottawa Ogemuk joined the Huron, Potawatomi, Chippewa, and Sauk kinsmen to drive the Dakota from their territory along the Mississippi River. It was evidenced when Kiskakon Ogema affiliated themselves with the Jesuits at Chequamegon and St. Ignace to preserve a favored position in trade. The account of kin relations and Ottawa Ogemuk vying for prestige and influence at the founding of Detroit further demonstrates the workings of a strongly egalitarian society and the importance of examining interpersonal relationships within a model of filial structures.

It is most important to note that, throughout these dealings, the Ottawa were not dominated by European powers but exerted their considerable influence to obtain prestige, influence, and wealth. In the process, they formed a common ground with the French through their contribution to the European market, first as conveyors of peltries, and second as direct producers of provisions and furs. As Cadillac learned at the founding of Detroit, the Ottawa and their allies could not be forced to undertake economic or military endeavors at the whim of a colonial administrator and could force the Europeans to alter their plans. As a reliable soldiers, the Ottawas and allies maintained still greater leverage in the politics of New France. During Pontiac's "Rebellion," they forcibly convinced the British to abandon their position of conquest and assume one more conciliatory to the majority Indian population of Michigan.

While the subsistence base and political organization of Ottawa society remained relatively intact throughout their migrations and in-

creasing contact with the European market and its accompanying politics, there was some change. In the years following the diaspora, refugee Ottawa spread westward and increased their regularly used territorial range. During the period of fluorescence, between 1670 and 1700, they once again took firm control of their old hunting and fishing territory at the Straits of Mackinac. From there they moved permanently into Michigan's Lower Peninsula, securing their role as provisioners in the Detroit trade and their claim to southernmost portions of their old hunting territories.

Increased contact between the Ottawa and neighboring tribesmen in trade and military confederations somewhat altered the Ottawa sense of identity. References to the four named groups by which they had been identified disappeared by the mid-eighteenth century; there are no clues as to why this was so. There is evidence that the Ottawa developed a set of totemic eponyms. Although these totems did not attach to clans, their symbols could well merge with those of southern Algonquin clan systems and provided Ottawa travellers with hospitality in villages and territory where they maintained no other kin ties. Indeed, as the Ottawa more frequently shared their villages, territory, and natural resources with surrounding peoples, the identities of some groups became merged with those of their neighbors. This was the case for the Ottawa in Illinois and Ohio whose assimilation into other tribes precluded their contact with their Michigan relatives. Given the traditional Ottawa emphasis on marriage with surrounding tribesmen and their emphasis on bilateral filial relations, there is little reason to believe that increased intermarriage presented any complications for determining

the jural affiliation of children produced by these liaisons. There are few references in the historical record to Metis or children of mixed-tribal origins, though many such undoubtedly lived in the Ottawa community. This lack of specific mention may be accounted for by the filiation model. As long as a person was the legal heir of an Ottawa parent and fulfilled culturally defined obligations to his/her relatives, he/she could be considered Ottawa.

Importantly, the Ottawa gained knowledge of the European politics and the market system. From the days of Father Menard, they dealt with the presence of French clergy and colonial officials in their territory. They understood fluctuating fur values and the prices they could command for their produce. As La Pothrie and Henry reported, the Ottawa charged Europeans the highest price possible. At the same time, they continued to maintain value reciprocity within the bounds of kinship, a custom that prohibited the accumulation of capital. Knowledge of the European system gave the Ojibwa some advantage in dealings with the incoming Americans.

Following the American occupation of the Michigan Territory in 1814, the Ottawa faced a new form of intervention in their affairs. They were no longer the military equals or betters of the society they faced and could not dictate the terms of their coexistence with the incoming powers. Their land became a commodity to be purchased by thousands of Americans who sought to remove them from the base of their economic production and cultural stability. The Ottawa were forced to

negotiate a position for themselves in their old territorial domain as their resources were appropriated by the expanding American system.



## CHAPTER 2: PRELUDE TO "CIVILIZATION"

When the British abandoned Detroit in 1813, the Americans came to stay. Thereafter, the Ottawa had to face the expansion of federal and, eventually, state jurisdiction over their persons, lands, and resources. Ultimately, they were politically and economically encapsulated. Reduced to ownership of only fragments of their former estate, their political autonomy was greatly limited and access to needed resources was severely restricted. Indeed, their continued existence in Michigan became linked to the functioning of the American state, dependent on the Ottawa's skill in coping with demands thrust at them from that quarter.

The texture of Ottawa and American relations between 1813 and 1830 derived from a complex set of interacting factors that combined to isolate the Indians from the vanguard of American frontier expansion. These included federal policies and their enforcement by territorial officials, the natural resources of the Ottawa homeland, and the conditions of developing national and regional economies. The gradual extension of American political jurisdiction and settlement toward Ottawa territory did not precipitate an immediate crisis. Since the Ottawa were not faced with immediate dispossession, they experienced the extension of American influence as peaceful, with missionaries, traders, and government Indian authorities seeking to transform and mold them in accordance with patterns of American culture. The greatest issue faced by the Ottawa during these years, and for decades to come, was what

kinds and amount of change they would accept.

### Extending U.S. Jurisdiction

In 1813 Lewis Cass became Michigan's territorial governor.<sup>1</sup> His primary administrative goal was to extend American political and economic influence into a region that included present day Michigan, Wisconsin, and a portion of Minnesota and to win the loyalty of a composite French, British, and Indian population whose interests were closer to those of the British in Canada than to those of the new regime. In the Michigan Territory Cass sought to establish direct relations with the Indians. To slow or halt their annual visits to British posts and their participation in international trade, he increased distribution of useful commodities at Detroit. To guard against the flare up of Indian or British antagonisms, Cass organized militias, and petitioned Congress for additional troops at Mackinac and Sault Ste. Marie.<sup>2</sup> With threats of Indian hostility minimized, he then encouraged American settlement in hopes of swinging the balance of regional power and spurring economic expansion.

Purchase of Ottawa land was at the center of Cass's plan.<sup>3</sup> Until the War of 1812 the principal cash producing resources in Michigan had been furs and, to a limited extent, maple sugar. Cass believed these resources could never support a population large enough to guarantee statehood to Michigan Territory because they were limited and could not be increased by husbandry; and fur bearing animals were already being rapidly depleted. Agriculture was to be the base of the new economy

Cass envisioned, so he encouraged emigration of farmers and the artisans required to serve their needs.<sup>4</sup> He negotiated treaties for millions of acres of the territory's richest farmlands. The Ottawa participated in: the 1815 Treaty of Springwells, by which Michigan Indians and others reaffirmed terms of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville and the five million acre cession made in the 1807 Treaty of Detroit; the 1817 Treaty of The Foot of the Rapids, for lands in northern Ohio; the 1819 Treaty of Saginaw, for six million acres in the central and eastern Lower Peninsula; and the 1821 Treaty of Chicago, for lands in southwestern Michigan south of the Grand River. The 1821 treaty was the first major cession to impinge on land the Ottawa used regularly.<sup>5</sup>

Cass fully understood that American expansion would forever disrupt Indian cultures. His policy toward the affected Indians was characteristic of the times. At first he favored the "civilization policy" or rapid, government sponsored acculturation, with Indians adopting intensive agriculture and learning American language, customs, and methods of production to integrate into the larger society.<sup>6</sup> In all the major treaties Cass negotiated, he allowed Indians farming equipment and cattle and, in some cases, provided blacksmiths, farmers and teachers to train them in American ways. He encouraged the Indians to adopt private ownership of property and supported missionary attempts to educate them in Christian values.<sup>7</sup>

When Indians refused the impossible task of overnight cultural revision, Cass (and many other Americans) adopted the alternate Indian policy -- "removal." Removal developed over the course of six presidential administrations, and the meaning of the policy evolved to

accommodate political and economic conditions of the times.<sup>8</sup> Various options were considered at different times to deal with the Ottawa and their dispossessed neighbors. In its earliest form "removal" implied only the movement of native peoples beyond the line of American settlement. After Jefferson made the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, "removal" meant the resettlement of Indians on lands west of the Mississippi River. However, the concept first became meaningful to the Ottawa as early as 1820, when Jedidiah Morse suggested that the western shore of Lake Michigan be set aside to relocate northern woodland Indians of Michigan, northern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The region, he reasoned, had a climate similar to their former habitations and a sufficient amount of fertile soil for agricultural development and was beyond territorial limits he believed would be called for by the American public.<sup>9</sup> Although the plan was not adopted by the senate in 1820, the idea of locating northern Indians in a Wisconsin Indian territory surfaced several times between 1820 and 1855.<sup>12</sup> At the same time some American government threatened to remove the Ottawa, others continued to emphasize the civilization policy. As we will see, the civilization clause of the 1821 Treaty of Chicago proved the means by which the American government first extended its political jurisdiction directly into Ottawa territory.

In a special message delivered to Congress on January 24, 1825, President James Monroe outlined a plan to induce voluntary removal of eastern Indians to lands west of the Mississippi River. Volunteers would receive financial aid for the journey and support during the first year in the new location. Monroe planned to organize a government for

them which would then "preserve order, prevent the intrusion of whites, and stimulate civilization." Monroe's message was presented to the Ottawa by Isaac McCoy, a Baptist missionary who was already attempting to establish a mission at Owashshinong, or Grand River. The Indians, as we shall see, did not seriously entertain the proposition.<sup>11</sup> During the Andrew Jackson administration, "removal" was defined more precisely. Jackson believed that no Indian tribe could hold political jurisdiction within boundaries of states. Thus, they must either become citizens or move beyond state lines. If they opposed extension of state jurisdiction, their property would be taken and they would be moved to lands west of the Mississippi. On May 28, 1830 President Jackson signed a bill making this more stringent definition of removal into official federal policy.

By the time Andrew Jackson was about to take office, Cass had evaluated the success of the civilization policy and decided there was no hope for Indians to achieve a suitable status in settled territories.<sup>12</sup> Cass's best efforts at effecting change were rejected by the Ottawa, the Chippewa, and to some extent, the Potawatomi. Ultimately, Cass became Secretary of War under the Jackson administration and was responsible for removing Indians to lands west of the Mississippi.

Removal became a serious threat to the Ottawa during the Jackson administration. They could be called on at any time to negotiate a treaty stipulating for their removal west of the Mississippi River or possibly, under more favorable circumstances, to lands in Wisconsin. When removal pressure was most extreme between 1830 and 1855, the

civilization policy that had characterized the government's first dealings with the Ottawa provided them with an alternative by which they were able to forestall or subvert the plans of those who desired their westward emigration.

The Ottawa's continued residence in their homeland during the late 1820s and 1830s resulted largely from American settlement patterns which concentrated settlement in the Lower Peninsula south of the Grand River.<sup>13</sup> In 1810 two thirds of the territory's non-Indian population of 4,762 lived in the counties surrounding Detroit. By 1820 the population had risen to only 8,896 and was still concentrated in the southeastern Lower Peninsula.<sup>14</sup> The Cass administration attempted to speed the rate and expand the direction of settlement by constructing roads in the region and by advertising the quality of lands available for settlement.<sup>15</sup> Even so, when a special census made for legislative reapportionment in 1827 revealed that the basic settlement pattern had not changed. A population of 17,411 was enumerated (excluding parts of Crawford and St. Clair counties which sent incomplete returns) with a distribution such that the southeastern counties received eleven delegates while the entire Upper Peninsula of Michigan and state of Wisconsin formed a single district and only received two.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the government was not pressured to negotiate a cession for the core of Ottawa territory north of the Grand River until the 1830s.

During the 1830s, Michigan underwent the largest population expansion of any territory or state in the union. At the opening of the decade, the federal census showed a population of 31,639 non-Indian residents in Michigan.<sup>17</sup> Of these, 27,378 lived in the portion of the

territory east of Lake Michigan; the southeastern counties in Michigan's Lower Peninsula accounted for sixty-nine percent of the total.<sup>18</sup> In only four years between 1830 and 1834, Michigan Territory's population more than doubled with 85,856 non-Indians living east of Lake Michigan.<sup>19</sup> During these years, demand for Ottawa lands remained high, and threat of removal was keen. American officials called on the Ottawa to cede their entire estate in the 1836 Treaty of Washington. In 1837, the population in the newly formed state of Michigan (excluding the Wisconsin Territory) numbered 174,543 and only forty-five percent was concentrated in the counties directly surrounding Detroit. Newcomers now settled the rich lands of the Grand River valley. By 1840, Michigan's Euroamerican population totaled 212,267 and outnumbered the Ottawa nearly 200 to one.<sup>20</sup>

Michigan's settlement patterns were linked to three key factors.<sup>21</sup> First, in 1825 the Erie Canal opened a relatively rapid transportation route between the highly desirable farmlands of northern Ohio, Indiana, and northern Illinois and commercial centers to the east. Second, while the canal provided a regular transportation link to the east, Michigan's road system remained relatively undeveloped, limiting transportation of settlers to the interior and the shipment of agricultural produce to eastern markets. It consisted of three major roads, one linking Detroit and Chicago, the territorial road connecting Detroit and St. Joseph, and a third thoroughfare from Pontiac, running through Ottawa lands along the Grand River to Grand Haven. None were completely passable until the mid-1830s, and even then the northernmost road along the southern edge of Ottawa territory was little more than a trail. Hence, Michigan's

settlement was densest along the two southern roads and navigable rivers.

The third factor that helped restrict settlement to areas below the line of Ottawa villages was soil quality and natural vegetation. Settlers desired soils that were neither heavy clay or light sand. The sandy pine lands in the unorganized counties north of the Grand River were considered infertile by agriculturists and the forests were thought a liability. Thus, settlers' attention focused on tracts in the southern portion of the territory which supported stands of black walnut, maple, and ash. Although such species also occurred in the 1819 Saginaw purchase, farmers considered this land too marshy, the woods too thick, and the soils of too inconsistent a quality to encourage agricultural settlement. In Jackson, Calhoun, and Kalamazoo counties, the small prairies surrounded by oak forests were highly desirable even though breaking the tough sod took large investments of time and cash.<sup>22</sup> Americans judged lands along the Grand River fertile, but the north bank was not yet ceded by the Ottawa. All these features combined to limit settlement to land south of the Grand River well into the 1840s, leaving the majority of Ottawa just beyond the frontier.

#### Life Beyond The Frontier

From their position beyond the line of frontier expansion, the Ottawa witnessed the benefits and limitations of government policies as the tribes of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were moved when settlers wanted the rich soil of their homelands. Building upon this vicarious experience, when they themselves were eventually called on to become



"civilized" or move west, they benefitted from this vicarious experience and adopted those American traits that best suited their own needs and goals to forestall emigration. When pressured to remove westward, the Ottawa claimed the right to remain in Michigan based upon their attainment of those "civilized" attributes pressed on them by Americans. To better understand the impact of United States settlement and government policy upon the Ottawa, it is important to discuss their geographical location, numerical strength, and major political divisions.

During the opening years of the American regime, the Michigan Ottawa inhabited territory stretching from the Straits of Mackinac to a southern point approximately midway between the Kalamazoo and Grand rivers. The Little Traverse Bay region and territory along the Grand River and its tributaries remained major centers of their population. Smaller villages were located at the mouths of the Muskegon, White, and Pere Marquette rivers. By this time, there were few ties between the Michigan Ottawa and those on the Maumee River of Ohio or those who had joined the Potawatomi living along the southern end of Lake Michigan.<sup>23</sup>

The earliest and most reliable estimate of Michigan's early nineteenth century Ottawa population was made by Lewis Cass in 1818; he gave their number as 2,086 persons living in 29 villages.<sup>24</sup> This estimate, however, provides only a crude picture of Ottawa demography. As we will see, it is probably too conservative an estimate of their numbers. However, its primary fault is the failure to distinguish between semi-permanent horticultural sites and seasonal hunting or fishing villages. This factor is crucial. An inflated number of

villages significantly decreases the estimated number of persons affiliated with each and deemphasizes the traditionally large, semi-permanent village concentrations made possible by Ottawa horticultural and fishing adaptations. The issue of village type is especially important south of the Grand River where the Ottawa, with one exception, maintained only hunting camps for some one hundred years. Counting hunting camps as horticultural villages makes Ottawa claims to southern lands -- especially those between the St. Joseph and Kalamazoo rivers -- appear stronger than they actually were. The permanent villages located in the south belonged to the Potawatomi. <sup>25</sup>

Cass's first census is further skewed by its inclusion of the Grand Traverse Chippewa in its total, for he counts at least two and possibly four groups who defined themselves as Chippewa. These people had moved into Ottawa territory perhaps one or two generations before the 1818 census.<sup>26</sup> Their ethnic identity and affiliations remained separate from those of the Ottawa well into the 1840s, though they shared land and resources and ever tightening bonds of kinship as they married into local Ottawa kin groups.<sup>27</sup> By the late 1840s a significant number of Ottawa moved their permanent villages to Grand Traverse and in time absorbed the Chippewa. The amount of interaction between them in 1818 is impossible to assess; therefore, I will not count them as Ottawa until analysis of the 1840s.

Ottawa horticultural villages seem to have enjoyed a greater stability than many peoples at their level of political organization. All of the Owasshinong (Grand River) villages identified in detailed documents following the 1836 cession were in place before 1820. Many

maintained their physical location and political autonomy until the end of the removal period. These were: Fort Village at the mouth of Crockery Creek in Ottawa County; Muckatosha's or Blackskin's village, which was first located near modern Grandville but later moved to the Rapids of the Grand River south of Bowting Village; Bowting or the rapids of the Grand, which is often referred to as Noaquageshik's or Noonday's village and became the site of Grand Rapids; Prairie Village, at the mouth of Rogue River; Nongee's Village also called Forks of the Thornapple, at present day Ada; the village of the Thornapple River Band, also known as Middle Village, near Gun Lake in Barry County; Keewaycooshcum's village at the mouth of the Flat River near Lowell which was later referred to as Cobmoosa's (The Walker) Village; the village at the mouth of Maple River at Lyons-Muir in Ionia County; and the easternmost village of Meshimnekahning or "Apple Place" located about 2.5 miles south of the mouth of the Looking Glass River in Ionia County.<sup>28</sup>

Less closely associated with the Owashshinong people were those living in centrally located villages at the mouths of rivers north of Grand River and south of Grand Traverse Bay. There were three such settlements. The southernmost of these was at the mouth of the Moskego (Muskegon) River. North of that one was the village at White River or Clay Banks, and above that was the settlement on the Pere Marquette River.<sup>29</sup> While the population of this central region in Ottawa territory fluctuated with the coming of winter hunters and spring fishermen from the north, the Muskegon village, and probably that of the White River were permanent in the region.<sup>30</sup> Since there are few

references to the Pere Marquette village prior to the late 1830s, it may have been more recently settled. The central villages at the Muskegon, White and Pere Marquette rivers were most often linked to Owashshinong villages in dealings with the United States, indicating that they shared little political affiliation with the Little Traverse people who annually visited their region.

By the mid-1830s, the northern Ottawa lived in five villages stretching from the south shore of Little Traverse Bay to the Straits of Mackinac. The name given to this region by the French was L'Arbre Croche, but it was known to the Indians as Waganagisi, also meaning Crooked Tree. Cross Village (La Croix) or Ahnumawautikuhmig (Prayer Tree or Cross Place), was the original village in the region founded in 1742.<sup>31</sup> A second village was founded prior to 1800 between Ahnumawautikuhmig and Little Traverse Bay. This village was also called L'Arbre Croche by some but the Ottawa called it Ahptuhwaing (Half Way Place or Middle Place), a name the Americans adopted, calling it Middle Village after a large segment of its population moved south and formed a new community in 1829.<sup>32</sup> The new village so formed was located near present-day Harbor Springs and became known as New L'Arbre Croche to Americans and was Weekwitonsing (Bay or Harbor Place) to the Ottawa.<sup>33</sup> A fourth village called Little Traverse or Agaming, was located along the south shore of Little Traverse Bay at the modern city of Petoskey.<sup>34</sup> A fifth settlement, smaller than the rest but seemingly as permanent as the others, was located at the lake called Cheboygan by the Ottawa but later renamed Burt Lake after the American surveyor of the region.<sup>35</sup>

The first Ottawa called upon to acculturate were those whose

subsistence patterns were most seriously threatened by American appropriation of resources: the people living along the line of frontier settlement on the Grand River. While title to the traditional core of Ottawa territory lying north of the Grand River to the Straits of Mackinac was not immediately sought by the Americans, lands to the south were rapidly claimed by Americans. Although the Ottawa in this area felt the immediate push for change, they had some control over their fate because they were in a position to provision and trade with the American settlers.

The 1819 Treaty of Saginaw was the first to acquire land inhabited by the Ottawa. The villages at Maple River and Meshimnekahning which the Ottawa had established at the eastern reaches of the Grand River shortly after the War of 1812, were included in the boundaries of this cession. This treaty, however, primarily bought lands identified as belonging to the Chippewa of Saginaw. It was signed by ninety-six Chippewa and only eight Ottawa leaders from the Grand River valley. None of the Ottawa received financial benefit from the treaty. As discussed earlier, most of this land was not highly desired for settlement by American agriculturists. Consequently, there was less economic impact on villages included in this cession than in the region of the later Treaty of 1821.<sup>36</sup> The 1821 Treaty of Chicago directly affected territory and resources claimed by the Ojibwa Ottawa. It included land between the Grand River and the Kalamazoo River, Middle Village of the Thornapple River and winter hunting grounds that the Waganagisi Ottawa had used for more than a century.

The 1821 sale was made at the very time the fur trade reached its

zenith throughout the Lower Peninsula, making the land highly valuable to Ottawa hunters. Between 1816 and 1830 trading posts were established near almost every Ottawa village.<sup>37</sup> In 1816, the American Fur Company placed the Great Lakes region operations under the management of Ramsay Crooks and Robert Stuart, who immediately set about to create a monopoly by co-opting or financially bankrupting their independent competitors.<sup>38</sup> Stuart personally supervised the company's affairs at Mackinac and competed with a number of men who would later be prominent in Ottawa affairs. Other important traders operating in the northern reaches of Ottawa territory included Samuel Abbott, John Drew, Edward Biddle, Michael Douseman, and William Lasley.<sup>39</sup> George and John Johnston (the sons of John Johnston a trader at Sault Ste. Marie) would later move south and also assume important roles in Ottawa politics. Rix Robinson was hired by the American Fur Company to promote trade between the Kalamazoo River in the south and Little Traverse Bay in the north. He operated as many as twenty-seven different posts near various Ottawa and Potawatomi hunting grounds in that region during his career as a fur trader. These included some more permanent centers including one bought from the Ottawa/French Metis Madeline La Frambois near the Forks of the Thornapple River and Grand River in 1821, here Robinson established his home.<sup>40</sup>

Because many independents competed with the American Fur Company, creating fierce competition for all the furs Indians throughout the Great Lakes could produce, the fur trade intensified rapidly in Michigan's Lower Peninsula during the 1820s. Along the Grand River, competition was especially strong. The free traders on the Grand River

included: Louis Campau, who maintained posts at Manistee, Kalamazoo, Lowell, Hastings and Eaton Rapids and settled at the Ottawa Village of Bowting in 1826; Campau's brother Antoine, who first represented Pierre Choteau, Jr., but later became a government interpreter to the Ottawa; the Metis Louis Genereaux of Maple River; and Richard Godfroy formerly of Detroit who also settled Grand Rapids.<sup>41</sup> These men, as we will see, played central roles in Ottawa politics. From contemporary reports it appears that the species of furbearers most demanded by the traders were depleted by increased exploitation during the brief period of intense trade between 1816 and 1830. Competition between them and other traders was further heightened as the fur supply dwindled throughout the 1820s and 1830s.<sup>42</sup>

The annual cycle of resource use that was the base of Ottawa economy in the southern range was irrevocably altered by the American agriculturists who filled counties carved from the 1821 cession. They speeded the decline of fur bearing animals by clearing forests and plowing the prairies, transforming the environment, and by trapping furs themselves. They also relied upon the region's wildlife as a food source while establishing homesteads.<sup>43</sup> Although Indians continued to hunt various species of animals demanded by American and foreign markets for fur and hides, alteration of the environment assured that the Ottawa received an ever smaller portion of the territory's gross product.<sup>44</sup>

Decline of the fur trade economy was also closely related to the expansion of the American market system into Michigan.<sup>45</sup> By 1830 the development of Michigan's agricultural lands and early timber and fishing operations relegated the fur trade to a smaller portion of the

total territorial economy than had been the case in the 1820s.<sup>46</sup> The fur trade had always been a high risk business for traders. It required substantial amounts of capital in credit, and return depended on the uncertainties of nature and loyalty of Indian trading partners; in times of intense competition this could not to be taken for granted. By 1830, the most prominent traders in the south changed the emphasis of their investment to land acquisitions, local development, and to provisioning new settlers, who in contrast with the Indians, had a greater range of material needs and legal accountability for payments.

Cass and other leaders of the Michigan Territory welcomed this maturing of Michigan's economy. As an extractive economic activity, the fur trade could not provide the capital necessary to fund further development in the region.<sup>47</sup> The population growth in the southern region of the Lower Peninsula encouraged eastern capitalists to invest large sums of cash in the purchase and development of agricultural lands and in the founding of towns within the boundaries of the Indian cessions. These activities further encouraged emigration.<sup>48</sup>

During the acceleration of American settlement in the 1820s, the Ojibwa and Ottawa compensated for lost fur revenue by developing their older economic role of provisioning the non-Indian population. Indeed, the rapid rise in the American population afforded them a greatly increased market for corn, vegetables, game, maple sugar, and wild fruits. By the early 1830s, the growing markets of Detroit and Chicago called for large amounts of grains, beef, and pork. By the mid-1830s, roads linked interior farmsteads and settlements to lake ports which were, in turn, linked to east coast markets via the Erie Canal. During



the boom years of the 1830s, prices of most commodities were high, so farmers on new homesteads produced crops and livestock for sale. The Indians furnished them with turkey, passenger pigeons, venison and other wild game, deerskins, blueberries, blackberries, cranberries, honey, moccassins, canoes, and woven baskets.<sup>49</sup> Maple sugar became an important commodity for sale to local settlers, since beet and cane sugar was expensive and supplies limited. Some maple sugar was shipped to Boston and New York, but the bulk of the product remained in Michigan.<sup>50</sup> This is not to say that the Ottawa became profit maximizing capitalists who stored surplus funds for future investment or even for their own use in purchasing consumables. They continued to exchange their produce according to their need for cash or other commodities such as bread, flour, sugar, cloth, gunpowder, and luxury consumables, including alcoholic beverages.

By the mid-1830s, the Owasshinong Ottawa were beset by frontier pressures caused by a rapidly expanding American population, and income sources no longer met subsistence needs. One local resident of Detroit estimated that as many as 2,000 new settlers arrived at their city in a single day in 1834, many on their way to take up homesteads in lower Michigan.<sup>51</sup> Although this incident was probably exceptional, the influx of American settlement reaching to the southern limits of Ottawa territory made it clear to some Ogemuk that they were rapidly becoming a minority in their own territory and were no longer to be masters of their estate. There was, however, no consensus in the Owasshinong villages on whether they should oppose further American settlement in their territory, move north and beyond the line of settlement, or

consider the options available to them under the civilization clause of the Treaty of 1821.

In the northern reaches of the Ottawa territory, the original reliance upon a mixed economy of fishing, farming, and hunting or trapping was not abruptly disrupted by the intensification of fur trade competitions or by American settlement near Ottawa villages. Nevertheless, when the Ottawa share in the fur trade declined, the American Fur Company shifted its interests to more lucrative regions in northern Wisconsin and present day Minnesota.<sup>52</sup> As early as 1827 John Jacob Astor wanted to close the Detroit office. He sold his interest in the northern division of the company to Ramsay Crooks in 1834. Crooks then moved his center of trade to La Pointe on Madeline Island.<sup>53</sup> This move had substantial impact on the northern Ottawa. Although fur company agents continued to buy the Ottawa's reduced stocks of furs, they transferred the blacksmiths, gunsmiths, and other craftsmen to more profitable locations. This factor would greatly influence the course of change in their society during the mid to late 1830s.

The issue of moving north and west beyond the line of settlement or accepting the government sponsored acculturation was not an easy one because it involved changes on all levels of Ottawa society. Acculturation required replacing seasonal cycles of hunting, fishing, and horticulture with a sedentary life of full scale agriculture. To be a successful farmer required capital to purchase tools and livestock and finance the expansion of gardens. In addition, the Ottawa would need to construct appropriate buildings to shelter animals and store hay, grain, and vegetable harvests. The acquiring of capital was foreign to members

of a society that did not sanction individual property in land and was held together by the bonds of reciprocity. The change, then, was not merely an intensification of native horticulture but required adopting American traits of "industry" and "thrift," or the accumulation of capital for private gain, an idea the Ottawa had rejected for two hundred years.<sup>54</sup> It required the division of Ottawa extended families and kinship groups into nuclear family units which was tantamount to complete disruption of the political organization of the society. It also necessitated a complete change in the male role in production; men, not women, would have to work the fields. Thus, becoming American farmers demanded a complete revision of Ottawa world view and associated ritual behaviors.

To compete in the American market also required the Ottawa to know some English, learn basic mathematics, and have some general knowledge about American government and law. The government had made some provision for Ottawa education, but it will was inadequate. In addition, the task of teaching was given to missionaries who linked their services to the Ottawa's renunciation of their belief systems. The issues involved were not easy ones for the Ottawa; they were debated in a long process of dispute and accommodation, division and consensus seeking which will be detailed in subsequent chapters. The decentralized nature of Ottawa socio-political organization allowed each segment of Ottawa society to respond to the pressures of American intervention in the manner it deemed best suited to its own immediate interests. The result was an exacerbation of previously existing tensions between various Ottawa extended families and kin groups along

with shifts in village composition in regions experiencing the highest stress.

To understand the differential effects of the 1830s period of heavy settlement and Ottawa political responses of various groups, it is useful to examine the distribution of Ottawa population at the time. Henry Schoolcraft compiled a list of all Ottawa heads of households entitled to payment under the 1836 treaty and the numbers of their dependents, village by village. His estimates are the most reliable of the period because Indian agents before Schoolcraft did not have the opportunity to meet the Indians face-to-face and gather such detailed information; those who came after Schoolcraft did not make the effort to do so.<sup>55</sup> The largest errors in the count can be identified by careful analysis of documents describing annuity payments of those years.<sup>56</sup> Schoolcraft himself believed the census accurate enough that he included its figures in his history of North American Indians.<sup>57</sup>

The total population of Ottawa villages was estimated at 2,775 persons in 1839.<sup>58</sup> These people lived in the seventeen previously identified villages in Michigan's Lower Peninsula. Another Ottawa band of 67 persons was identified by Schoolcraft as living on Drummond Island, however, these people left the Little Traverse Bay region before the removal period with the majority eventually settling on Manitoulin island.<sup>59</sup> It is uncertain whether they ever affiliated with the Michigan Ottawa for more than brief meetings under British auspices during the American era. The Drummond Island Ottawa are not included in my count.

Approximately 1,214 people (44 percent of the population) lived in

the nine Grand River villages with an average of 134 persons per village.<sup>60</sup> These ranged from approximately 170 people at the horticultural Bowting Village to as few as 50 at Prairie Village, perhaps indicating differences in the economic focuses of the Owashshinong settlements.

The central Ottawa villages, with 317 people, comprised about 11 percent of the population, averaging 106 per settlement. The populations of these villages ranged from 150 at horticultural White River settlement to only 50 at Pere Marquette where hunting and gathering was the predominant economic occupation.

The population affiliated with the five horticultural villages of Waganagisi was 981.<sup>64</sup> Schoolcraft purposely omitted from the 1839 payroll those persons whom he believed had emigrated to Canada to avoid federal removal policy that year. He excluded 105 persons from the band of Apokisigan (Smoking Material) of Ahnumawautikuhmig, 49 from the band of Namouschota (Middle of the Prairie) also from Ahnumawautikuhmig, and an additional 62 from the band of Chingassamc (Big Sail) from Cheboygan, adding yet another 263 persons to the total population.<sup>62</sup> Thus, 1,244 persons were recorded in association with the Waganagisi villages, comprising approximately 45 per cent of the total Ottawa population and averaging 249 persons per village.

The nearly equal distribution of the Ottawa between their northern and southern division is important. Each division had sufficient numbers to make it relatively politically autonomous. This autonomy was enhanced by distance between separated the divisions which was sufficient to make travel seasonal. This sense of division autonomy was

increased as the Americans settled lower Michigan. This is not to say that the division between the Owasshinong and Waganagisi Ottawa was equivalent to that between the Michigan Ottawa and their Ohio relatives. Many northern and southern families continued to meet annually at Mackinac Island and Manitoulin to renew ties of friendship, kinship, and business. The Waganagisi Ottawa also continued their long established practice of wintering along the Kalamazoo River and near hunting camps of the Owasshinong people, maintaining further political continuity. What separated the two groups were differences in the local issues they faced and a heightened sense that neither group could dominate the other to make binding decisions based purely upon their own interests.

There is little data to suggest that the Ottawa experienced significant structural change in the nineteenth century. The essential political bonds remained those between kinsmen, and their political actions were taken through leaders who expressed the consensus of their constituents. It is impossible to determine the number of distinct Ottawa extended families counted at any given time in history. In 1839, Schoolcraft recorded 581 family heads, including widows and widowers, with and without children. While this number may give some indication of the upper limit of possible familial division that year, it says nothing of the genealogical ties along which extended families and kin groups organized for ceremonies, work parties, or the support of an Ogema in the decision making process. A varying number of extended families occupied each of the Ottawa's semi-permanent villages, where they maintained rights to fields and natural resources in the vicinity. Since leaders were only "first among equals," and without coercive

power, each family head had the potential to exercise skills of leadership in organizing his kin around local issues and helping to determine the configuration of his (or, in rare instances, her) society.

The political relationship between autonomous Ottawa political units -- geographical or those based on kinship -- was one of limited unity or coalition around issues of mutual importance. If they stood together to support consensus decisions, they formed a formidable opposition that was difficult to move by political manipulation. Cass tried to do so during negotiations for the treaty of 1821 but reported to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun:

We soon found that so extensive a cession would be impracticable. The Indians who occupy the northwestern corner of this peninsula extending from Thunder Bay to the mouth of Grand River, and including the flourishing settlement of L'Arbre Croche did not attend the general council. And although other portions of the same tribe were present, yet as they lived in different quarters of the country no proposition for a cession of this land could be made to them. The Indians of the same tribe are divided into various political communities with separate interests and separate rights. The inhabitants of one village are unwilling to cede the land of another, and when the distances are considerable, they feel rather as independent bodies, than as members of the same nations.<sup>63</sup>

As will be discussed in Chapter Three, when a treaty was finally made, it was done without group consensus and in violation of Ottawa understandings of land ownership.

During the best of times, consensus between the Ottawa divisions was difficult to obtain; it required careful orchestration of kin group support by the Ogemuk to adopt a course of action. For one or more extended families to act in concert was common; for many families or kin groups to present a united front was virtually unheard of. Because of

this decentralized authority system it was difficult for the Americans to manipulate the decision making process with techniques that fell within the American understanding of "fair play." From the very earliest days, the Ottawa were divided as to which course to take in dealing with Americans who moved into their territory. The drama that resulted from even the earliest American inroads to Ottawa territory will illustrate the method used by the decentralized Ottawa society to make decisions. It will also show how the nature of Ottawa political organization combined with natural resources and a changing position in the regional economy to affect their dealings with the American authorities.



### CHAPTER 3: CONTESTS ON THE FRONTIER

Events arising from the 1821 Treaty of Chicago provide the best evidence for examining the role of decentralized Ottawa socio-political organization in dealings with the Americans. In the aftermath of this treaty, the Ottawa faced both the loss of political autonomy in their homeland and powerful forces for culture change. These set in motion a complex series of political maneuvers within Ottawa society that directly influenced relations with American newcomers. This chapter examines the events between 1821 and 1836, concentrating on political contests between the Americans and the Ottawa for natural resources and political jurisdiction and between those Ottawa leaders who supported the adoption of the "civilized" way of life and those who sought to maintain an earlier cultural adaptation.<sup>1</sup>

#### Cultural Dimensions Of Competition

Tensions created by American settlement on the frontier of Ottawa territory had to be resolved within the prescriptions of both American and Ottawa value systems and institutions. To provide a better understanding of the nature of the post-1821 political contests, I will briefly describe here the cultural constraints that guided actors in the events discussed in later analysis.

When Lewis Cass first sought to win legal title to Ottawa territory, he faced a people who were not demoralized by war or frontier

violence. Because the Ottawa retained access to natural resources within their core territory, they could both sustain their subsistence economy and develop a position as provisioners to the few settlers near their territorial limits. Given their sound economic base, the Ottawa were not easily intimidated into ceding their lands or forced to accept disagreeable cultural changes. Also, as long as they did not provoke violent confrontation with the Americans, Cass also could not press his demands directly upon the Ottawa by military force or open fraud. He was bound by the constraints of an American moral code that stipulated just treatment of the natives and acquisition of their lands through purchase, not by plunder. This code required American officials to negotiate with the Ottawa for legal title to lands and access to resources, as well as for implementation of their policies of "civilization" and "removal."

Americans could create the impetus for culture change and try to convince Indians of its merit, but many times the business had to wait until the Indians had debated issues in council at length and until all political factions aligned to achieve consensus. As will be shown, the Ottawa remained fiercely egalitarian. The power base of their Ogemuk rested in extended families and kin groups. Local leaders remained responsible for resolving conflict, setting an example of moral behavior, and successfully producing and redistributing material wealth. If a man were skilled in these activities, he gained the broader prestige and status to represent his kin group, his village, or even several villages in political dealings with non-Ottawa.

More influential leaders established patron/client relations with

individual Americans which enhanced their ability to provide American commodities for their supporters.<sup>2</sup> High status leaders usually also acted as middlemen in political dealings between the Americans and their own constituents. Both of these roles further enhanced leaders' social positions by allowing them to demonstrate adherence to cultural prescriptions of reciprocity and to display their abilities in oratory and political action. Although leaders were not structurally ranked in Ottawa society, their abilities varied, as did their skills in internal and external politics. Lower status leaders were those who claimed the support of fewer persons and had fewer dealings with Americans.<sup>3</sup> A great deal of the tension that arose in Ottawa society resulted from competition among leaders for more access to American resources and greater prestige.

Much to the chagrin of Americans -- who thought in terms of and valued hierarchical power systems, no Ottawa leader could unilaterally dictate the terms of change nor the course that would be taken in response to any given overture or event. Ottawa norms provided all constituents a voice in the decision-making process. The Ottawa judged the actions and successes of their leaders according to traditional values in a forum of public debate. A failure to represent what one's constituents perceived as their best could result in not only public censure but also ostracism or even death.

There is little specific discussion in nineteenth century documents of the world view that justified and guided the egalitarian Ottawa socio-political system.<sup>4</sup> Those sources that do touch on the topic suggest a complex of beliefs and institutions much like those described

for the Chippewa. Their system was characterized by belief in a superhuman power that pervaded a dangerous universe and influenced all events in human life.<sup>5</sup> This power could assume physical forms, thought of as manitous, a special class of other-than-human persons that could be supplicated in songs, dances and rituals to prevent misfortune in daily life.<sup>6</sup> The Ottawa practiced the vision quest to acquire superhuman guardians. Some Ottawa were also Jesshakids, persons invested with special powers for speaking to animal manitous in the shaking lodge ceremony which was used to divine the future or to find the causes of misfortune.<sup>7</sup> The maintenance and use of superhuman power was also institutionalized in the Midewiwin lodge. This religious institution consisted of a series of ranked roles and trained youth in the use of power for the well-being of the group and the continuation of the universe.<sup>8</sup>

These core beliefs and institutions contributed significantly to the unity of the Ottawa. Culturally, they represented much valued, central elements of the shared moral order. Socially, these institutions linked the widely separated, autonomous, coresidential groups. Although the acquisition of personal superhuman power via the vision quest remained an individual matter, its validation and use were highly public. In such contexts, individuals and groups expressed and reinforced religious values, which prescribed an acceptable range of behavior. Leaders who displayed appropriate concern for the moral basis of Ottawa life were rewarded with esteem and support. Moreover, those who manifestly bolstered their social skills by superhuman means achieved greater influence than others less well endowed. Any Ottawa

who abandoned the superhuman power of the universe was left unprotected in a dangerous world; men in recognized positions of leadership were especially vulnerable in this respect. Consequently, an Ottawa Ogema who accepted Christian practices was seen as turning his back on the core tenets of Ottawa cosmology and the moral principals supported his political status among his constituents.

Ottawa responses to issues of political autonomy, resource use, and culture change depended on a host of factors. Among the most important were the rate and locations of American settlement and the stability of the Ottawa subsistence base. Equally significant was the degree of direct intervention by missionaries, traders, and American officials in local affairs. The following analysis examines the responses of the two largest Ottawa geographical and political divisions, the villages at Owashshinong and those at Waganagisi to demonstrate the differential impact of these factors.

#### Mission Of Civilization At Owashshinong

The Owashshinong Ottawa experienced direct American pressures for cultural change years before their Waganagisi kinsmen. Their proximity to the Lower Peninsula's richest farming territory, village locations along rivers that served as routes for American emigration, and relative proximity to the seat of government at Detroit made them especially vulnerable to interventions in their affairs. At the 1821 Treaty of Chicago, the United States government called on these Ottawa to cede lands important to their economic and political well-being.

Governor Lewis Cass was appointed commissioner to negotiate the

Treaty of Chicago of 1821. When Secretary of War John C. Calhoun instructed him, to treat for as much Ottawa land in the Michigan Territory as the Indians would relinquish. Cass soon learned the difficulties of negotiating with members of a society that was strong but without centralized authority.

The magnitude of the 1821 cession was first restricted when the Waganagisi Ottawa refused to attend the council. By Ottawa rules of land tenure, representatives from each extended family, kin group, or village with interest in the country and resources to be ceded had to be present and in agreement before a sale was concluded. The Owashshinong Ottawa who attended the negotiations refused to sell tracts used by their northern kinsmen and thus prevented Cass from obtaining land containing semi-permanent Ottawa villages.

It appears that the Owashshinong Ottawa opposed sale of their hunting territory along the Kalamazoo as well. Negotiations with the Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Chippewa continued for two weeks before Cass reached a settlement. When the 1821 Treaty of Chicago was drafted, only eight of the sixty-five signatories were Ottawa, one was Chippewa, and the rest were Potawatomi.<sup>9</sup> Lewis Cass later stated that he made the treaty principally through the efforts a single Owashshinong Ogema, Keewaycooshcum (Clouds Pushed Back to the Place they Come From By Other Clouds) from Flat River Village.<sup>10</sup> Although virtually all other influential Owashshinong Ottawa leaders refused to recognize the validity of the cession, the treaty became the basis for a long series of political maneuvers.

This treaty was the first to confront the Owashshinong Ottawa with

the issues embodied in American policy. Cass used the agreement to begin directed Ottawa acculturation by reserving funds for Ottawa and Potawatomi agricultural intensification, a development designed to advance them toward the American ideal of "civilization."<sup>11</sup> Cass established a \$1,000 perpetual annuity, which he believed would adequately compensate the Indians for resources lost to American settlement as well as provide income and capital for development during the cultural transformation. During the 1820s, when competition for Ottawa produced furs remained high and the Indians were still the primary purveyors of corn and other foodstuffs to American traders and settlers, the cash return from these activities was far greater cash returns than that from treaty proceeds. The nearly 1,200 Ojibwa Ottawa received less than one dollar per person annually from the annuity.

More importantly, the treaty set aside \$1,500 annually for ten years to support a blacksmith, a teacher, and a farmer who would instruct the Ottawa in agriculture. Part of this sum could be used to buy cattle and farming equipment. The compound at which these services were based was to be a model operation at a location north of the Grand River to be selected by American authorities.<sup>12</sup> This was in effect a demonstration project, a combination technical school and agriculture extension service. It was the first legally sanctioned center of American jurisdiction in Ottawa territory south of Mackinac.

The Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy was given the responsibility for administering the "civilization" funds from the 1821 treaty. Through his efforts the Americans established the first government supported station on the Grand River. McCoy's "humanitarian" aims sought to raise

the Indians of North America above their degraded station of "barbarism" and teach them the ways of "civilization." As a Baptist minister, he endeavored to complete the transformation by converting the Indians from their traditional beliefs to Christianity. McCoy had hoped to leave his failing Miami mission in the Fort Wayne area, where the Indians were suffering cultural disintegration in the face of American settlement, and move to the more remote villages along the St. Joseph River and northward. The Treaty of Chicago provided him with means to do so.

The United States and Lewis Cass were primarily concerned with the promotion American civilization in Indian territory.<sup>13</sup> Cass instructed McCoy that his duties as a missionary and those under the 1821 treaty were complementary but separate. Though the amount of religious and moral teaching was left to McCoy's discretion, he was to instruct the Indians young and old. Beyond this he was to lure Indian attachments away from the "foreign power" of the British and "inculcate proper sentiments towards the Government of the United States," as well as to prevent depredations against American property. He was to stop Indian use of whiskey and prevent infractions of the trade and intercourse laws by traders and settlers. Whenever possible, McCoy was to direct the Indian economy away from the fur trade toward agriculture because "all prospect of moral improvement must depend upon a previous improvement in their physical condition." Toward this end, McCoy should teach the Ojibwa Ottawa how to spend their annuity money on agricultural implements, to them in their adoption of American customs, and direct the artisans provided in the 1821 treaty.<sup>14</sup>

McCoy's Carey Mission, for the Potawatomi on the St. Joseph River,



was established in 1822. The mission station was well underway by 1823 with at least crude dwellings for students and workers and a school.<sup>15</sup> While some Potawatomi in southern Michigan accepted McCoy's services, the Ojibwa Ottawa resisted. McCoy believed that French Canadian traders who favored Catholic missions hindered Protestant efforts by encouraging Indian opposition. This belief accorded Christian factionalism too large a role. Such factionalism was far less significant in decisions made by the Ottawa than were issues which directly affected the whole society, issues of reciprocity and prestige within the society matters of economy and politics.

In fact, many Ottawa in the nine Ojibwa villages maintained that Keewaycooshcum had no right to negotiate the 1821 treaty and refused to recognize its terms. They believed that, by accepting even the blacksmith (something many local Indians would probably have desired), they would indirectly endorse a land cession that they opposed.<sup>16</sup> Further, Lewis Cass had commissioned Charles Trowbridge, a former Deputy Marshall and young Detroit businessman, to meet with the Indians soon after the treaty. Trowbridge was to locate suitable sites for the Potawatomi and Ottawa missions.<sup>17</sup> There is no record of the Ottawa meeting with him, but the criteria used to locate the mission station became clear when he chose the village of Keewaycooshcum to host McCoy.<sup>18</sup>

It was May 1823 before McCoy had made sufficient progress at Carey to begin his program of cultural change among the Ottawa. He then visited the site chosen by Trowbridge for the mission but the Ottawa would not meet him in council there. So strong was the opposition to

the 1821 treaty and the mission that Keewaycooshcum feared for his life; he was never again allowed to appear as an Ogema in Ottawa councils.<sup>19</sup> Ottawa unity in opposition to the Baptist mission remained so strong that McCoy left the Grand River without locating a site for his operations. He sent the craftsmen hired by the federal government to work for the Ottawa to labor for the Potawatomi instead.<sup>20</sup>

While returning from Grand River to the Potawatomi mission, McCoy was struck by an insight would guide his personal and public goals for Indian peoples for the next twenty years. His failure to promote acceptance of American beliefs and ways, he became convinced, was caused by frontier ruffians whose "adverse influences" turned Indians from the paths of righteousness.<sup>21</sup> Thereafter, he began advocating the removal of Indians from the regions east of the Mississippi River to an Indian colony west of the state of Missouri. He was convinced that, isolated from the vices of the frontier, the Indians could adopt American culture. This idea eventually matured into a full scale plan and lobbying effort during the Monroe, Adams, and Jackson administrations. Although McCoy's message won him some notoriety in Washington, the Ottawa would never fully support a man whose ideas ran so counter to their own.

Despite his preference for removal, McCoy finally did establish the Grand River mission.<sup>22</sup> To win Indian support, he emphasized the economic benefits that would accrue from a blacksmith shop. In October of 1823, he set out for the Kalamazoo River; there he planned to establish a blacksmith shop among some Ottawa families residing on the southern edge of Ottawa territory.<sup>23</sup> He later observed that "the advantages which they would derive from the smithery, and the opportunity which, by

the course, would be afforded of extending our acquaintance among them, we believed, would result in subduing all their jealousies in relation to us."<sup>24</sup> McCoy explained his plans to assist the Kalamazoo people "in improvements, &ct." This group of Ottawa was not averse to the aid, and by the end of November, the shop was constructed.

After the blacksmith shop had been in operation for a short time, McCoy reported that the Indians in the vicinity were "exceedingly pleased with what we had undertaken for their benefit."<sup>25</sup> By his account "three villages" with "nine chiefs" settled around the shop before it was abandoned in 1825. It seems unlikely that these were permanent villages; the Owasshinong village averaged about 130 persons. The "three villages" McCoy refers to were probably the winter camps of several extended families from one or more permanent villages. Evidence for this is that the shop began its operation in late November, the time when people from large villages along the Grand River conducted their winter hunts, and the Kalamazoo River valley was long a traditional Ottawa hunting ground. Moreover, there is no record of a large, permanent Ottawa village in the vicinity after the blacksmith shop closed sometime before November of 1825. To further analyze McCoy's glowing report, we must consider his use of the term "chief." If these were Ottawa hunting parties, then McCoy's use of the term may well indicate the head of an extended family. These were not necessarily leaders of kin groups or the men of influence referred to by the Ottawa as the Ogema.

Although McCoy's report was overly optimistic, clearly, by July of 1825, the Owasshinong Ottawa no longer solidly opposed a blacksmith

shop in their territory. Indeed, those wintering along the Kalamazoo River reported to McCoy that the Grand River villages wanted the shop placed in a more "central and eligible place."<sup>26</sup> In September McCoy sent a deputation to the Owasshinong people to explain his plans for a mission; they were received without incident.<sup>27</sup> In November, the Ottawa at Bowting village sent word to McCoy, again asking for a mission on the Grand River. The message was sent not by Keewaycooshcum whom Governor Cass favored, but by Noaquageshik (Noonday), one of the most influential leaders on the Grand River.

Noaquageshik was an Ogema in good standing among the Ottawa. That he could make overtures to McCoy less than one year after the Owasshinong Ottawa had firmly repudiated the 1821 treaty indicates his high political status among the Grand River communities. It may also indicate a change in sentiments among the people themselves because of favorable experiences at the Kalamazoo River blacksmith shop. Many of his fellow leaders and their constituents still wished to ignore American overtures; nonetheless, Noaquageshik willingly instigated cautious steps toward change, using his prestige to convince the southern Ottawa of the importance of doing so.

It is impossible to reconstruct all the possible motives that lead Noaquageshik to make this invitation to McCoy. The survey and settlement of the 1821 cession lands must certainly have convinced him and other leaders that the government considered the Treaty of Chicago a valid document and that no amount of protest would halt the line of settlement. Perhaps these same leaders realized that the large number of settlers occupying their hunting territories was only the beginning

of their dispossession and that they were no longer immune from direct American intervention. From the very beginning of Noaquageshik's dealings with McCoy and his sponsors, it was clear that this leader sought to promote the intensification of agriculture and, at least nominally, the education of Ottawa children in an American school system.

At Noaquageshik's invitation, McCoy visited the region around Bowting in November 1824. McCoy reported that Noaquageshik requested "oxen and other cattle, yokes, ploughs, chains etc, on behalf of his people, and he desired a school might soon be opened for the instruction of their children and that a teacher in things of religion be furnished them." Noaquageshik's appreciation of his risk in initiating change was apparent when he sought to bind McCoy to his word asking him to guarantee his assurances of assistance in writing.<sup>28</sup> In other respects Noaquageshik conducted this transaction in accordance with established Ottawa rules of reciprocity by showing McCoy a place where he had recently taken a deer and the location of a salt spring and by offering the use of his kettle. For both Ottawa and frontier Americans, who obtained meat by hunting and who valued scarce salt as a highly desirable flavoring and preservative, this information could be of economic importance.<sup>29</sup>

During this trip in 1824, McCoy realized that if he were to receive permission for a mission on the Grand River, it would have to be at a location chosen by the Ottawa themselves, rather than the one selected by Trowbridge at Keewaycooshcum's village on the Flat River.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, acknowledging Ottawa autonomy, McCoy requested permission from

Lewis Cass to locate at Bowting. The governor approved in January of 1825.<sup>31</sup>

Why could Noaquageshik invite McCoy to locate a mission at his village while Keewaycooshcum had met censure for the same proposal?<sup>32</sup> This question can best be answered from the perspective of Ottawa values. At the time McCoy made his initial overtures, few men had sufficient prestige to act as leaders beyond the boundaries of their extended families, especially when issues were as significant as treaties and sweeping cultural changes. Only Noaquageshik, Keewaycooshcum, Sagina of Middle Village on the Thornapple, Muckatosha, who also lived near Bowting, and a very few others had the requisite position, influence and skills to unify their constituents to face such changes. These men formed the generation of elder statesmen.<sup>33</sup> They had fought against the Americans in the War of 1812, and several were with Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames.<sup>34</sup> They were the respected leaders to whom the British had listened and who, in return, were given gifts of manufactured goods which they had distributed to their people to solidify their popular base. Noaquageshik had gained a significant status in dealings with Americans and had already signed three treaties by 1819.<sup>35</sup>

Lewis Cass, who negotiated or was present at all treaties where Noaquageshik had represented his people, recognized the high political position of these most influential Owashshinong Ogemuk when he called on them to witness and sign the 1819 Treaty of Saginaw. The post-1812 Ottawa villages of Meshimnekahning, near modern Portland, and the village of Kookoosh (Pig), near the mouth of the Maple River, were included in this session. Even though these villages were new and the land had

long been associated with the Chippewa of Saginaw, Cass included Ottawa representatives to assure that the cession could not later be questioned as having been negotiated with improper Indian representatives. The Ottawa signers who ceded their villages were Wawubegaquak (hereafter Wabigake) and Kookoosh who were associated with the Maple River village, and Moksauba (Submerged Beaver) and Mawmawkens from Meshimnekahning. Nowkeshuc (Noaquageshik or Noonday), and Meckseonne (Megisinini or Shell [Megis] Man) from Muckatosha's (Blackskin) village south of Noaquageshik's village at Bowting, Shaconk (Sagina, perhaps from Gun Lake) and Kawgeshequm (Keewaycooshcum) of Flat River all participated in the cession even though their villages were not sold.<sup>36</sup> Of these leaders, then, the men who did not reside in the ceded villages were from the vicinity of Bowting or closely allied to people there, except possibly for Keewaycooshcum.<sup>37</sup>

As mentioned previously, Keewaycooshcum had violated the essential egalitarian nature of Ottawa society by defying the opinion of other leaders and their supporters to negotiate the 1821 Treaty of Chicago. These other Ottawa would not allow McCoy to place a blacksmith shop at Flat River village because it would have enhanced Keewaycooshcum's prestige by contributing new services to his people at the expense of other Ottawa. Discredited as a leader, Keewaycooshcum left Flat River in 1829 and Cobmoosa (The Walker) became the presiding Ogema in that village.<sup>38</sup>

Noaquageshik, in contrast, was more successful in having a blacksmith shop located at his village because he had carefully built support among the people in his own village. Creating a large network of af-

final kin was an important means of doing this. Noaquageshik reportedly had no children of his own but adopted several.<sup>39</sup> By this means he acquired additional producers for his household and thus, could provide more gifts to his guests. By liberal giving he won the friendship and support of a large number of people. When Noaquageshik's children married, they extended affinal ties beyond their own village. For example, one of Noaquageshik's daughters married Megisinini, the "young chief" or "Ogemasi" of Muckatosha's village, creating an important political link to one of the most influential leaders in a neighboring village.<sup>40</sup>

Noaquageshik also sought support outside the Ottawa community as demonstrated by the marriage of his sister Sebequay (River Woman) to Rix Robinson, the ranking American Fur Company trader on the Grand River. This affinal kin tie gave Noaquageshik access to trade goods his people desired and to political influence among Americans that other local Ogemuk could not claim.<sup>41</sup> Further, Robinson's home post was at the mouth of the Thornapple River, near the village of Nawbuneegezhig (Hazy Cloud), another prominent leader.<sup>42</sup> The residence of Noaquageshik's sister there assured frequent communication between the villages. Noaquageshik's great influence among the Owashshinong Ogemuk west of the Flat River is demonstrated by his name being the first signature upon most petitions and other formal documents with the United States from 1820 to 1840, even when other prestigious Ottawa men also signed.<sup>43</sup> The 1836 Treaty listed Noaquageshik as one of nine "first class chiefs" on the Grand River.<sup>44</sup>

Although McCoy happily accepted the invitation to provide a school and teachers, he realized that the economic aspects of the contract with



Noaquageshik had to be fulfilled before there could be any hope of success in other matters. He promised that the goods provided in the 1821 treaty would be shipped immediately and sent two men to transport the equipment from the Kalamazoo River blacksmith shop to Bowting. He also asked Lewis Cass to send cattle purchased with money from the civilization provision of the treaty and to hire government employees to build log houses for Noaquageshik and other Indians at Bowting. McCoy hoped that all Ottawa opposition would end once the economic benefits of the mission became apparent.<sup>45</sup>

Since the influence of an Ogema depended in part on his continued ability to provide for his family and friends, Noaquageshik added to his already high prestige by increasing his control over the resources provided in the treaties with the United States and those from the Baptist Mission Board. This move toward greater political consolidation was bound to be challenged by other Ottawa leaders, who desired similar advancements for their own kin and supporters. Thus, resistance to the Protestant mission at Owashshinong came from several sources and involved numerous issues.

The Ottawa who lived west of Nongee's village (at the Forks of the Thornapple River), expressed concern that a blacksmith shop located so far from their homes could not give them adequate service. Keewaycooshcum also immediately expressed his dissatisfaction with McCoy's decision. Of the leading Owashshinong Ogema he alone had signed the 1821 treaty and yet received nothing in return.<sup>46</sup> These and other dissatisfied Ottawa found support for their complaints among the French Canadian and Metis traders living with them. These French speaking

traders, who had spent many years in Michigan, had good reason to oppose the extension of authority by a government that favored the American Fur Company, opposed the profitable whiskey trade and sought to turn the Indians from hunting to sedentary agriculture.

McCoy still believed their opposition arose from the Metis traders' desire to establish a Catholic mission at Bowting. The religious beliefs of a missionary, however, were not of primary importance to the Ottawa there. They were immediately mobilized against the Baptists by rumors that McCoy would keep a portion of their annuities in return for the educations of their children, enslave their children, desecrate the burial grounds, and other similar horrors.<sup>47</sup> Nor were denominational perspectives of major concern to traders. Many were independent merchants such as Louis Genexeau at Maple River, Louis Campau at Bowting, and the Duvernays at the mouth of the Grand River. These men operated outside the auspices of the American Fur Company, whose traders constantly sought to monopolize the Great Lakes trade.

In March of 1825, McCoy sent his brother-in-law, William Polk, along with a blacksmith and his apprentice, and a laborer to Bowting to begin the Thomas Mission. The Ottawa opponents to the mission tried to prevent its establishment by assassinating Polk, whose life was saved by McCoy's Ottawa friend Gosa. Polk returned to Carey Mission on the St. Joseph but left the workers at Thomas to begin their labors. Because of the tangible results produced by mission laborers in a short time, Polk found a few hopeful Indian supporters of the new farming operations when he returned to Thomas in May. The Bowting villagers again expressed desire for schools to educate their children.<sup>48</sup>

The work of building the new mission went slowly. The best efforts of the mission workers proved inadequate to provide direct financial benefit to the more than one thousand people living on the Grand River. There were not enough man-hours or implements available to make new fields for everyone at Bowting, let alone at the other eight village sites. Not enough houses could be erected for everyone, and there were too few cattle to go around.<sup>49</sup>

A number of intoxicated Ottawa who saw little to be gained from the efforts of the mission workers continued to hinder the blacksmiths and farmers with direct physical attacks. One night the workers and Gosa had to barricade themselves inside their cabins with armed sentinels at the doors. The laborers threatened to withdraw from the mission but the Ogemuk promised that no "ardent spirits" would be consumed within eight miles of the mission station and the workers continued. By September, the Baptists had invested some \$1,141 in supplies including livestock, tools, furniture, and provisions. The workers had already constructed two hewn log cabins and plowed twelve acres. By July of 1826 the number of buildings had grown to seven, three of which were cabins built for Indians. Noaquageshik, who owned one of the cabins and Muckatosha, the Ogeema of the village directly south of the mission, were reported to have been most appreciative of the mission efforts and were anxious for the November opening of the school.<sup>50</sup>

McCoy continued to supervise mission staff from his post at Carey mission. Despite McCoy's encouraging reports to Lewis Cass about the progress of Thomas Mission, not even Noaquageshik was satisfied with what had been accomplished by 1827. On the promise of large economic

benefits, he had taken an enormous political risk, but despite many promises and two years of work, little had been delivered. When McCoy held a business meeting in January of 1827, Noaquageshik stated that he had only seen the beginning of the fulfillment of the missionary's pledges. He wanted his children instructed like whites, "Then these educated children will become capable of assisting us in the transaction of business with white people." To underscore the legitimacy of his expectations, Noaquageshik displayed the paper McCoy had written earlier outlining his promises.<sup>51</sup>

If mission progress did not satisfy Noaquageshik who had most directly benefited, others who had no share in the division of goods and services were even more unhappy.<sup>52</sup> The limited support McCoy commanded is reflected in the number of students who enrolled in his school. It opened with five students on December 26, 1826, about the time many extended families moved to their winter hunting territories. By June of 1827, when all of the people had again gathered at Bowting to fish and raise their gardens, the number grew to twenty-five or approximately one quarter of the eligible children living in the immediate vicinity of the mission.<sup>53</sup> The maximum number of mission students never exceeded some three percent of the 780 Ottawa children who lived in the nine major villages on the Grand River as of 1839. During a supervisory visit in February 1827, McCoy noted that Thomas Mission School was regressing with an enrollment of only twelve children. Any school among the Indians would have fewer students in winter because of seasonal hunts, but in this case, the small attendance also involved political dissension; Muckatosha, the Ogema of the lower village at Bowting, refused

speak with McCoy during this visit.<sup>54</sup>

In 1827 two men who would play a major role in future Ottawa responses to American settlement and government policy took residence at Bowting, the a new Baptist missionary named Leonard Slater and the fur trader Louis Campau. McCoy had been ambivalent about the development of a permanent mission at the rapids of the Grand River. From the very start of its operations, he was concerned that anything he did would only be temporary since settlers were rapidly filling the southern two tiers of counties in the Michigan territory and he increasingly favored removal.<sup>55</sup> Leonard Slater did not share McCoy's views on Indian removal, however. While McCoy was in Washington promoting removal and Indian resettlement in the west, Slater set about to construct a permanent settlement at Bowting where the Indians would learn American ways and become self-supporting, American, Christian agrarians.<sup>56</sup> The two Baptists would later clash over removal during 1836 negotiations for Ottawa homelands.

Louis Campau's arrival at Bowting in 1827 marked the beginning of permanent American settlement on the Grand River. He quickly built a house, a trading post, and a blacksmith shop on the south side of the river, opposite the Baptist mission, on land ceded in the 1821 treaty. Unlike most other Euroamericans, Campau intended to stay in the region and brought his French-speaking wife to the rapids in 1828.<sup>57</sup> He relied heavily on Ottawa fur production for his livelihood during his first few years on the Grand River and dealt out beatings to Indians he suspected of selling their pelts to his competitors.<sup>58</sup> Campau, however, looked forward to the day when the lands he bought from the United States in

1821 would grow in cash value as the demand by American settlers for prime agricultural acreage increased. Hence, it was not in his best interests to have a permanent Indian settlement adjacent to his lands. Campau and other traders were especially opposed to Slater's Protestant settlement, particularly since the missionary worked through government channels to limit their unrestrained methods of trade and illegal sales of alcoholic beverages.<sup>59</sup> Campau's strategy for opposing Slater's program was to build on an established social division at Bowting, that between the villages of Noaquageshik and Muckatosha, as well as on the disagreements between those leaders and Ottawa living in the easterly Grand River villages. Since many men, like Keewaycooshcum, felt slighted in the distribution of American goods and services through Protestant missionaries, Campau found willing allies. This competition eventually sharpened, pitting those Ogemuk who favored the official American program of civilization propagated by Protestants against those who looked to the French speaking traders and the Catholic church for financial support and political patronage.

After Leonard Slater assumed full control of Thomas Mission in 1828, Isaac McCoy launched his first concerted effort to convince the Owashshinong Ottawa to move west of the Mississippi River.<sup>60</sup> He planned an exploratory journey to western lands even before the Baptist missionary board of the federal government authorized such a trip. McCoy intended pay travel expenses by selling the Potawatomi's Carey Mission improvements in a proposed treaty to be held at there later in the year. He would supplement this money with his own salary.<sup>61</sup>

McCoy reported that the Ottawa clearly recognized the implications

of sending a delegation to explore land in the west and that they stood firm against removal. Delegates demanded support for their families during their absence before they would even consider leaving. When the price was arranged it was agreed that Noaquageshik and Wesauogana [Sagina?] would accompany McCoy.<sup>62</sup> Gosa joined these two high status leaders. It is difficult to access the motives of Noaquageshik and Wesauogana. They may have actually considered moving beyond the line of American settlement, but it is more likely that they exercised the prerogative of their status -- to serve the interests of their people in this exploration. The Ottawa believed these men trustworthy and relied on them to honestly access the western territory. At the same time, they could be counted upon to make no decisions regarding removal without the full consent of their followers. McCoy, in turn, wanted these influential men to accompany him in hopes they would either arbitrarily agree to removal or later advocate such a move among the people.

Gosa, on the other hand, had no right to make any decisions of importance. He is mentioned often in McCoy's work as his "friend," whom he had met on the Kalamazoo River.<sup>63</sup> Gosa was at one time recognized as a leader by the British, but in 1817 he had made several unjustified demands for supplies at Drummond Island. When the British Commander rejected his request, Gosa returned his British medal and flag, a repudiation of alliance blessed by Thomas Anderson, the local Indian agent. Anderson characterized Gosa as "not being a man of respectability amongst the Indians" one who drank substantial quantities of alcohol. The British then took steps to ensure that Gosa not be given supplies in the future.<sup>64</sup> Hence, he lost prestige among the Ottawa, and by the time

of McCoy's visit to the Kalamazoo, Gosa represented only his family. His attachment to McCoy may be interpreted as an attempt to regain lost prestige and status by maintaining access to McCoy's funds and favors. Gosa eventually accompanied McCoy to Kansas and remained there.

Following a tour of the country along the Osage River in Kansas, McCoy reported that all the delegates except Noaquageshik had agreed to move there.<sup>65</sup> But without federal pressure to force Ottawa removal and with the firm declaration of their important leaders against such a move, McCoy could not realize his goal. Many Owashshinong Ottawa more strongly supported McCoy's missionary antagonist, Leonard Slater, who promoted local agricultural development. It is doubtful that many of Leonard Slater's political supporters at Owashshinong fully endorsed his cultural program. Nonetheless, in the heat of competition between the missionaries, the most important Ogemuk, living between the mouth of the Grand River and the mouth of the Flat River, supported Slater.<sup>66</sup>

As the pressure of American settlement bore more directly on the Owashshinong Ottawa, divisions between the extended families, kin groups and villages were exacerbated until full-fledged factions developed in the 1830s. The most prevalent complaint made by the Ottawa on the Grand River in the late 1820s continued to be that, despite the promises and efforts of the missionaries, economic development was too slow. Noaquageshik and Muckatosha suggested to Lewis Cass, "You have sent us two men to make houses. We shall shake with cold many winters before we all have houses." By 1821 Slater had full control of Thomas Mission, and McCoy's opinions about removal could no longer impede his program. That year, at Slater's bidding, the Bowting Ottawa asked Lewis Cass to



withhold \$600 from their annuity to construct a mill so that they could saw their own timber for houses and outbuildings and grind their corn.<sup>67</sup>

There is little record of interactions between Ottawa Ogemuk or between them and the Americans on the Grand River during 1830 and 1831, the years the land on the south side of the rapids was offered for sale by the United States General Land Office. From later reports it is evident that the Indians built their sawmill with a portion of the annuity funds applied by Noaquageshik and his supporters. The mill turned profits which stimulated growth at Bowting. One American man alone purchased \$500 worth of sawed lumber from it, returning almost the entire investment.<sup>68</sup> The government continued to supply the services of a blacksmith and a teacher, as well as providing cattle and tools. Still, the dispensation of these goods and services depended upon the temperament and good graces of Leonard Slater who treated provisions from the 1821 cession as if they were his to dispense as gifts. To make matters worse, he delivered them only to those Indians associated with Thomas Mission. This practice brought loud complaints from those extended families and kin groups who were not in Slater's favor and, thus, received a lesser share of the payments.

By 1832 tensions between Louis Campau (with his French/Metis relatives and colleagues) and Leonard Slater intensified. Slater's Ottawa supporters drafted petitions to Governor George Porter complaining of their Euroamerican neighbors. Among other matters, they protested whiskey selling on their land, the raping of Ottawa women, and Campau's beating of Indians for supposed infractions of trade credit agreements. Slater claimed this kind of behavior happened so frequently that the

government should intervene.<sup>69</sup>

The Ottawa on the Grand River who were associated with Slater's mission staff had discussed the possibility of asking the government to buy them a tract of land within the territory ceded in the 1821 treaty. The acting Secretary of War, however, rejected this innovation, asserting that the purchase of land by the government for collective ownership by Indians would defeat the removal policy. On the other hand, he declared individual Ottawa could buy land to be held as private property and informed the Governor of Michigan that it would be proper to aid the Ottawa in making their purchases.<sup>70</sup>

If the Bowting Indians bought land near their village and mission improvements, Campau would lose in two important ways. First, the town of Grand Rapids which he had platted and registered in 1833 would be bordered by an Indian settlement, lowering the value of the lots he wished to sell.<sup>71</sup> Second, his share of the annuity money against which he had issued the Indians credit would be lessened. Because there was no procedure of foreclosure on Indian lands for debt, Campau might never collect on some outstanding accounts. The Indians, realizing that if their money fell into Campau's hands they might never see it again, asked the government paymaster not to deliver the money at the trader's house.<sup>72</sup> Campau, therefore, mobilized his Ottawa clients and supporters to oppose any plans supported by Slater.

Campau's first move to prevent land purchases and the success of Slater's mission was to discredit the civilization programs that the missionary had contracted with the federal government to perform. Those Ottawa most closely affiliated with Campau sent a petition to Governor

Porter stating their dissatisfaction with Slater's conduct and his use of their education fund money. Porter immediately sent this petition to Daniel Kurtz, Indian office Chief Clerk, bookkeeper, and sometimes acting Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Kurtz then wrote to the President of the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions, instructing him to withhold funding from Slater until the matter was adjusted.<sup>73</sup>

Slater corresponded directly with Lewis Cass in this matter, defending his past actions and the quality of services to the Ottawa. He pointed out that Keewaycooshcum made the original complaint at the instigation of an unnamed "French Trader," implying the influence of Campau in the matter. Slater reported to Cass that he had offered to extend mission services to Keewaycooshcum, to build him a house and enclose a field for him, but the former Ogemaw had refused the offers.<sup>74</sup> That Keewaycooshcum refused to receive mission services should have been no news to Cass. Keewaycooshcum himself had admitted his previous reluctance to use the services of Thomas Mission on December, 1830, when he stated his intention to move nearer the site to get some benefit from it.<sup>75</sup> As further support for his contention that Owasshinong Ottawa supported his program. Slater forwarded a petition signed by the most important leaders at Bowting, Nongee's village at the mouth of the Thornapple River, and the former village of Keewaycooshcum at Flat River. The Ogemaw there expressed their satisfaction with Slater's teaching and stressed the importance of the blacksmith services they received, as well as the usefulness of the agricultural workers at the mission.<sup>76</sup> They acknowledged that Keewaycooshcum and perhaps others had not benefited from the mission but firmly said that these Indians had

the same opportunities as the others to adopt the ways taught by the missionaries and had refused to do so.

The dispute between Campau and Slater escalated in 1833 when Campau invited the Catholic priest Friedrich Baraga to found a mission at Bowting. Baraga placed his Mission of St. Mary on unceded Ottawa land on the north side of the river, near Muckatosha's village, less than one eighth mile south of the Baptist mission. The resulting competition between the Protestants and Catholics for an Ottawa following caused a great deal of social dissension at Bowting.<sup>77</sup>

By 1834 the Owashshinong Ottawa faced the direct possibility of removal west of the Mississippi River. They discussed the subject in their councils, as did settlers who crowded the lands south of Ottawa villages. It was talked of in the east by land speculators and investors who wished to profit from the inflated land prices, as well as by men in government circles.<sup>78</sup> In such times, it was important that the Ottawa at Bowting have missionary support to act as liaison between themselves and the government to help prevent removal. But, to assure missionary support, the Indians had to conform to American ideals.

From the earliest days of their mission, the Baptists taught a world view which ran counter to the Ottawa cosmology and behavioral prescripts. The Protestants demanded that converts disassociate themselves from the rituals, ceremonies, and feasts which they believed to perpetuated the well-being of the community. Missionaries accompanied this demand with an insistence on revised sex roles in which men, not women, cultivated fields. They also encouraged capital accumulation to finance agricultural expansion. This innovation threatened to undo the

fabric of the society by ending the culturally prescribed pattern of reciprocal giving.

As competition between the traders and missionaries grew, Ogemuk at Bowting solidified their support for their several chosen allies. If they elected to support the Baptist who controlled their treaty proceeds, they picked the road of Americanization. Noaquageshik described their views of this development to Governor Porter, saying:

There! You whose residence is Detroit it is so. Your children have feeling the same (those of us who are Indians) as those white people who are your children. . . . The laborers you furnished us have worked where we live. It was so, they made fences also fields. They assisted us also in rearing horses. We were very glad when they were with us. Cattle also you gave to assist in ploughing for us. Our friends, some of them refused to take cattle to plough. Myself and young men only ploughed with them. Since we have used the cattle we have plenty of food. I informed your predecessor [Cass] we wanted a mill and would give our money to erect one. We now have a mill and tolerable many boarders. Now the teacher you gave us, that is the reason we have something. He has taught us good words and humility and everything good to avoid everything bad.<sup>79</sup>

If, on the other hand, the Owashshinong Ottawa aligned themselves with the Catholics, they chose a route toward change that allowed them greater latitude in determining the kind and speed of innovations. Most often this involved a continued reliance upon the traditional seasonal cycle of subsistence, extracted from the region's natural resources.

The different expectations of the Catholic and Protestant missions for culture change on the Grand River were striking. Slater called for complete cultural revision as promoted by federal Indian policy, with the ideal of creating sedentary farmers. Baraga, on the other hand, fully realized the importance of hunting to the native economy. He did not have the financial and political backing of the Office of Indian Affairs or the federal government. He could not build a model farm and

request such sweeping changes as did McCoy or Slater. Thus, traditional production remained crucial in the support of his parishioners. Further, Baraga had been called to the region by Campau and the French Canadians living with him. Some of his French parishioners continued to sell native produce from hunting and gathering; they did not wish to see the Indians settled in agricultural communities as long as there was any chance of profiting from their foraging adaptations. The Ottawa pleased Baraga, for example, by increasing their maple sugar production sufficiently to provide income to replace that gained earlier from hunting. This allowed them to attend Mass more regularly on Sundays and confession on the most important Christian holidays.<sup>80</sup>

Even with these changes, only those Ottawa living between Fort Village and Prairie Village were directly affected by any missionary activities at all.<sup>81</sup> Approximately nineteen families comprised the Bowting Baptists.<sup>82</sup> When the Baptists left Bowting in 1836, ninety-one persons or (about seven percent of the Grand River population of 1214) accompanied them.<sup>83</sup> Baraga's influence was primarily with Muckatosha's band. By his own account, this band numbered only fifty-three persons (four percent of the Grand River population).<sup>84</sup> There is no indication that the remaining Owashshinong villages took sides in the factional disputes caused by the two missions at Bowting. They received no missionaries at their villages until the mid-1840s, when American settlers surrounded their homes and cultural change became imperative. Before that time, however, the leaders of outlying villages supported whichever mission faction best represented their political and economic interests without challenging their own autonomy.

As the influx of Americans in the southern portion of Ottawa territory during the "land boom" (1834 to 1837) threatened the Ottawa natural resources and hence their economy, it became more critical that they obtain a share of the economic benefits from their earlier treaties. The leaders who supported Campau and Baraga represented those extended families who believed that Slater had denied them goods and services. They were likely to be culturally conservative, seeking to continue native economic systems and to have autonomy greater than that allowed by Slater.

The tension between the two major Christian Ottawa factions at Bowting appears to have remained relatively constant between 1833 and 1836, at times flaring to open violence. Slater viewed the priest's presence as a direct threat to his mission and an undercutting of his religious instruction. In May of 1834 he again petitioned Governor Porter to have Baraga removed from St. Mary's Mission because of the conflicts his presence caused between the Indians.<sup>85</sup> Slater also forwarded a petition signed by the recognized family heads and leaders of the Baptist Ottawa at Bowting. Noaquageshik characterized the situation there as:

very hard. We are all the time lonesome. This is the reason we are lonesome, where we have endeavored to be in health and to love one another. There came among us a foreigner [Friedrich Baraga] a white man who separates near friends. Now hatred and variance is among us. Everything that is bad is now in our village. We are all of one mind that sit here in council, that you should tell this white man to go away from our village. 86

Across the river at Grand Rapids business went well for Baraga's Euroamerican patrons through 1834. Louis Campau had built the city's

first hotel and improved the portion of his plat nearest the Grand River. Settlers had already begun to purchase his lots. Campau hired laborers to dig a mill race around the rapids of the Grand River to allow for more efficient use of the water power there. Brick yards, blacksmith shops, furniture shops and stores all began operations at Grand Rapids in 1834 and 1835.<sup>87</sup> With these local developments, Slater had difficulty attaining his ministerial objectives. Baraga did not leave the rapids of the Grand until later in 1835, then only after several attempts on his life. Even though Governor Porter supported Baraga's right to remain at Bowting, federal officials asked the priest to leave his post.<sup>88</sup> The next clergyman to serve the Catholic community at Grand Rapids held services in a church built by Louis Campau on the south side of the Grand River, on land Keewaycooshcum had ceded in 1821.

Baraga's departure from Bowting did not end hostilities between Campau and Slater. Those Indians who did business with the entrepreneur still complained to territorial and federal officials about Slater's handling of treaty funds and mission operations in general. In 1836 Governor Stevens Mason sent special agent Kintzing Pritchett to Grand Rapids to investigate Ottawa complaints against Leonard Slater. A delegation of twelve Ogemuk and family heads lead by Muckatosha and Megisinini met with him. They complained that the treaty-stipulated term of Slater's mission had expired and that Americans living north and west of the Grand River intruded on their territory. They said they had sold their land to get a farmer and blacksmith for ten years, but only mission Indians benefited from these services. Non-Baptist Ottawa



received nothing from these blacksmith services, government livestock, and the mission school. They further complained that even though they had contributed money to construct the sawmill at the rapids, they received nothing from it. Pritchett did not accept these complaints at face value, observing astutely that many latent interests underlaid the disputes and that they would require fuller investigation.<sup>89</sup>

Polarization of Ottawa political organization resulted from the settlement of the Grand River valley at Bowting. Facing the issues of economic change and political encapsulation was difficult enough; the conflicting interests of traders and missionaries, government officials and Indians aggravated an already tense situation. In 1835 many settlers and territorial officials openly promoted a policy of more immediate consequence -- removal of the Ottawa to lands west of the Mississippi River. While Kintzing Pritchett investigated Ottawa complaints against the Americans with whom they dealt daily, he also took time to test Indian opinion of a sale of all their lands within the boundaries of the Lower Peninsula. Pritchett assured the Governor that the Indians themselves had discussed the same matter in frequent councils and that they "were not only willing but desirous to treat."<sup>90</sup> Despite this optimism, the United States would have a most difficult time in uniting the Ojibwa Ottawa for negotiating a treaty in 1836.

#### The Civilized North

When the Americans took possession of Mackinac Island after the War of 1812, they did not step across a clearly defined line from civilized

living into a wilderness. Rather, they were welcomed by a French/Metis and Indian population who had lived and worked together for more than one hundred and fifty years. They found wealthy and influential French Canadian and British men who had married daughters and granddaughters of important Ottawa leaders. The island was then, as it had been for more than a century, an outpost of Euroamerican civilization in a wilderness. It had over a hundred houses and nearly four hundred permanent residents, who hosted the annual brigades of visiting fur traders with festivities after their return from a winter in the woods.<sup>91</sup> The wealthiest families lived in large frame houses filled with luxuries suitable for entertaining dignitaries from European countries and the most refined American visitors in a fashion well beyond that possible in most frontier towns. They educated their children in European and large American cities, and the new generation often returned to the Straits of Mackinac to assume high social and economic positions.

The Ottawa and Euroamerican residents of Mackinac often pursued and maintained political and economic relations regularly cemented with the traditional bonds of kinship. Ottawa women who married Frenchmen were not confined to their households and island habitations. Those who married traders, for instance, freely accompanied their husbands on expeditions to Ottawa villages and annually renewed their kinship ties there. Madeline La Frambois, the grand-daughter of the Ottawa leader Kewiniquot (Returning Cloud), is a striking example of this close interaction between the French and Ottawa.

Born Madeline Marcotte, she had married the trader Joseph La Frambois, who as early as the 1780s maintained posts in the Grand

River valley from his base on Mackinac Island. Madeline spoke Ottawa and French fluently and accompanied La Frambois on his trading missions among her Ottawa relatives. When a disgruntled Indian killed her husband during a trading expedition in 1809, she continued her trip to their posts on the Grand River, accompanied by her slaves and a crew of twelve men. She continued to conduct her winter trading for many years after her husband's death, reaping substantial profit from her operations until Rix Robinson bought her posts for the American Fur Company in 1821.<sup>92</sup>

On Mackinac Island, in a society where women were not discredited for their sex and racial origins, Madame Frambois held notable rank. She kept a large well staffed house and regularly entertained American soldiers from the Mackinac garrison, as well as visiting dignitaries. Her children were educated in Montreal, and she provided schooling locally for deserving Metis girls who could not afford outside training. She was the largest single patron of the Catholic Church on the island and was buried beneath the altar of the church building constructed in the mid-1820s. Madeline's daughter, Josette, married Captain Benjamin K. Pierce, whose brother Franklin became President of the United States. Despite her social standing among the wealthiest people in the territory, Madeline did not completely abandon her identity as an Ottawa woman and was as likely to attend formal weddings in an Ottawa costume of ribbon applique as in a silk gown. The Americans greatly respected Madeline for her talents, and the Indians relied upon her as both trader and advisor.<sup>93</sup>

Madeline was not an exception at Mackinac. Many women of Indian

descent participated directly in the economic, social, and political activities of their time. One Ottawa woman for example, married the English surgeon Dr. David Mitchell. When the Americans took possession of Mackinac Island, Dr. Mitchell moved to Drummond Island. His wife, who had never learned to speak English, and their two daughters chose to remain in their home at Mackinac from fall to spring to continue their fur trade operations. They visited Drummond Island only in summer. The Mitchells were among the wealthiest people on the island, maintaining the largest and most elegant home there. The daughters were schooled in Europe and, on their return, hosted the island's grandest social events. Another notable Ottawa woman of Mackinac was Agatha Bailey, the Ottawa step-daughter of the trader Joseph Bailey. She married Edward Biddle, whose brother Nicholas was then the President of the United States Bank.<sup>94</sup> Biddle maintained trade and political relations with the Ottawa throughout the treaty era. Many other Ottawa women married less wealthy and prominent men of European descent. They became the wives of bakers, shoemakers, blacksmiths, fishermen, carpenters and other providers of service at the Straits of Mackinac. As such, they provided hospitality to their Indian relatives during their annual summer visits to the Island. Ottawa people relied on the services of some of these and, in some instances, learned trades from their husbands.

Ottawa, French, or British, the people at the Straits of Mackinac relied upon the same natural resources for subsistence and trade from the earliest days of the Mackinac fur trade until the coming of the Americans. Without furs, fish, corn, and maple sugar the regional economy would have died. Americans counted the similarities between the

Ottawa's own mixed horticultural, fishing, and trapping lifestyle and that of their Metis kinsmen, and found that the Waganagisi Ottawa came closer to the ideal of civilization than did many of the neighboring Indian groups. Indeed, during the eighteenth century, these Ottawa provided the largest share of locally produced food commodities. However, as the permanent European and Metis population grew at the Straits, they and the Indian women who married them provided an increasingly larger share of the foodstuffs for the local fur trade market. Many residents of Mackinac Island and St. Ignace maintained fishing stations and maple groves and followed a portion of the same annual rounds as did the Ottawa. Until the Americans came, they maintained a working agreement with their Ottawa kinsmen and clients regarding the use of lands and resources.<sup>95</sup> Indeed, together resident Euroamericans and the Ottawa formed a symbiotic economic and cultural relationship with closely entwined interests, a system that incoming Americans found difficult to penetrate or challenge. Thus, the Americans had to build their influence within a preestablished social order. They could not simply send agents and missionaries to promote their brand of civilization at Mackinac without considering powerful political relationships between the Ottawa and Metis.

As indicated in Chapter Two, the Ottawa lived along the shores of Lake Michigan, between the Straits of Mackinac and the southern shores of Little Traverse Bay. These Ottawa did not face immediate crisis in their dealings with the Americans. Since they and their Metis relatives remained economically interdependent, their political interests often coincided and the Ottawa could count on assistance in resisting un-

popular American policies and interventions in their affairs.

The Ottawa had refused to cede their territory and resources in 1821. With their land base intact, did not have the immediate subsistence or economic needs that would make American advances and propositions attractive. The slower rate of American settlement and the less drastic pressures for economic change, however, only slowed the process of cultural change at Waganagisi. Throughout the 1820s, Ottawa there were compelled to cope with declining income as the fur bearing species in their district diminished.<sup>96</sup> This loss was balanced somewhat since even the small increases of Metis and American populations in the Mackinac region created a larger market for Ottawa fish and maple sugar.

Although the Ottawa at Waganagisi maintained a horticultural and fishing economic system that resembled that of the less wealthy Metis at Mackinac and St. Ignace, the incoming American officials did not count them as fully "civilized." So long as the Ottawa spoke their own language, held their native world view, continued their cycle of feasts and ceremonies, lived in non-permanent dwellings, and continued to dress in their accustomed manner, they could not fully participate in the American social system. American residents and officials saw the need to promote and preserve their own version of civilized living as they had tried to do in the south. The political disputes that arose in northern Ottawa society over implementing the American civilization policy, however, reached a far different resolution than they had in the south. By the mid-1830s, American officials, Catholic clergy, and northern Ottawa leaders themselves touted the Waganagisi Ottawa as the most civilized Indians in the western Great Lakes.<sup>97</sup>

Unlike in the Owashshinong communities, the impetus for a new round of culture change at Waganagisi came from within the society and was promoted by some of the most influential Ogemuk. Heads of kin groups, particularly those at Ahptuhwaing or Middle Village, jointly petitioned the Catholic Church and the American government to establish a mission at their village during the early 1820s.<sup>98</sup> They did so partially in response to their own changing economic position in the American system and partially in response to changes in the intricate social and political balances within the broader Mackinac society.

The earliest Americans at Mackinac worked closely with the primarily Metis, Catholic social establishment of Mackinac traders, political leaders, and the general population. The Cass administration sought to develop and maintain American influence and military presence at this strategic outpost. A secure Mackinac community was important since it was situated upon the major thoroughfare upon used by all Indians of the Northwest Territory for their annual trips to British territory for presents.<sup>99</sup> The soldiers of the American garrison were happy to participate in the social life of Mackinac Island, and many found wives among the people there.<sup>100</sup> The American Fur Company relied upon the services of such skilled traders as Mrs. La Frambois and on the local population for boatmen and craftsmen for their operations. George Boyd, second Indian Agent of the Michigan Superintendency, fully participated in local society even sending his children to school among the Indians.<sup>101</sup> By 1823, however, the earlier atmosphere of cooperation that had pervaded relations between the American newcomers and the established community vanished as American ideals of civilized living

clashed with those of the island's older residents. This clash took place primarily along religious denomination lines.

The Jesuits had been expelled from their missions at the Straits of Mackinac during the turbulent 1760s. Priests of other orders had thereafter visited the region occasionally, though they had no permanent church building. In 1823, the Presbyterian preacher William Ferry began a government funded mission school for the northern Indians, which he staffed with teachers from New England. The mission attracted many Metis students from Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and for a time appeared to prosper. The staff's search for converts soon spread beyond the bounds of the mission compound. As one observer commented,

Proselytizing seemed to pervade the atmosphere of the whole establishment. Every one seemed to feel it her duty to make a convert daily. For a while the Presbyterians had full sway; then the Roman Catholics took a decided stand against them. . . . It really seemed a religious war. One had to be either a Presbyterian or a Roman Catholic, in those days; nothing else would for a moment be tolerated.<sup>102</sup>

The Presbyterians not only challenged the religious beliefs of Mackinac inhabitants, they also sought to impose their own sense of morality and social propriety upon the "free-livers, free drinkers and infidels" among the older inhabitants and fur traders.<sup>103</sup>

The old Mackinac residents did not always willingly accept these new religious messages from the east. The above assessment indicates the sharp division the early residents saw between themselves and the New England Americans who came to impose their ways on the local scene. In the midst of these denominational conflicts, the Ottawa of Waganagisi identified with the Catholics, their relatives and old traders, and they rejected all attempts of the Protestants to press cultural and political



reforms on them. This decision had important ramifications for the Ottawa.

During this Catholic-Protestant competition for converts, priests began to visit regularly the Waganagisi Ottawa. Scarcely fifty years after the Jesuits had left their Ottawa mission, the visiting missionaries reported that few vestiges remained of nearly one hundred years of Catholic labors. The Ottawa could recite apocryphal tales of Father Marquette, and one of the oldest Indians had been baptized. There remained the remnant of an old chapel and a wooden cross at the village the Ottawa called Ahnumawautikuhmig (Pray Tree Place, or Cross Place) or Cross Village, the northernmost village at the Straits.<sup>104</sup> This object was treated very much like the red-painted posts that stood outside the doors of Ottawa lodges, decorated with amulets to protect the residents from illness. The Indians considered this relic sacred.<sup>105</sup> Beyond that, the Catholic faith was absent in their villages.

One portion of the Catholic tradition remained more firmly entrenched than the priests suspected. The Waganagisi Ottawa associated Catholic clergy with a golden age of economic security and political power. When the Jesuits had lived in Ahnumawautikuhmig the Ottawa held political power and wealth from provisioning the Mackinac trade. They had fallen from this important lucrative position as the British and now the Americans consolidated their control over the trade. Some Waganagisi people had even intensified their hunting and trapping as occupations, following the hunts as far west as Saskatchewan only to find no future at the end of the trail.

Following the renewed interest shown by the priests for estab-

lishing a new Waganagisi mission, eight Ottawa leaders petitioned President Monroe in August 1823 to request a Catholic missionary to live permanently in their village. Perhaps the Ottawa leaders of Aptuhwaing had caught the spirit of the conflict between the sects at Mackinac Island. They may have sensed political benefits from aligning themselves to the old residents of Mackinac Island and their Catholic affiliation. It is more likely, however, that the Ottawa leaders sought to bring back the heyday of Ottawa affluence. When the new priests began making regular stops at Waganagisi, for example, the Ottawa referred several times to their eighteenth century experiences under Father DuJaunay. They clearly recalled that missionary's aid in intensifying horticulture and the days of affluence.<sup>106</sup> The movement toward the beginnings of what may be termed a "revitalization" movement was started by men who had participated in the hunting culture of the fur trade until the early 1820s. For example, at the head of the list of signatories of the 1823 petition was Mackatabenese (Black Hawk). Only a few years before this petition was drafted, Mackatabenese still hunted in the Red River region of Manitoba for a living.<sup>107</sup>

The programs of Ottawa leaders and American officials agreed on one key feature. The Ottawa sought to intensify their agricultural production for market sale. Hence, they voluntarily adopted a key feature of the American civilization program. Ottawa leaders were well aware of this congruence and sought to secure a priest for their village by presenting their request as a "progressive" move toward "civilization." Fearing that the petition might fail, Mackatabenese addressed a letter to President Monroe in December 1823. Mackatabenese tied his request

for a priest to the United States civilization program by asking that land be cleared for Indians to cultivate and promising to obey the wishes of the clergyman.<sup>103</sup> Federal officials took no action on this request since all funds available for Ottawa civilization had already been distributed to the Baptists on the Grand River.

The invitation of Waganagisi leaders to Catholic priests was not a purely political phenomenon. The religious features of Catholicism were first interpreted in nineteenth century Waganagisi villages by Andowish, probably a kinsman of one of the leaders who had invited the priest. In 1824 Andowish returned from Montreal where he had converted to Christianity and learned church songs and rituals. At Waganagisi, he began teaching his family the rites.<sup>109</sup> Although Catholic priests saw this man as a catechist, the Ottawa freely interpreted his teachings in the context of their own religious views. Ottawa people respected the superhuman powers this man claimed just as they would those of any other religious specialist in their society, and they learned the songs and rites that objectified Andowish's newfound power. The teachings apparently gained a considerable following. Apokisigan (Smoking Mixture), whom the priests later characterized as "the Great Chief of the Indians," "The most famous warrior of the tribe" and "the venerable patriarch" received instruction.<sup>110</sup>

Once Apokisigan had accepted Catholic teachings as interpreted by Andowish, he too used his influence to bring a priest to his village. He conferred with his Metis relatives at Mackinac Island and asked them what course the Indians should take in this matter, and they promised to help their Ottawa relatives recruit a priest in any way possible.<sup>111</sup>

Father Gabriel Richard, whose charge included Detroit and the entire outlying Michigan Territory, had visited the Ottawa several times between 1799 and 1821. When the Ottawa began petitioning for a missionary to live among them, Gabriel could not oblige their request. Instead, he sent Father J. V. Badin to visit to the Catholic settlements in Michigan and Wisconsin. In July 1826, Badin paid a short visit to Waganagisi where he received a formal welcome by Apokisigan and his followers.

Badin found that the Ahptuhwaing residents, hearing of his imminent approach, had constructed a log chapel covered with bark and lined with planks. Badin did not remain long at Waganagisi but made a tour to British controlled Drummond Island, Mackinac, Sault Ste. Marie, and Green Bay. Following this journey, Badin returned to Waganagisi, said Mass in the chapel constructed for his first visit, and baptized those people who he judged sufficiently instructed (apparently by Andowish) in the rites of the church. The priest also presented Apokisigan with a medal suspended on a scarlet ribbon in an elaborate ceremony observed by the elder Ogema's supporters.<sup>112</sup> By this act Badin recognized Apokisigan's high status in the village, showed approval of his efforts at religious reform, and signified to the leader's constituents the validation of a potentially useful alliance. Badin used traditional Ottawa political rituals as had the French and British in bygone years. Before Badin left Waganagisi again, he chose Seven Mile Point -- a place the Ottawa called Chinggabeeng (Heartland) -- five miles south of Ahptuhwaing, as the location for his new mission.<sup>113</sup>

During Badin's visit to Drummond Island he met Assiginac

(Blackbird), the brother of Mackatabenese.<sup>114</sup> Assiginac had at one time been a pupil of the Sulpitians in their Algonquin school at the Lake of Two Mountains, near Montreal. Badin called Assiginac and his wife, "pillars of the church" on Drummond Island.<sup>115</sup> On hearing that the Catholics intended to begin a church at Waganagisi, Assiginac moved there and also began work as a catechist.<sup>116</sup> Like Mackatabenese and Apokisigan, Assiginac held considerable status in Ottawa society. The Indians and the British alike acknowledged his oratorical abilities. Indeed, during Badin's visit Assiginac received a regular stipend from the British. When Assiginac later left Waganagisi for his final home on Manitoulin Island, officials there again hired him as an interpreter. One observer commented that they did so more to use the great influence he had over his people than for his interpreting skills.<sup>117</sup>

From the reports of the Catholic missionaries, efforts at promoting Catholicism at Waganagisi in the early 1820s were highly successful. It is important to note, however, that no missionary lived year-around in Ottawa villages during the first half of the 1820s. Yet church teachings were spread among the Ottawa by men of known influence, Apokisigan and Assiginac, who were also held in high repute for their military prowess and their achieved status of Ogemagigido "Speakers" or "Orators." In Ottawa perspective, the Ogemagigido voiced the wishes of the larger constituency, often stating the opinions of several villages in formal councils. Thus, with Catholic doctrine, being spread by fervent, well respected Ottawa, won a substantially larger body of converts here than it did being spread by missionaries among the Owashshinong people.

Mackatabenese, Apokisigan, and Assiginac promoted Catholicism in a manner understood by their supporters. They taught new rites and songs that could be interpreted by the people in terms of their own cultural beliefs. In a society that called for a high degree of individualism in acquiring a guardian spirit and power by vision quest, and where the results of the superhuman communication by fasting and ritual often led to the incorporation of new songs and ritual forms into the society, the actions of these influential leaders appeared thoroughly acceptable. Indeed, promotion of reputedly more powerful rituals among their people may have further enhanced the reputations of the men who spread the new rites. Even the construction of what Badin referred to as a chapel can be viewed as a continuation of practices and understandings of Midewiwin, rituals in which ranking members acted out significant religious events in the formal context of a specially constructed lodge.

The enhancement of personal prestige and the moral aim of strengthening society by acquiring new ritual power are two possible motives that led these three important leaders to promote Catholicism. There are, however, indications that economic motives also led certain leaders to press for missions at their villages. In 1825, Mackatabenese wrote to Father Gabriel Richard, Badin's superior at Detroit, to thank him for sending the missionary visitor to Waganagisi. In this letter, Mackatabenese moved beyond the general reference about land to cultivate made in the 1823 petition to President Monroe and connected a Catholic mission with general economic benefits. He said,

There are now many men with hats [i.e. Americans] on our land. We cannot shoot enough animals to make a living for our children. But before all, we desire to have a black robe who will come to teach us. . .

There is much whiskey, and we will be reduced to nothing. We want to have at L'Arbre Croche, a French priest to instruct us in sobriety and the good roads.<sup>118</sup>

Mackatabenese was so eager to have the mission established that he requested Father Richard to send him to Rome to speak to the Pope and to Paris to petition the French king. Five other Ottawa, among whom were Kemewan (Rain) and Louis Wasson (The Light All Around You, or Glowing) two important leaders, also wrote a letter at the same time thanking Richard for allowing Badin to visit.<sup>119</sup> These Ottawa leaders recognized the precarious economic position developing as their lands lost fur-bearing species and the fur trade moved west. They also knew that by inviting the Catholics to their villages, they made a step toward improving their economic situation.

In 1826, the Secretary of War agreed to provide the Catholics with two thirds of the cost of establishing a school at Chinggabeeng. Although Badin visited the Ottawa there again that year, he did not begin building a mission, and there is no indication that he used these funds. By then, the leaders who sponsored the priests began to accuse the Catholic clergy of lying to them about sending a priest to live in their villages. Not until 1827, when the Presbyterians were about to establish a school among the Ottawa, did Father Auguste Dejean and two Metis women from Detroit move to Waganagisi. On Dejean's arrival at Mackinac, the Ottawa sent a canoe and six men to bring him to their village to commence his work. They hoped the priest's stay would be permanent, but his superiors had not yet granted him permission to remain at Waganagisi.<sup>120</sup>

There is indication that, by this time, Badin's and Dejean's work

had divided the Chinggabeeng community into traditionalist and Catholic factions. The reasons for this development are clear. Dejean immediately demanded that the Ottawa revise their entire culture. He asked three unnamed leaders -- perhaps Mackatabenese, Apokisigan, and Assiginac -- to surrender their medicine bundles that manifested their ties to the superhumans who provided them with the power and knowledge to function as leaders. This was asking a great deal in a society where leadership demanded superhuman aid as a necessary adjunct to mental acumen and physical prowess. But this was only the beginning of Dejean's demands on the Catholic Indians. He said:

I have advised all the baptized adults to have their hair cut in the French style and I exhorted them not to wear these long earrings that they wear in their nose. In a word, I delivered to them all the physical and spiritual reforms that I thought appropriate to improve them. I burned several medicine bags containing dry birds, weasels, and I gave medals to all the Christian ones. They wear them around the neck.<sup>121</sup>

Nonetheless, church officials did not appoint a priest to live permanently at the Chinggabeeng mission. It appeared to the Ottawa that they were being called upon to abandon their culture but received nothing substantial in return. To leaders who had undermined their own authority by abandoning their sacred medicine bags this came as a serious political blow. In 1828 the Ogemuk again petitioned for a resident priest. In one letter, Assiginac warned, "My father, have pity on us. We savages, when we promise something, we keep our promise. Oh! my father, do not delay because we are in danger."<sup>122</sup> Thirteen Ottawa signed the second letter, including Apokisigan, Namouschota (Middle of the Prairie), Assiginac, Mackatabenese, Kiminichagun (The Bustard),



Sagitandawe (Coming Down Stairs), Pamoosiga (Sun's Path in the Cloudless Sky), and Itawachkachi, all of whom would later play an important role in dealing with United States efforts at land cessions. These Ogemuk recited their progress in Catholicism, requested that a clergyman be sent to live with them, and intimated that if the Catholics did not send someone, the Protestants would.<sup>123</sup>

The traditionalists explicitly stated their objections to the Catholic demands for culture change to Father Dejean at a public council attended by 238 Ottawa.<sup>124</sup> Dejean recorded nineteen separate complaints they made. All focused on the missionary's attempts to disband traditional Ottawa ceremonies, eliminate their religious beliefs, and by implication, alter their society's delicate balance.

The traditionalists recognized and decried the social and political malaise they believed would befall them from abandoning their own beliefs and practices. They would be beset by troubles sent from the superhuman world and from other Indians who believed adherence to Catholic principals an improper path to follow. On the issue of abandoning the Jesshakid or the shaking lodge ceremony, for example, the traditionalists said:

If we follow your advice, we would be like idiots. You know that we can know the future thanks to our superstitions. The only thing we have to do is build a small cabin where the juggler locks himself up. By miracle it raises on its own. The moon, the turtles, the owls can come into the cabin to see the juggler and announce to him what is going to happen. What is wrong with that?<sup>125</sup>

Their concerns went beyond the technical value of divination, however. As modern ethnography has demonstrated, the Jesshakid played a major role in resolving conflict within villages through making public

the weaknesses in the social fabric and prescribing a remedy.<sup>126</sup>

Indeed, twelve of the nineteen objections presented to Dejean related to concern for general village welfare. These focused on ceremonies and sacrifices to superhuman beings, which the priest wished to stop. For example, Dejean demanded they remove the manitou poles outside their doors, an act the Indians believed would expose household members to illness. The traditionalists also objected to the priest's injunction on shamanistic healing and prescribed ritual feasts. The clergymen discouraged the vision quest and fasts by which people received guidance by superhuman beings. His burning of the medicine bundles threatened the entire community by making it vulnerable to attack from its human and superhuman enemies.

Dejean also condemned dancing, singing, feasting, and offerings of tobacco to the manitous who controlled the rain, the wind, and storms on the lakes. For a people who derived much of their subsistence by agriculture and fishing, these demands threatened starvation. The priest discouraged rituals used to insure successful hunting as well. The traditionalists Ottawa drew the line at abandoning these, especially at neglecting the large annual feast to the Sun because, "it is him who warms us, which makes our seeds grow etc. If we did not feed him we would be ungrateful."

The priests especially challenged the traditional beliefs and practices concerning the afterlife, such as the act of placing food on the graves of relatives. They also discouraged the large annual feast for the dead, thus, condemning deceased community members to an unhappy existence in the other world. As a final touch, the priests even wanted

the Ottawa to abandon the eat-all feast. The recalcitrant Ottawa leaders responded, "eating during a meal all that has been cooked is a very pleasant thing. Why would your religion want to deprive us from this pleasure. . . ?"127

Dejean's demands also carried social and political implications of great magnitude. The traditionalists resented the priest's effort to end polygyny, for example, because limiting the number of ties a man could form through marriages to women from other kin groups or extended families would restrict an important means of gaining prestige in the Ottawa community. It would also mean fewer workers for his household, which would reduce the amount of sugar that could be made and crops that could be grown. Reduced household production would, in turn, affect the prestige that could be garnered through exchange. The priest wanted to further loosen the fabric of Ottawa society by allowing young people to choose their own marriage partners, ending the influence of elders in arranging politically desirable relationships.<sup>128</sup>

The priest's demands would have also weakened the Ottawa relationships with their neighbors, bringing the criticism,

If we do what you tell us, the other savages will not have more consideration for us than they have for an old woman. We will be called names and you want us to forgive. We will even be hit and we won't even be able to revenge ourselves. A savage [i.e. Anishnauby, or Indian] will not accept this very easily. And, isn't it true that the person who revenges himself is a great man and that he has more honor than the one who remains without revenging himself.<sup>129</sup>

Dejean noted that he satisfactorily answered the rejoinders to his demands and that the Indians were "deeply impressed" by his answers, but there is little evidence that he persuaded them to accept his ideology.

Instead, the traditionalists increased their opposition to the priest and his converts until Dejean suggested the latter separate themselves from their antagonists. Those Catholic Ottawa who accepted the priest's instructions moved south in 1829 and founded the village at Weekwitonsing (Bay or Harbor Place), near modern Harbor Springs.<sup>130</sup>

The location chosen for the Weekwitonsing mission reflects the Catholic Ottawa's determination to intensify their agriculture and adopt more sedentary lifeways. Their earlier villages at Chinggabeeng and Ahptuhwaing, located on the shores of Lake Michigan, faced full exposure to harsh winter weather from the west and, hence, were not well suited for year-around habitation by agriculturists. The effort to expand production also required the introduction of livestock which would prevent even short winter migrations away from the main villages. Weekwitonsing's location on a bay offered shelter from northern and westward winds. Its immediate vicinity was also better suited for hunting in winter. A system of marshes, streams, rivers, and lakes directly east of the bay, including Mullett, Burt, and Crooked lakes, provided more food and protection for game animals than did the uplands surrounding the more northerly villages.<sup>131</sup> This habitat could be relied upon to yield the best local supply of game, maximizing the Ottawa's chances for surviving the difficult winter season until they raised sufficient livestock and crops for total annual subsistence.

In May of 1829 Lewis Cass approved Dejean's request for a government-sanctioned mission at Weekwitonsing; Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas McKinney did so shortly after.<sup>132</sup> In the same year, a religious revival grew among the Presbyterians on Mackinac Island.

Subsequently, they built a church there and again announced plans to establish a mission at Waganagisi.<sup>133</sup> When word reached Detroit that the Presbyterians intended to intrude upon Catholic mission grounds, Father Dejean finally received permission to live at Weekwitonsing.

A substantial number of Ottawa joined with the Weekwitonsing mission from its beginning. Bishop Edward Fenwick, who had visited the Catholic Ottawa at Waganagisi in May 1829, noted a population of some 300 known Christian Indians. This number included approximately twenty-four percent of the estimated 1,244 northern Ottawa.<sup>134</sup> At least thirteen extended families had already moved to Weekwitonsing led by Assiginac, Apokisigan and Mackatabenese. Assiginac could be easily identified by the big silver cross he wore on his chest. Besides these three were the leaders Joseph Assagon (The Pepper), Louis Wasson, Ignatius Petoskey (The Light Coming At You), as well as Pamoosiga, Tagwagane, Sagitandawe, and others.<sup>135</sup>

The most detailed account of Dejean's missionary endeavors from an Ottawa perspective is found in the memoirs of Mackatabenese's son, Andrew Blackbird, who was approximately nine years old at the time the station was founded.<sup>136</sup> He reported that the Indians built a church, a school, and a house for the priest, all of logs. During the first year they also constructed cabins for Assiginac, Joseph Assagon and Peter Shomin (Red Ripe Grape). Other Indians continued to live in traditional wigwams of bark for the time being. The forty-four children who attended school lived in the school buildings. They learned the French language, academic topics, and manners. The Indians supported the pupils in part with proceeds from maple sugar sales, with each family

contributing eighty to one hundred pounds a year. Blackbird reports that the youngsters received kind treatment and that they learned their lessons well during Dejean's stay, but that subsequent teachers lacked his skill and interest and did not have the same success.<sup>137</sup>

Like the Baptist Ottawa of Bowling, these Catholic converts had agreed to make social and cultural changes. Some began by confining limiting the range of their already limited winter hunts. Blackbird reported that other Ottawa of Waganagisi had begun to winter at Weekwitonsing in the early 1820s, but not until the mission opened did his family remain at Little Traverse Bay instead of going on their winter hunt to the Muskegon River.<sup>138</sup> Dejean himself spent a great deal of time visiting the adult Indians in their homes. He specifically instructed adult males and females in the roles he expected them to assume in the new social order. Men, not women, were to work in the fields. Dejean reported that he spent a great deal of time teaching men how to increase crop production with more efficient tools, and helping to clear additional fields. He also helped build still more new log cabins.<sup>139</sup>

To insure that his work would continue after his departure, Dejean and the Ogemuk selected three of the most promising students to be educated in higher level Catholic schools. They chose William and Margaret Mackatabenese, the son and daughter of the elder Mackatabenese, and their cousin Augustin Hamlin, Jr. or Kanapima (He Who Is Talked About). In 1827, the Mackatabenese children arrived in Cincinnati Ohio, where Margaret finished her education. William and Augustin followed up their Ohio studies at the College of Propaganda in Rome where they

prepared for the priesthood.<sup>140</sup> Augustin Hamlin, Jr. was the son of a French/Ottawa Metis trader who lived at St. Ignace. He was also the grandson of the Weekwitonsing Ogema Kiminichagun, a nephew of Mackatabenese, and a relative of Apokisigan. Because of his education and family connections, Hamlin became an important political leader at Waganagisi.<sup>141</sup>

Dejean had hoped when the young people finished their education, there would be two priests at Waganagisi, but shortly before his ordination in 1833, William Mackatabenese was murdered in his room in Rome. The Italians speculated that one of William's fellow American students committed the act in a disagreement over the young Ottawa's well known plan to prevent a Michigan Ottawa land cession and his opposition to increased talk of removal.<sup>142</sup> Young Hamlin returned to Weekwitonsing in 1834 shortly after his cousin's death, and began his political career as mediator between the Catholic Ottawa and the American government.

By the standards of Catholic authorities and the United States government, the mission at Weekwitonsing had proven a success. To the editor of the Annales of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, the Weekwitonsing mission was "the gem on the mitre of Monseigneur Reese."<sup>143</sup> To Henry Schoolcraft, the head of the Michigan Superintendency, the Ottawa demonstrated "evidence of good sense" and of their "advancement in civilization and happiness," and he wished them well as they went along their "path of improvement."<sup>144</sup> By 1833 Dejean reported that his mission contained 600 neophytes, one hundred of whom had been baptized. Allowing for some exaggeration, one-third to nearly one-half of the estimated 1,244 Ottawa living in the Waganagisi region in 1839

were associated with the mission.<sup>145</sup> It is not clear that all these neophytes had fully adopted Catholic beliefs and world view, but it is significant that this large number shared in the economic restructuring and culture change associated with the mission.

The dedication of these Ottawa to the economic aspect of the Catholic mission is shown by their voluntary construction of cabins, mission buildings, and a school without funding or assistance from the federal government.<sup>146</sup> In fact, the priests had little monetary support to offer their followers. They constantly complained that their Protestant counterparts had more money to invest in the work of God and civilization than did the Catholic Church.<sup>147</sup> By 1833, the Indians had built twenty-one log structures, two of which housed schools (one for boys and another for girls) enrolling sixty-four students. By 1836 the priests counted 1,200 Catholic Ottawa in the region, a number undoubtedly inflated to include virtually the entire Waganagisi population. They admitted, however, that traditionalist families also lived in the neighborhood.<sup>148</sup> At the mission of Weekwitonsing alone, the Catholic Ottawa supervised by Dejean had built sixty-one log houses.<sup>149</sup>

As early as 1829 the prospect of removal had become an important issue, even to the people at Waganagisi. By nominally accepting the church, the Ottawa not only won the support of the clergy to help oppose removal but further strengthened their support among the Mackinac Metis. This could account for the nearly total affiliation of the Waganagisi Ottawa with the Catholic Church. The Ottawa efforts at mastering the skills of a sedentary existence, a key indicator of "civilized" living, helped win support from even local Indian department officials for



continued development in their homelands.

When Dejean had begun building the Weekwitonsing mission, he had lamented the church's lack of resources for building and supporting a staff saying, "but how to feed them, how to build? One finds there only fish, corn, and some game." Dejean reported the Ottawa's dependence on corn and fish as dietary staples several times during his stay.<sup>150</sup> In line with the United States policy of civilizing the Indians, the priest encouraged local development based on these Ottawa resources and the skills for their exploitation. He encouraged maple sugar production, which remained a highly marketable commodity and one which could be increased by additional labor. He also encouraged expanding fields and adopting European crops, particularly potatoes, which could be stored for sale or used for subsistence. Although the Catholic Ottawa had the land and skills for agricultural production, they required capital to buy oxen and tools for more intensive farming, as well as blacksmith services for repairs of their machinery. They requested financial aid for their efforts from the United States several times between 1829 and 1830 but received little or no support. This aid was not forthcoming until 1832, nearly five years after they had begun development efforts, by which date they had already made considerable changes in their economy.<sup>151</sup>

Henry Schoolcraft's speech to the Ottawa and Chippewa in 1832 addressed the successful intensification of agriculture already evident at Waganagisi and the resulting changes in their behavior. Schoolcraft told the Ottawa that the President of the United States was:

gratified when he casts his eyes over your villages to  
perceive that you have extensive gardens, fields, well

fenced and kept clean. That you own and raise horses, cattle, hogs and poultry -- that you live in comfortable houses, and are able, by your own industry to clothe yourselves, and to purchase guns, traps and other articles of first necessity. He is also happy to see that you begin to feel the necessity of having your children taught to read and write and keep accounts, and to serve God your maker. These are evidences of the good sense of the Ottawa and of their advancement in civilization and happiness.<sup>152</sup>

Schoolcraft went on to encourage the Ottawa to add one improvement after another until all Ottawa had good frame houses, garden and animals to do the heavy work and to give milk. To aid in the endeavor, Schoolcraft pledged that Ottawa farming tools and hunting equipment would be repaired with the best materials at the agency. He promised that the more they did for themselves, the more he would feel disposed to do for them. Being a loyal government official, Schoolcraft also suggested the Ottawa cease visiting the British for presents each summer.

It is clear from the response of Pabamatabi (He who Pulls), Ogemagigido for the Waganagisi Ottawa at this 1832 council, that they readily accepted this transformation of their former horticultural activities to more intensive and, perhaps, animal powered agriculture. This was seen by them as a culturally revitalizing experience and an acceptable means of forestalling the kind of economic and political crisis they happening on the Grand River by that time. Pabamatabi said:

My Father. The way in which we live, by having fields is one which our forefathers began. We have followed them. We have seen that this way is profitable and pleasing to the Great Spirit. We have also been advised by blackcoats to follow this path. Your words remind us of several things which they have mentioned to us, and advised us to do. They are the same and we rejoice it is so. . . . We have given over war and wandering. We live upon our own lands and we feel anxious to continue upon them and to secure them for our posterity. We do not wish to part with them.

This is what our chiefs have directed me to say. And it is what I feel myself. And we have to request that you will make our Great Father who sits beyond the Mountains acquainted with our wishes and feelings on the subject. . . We are pleased to find the doors of the agency opened. We are in need of the aid you have offered.<sup>153</sup>

From the signatures on this document, it seems that some people of Ahnumawautikuhmig joined the Weekwitonsing Ottawa in accepting at least the basic program of agricultural intensification. They also united joined in a firm stand against land sales. Ahnumawautikuhmig leaders Niscajinini (Wrathy man) and Pabamatabi joined the Weekwitonsing Ogemuk Apokisigan, Nissowaquot ([Bear] In the Forks of a Tree), Mackatabenese, Kiminichagun, and Sagitandawe, in expressing their peoples' opinions.<sup>154</sup>

As an instrument of cultural reform the Catholic mission seems to have lost its momentum after 1832. Dejean left Waganagisi that year and Friedrich Baraga took his place. Baraga reportedly found 700 Catholic Ottawa at Waganagisi and judged the mission to be on firm religious footing, capable of supporting itself. He asked for and received permission to expand his operations to the Beaver Islands and southward along the Lake Michigan coast line to Grand River. As Blackbird reported, the teachers who replaced Dejean did not win Ottawa respect and the boarding school soon closed.<sup>155</sup>

After 1832 no more glowing reports of conversions or of a growing mission came from Waganagisi; the fervor of the 1820s revitalization movement ended. A strengthened commitment by many Ottawa people to a program of economic development within their homeland remained as the most notable legacy of the movement. Some Ottawa may have, indeed, understood tenants of Catholicism and experienced religious conversion.

For others, however, the relaxation of direct Catholic pressure for ideological renovation no doubt allowed an open resurgence of previously suppressed beliefs and rituals. Indeed, many core elements of native religion were expressed in myth, folklore, songs, dances, and feasts well into the twentieth century.<sup>156</sup>

Despite the successes of the Waganagisi people in facing economic, political and cultural change in their homelands, the expanding American population at the Straits of Mackinac increased the competition for those natural resources that remained crucial to Ottawa survival. Without adequate income from market fishing, maple sugar, horticulture, and fur production, the Ottawa lacked funds for development. In one notable case of competition between the Ottawa and incoming American citizens for resources, the Secretary of War was asked to intervene.

In December 1832, Robert Stuart informed Secretary of War Lewis Cass that two of his agents, Edward Biddle and John Drew had begun a seine net fishing industry in unceded land regularly used by the Ottawa for their spring fishing. The Americans had cleared portions of two rivers in which to drag nets and built structures to support their operation. Stuart asked Cass, as the head of the department responsible for Indian affairs, to grant these men exclusive right to fish in this territory. To bolster their case for sole rights, Stuart stated that Biddle and Drew bought had purchased the right to use these resources from the Indians.<sup>157</sup> Cass referred the matter to Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Michigan, Henry Schoolcraft, who was then responsible for licensing all operations in Indian country under the 1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. The local issue focused on the exclusive use

of natural resources by newly arrived entrepreneurs to the exclusion of the Indians and old Mackinac residents who had long exploited them. In June of 1833, Schoolcraft received a petition from sixty-three non-Indian Mackinac residents who also regularly used the grounds asking that Biddle and Drew not be given the monopoly they sought. Schoolcraft refused to issue a license until he had more information in the case.<sup>158</sup> The Ottawa similarly objected to being excluded from their own fishing grounds, a move they interpreted as an intrusion into their rights and territory. More than one hundred Ottawa people, led by Apokisigan, Anse, and Mwakewenake, landed their canoes at Mackinac in June of 1833 to complain. They argued that Biddle and Drew purchased their supposed right to fish in these waters from a man named Nabanoi who represented no one but himself and who had only recently begun fishing in that region. They told Schoolcraft that the Indians and the "poor class of whites" at Mackinac would all suffer if Biddle and Drew received exclusive rights to the region.<sup>159</sup>

In the face of intense local opposition by Indians and American citizens, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Elbert Herring, responded to queries about the legality of such operations in Indian country. Herring decided that any rights the Indian Agent or the War Department had given Biddle and Drew in the past were not intended to be exclusive. Schoolcraft was advised to use his discretion in regulating their operations under the trade and intercourse laws.<sup>160</sup>

The incident involving the Ottawa and Biddle and Drew is important beyond its illustration of competition for resources. It demonstrates that fish were by then a marketable commodity and also indicates the

Ottawa capacity for protecting their own economic interests. It also shows the strength of the political organization and values of Waganagisi Ottawas, here applied to prevent usurpation of power and unauthorized actions by individual Indians. The Ottawa of Waganagisi were rapidly approaching dire economic straits, and in 1833 the leaders Negwegon, Apokisigan, Pabamatabi, and Nissowaquot requested a trip to Washington to discuss their situation with the President.<sup>161</sup>

### Facing The Crisis

At the end of the frontier period, the Ottawa began their most intensely fought political contest with the American regime. At stake was the right for continued residence in their homeland, an economic position in the rapidly developing state, and a measure of cultural and political autonomy. The pressures for a cession of Ottawa lands and for culture change had mounted steadily between the initial American occupation of Michigan and the mid-1830s. By the beginning of the Michigan land boom in 1834, the Ottawa faced the strong suggestions of removal west of the Mississippi River. Differing responses of Ottawa leaders at Owashshinong and Waganagisi to varying economic and political pressures during the frontier period, however, had left each division with unique interests and bargaining positions.

The Owashshinong Ottawa only slowly accepted American-sponsored cultural innovations. In the years following the War of 1812 and throughout the 1820s, their land base gradually eroded, while they continued to provision Euroamericans with vegetable produce, game, and sugar. They also continued to sell furs to pay for the manufactured

goods they required and the services necessary to maintain their equipment. This resistance to the American proposed "civilization" program resulted from the political alignments of kin groups and extended families. Even those Ottawa who would have accepted aid in intensifying their horticultural production were restrained by tensions brought by the heavy-handed negotiations of Cass at the 1821 Treaty of Chicago. In response the population, after a long period of internal conflict, united against the cession and the accompanying innovations. Only when it became evident to the Owashshinong Ottawa that their wishes to invalidate the 1821 treaty would not be respected did a few of the most respected Ogemuk at Bowting village adopt the American civilization policy. The Baptist program of culture change, however, did not encourage an expanding movement among the larger Ottawa population but, instead, isolated the few who chose to adopt the benefits of mission services from the larger body of their kinsmen.

Had the cultural restructuring required by the American civilization policy been left to the Indians themselves, they may have intensified their farming and increased their market participation in line with their traditional values. The federal government, however, sent too little aid to benefit all the Owashshinong people. The cash and material that did arrive remained tightly controlled by missionaries, who distributed financial benefits selectively as rewards for conversion. This practice encouraged factionalism by disrupting the local political balance between the various Ottawa villages, kin groups, and extended families and by discouraging those native beliefs and religious practices that had united the various groups.

French-Canadian and Metis traders operating in Ottawa territory further encouraged factional divisions. The wealthiest of them, though certainly not all, sought further economic benefits from land speculation and promoted American settlement within the Ottawa territorial heartland. A resident Ottawa population in the area as would seriously hinder their plans. Hence, the traders actively encouraged religious based factionalism and spurred a rivalry that contributed to the local tensions and weakened Ojibwa Ottawa's ability to unite against land sales.

By the mid-1830s, those Grand River Ottawa who had not affiliated with a Christian organization continued their older cultural and subsistence practices even though they were the line of American settlement. The Ojibwa of these villages and their constituent kin groups remained divided or undecided as to the best course for dealing with the Americans. As we will see in Chapter Seven, even by 1855, they had not reached a full economic accommodation with the American politico-economic system.

Further north, at Waganagisi, the Ottawa did not experience direct intervention by American agents of change as early as the southern Ottawa. Through long interaction between themselves and the Euroamerican population at the Straits of Mackinac, they had developed a strong economic and political position, which the Americans found difficult to dominate. Economically, the Waganagisi Ottawa had long been provisioners of and producers for the fur trade. Even though these economic opportunities were diminishing, the Ottawa saw production for the American market as little or no threat to their well established,



viable cultural configuration. Moreover, they were well positioned politically, being connected through both kinship and economics to wealthy traders and merchants who willingly gave advice and exerted considerable political aid when their interests coincided.

Economic pressures slowly intensified at Waganagisi. At first, the Indians and residents of Mackinac shared the resources of the region, mutually profiting from a symbiotic relationship, contributing to rather than impinging on each other's livelihoods. The growth of the American population at the Straits led to direct competition for natural resources. Partially as a response to economic pressures and also partly at the advice of their Metis relatives at Mackinac Island, the Ottawa invited Catholic priests to reestablish a mission in their region. Unlike the missionary efforts on the Grand River, the impetus for the changes promoted by Catholic priests came from within Ottawa society, sponsored by recognized leaders who employed established means of decision making which were well understood and sanctioned by their constituents. The movement was interpreted by the Ogemuk to their constituents as a return to the days of Ottawa affluence. Hence, the number of Catholic affiliated Ottawa at Waganagisi grew rapidly although there are questions about how well they had internalized Catholic dogma and practices.

The refusal by some Waganagisi Ottawa to convert to Catholicism forced the most dedicated Catholics to move to Weekwitonsing. There the Indians themselves launched a full-scale movement to intensify their farming and fishing, further limiting the scope of their already circumscribed winter hunts and seasonal migrations. This Ottawa initiative

went far beyond any effort made on the Grand River, where government funds were available for improvements designed to encourage sedentism.

The continued growth of the Ottawa version of the American civilization program beyond the period of sustained intervention by the priests indicates how strongly the people supported their leaders in their efforts. That large numbers of culturally conservative Ottawa willingly joined in activities of the Catholic mission and the persistence of traditional mythology, rituals, and feasting, all indicate that unlike the Protestants of the Grand River, the Catholics tolerated the older cosmological beliefs and practices of their parishioners. This liberality of Catholic proselytizers made it easier for non-Catholic Ottawa to participate in the economic developments of the mission.

The efforts of the Waganagisi Ottawa won for them political support among Americans, who saw their efforts as steps toward attaining civilization. While they continued along this route, they were not pressed on the issue of removal. When the Ottawa began to develop their resources, however, their sources of capital were diminished. By the mid-1830s they no longer had the reliable flow of cash necessary to further expand their farming or fishing. For the people of Waganagisi, the crisis of capital was crucial. It was the direct precursor to the much larger issue of land cessions that was soon to follow in the Treaty of 1836.

#### CHAPTER 4: NEGOTIATION FOR CHANGE, 1834-1836

The political and economic crisis created by American expansion left the Ottawa no alternative but to negotiate a settlement. By the early 1830s, Michigan officials were actively planning for statehood and wanted Ottawa title to valuable land in the territory eliminated as rapidly as possible. Nevertheless, despite their already superior numbers and firm political control of southern Ottawa territory, the Americans could not dictate their terms. Prominent Ottawa and American leaders, considered, the interests of all concerned groups, including Ottawa socio-political divisions, the Metis, those involved in regional trade, and local and national governmental officials, to reach what all hoped would be a final solution to frontier problems. At the onset of negotiations, the outcome was unclear, but the value of Michigan lands and the firm entrenchment of Jacksonian Democrats in the federal and territorial legislatures strongly favored ending earlier assimilation policies and implementing removal policies to release the land for future development.

This chapter examines the intricate political issues and actions that affected negotiations for the 1836 Treaty of Washington. In these negotiations, more than in others in the period of Ottawa and American interaction, we can delineate a clear picture of the decision making processes, the importance of the Indians' own cultural perspectives and subsistence practices to negotiations, and the ways the Ottawa linked

their political survival with an internally generated program of culture change.

The Waganagisi Ottawa made the first moves toward a negotiated settlement with the United States. Unlike the Owashshinong Ottawa whose leaders remained divided on the course they should take to secure their economic future, the northern leaders had won solid support from their constituents which allowed them to act with some confidence in preparing for inclusion in the American economy. The extent of northern Ottawa economic development was striking to all who saw their villages at Ahnumawautikuhmig and Weekwitonsing.<sup>1</sup> Log cabins twenty feet square lined wide streets just beyond the shores of Lake Michigan; Weekwitonsing boasted sixty-one such houses in 1835. Indians built these structures for Indians. They received construction training and manufactured supplies such as nails and window glass from the Catholic mission, but no one reimbursed the expenses the Indians incurred. Both villages maintained churches and priests' residences. At the end of the decade, their local clergymen would brag that Waganagisi craftsmen built many of the new houses on Mackinac Island, indicating their mastery of more complex woodworking skills than those used even ten years earlier.<sup>2</sup>

Little game remained at Waganagisi, neither deer for food or furs for cash trade, and the Ottawa intensified their horticulture. In the yards surrounding their cabins, they raised currants and other fruit bearing shrubs. Between house plots they maintained fenced gardens with pumpkins, squash, potatoes, and corn. Fences indicate a growing reliance upon livestock production, including oxen for labor, dairy cattle, and small horses for hauling produce. They regularly marketed

vegetables, fish, and maple sugar to the large American garrison and the civilian population at the Straits.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to the Waganagisi, the Owashshinong Ottawa continued to live in smaller, less developed villages. Government commissioners evaluated Weekwitonsing and Waganagisi village "improvements" -- structures other than traditional Ottawa houses -- and cleared lands at \$6,814 but, among the Owashshinong, only Bowting village showed similar commitment to development with an improvement value of \$3,800. The commissioners counted a total of 48 improvements at Bowting, but these included the several Catholic and Baptist mission buildings and the Ottawa sawmill. In contrast, Weekwitonsing and Ahptuhwaing village listed 112 improvements. In the south only Fort Village and Cobmoosa's Flat River village showed valuations over \$1,000, and both of these locations were regular fur trade depots; thus, the estimated cash values may have included traders' structures.<sup>4</sup>

The Waganagisi Ottawa relied heavily on the Americans to provide the metal technology for their development. They had no blacksmith shop to repair and sharpen their plows and other agricultural implements. Even the kettles they used for sugar making required maintenance. Only one young man knew any blacksmithing techniques, and he lacked the skill to meet community demands. Although the Ottawa earned cash from their farming and fishing, these activities were engaged in more for subsistence than to make profits. Further, Ottawa ethics discouraged accumulation of wealth in favor of kin based reciprocity. Hence, the Ottawa found it difficult to accumulate the capital and tools needed to develop their own metal working shop. Thus, by providing a

blacksmith shop, the federal government played a crucial role in Ottawa development, one which could not be easily relinquished without causing hardship in Ottawa communities.

Andrew Jackson's monetary policies in the early 1830s demanded budget cuts on the Michigan frontier.<sup>5</sup> As a result, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Elbert Herring ordered the Ottawas' agent, Henry Schoolcraft, to close the blacksmith shop on Mackinac Island. The Waganagisi Ogemuk responded immediately. In April 1834, they requested permission to visit President Jackson to discuss their affairs. The Commissioner denied permission saying he had no expense funds available and that he believed the Indians would not sufficiently benefit from such a trip.<sup>6</sup> On August 18, 1834 the Waganagisi Ottawa met Schoolcraft in council, and speaking through the Ahnumawautikuhmig Ogema Pabamatabi, made a case for restoring the service. Pabamatabi said that the French king had established the shop at the Straits as a mark of his friendship, and that the British had continued the service. It had pleased the Ottawa that the Americans also maintained the shop. He said, "We so highly appreciate the value of the shop that we do not know how to live without it. A great part of the implements we use in hunting and cooking are made twice valuable to us by being mended."<sup>7</sup>

The failure of Americans to participate in the established patterns of community reciprocity caused as much Ottawa disaffection as did the shop closing itself. Pabamatabi reminded Schoolcraft that at the 1795 Treaty of Greenville, the Ogemuk had freely given the Americans title to Bois Blanc Island and agreed to allow a survey of the old French and British grants at Mackinac as a mark of friendship at a time when the

Ottawa were still financially well off. Now that the Americans refused to reciprocate with blacksmith services, the Ottawa requested payment for Bois Blanc Island which had already become an important source of wood and hay for Mackinac Island residents. Further, when the government finished the survey, the Ottawa wanted the Americans to stay on their side of the line and pay cash for any wood they cut from Ottawa lands.<sup>8</sup>

From an analysis of petition signers, it appears that Pabamatabi spoke primarily for the Catholic Ottawa of Weekwitonsing and Ahnumawautikuhmig, the people who had the most to gain from the blacksmith shop. Twenty-three Ottawa leaders signed the petition, including Pabamatabi and the familiar Ogemuk Apokisigan, Mackatabenese, Sagitandawe, Pamoosiga, Nissowaquot (all from Weekwitonsing), Kemewan, Namouschota, Chemokoman and Niscajinini (all from Ahnumawautikuhmig).<sup>9</sup> Negwegon whose village site cannot be located but who remained politically affiliated with the Waganagisi communities, and Chusco who had left Waganagisi and moved to Mackinac where he joined the Presbyterian church, also signed with the Catholic Ogemuk. The remaining twelve signatories do not appear in earlier petitions, probably indicating their lesser status in the Catholic villages.<sup>10</sup>

Henry Schoolcraft knew well that placing additional expenses in the way of Indian development could stop the movement. He petitioned Territorial Governor George Porter and his successor Stevens Mason for funds to maintain the Mackinac shop but received permission to man the establishment only until the end of 1834. To compensate for diminishing government funds, Schoolcraft began working for a land cession. A small cession would provide capital to finance the Indians' development of

their resources for the American market, but Schoolcraft most desired a large cession clearing all Michigan for settlement.<sup>11</sup> He reasoned that the Indians could not long remain in the Lower Peninsula. When the Potawatomi of southern Michigan had sought refuge in the north following the 1831 Treaty of Chicago, Schoolcraft had opposed the move, arguing that "the Indians who already resort to it [the lands north of the Grand River] are sufficiently burdensome in the unavoidable expenses which they create."<sup>12</sup>

Assiginac, the influential catechist Ogema from Weekwitonsing, and seven other men from the Catholic settlement discussed a land sale with Schoolcraft as early as February 1834. To pay their debts to local traders who had so far provisioned the Ottawa expansion, Assiginac offered to sell the already abandoned territory at Drummond Island.<sup>13</sup> Schoolcraft enthusiastically relayed the proposal to Secretary of War Lewis Cass. Cass replied that it would be "folly" for a delegation to go to Washington "as their lands are not required at present."<sup>14</sup> Governor Porter, acting as head of the Michigan Superintendency, forwarded another Ottawa request to visit Washington despite Cass's discouraging stance. Elbert Herring once more said he could spare no funds and that little could be accomplished by a visit.<sup>15</sup> When the Ogemuk again requested payment for Bois Blanc, Schoolcraft recommended that the government remit. He also suggested that, if a formal treaty for the land were necessary, the government also buy Presque Isle Harbor some sixty miles southeast of Mackinac on eastern shore of Lake Huron.<sup>16</sup> The harbor had already become an important fueling station for steamboats en route from Detroit to Mackinac, and the Indians complained of wood being



taken from there without compensation. Thus, Schoolcraft's interests went beyond those of the Ogemuk.

The scope of Schoolcraft's agenda was apparent to young Augustin Hamlin, Jr. upon his return from seminary in near the close of 1834.<sup>17</sup> Educated in the academic interests of the day, literate in at least four languages, and acquainted with American and international politics, Hamlin began teaching in the Catholic school at Weekwitonsing.<sup>18</sup> His skills, family ties in the Mackinac and Weekwitonsing communities, and his demonstrated influence with church members equipped him to organize community interests and disrupt Schoolcraft's plans for a large land cession.<sup>19</sup>

By the spring of 1835, the Ogemuk had received only refusals from Washington officials to all their overtures to the United States, including permission to go to the Capitol to discuss their blacksmith shop, the sale of Drummond Island, or their complaints of Americans usurping their resources without repayment.<sup>20</sup> Hamlin convinced Apokisigan, Mackatabenese and other high ranking Ottawa leaders that Schoolcraft did not protect their best interests and even withheld funds and supplies that rightfully belonged to the Indians. He advised the Ogemuk to deal directly with the federal government instead of allowing Schoolcraft to manipulate their affairs. Hamlin offered his knowledge and skills in American culture to act as their advisor, interpreter, and intermediary.

At a council held on May 3, 1835, thirty-one of the most prominent Waganagisi Ogemuk joined twenty-seven other Ottawa and Chippewa from villages as far south as the Manistee River in signing a petition recog-

nizing Hamlin as an Ogemaw.<sup>21</sup> This vaguely worded document combined the Ottawa concept of egalitarian leadership with the American legal concept of power of attorney. On the first count, the document made Hamlin a leader with the same status as his grandfather, Kiminichagun -- a man accorded respect and influence because of his work on behalf of his family and friends. Thus, Hamlin would be welcome at important councils, his opinions would be respected. On the other hand, the document authorized Hamlin "to execute and perform all the duties pertaining to that appointment," and committed the Ogemuk to "hereby engage to ratify all his doing as such."<sup>22</sup> No traditional Ottawa leadership role included this broad ranging delegated power. The Ogemuk who signed the document would later deny granting such power. The most important leaders at Weekwitonsing and Ahnumawautikuhmig, including Apokisigan, Mackatabenese, Nissowaquot, Kiminichagun, Sagitandawe, Petoskey, Neogema, and Wasson signed the petition. The Mackinac County clerk certified the document to assure the validity of the proceedings in American courts.

When Hamlin, acting in his new capacity, later visited Schoolcraft the agent refused to treat the twenty-two year old teacher, "a mere youth, the son of a French half breed trader at St. Ignace" as the official representative of the Waganagisi or any other Ottawa.<sup>23</sup> Hamlin, nevertheless worked to win financial support for development and to kill the threat of Ottawa removal, a political agenda contrary to that of Schoolcraft and other government officials.

In June a group of Ottawa who had moved from Drummond to Manitoulin Island on the British side of the international boundary seconded

Assiginac's earlier request that Schoolcraft propose a sale of their old village and lands to President Jackson. Schoolcraft did so and on August 29, 1835, Herring sent a letter that the agent later called "a leading step in the policy of the Department respecting the tribes of the Upper Lakes."<sup>24</sup> Herring had responded that Secretary of War Cass had not intended to purchase any Lake Huron lands but he would consider the Indian's proposition if the cost were reasonable. In addition Herring ordered Schoolcraft to see if the Ottawa living north of the Grand River would part with any of their land and, if so, on what terms.<sup>25</sup>

Schoolcraft acted on this opportunity to purchase Michigan lands immediately. He received his original instructions on September 12, 1835, and by September 17, he reported to Governor Mason that the Indians would sell.<sup>26</sup> In this short period, he could not possibly have held formal councils with the Owasshinong Ottawa. If he consulted the southern leaders at all, he did so beyond earshot of their constituents. Those Ogemuk Schoolcraft did consult asked once more to visit Washington. Since he could not plan and gather a proper delegation to Washington before the close of lake navigation, Schoolcraft requested permission to visit Washington alone and present "preliminary points" of the treaty.

Schoolcraft spent the time between mid-September and the end of October visiting other villages, including those on the Grand River. He found that the Owasshinong people had already discussed a treaty. As we will see, Schoolcraft understated their strong opposition to the sale saying only that Owasshinong Ogemuk agreed to treat if they received

large reservations, were assured use of natural resources on the ceded lands, and were provided a "place of permanent residence." The Waganagisi Ottawa "out of their ignorance of their true position" and susceptibility to removal, refused to make a large land cession but stuck to an earlier resolution to sell only the Manitou Islands in Lake Michigan, Drummond Island, and lands they used in the Upper Peninsula.<sup>27</sup> The Department responded negatively to Schoolcraft's request for a trip east. Herring instructed the new Michigan Territorial Governor, J. Horner, that Schoolcraft should not make the trip and, if he had already departed, he would have to cover his own expenses.<sup>28</sup> Schoolcraft decided to go to Washington and promote the matter at his own expense.<sup>29</sup>

From 1833 through 1835, the Waganagisi Ogemuk had asked permission to present their problems to the President in no less than five formal councils.<sup>30</sup> Rejection of all their requests and Schoolcraft's seeming lack of concern for their financial needs frustrated and angered them. The Ogemuk wanted to know where their affairs stood and did not trust the agent's assessment. Concerned about Schoolcraft's open agitation for a land cession beyond what the Indians originally proposed, Apokisigan and other Ogemuk left for Washington on October 30, 1835, accompanied by Augustin Hamlin, without official sanction and at their own expense.<sup>31</sup>

The Ottawa delegation arrived in Washington a few days before Schoolcraft. They called on the Michigan Senator John Norvell, presented their complaints against Schoolcraft, and again proposed a limited cession of Michigan land. The senator stalled the Ogemuk for three days and in the end did nothing. They then spoke with Cass who

heard their requests and suggested that the delegation put its wishes in writing. Hamlin did so. The Ogemuk again complained of Schoolcraft's unresponsiveness to their needs, saying that he withheld information important for their decision making, and stated that they had come to Washington to learn the truth about their affairs. They then addressed their larger concern saying:

The principal objects of our visit here are these: we would make some arrangements with government for remaining in the Territory of Michigan in the quiet possession of our lands, and to transmit the same safely to our posterity. We do not wish to sell all the lands claimed by us, and consequently not to remove to the west of the Mississippi. . . we Indians cannot long remain peaceably and happy in the place where the tribe is at present if we persist in pursuing that way and manner of life, which we have hitherto loved although now in a less degree. We now deem the life of a savage incompatible with that of a civilized man; and therefore we would wish to exchange the former with the latter. We have already made some progress in this pleasing path, and tasted some of its comforts; and it is our desire and will to advance more and more in it.<sup>32</sup>

They went on to say that a few years earlier their people could not had become citizens of the United States, but they have done all they could to become "civilized" and could now propose attaining full rights. If the government provided cash for "implements of husbandry, and a fund for procuring things in this line," and for education, they would continue their earlier progress. The Ottawa asked that government funds be administered by Bishop Rese, who maintained the Catholic schools at Waganagisi.<sup>33</sup>

Had the federal money policy not created such fiscal uncertainty, perhaps Cass would not have hesitated when the Ottawa first proposed a land sale. When Schoolcraft arrived at the capital in mid-December,

only days after the Ottawa delegation made their formal proposal, Cass had already decided to treat not just for the small tract the Waganagisi Ottawa offered but for "the only proposition that could be entertained" -- all Ottawa lands north of the Grand River.<sup>34</sup> Cass realized that this group of Catholic Ottawa did not represent all persons with claims to even the little land they offered for sale, let alone the much larger cession he proposed. Immediately upon Schoolcraft's arrival, Cass commissioned the agent to assemble a delegation representing all the Indians then living on unceded Michigan lands north of the Grand River to negotiate a treaty.<sup>35</sup>

In his desire to select representatives from all divisions of Ottawa society, Schoolcraft called attention to its schisms. Further, in his efforts to rally support for what proved an unpopular treaty in the Ottawa community, Schoolcraft called on those Euroamerican members of Mackinac and Grand River society who had the most influence upon the Ottawa. The representatives chosen, in turn, had diverse political and economic interests related to key issues of the day.

Schoolcraft began his task by soliciting aid from the acting Mackinac Indian Agent John Clitz, the commanding officer of Fort Brady. The agent instructed Clitz to send five or six "principal" Ottawa and Chippewa from the Mackinac region and one or two from Thunder Bay to Washington. Their expenses for clothes and travel would be paid by Cass's friend and Cashier of the Bank of Michigan, Charles Trowbridge.<sup>36</sup> Schoolcraft asked Clitz to prepare a document signed by the delegates he sent, granting them "power of sale" and stating any restrictions they placed on the settlement.<sup>37</sup> Schoolcraft sent similar instructions to

Trowbridge who acted as the coordinator for the important Indian traders deputed to gather a representative delegation.<sup>38</sup>

Schoolcraft most immediate problem was convincing the Waganagisi Ogemuk already in Washington that their best interests demanded a large land cession -- a difficult task at best. Hamlin and Schoolcraft had opposing expectations from any negotiations. Hamlin demanded that the Ottawa be allowed to live in Michigan and that they be granted capital for development. Schoolcraft wanted free title to all the land he could get. If that meant the entire territory, fine; if not, he would compromise.

Schoolcraft would grant the Ottawa reservations in Michigan if they lived north of prime agricultural lands. As long as the Ottawa continued to intensify their horticulture, Schoolcraft would forego mandated removal, at least for the time. When compromise appeared the best option, Hamlin apparently considered the Schoolcraft plan a viable option. Cass sweetened the deal by promising Hamlin government employment and, on about January 2, 1836 sent him back to Michigan to recruit a delegation to negotiate the treaty.<sup>39</sup> Hamlin's conversion did not, however, assure the support of even the Ogema who had accompanied him. When Schoolcraft wrote to Trowbridge on January 13, 1836, the Ottawa in Washington still opposed a large cession.<sup>40</sup>

Well established fur traders married to Ottawa women helped Schoolcraft assemble a representative delegation. Rix Robinson from Owashshinong and John Drew of Mackinac were most influential. Robert Stuart deemed the influence of these men indispensable to making a treaty.<sup>41</sup> There is little documentation of Drew's role in the Mackinac

community beyond his marriage to an Ottawa woman and fathering an "Indian family" who lived at the Rapids of Cheboygan River.<sup>42</sup> He maintained a trading partnership with Edward Biddle who also had an Ottawa wife and family. Although these men may have operated for the American Fur Company on occasion, they remained primarily independent traders.<sup>43</sup> Their marriage to Indian women partially signifies stronger ties to the old Mackinac trader community than the Protestant Americans. There is no evidence that they displayed an air of cultural superiority in any of their dealings with the Indians. On the contrary, they forged links with the Indian community by the traditional Ottawa exchange and kinship rules. The Indians later expressed their respect for and trust of Drew when they chose him to inspect the original treaty draft for improper language and unfavorable terms added without their knowledge or consent.<sup>44</sup>

Schoolcraft recruited Robinson in late December 1835.<sup>45</sup> As discussed earlier, Robinson had married Sebequay the sister of Noaquageshik, the leading Baptist Ogema at Bowting. From his home near Nongee's village at the mouth of the Thornapple River, Robinson coordinated the American Fur Company operations in the Lower Peninsula, ordering goods, determining points of trade, and employing runners to gather the furs.<sup>46</sup> He operated his business according to Ottawa rules of hospitality, dispensing thousand of dollars worth of goods and services to the Indians during a single year.<sup>47</sup> His rapport with the Indians and business skills made profits for himself and for the American Fur Company. He corresponded directly with Robert Stuart who operated the Mackinac trade and with Ramsay Crooks who controlled the



larger company business from New York.<sup>48</sup> Thus, Robinson's political connections reached in all directions.

Drew in the north and Robinson in the south both had to contend with strong opposition to the land sale. Neither had an easy time gathering a delegation. The Ottawa left no record of the councils in which they had debated Schoolcraft's offers so whatever differences of opinion there may have been within villages or among villages in a region is lost. What is documented is the split between the Waganagisi and Owashshinong Ottawa on the issue. The northern division pressed slowly toward a sale, even though the various kin groups disagreed on the terms. Among the Owashshinong, the weight of consensus was against cession.

Trowbridge asked Drew to bring representatives from Waganagisi, Cheboygan and Thunder Bay.<sup>49</sup> The Mackinac Catholics opposed treaty negotiations in Washington, not because they disapproved of a cession but because they thought they would have greater influence over the negotiation process and promote a more favorable settlement at Michigan based proceedings.<sup>50</sup> Many old Mackinac residents claimed descent from one or more Ottawa ancestors and determined to participate in the sale of what they considered their birthright.<sup>51</sup> Their complaints carried weight in the Ottawa community, and when William Johnston approached the Waganagisi Ottawa to sign a power of sale, only the Ogemuk Mackatabenese and Chingassamo with three or four young leaders would do so. Those who did sign confided that the Ogemuk would sell but only if they could get firm title to Michigan lands. These leaders had to be counseled separately for they feared to negotiate in the presence of their peers. Not

even Edward Biddle and John Drew could convince more Indians to give their signatures.<sup>52</sup> In the end, however, Apokisigan, Kiminichagun, Tagwagane, Kinoshamaig, Naganigobowa, Onisino, Mackatabenese, and Chingassamo left Waganagisi to attend the Washington negotiations.

In the Grand River area, Robinson faced strong, sustained, and highly mobilized political resistance. He received instructions in late December directly from Schoolcraft and Michigan Senator Lucius Lyons. Lyons, the leading agent for eastern capitalists, had invested in Michigan lands and had plans to plat land at Bowting and Nongee's village at the mouth of the Thornapple River.<sup>53</sup> Since the Ottawa owed Robinson's company more than \$30,000, he cooperated and immediately sent runners to the Owashshinong villages. Grand River Metis objected to a Washington treaty on the same grounds as did the northern community. Hamlin and the Waganagisi Ogemuk visited the southern councils on their trip to Washington at the end of January and tried to convince leaders there to sell. The Owashshinong Ogemuk refused, however, to treat beyond the view of their constituents so they would not go to Washington. Robinson had hoped to have a delegation ready by the end of January, but on February 1, he informed Trowbridge that the Ogemuk would not consent.<sup>54</sup>

The petition sent by the Owashshinong Ottawa to President Jackson on January 27, 1836 demonstrates the unanimity of their opposition.

Now we take a pen to communicate our thoughts, not only what is in our mouths but that which comes from our whole hearts we shall speak. We are afraid and the reason is because you already would take our land. We think not to shoulder this our land and carry it where you are, it is too heavy. We hear that you would make a treaty for our land. We refuse to go, it is too hard for us. We think to remain on our land

here and not sell it. . . . Were we desirous to make a treaty for your land you would refuse us, you would say I cannot sell the graves of my relation. We have not a mind to remove to a distant land our children would suffer. You say we shall see prosperity and be in health if we remove. We have knowledge of the country you offer us. Our eyes have seen it and our feet have trod on it. We saw the inhabitants there naked like animals. You might think we would sell should you come here but our mind would be the same.<sup>55</sup>

Representatives from eight of nine Grand River villages signed the petition. Although many of the signers maintained at least marginal affiliation with the missionary Leonard Slater, who firmly opposed a land sale without compensation to the Baptist mission and remained firm against removal on any terms, sectarian divisions did not guide all the signatories.<sup>56</sup> Although Noaquageshik signed first, the prominent Catholic Ogemuk Muckatosha and Megisinini also endorsed the document. Nor did pro-American versus the old French factions divide the signatories, for McCoy's friend Gosa and Antoine Campau's son Cobmoosa, already an important traditionalist young leader, both participated.

Word of the Owashshinong Ottawa refusal to sell travelled quickly throughout southern Michigan where the American population had eagerly anticipated a large sale. In February Henry Connor, Indian subagent for southeastern Michigan, proposed that the treaty negotiations should take place at the Grand River. He reminded Schoolcraft that the Ogemuk feared acting beyond the bounds of their culturally prescribed authority by negotiating outside of public councils and ignoring their constituents' will. He said they remembered well that after Keewaycooshcum made the 1821 Treaty of Chicago "he was never able to say his life was his own or appear in their councils as a chief."<sup>57</sup> The Ogemuk would not risk their own positions as Keewaycooshcum had done, no matter what

the material and political stakes.

A smallpox epidemic had struck the Owashshinong villages in the fall of 1835 making their flat refusal to treat all the more extraordinary. Many had died entire villages had been abandoned as people took to the woods to avoid contagion. No contemporary documents estimate the numbers who died, but when the same sickness struck the Saginaw River valley in 1837, it claimed more than one third the total population. The disease disabled enough Owashshinong Ottawa to disrupt fall hunts. The southern Ottawa who still generated cash income by fur trapping, needed annuity money immediately. Still, the Owashshinong Ogemuk refused to treat.

Leonard Slater took a delegation to Washington for the treaty negotiations, but the Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy, who also attended the meetings, reported that the delegates had not intended to make a treaty. The Ottawa leaders sent primarily Ogemasi (Young Leader), including Megisinini and Nawbunegeezhig, headed by a single Ogema, Muckatosha, with the mandate of preventing the Waganagisi Ottawa and Upper Peninsula Chippewa from selling their land.<sup>58</sup> Mary Holiday, a Metis woman from La Pointe who also attended the negotiations and William Brewster, a New York associate of Ramsay Crooks, verified this assessment.<sup>61</sup>

On February 13, 1836, Robinson announced that a second delegation of Owashshinong Ottawa had agreed to accompany him to Washington.<sup>59</sup> Brewster reported that when Robinson left Grand River with his second delegation, he opposed negotiating the treaty at Washington, a view that Brewster reportedly changed.<sup>60</sup>

The Indian delegates who travelled with John Drew arrived in

Washington on March 12. William Brewster had suggested to Rix Robinson that "it would be proper to have the Indians well trained in what they are to ask of government before they arrive at Washington."<sup>61</sup> Other interested parties had the same idea. Each individual and group sought the most financially advantageous settlement for themselves and advised the Indians to support their demands. Schoolcraft wished to begin negotiations as quickly as possible because there were "gentlemen coming in every day from the north to attend the treaty."<sup>62</sup>

The Indians' traders and "friends" agreed that an Ottawa and Chippewa refusal to sell would give them leverage in the negotiations.<sup>63</sup> There is no way to know who participated in the unofficial negotiations that took place in hotel rooms, theaters, restaurants, and taverns. The interests of traders, missionaries, Metis relatives, and government officials presented in the formal sessions demonstrated the host of political factors that determined the treaty's final shape. It seems that only the Grand River Ogemuk truly opposed the treaty by the time deliberations began in Washington.<sup>64</sup>

For the small independent traders like John Drew, payment of debts charged by the Indians before the treaty were the most important provision for any treaty. Of the fourteen witnesses to the treaty drafted during the negotiations, at least nine profited from Indian trade.<sup>65</sup> A second important provision generally included in similar treaties between the United States and Indian groups stipulated private reserves to traders or prominent frontier personalities who worked for land cessions. Many of these people had maintained posts for many years, building structures, clearing fields, and relying on the natural re-

sources of the area. They often located at strategic points where water power, minerals, or timber could be easily exploited as settlement spread into their regions. John Drew, for example, maintained extensive Lake Michigan fisheries, clearing spawning streams for nets, maintaining structures for processing, and investing capital for their operation.<sup>66</sup> He naturally sought title to the lands he used. Rix Robinson lived on prime farm land at the confluence of two large navigable rivers. This made real estate in his locality especially valuable during the Michigan land boom then in progress. Indeed, Senator Lyons had already platted Ada village on land less than one mile from Robinson's home. These land grants became a central issue in the negotiations.<sup>67</sup>

American Fur Company managers Ramsay Crooks and Robert Stuart viewed Robinson's influence with the Ottawa as essential to winning the best possible settlement of the company's extensive claims. They quickly convinced Robinson that a cession negotiated at Washington would meet the best interests of the Indians and the company by limiting unjust claims which would be presented and passed by local partisans at Michigan based proceedings. If possible, the treaty should make a direct payment without examination of the claims by either the Indians or any special government commission like those established by earlier treaties. They encouraged Robinson to support the Ojibwa Ottawas' boycott until the government commissioners met these conditions.

The Indians and traders agreed on two goals which formed the entire agenda of the Waganagisi Ojibwa. They would not emigrate west of the Mississippi and they must receive large annuities with which to purchase their growing material needs. Traders married to Indian women

sought assurance that their relatives and patrons, and even their children, would not be forced to leave their homes. The Indians wanted guarantees of continued participation in the expanding politico-economic complex in their region. If repeated refusal to sell would raise the annuities and keep their Waganagisi home secure, then the Indians would willingly hold out.

Formal negotiations began on March 15. Twenty-seven delegates, their interpreters, and their advisors gathered in the District of Columbia Masonic Hall. Henry Schoolcraft called the meeting to order, announced his commission to treat for the United States, and recounted the events that led to discussion of the sale and the arrival of the Waganagisi delegation in 1835. He stressed that the Waganagisi people had offered to sell land in the Upper Peninsula to which they could not prove sole claim and announced President Jackson's wish to treat with properly authorized delegates for as much land as the Indians would sell between the Grand and Chocoleet rivers.

The terms Schoolcraft offered that first day addressed the concerns of all parties involved. In exchange for land title, the Ottawa would receive a cash payment and they could designate reserves to be held in common by their various major political divisions. At President Jackson's order, however, the Ottawa's Metis relatives and the Euroamericans who served in the capacity of traders and friends, could not receive private land reservations. They would instead be paid a cash settlement computed from market value of one or more sections of land as historically granted under earlier treaties. Ogemagigido, a Chippewa leader from the Mackinac region then requested three days to

discuss this proposal.<sup>68</sup>

Apokisigan, Hamlin, and their supporters believed from the start that this was the best offer they could expect and would have signed on the basis of the permanent land tenure and cash for development it provided. They could not, however, immediately convince other Indian delegates on the wisdom of a settlement that did not meet the approval of their traders and relatives. Even Mackatabenese, who shared Apokisigan's goals and had cooperated with him for more than fifteen years refused to sell, reportedly on the advice of traders. Schoolcraft privately told his wife Jane that the greatest opposition was from "the narrow minded and selfish views of the traders, who are low and groveling in their views and not ready to sacrifice general for private interests."<sup>69</sup>

The Indian delegates discussed their differing interests and positions in supposedly private councils until March 18. These councils were disrupted by the Americans whose interests would be most directly affected by the Indians' decisions. They called as many as six delegates at a time from their closed negotiation chambers to try to bolster their own positions.<sup>70</sup> The tactic the Ottawa used to achieve a larger cash payment for lands and to promote favored land settlements was accepted by the Americans since it was widely known that most Ottawa opposed the sale.

When the negotiations reconvened March 18, there were pronounced tensions between the Chippewa, the Owashshinong Ottawa, and the Waganagisi Catholics. Ogemagigido, apparently thinking that he had been excluded from behind-the-scenes dealings, asked Schoolcraft what



Apokisigan had privately proposed. He said that he and his people would not sell their land until the government made reservations for their American "friends" who would then stay among them to provide protection from settlers. Megisinini, the Ogemasi of Muckatosha's village at Owashshinong, seconded Ogemagigido's speech. Apokisigan answered these hostile leaders by saying that the Owashshinong people collected the annuities from all previous treaties the Ottawa had signed; the Chippewa too had money. The Waganagisi Ottawa, however, "have not received so much as one pipe of tobacco."<sup>71</sup> The reservations proposed at the first council satisfied Apokisigan. He believe the sale was his only means to raise cash and would willingly sell. Apokisigan could not sway Mackatabenese and Chingassamo who held out for more favorable terms, perhaps at Drew's bidding.

Given the strength of Ottawa opposition, Schoolcraft, tried to divide the Ottawa and Chippewa delegates and salvage the negotiations. The agent reminded the Ottawa of their financial insecurity and told them that, since they had decided not to sell, the President would close negotiations and not open them again in the near future. Schoolcraft then said he would offer the Chippewa the opportunity to sell their Upper Peninsula lands separately during their next council on Tuesday, March 22. If the Ottawa should change their minds, they would be welcome to participate. The meeting adjourned.

Schoolcraft's move involved low risk for high return. First, the Chippewa comprised only six of the twenty-seven delegates assembled. Five of the six were Ogema, but they represented only a small number of the far-flung Michigan Chippewa bands. Aishquagonabe and his nephew

Agosa lived at Grand Traverse Bay surrounded by Ottawa land which they had little right to sell. Jane Schoolcraft's uncle, Waishkee of Sault Ste. Marie, headed the Chippewa delegation. The Sault Chippewa had complained from the beginning that Waishkee came from La Pointe and should not represent them in any dealings with the federal government. Jane's brother William had collected the delegates from that region and had chosen his uncle because he could be counted on to insist on a treaty which would eventually pay claims to the Johnstons, who later received one of the largest trader settlements granted by the treaty. Schoolcraft could easily promote consensus for a treaty with the small Chippewa delegation. Under these circumstances, Schoolcraft could be nearly assured to receive title to the Upper Peninsula.

Schoolcraft requested the Chippewa to advise the Ottawa to sell and admonished the Ottawa to heed the words so that when the Chippewa received large payments, they would not "feel ashamed." Schoolcraft's threat of closing the negotiations without a sale brought Hamlin, who acted as official interpreter for the Waganagisi delegation, to his feet. The Indian delegates, Hamlin said, had been "constantly beset" by men who only wished to benefit themselves. The traders' tactic of calling delegates from private councils and advising them to abstain from a sale to get more for the land had indeed kept them from assent. Hamlin said that the Indians really wanted to sell their land and would do so if left to make unbiased decisions. Schoolcraft explained Hamlin's words to the Indian delegates who affirmed at least some of what the young man had said. The agent then ordered that no one be allowed to disturb the Indians during their deliberations.

Negotiations reconvened on March 22 but quickly adjourned until the following day. Not even Rix Robinson could guess the outcome of the Indians' council. He delayed writing to Ramsay Crooks on the status of company claims until news circulated that the Chippewa would cede the Upper Peninsula and the Ottawa would all but their reservations in the Lower Peninsula. Robinson lamented that the American Fur Company claim would be investigated like the others--that "every inch of ground has been faithfully fought from the commencement by myself and Mr. [R.] Stuart until Mr. Drew's Indians all deserted him and consented to form a treaty."<sup>72</sup> Robinson believed that Muskegon River traders, possibly the Lasleys who followed the delegates to Washington without invitation convinced all but four staunch Ojibwa Ogemuk "who are still true and faithful." As a result he had to "make my peace with the great folks" and settle for the best terms he could get.

When the negotiations reopened on March 23, Apokisigan spoke first. He offered to sell the Ottawa's Lower Peninsula lands and invited the Ojibwa people to move north beyond the southern American settlement. Megisnini seconded the offer to sell, repeating that the Ojibwa villagers would do so for reservations to "benefit them and their children." He added the condition that their "friends" should read the treaty before the delegates signed it to assure that it included the terms agreed to in council with no additions or deletions. Megisnini also requested that Robinson be their reader and one final time proposed that the trader and his children be granted one square mile of land on the Grand River. Chingassamo asked the same for John Drew. Mackatabenese requested that Hamlin be their reader, indicating

once more their faith in this young leader. This work done, the council adjourned until Monday March 28, when the Indian delegates, interpreters, and American witnesses signed the treaty.

The original treaty met minimum Ottawa criteria. In return for their more than 13 million acre estate, the Ottawa received an \$18,000 cash annuity, a little more than \$6.00 per person, in specie for twenty years. An additional \$1,000 per annum would be invested in bonds which could be sold only after twenty years. This small sum could not fully support the Indians, but it provided a reliable flow of cash. The treaty also obligated the United States to pay for education, missions, agricultural tools, medicine, manufactured goods and provisions. The treaty stipulated \$5,000 annually for schools with a time limitation of twenty years or "as long thereafter as Congress may appropriate for the object."<sup>73</sup> It set aside \$3,000 for missions to administer the education funds. Ten thousand dollars were set aside for "agricultural implements, cattle, mechanics' tools "and such other objects as the President may deem proper."<sup>74</sup> It contracted for the government to cover \$300 in medical expenses annually and to establish two blacksmith shops. Lastly, the government would annually supply \$2,000 worth of provisions, 6,500 pounds of tobacco, and, most important, 100 barrels and 500 fish barrels annually. Distribution would begin immediately after the treaty signing to provide the Indians a livelihood on their diminished estate.

The demonstrated ability of large segments of the Ottawa population to adopt American customs indicated their potential to become contributing members of Michigan society and the original treaty did not include a removal clause. The Ottawa Ogemuk and delegates had in the end

spoken with a united voice against trans-Mississippi emigration and ended the threat of removal. The final provision for fish barrels, for examples, clearly indicates that the commissioners did not envision Ottawa emigration from the Great Lakes to western prairies, but encouraged the economic development in Michigan. The treaty also reserved 140,000 acres in four locations with no limitations on their tenure. The Owasshinong Ottawa, pressed by settlers, could not reserve land surrounding their southern Michigan villages where Americans farmers loudly demanded the hardwood covered, fertile soil. The treaty allowed these Ottawa to choose land north of the "Pieire Marquette" River in the mixed conifer forests. Another reserve included the Chippewa villages on Grand Traverse Bay. The Waganagisi Ottawa reserved their villages and 20,000 acres surrounding them. Chingassamo of Cheboygan received an additional 1,000 acres for his people. Although the reserved lands were marginal for American agriculture, they were located well within the 120-140 frost free day zone required for native corn, European vegetables and root crops, and grains such as buckwheat, barley and rye. The Ottawa knew all the regional advantages well, for they had farmed these lands for more than a hundred years.

The politically influential traders and relatives who accompanied the Ottawa had supported the Indian demands to remain in Michigan. Many had the interests of their families and Metis relations in mind, but they also sought to continue their financial relationship with Ottawa patrons who would now have cash to spend. On the Michigan frontier, especially at this time of national fiscal crisis, traders and incoming merchants welcomed the Ottawa contribution of hard cash. To assure

continued political support of this negotiating block, the government agreed to establish a \$300,000 fund to pay past debts incurred by the Ottawa. Robinson's bid for direct payment was unsuccessful, and commissioners were to be chosen to study the legitimacy of the claims. The Indians would verify or deny their justness before payment. This proved a satisfactory compromise.

Since few of the delegates had received authority from their communities to negotiate with the United States, by doing so they endangered their lives. The influence of their relatives in communities like Mackinac, St. Ignace, Grand Haven and Grand Rapids could promote either violence or compliance with the treaty. To lessen the chance of violence, the delegates pressed for provision of payment to persons of Indian descent (i.e. Metis) who lived within the cession boundaries.

Despite the hard fought compromises and seeming agreement on key provisions, national rather than regional interests determined the final form of the 1836 treaty. Senator John White who then headed the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, wanted to "embarrass or disoblige President Jackson and his agents."<sup>75</sup> To this end, White limited Ottawa tenure of their reservations to only five years, "unless the United States shall grant them permission to remain on said lands for a longer period."<sup>76</sup> At the end of five years, the Ottawa would receive \$200,000. ~~After~~ that time, they could settle lands west of the Mississippi. Staying in Michigan and living like citizens remained an unwritten option. Removal partisans welcomed this plan. Senator John Tipton of Indiana and Isaac McCoy, who still pursued his dream of a western Indian nation, both promoted the limitation to reserve tenure.<sup>77</sup>

White's treaty amendment would damage the administration in two ways. First, the United States had recently negotiated the fraudulent Cherokee Treaty of New Echota. This document became the focus of much popular anti-removal sentiment throughout the nation. By inserting a removal clause in the Ottawa treaty -- even though emigration could not take place until "the said Indians desire it" -- White increased the probability of anti-Jackson sentiment in Michigan.<sup>78</sup> By limiting the tenure of reservations, he decreased the number of patronage positions available to reward loyal Democratic partisans. Since the blacksmith shops, government farmers, carpenters, and mechanics would only be assigned on a shortened basis. Also, Indians who did not have firm title to their land would be less inclined to spend time, labor, and cash to make "improvements" that American settlers could attach under preemption laws. This uncertainty further limited the value of government service providers. President Jackson had already angered Michigan residents by his stance in their boundary dispute with Ohio, and White hoped the treaty provisions would further alienate their support.<sup>79</sup>

Senate hearings on the Cherokee treaty delayed action on the Ottawa and Chippewa treaty until May 20, 1836, when the Senate approved the Ottawa document with the recommendations of its Committee on Indian Affairs. The amended treaty would leave the Ottawa less secure than ever. They had ceded their homeland and opened their territory to American exploitation. In return they received cash to develop lands that they could not legally hold. Instead of a firm commitment ending the removal threat they received only legislated ambivalence. Even Schoolcraft recognized that the Senate amendments did more harm than

good to Ottawa affairs.<sup>80</sup>

The Senate alterations made it necessary for Schoolcraft to present the amended version of the treaty to a council of Michigan Ogemuk in their home territory in the presence of their constituents. Consensus had been difficult enough to reach in Washington beyond the reach of objecting voices, in Michigan it would be far more so. Terms of the sale angered some Waganagisi Ottawa but the Ogemuk soon convinced them of its benefits.<sup>81</sup> John Holiday, dissatisfied at his share of the settlement, caused dissension at Mackinac by freely giving facts about the Washington proceedings.<sup>82</sup> Schoolcraft realized that the treaty must be ratified as rapidly as possible to prevent opposition factions from building a solid front.

Schoolcraft determined to council with the Ogemuk at Mackinac on July 10, 1836. By that time, he anticipated the arrival of the \$150,000 in goods and provisions promised for immediate distribution by the treaty's fourth article. The Ottawa needed these goods badly in 1836. As noted earlier, the 1835 smallpox epidemic ruined fall hunts at Owashshinong, and when Rix Robinson returned to the Grand River in the spring, he found that the winter takes had also been poor.<sup>83</sup> Settlers who competed with the Indians for game while they cleared farms probably contributed to a general game shortage in the south. In the north, colder than usual weather had decimated deer herds.<sup>84</sup> That spring, late frosts also destroyed Waganagisi Ottawa gardens, leaving the Indians with few provisions.<sup>85</sup> Schoolcraft and Cass knew that treaty ratification depended on the goods distribution. When Senator White attempted to delay distribution until after the Indians approved the amendments,



Cass warned that unless the payments were ready in July, the Indians would leave the council grounds dissatisfied and would not give their assent.<sup>86</sup>

The 1836 Mackinac Island council proved one of the largest gatherings ever held there. Schoolcraft requested that Rix Robinson once again accompany a delegation of Ogemuk from Owashshinong, Muskegon River, and Grand Traverse, bringing only Ogemuk authorized to ratify the changes.<sup>87</sup> Although Schoolcraft cited expense as the reason for restricting attendance, the move was also designed to limit the potential number of dissenters. Despite Schoolcraft's efforts, three to four thousand Indians pitched bark wigwams along the beach.<sup>88</sup>

Council proceedings began on July 12, even though some Owashshinong Ogemuk did not arrive until July 21.<sup>89</sup> Schoolcraft kept no journal, but his formal reports indicate that the Indians immediately heard and understood the Senate changes. The Ogemuk then "strenuously opposed" releasing their reservations after only five years. Schoolcraft, however, assured them that, by the treaty's thirteenth article, they maintained "indefinitely the right of hunting on the lands ceded, with the other usual privileges of occupancy until the land is required for settlement."<sup>90</sup> Schoolcraft himself believed that large portions of their country were "uninviting to agriculturalists" and, hence, unlikely to be settled. He assured the Indians they could use these lands and resources for many years to come.<sup>91</sup> Westward emigration remained a matter of consent, so they could not be forcibly moved from their homes.

The Ogemuk briefly debated the government's propositions. On the basis of Schoolcraft's assurances of protection under the thirteenth

article of the treaty, the first leaders signed on the first day of council. Others added their marks during the next two days. On July 15, satisfied that he had received assent from an adequate number of Ogemuk, Schoolcraft announced to the Indians that he would make their first payment in September.<sup>92</sup> The remaining Owashshinong Ogemuk signed the document on July 22, 1836.<sup>93</sup>

### Summary

In summary, between 1834 and 1836, American settlement in Michigan and Ottawa economic needs moved the ongoing political contest between these groups from the frontier to Washington, D.C. Negotiations for the treaty of 1836 took place on three socio-political levels. First, the Ottawa themselves remained divided on the options they should pursue. The Owashshinong and Waganagisi groups were the primary units of contention. Within each of these divisions, there was relative agreement between the villages and kin groups. The Owashshinong Ottawa had as yet reached no coherent plan for their future economic well-being in Michigan and refused to sell their land, hoping to maintain the status quo. The Waganagisi Ottawa needed cash for development and willingly ceded land to obtain it, though they disputed negotiating tactics. The largest issue dividing the Waganagisi Ogemuk was how much they should receive it and how to best negotiate. The Ottawa custom of recruiting allies by marriage had worked well. The French, British, and American husbands of Ottawa women and their children, many of whom traded provisions to the Indians, proved a formidable power block against American government domination. Powerful men like Rix Robinson and John Drew

advised their Indian kinsmen on how to win the best possible accommodations with the Americans. No records indicate open disputes between the Ottawa and their relatives of Euroamerican descent. Together they hotly contested American propositions that they considered negative.

On the third level, Indian delegates, their relatives, and their other American allies compelled American commissioners to negotiate hard to obtain their own goals. Schoolcraft and Cass did not obtain their ultimate object -- a complete purchase of Ottawa lands and Ottawa emigration west of the Mississippi River. The compromise they struck gave the Ottawa reserved lands and the cash to develop them, assuring them a place in Michigan society. This settlement is testimony to the negotiating skills of the Ogemuk and their relatives.

The central issues in the 1836 negotiations remained control of land and natural resources on the Michigan frontier. The American officials wanted clear title to the entire territory, but the Indians, their relatives, and their allies refused to negotiate a document that denied them access to the natural resources crucial for their continued residence in Michigan. Faced with removal, the Ottawa delegation negotiated for assimilation and reserved the resources they believed could support them. They accepted reserves in their traditional transition zone environment, safely beyond the range of American agricultural settlements. They demonstrated their resolve to maintain a land base and access to natural resources once again by signing the document as amended by the Senate only after receiving assurance that they would have rights to use the resources in their ceded territories for many years to come.

Despite the skill of Ottawa Ogemuk and the help of their supporters, the Senate-amended treaty left the Indians in a legally ambiguous position. They could not be moved west of the Mississippi against their will, but with tenure of their lands limited to only five years, they would face economic and political pressure to emigrate. They received substantial sums of cash and manufactured goods which had to be used immediately to create farmsteads on lands that could later be taken by Americans under preemption laws. If they did not farm, some of them would starve. United States officials would then doubt their ability to become "civilized" and pressure more strongly for removal. The treaty provisions themselves, then, encouraged further American expansion and made the position of the Ottawa in their homelands more uncertain. For the next nineteen years, Ottawa Ogemuk coped with the problems created by contradictions of the 1836 Treaty of Washington.



WE WISH TO BE CIVILIZED:  
OTTAWA-AMERICAN POLITICAL CONTESTS ON THE MICHIGAN FRONTIER

Volume 2

By

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Anthropology

1988

## CHAPTER 5: POLITICS OF PERSISTENCE, 1837-1842

After the ratification of the 1836 treaty, many prominent Ottawa leaders immediately set out to stabilize their continually declining political and economic condition. This proved a difficult task which called for rapid cultural change and a long series of political contests between Ottawa leaders and the local, state, and federal officials who wished to continue the process of Ottawa dispossession. Throughout the years of intense confrontation over the issues of removal and assimilation, Ottawa leaders gradually defined a culturally acceptable alternative to emigration or extinction. Variables such as nearness to the line of American settlement, proximity of the international boundary, the number of locally resident Euroamerican educated Indian leaders, and the degree of inter-village cooperation initially led the Owashshinong and the Waganagisi to adopt different tactics. By 1842, however, the people of both divisions had expressed their willingness and capability to participate in the American system as landholding, franchised citizens as the best means of guaranteeing themselves a land base in Michigan.

This chapter focuses on the political process of incorporation as it developed around the issue of removal. Removal threats mounted and declined with changes in national and regional politics, the state of the United States economy, and the personalities of powerful men who appeared on the Michigan scene. In the resulting political contests,

the Ottawa benefited from a decentralized, difficult to manipulate socio-political organization and from skilled leaders who maintained political linkages at all levels of Michigan frontier society. Support from American citizens, missions, state legislators, and eventually even federal legislators proved essential to their project.

#### The Escalating Removal Threat

The Owasshinong Ottawa were the first to feel adverse repercussions from the 1836 treaty. Even before the negotiations, American land brokers and settlers had coveted Indian fields situated at strategic locations, such as Fort Village, Bowting, and Prairie Village along the western, easily navigable portions of the Grand River. The settlers at Campau's Grand Rapids settlement clamored to extend their holdings north of the river and claim the government sponsored mission farms and the sawmill that Muckatosha and Noaguageshik's people had financed and built.<sup>1</sup> These structures and the Ottawa's log and frame houses there could serve as ready-made proofs of habitation with which to claim preemption rights and purchase improved land for only \$1.25 per acre. Others saw Indian owned buildings as public property that could be dismantled and moved to more convenient locations.<sup>2</sup> By the late 1830s, Grand River Road ran near the several large Owasshinong settlements. Politically important Ottawa settlements such as Nongee's on the Thornapple River -- then lead by Nawbuneegezhig -- and Cobmoosa's Flat River village, became easily accessible for American settlement. Senator Lucius Lyons had already platted the town of Ada about one mile from Nawbuneegezhig's village and planned for booming sales to New York



emigrants even before the Ottawa accepted their first payments from the 1836 treaty.<sup>3</sup>

The treaty makers had foreseen, if not abetted this rush for lands the Owasshinong people relied on and had hoped to relocate the Indians on the seventy thousand acre reservation north of the Pere Marquette River. This would place them in the mixed conifer and deciduous forests, beyond the line of agricultural lands preferred by Americans but in an environment in which they believed the Ottawa could prosper. Few Owasshinong Ottawa would leave their village sites in the rich-soiled, warm southern Michigan counties and made their disapproval clear by simple lack of compliance. Usufructuary rights to unceded lands assured that the Ottawa could not be forcibly removed unless they disrupted settlement or threatened violence against American citizens.<sup>4</sup>

The Baptist Ottawa at Bowting relocated before any of their kinsmen. Leonard Slater, who had opposed removal, believed the Ottawa could rapidly assimilate in frontier agrarian society and won tacit support from Henry Schoolcraft, now Superintendent of Michigan Indian affairs, for a new mission colony in the south. On November 1, 1836 Slater bought 830 acres of "superior land" at Noaquageshik's hunting range near Gun Lake. He reported that Ogemuk had visited him from several villages and that three had decided to join the colony in the spring. Slater counted the dense American population that already surrounded the colony as an advantage. Since the Americans loved God, he reasoned, they could not hate the Indians. They would serve as a market for Indian produce and a model for community advancement. Noaquageshik and ninety of his followers leased their holdings at Bowting to trusted Americans to

protect them from any preemptionist threats before they could be sold under the treaty's terms. They then took leave of Muckatosha and the Bowting Catholics and moved to the new settlement at Gull Prairie in Barry County, later known as Ottawa Colony.<sup>5</sup>

The Ottawa Colony residents set about the formidable tasks of clearing new fields and building homes. That year all Ottawa throughout Michigan faced more difficulties than they could have anticipated. As discussed in Chapter Four, the severe winter of 1835/1836 killed many deer in the northern Lower Peninsula, making wild meat and moccasin leather difficult to obtain.<sup>6</sup> Crops all but failed in 1836. Even the most competent Waganagisi farmers lost their entire grain crop. Corn, clothes, and game remained in short supply throughout the winter and reduced even those Waganagisi kin groups who still travelled annually to the St. Joseph region to having to beg at the homes of settlers.<sup>7</sup> At the 1836 annuity payments, Schoolcraft had distributed \$2,000 worth of provisions in addition to 3,000 bushels of corn and additional rice and fish which he purchased at Mackinac. The Indians in attendance regarded that as limited rations. When Commissioner of Indian Affairs Carey Harris set \$300 as a maximum expenditure for provisions, Schoolcraft reminded him that the Indians sold much land to procure rations when "the chase" failed and that even the amount he had spent was not enough in this instance.<sup>8</sup> To make matters still worse, late spring frosts in 1837 again killed many crops and floods destroyed much of their remaining corn and vegetables for yet another year.

To exacerbate an already difficult situation, American preemptionists who claimed Indian fields also hindered Owashshinong horti-

culture. Reports of food shortages were common on the Grand River by 1838.<sup>9</sup> Since the Indians held usufructuary rights to any unsold lands, American citizens who trespassed at or near Owashshinong villages kept their presence quiet. It is impossible to tell how many Indian corn fields settlers took. Between the winter of 1836 and about 1839, the Ottawa relied more heavily on credit for subsistence than they did in most of the previous or following years. They called on their Metis relatives and local traders who in turn provided them with flour that they themselves had purchased at high market prices and sold at a considerable profit margin.<sup>10</sup>

The 1836 and 1837 crop failures pressed the Owashshinong Ottawa more than the Waganagisi people for other reasons, as well. Although the prices of the provisions the Waganagisi people received were high by the standards of the day, the trade itself remained in the hands of well known, established traders, many of whom were kinsmen obligated to provide emergency provisions at honest if high prices. The Owashshinong market was less stable. Many among the large influx of settlers traded whatever they could to the Indians for provisions or cash, exercising varying scruples in their enterprise.<sup>11</sup> Also, in 1836 and 1837, the Owashshinong Ottawa received few of their treaty stipulated goods and only part of their cash payment while the Waganagisi people took their full portion. As a result of difficulties in travelling from the Grand River to Mackinaw, and imperfect communications between the two points, as many as 900 Owashshinong Ottawa did not even attend the 1837 distribution.<sup>12</sup>

Schoolcraft had charged Slater with delivering the treaty goods to

the Owashshinong Ottawa before October 15, 1836, but, the Indians did not receive their annuity payment until January 16, 1837, the most difficult portion of yet another extreme winter. They had no doubt already used substantial credit to provision their families.<sup>13</sup> On June 23, 1837 Commissioner of Indian Affairs Carey Harris advised Henry Schoolcraft that the government could not deliver the total amount of the Ottawa's cash payment and asked the Indians to accept half of the payment in specie and half in goods. If they would not accept the goods, Harris said, they would have to wait until 1838 for full payment.<sup>14</sup>

On an expanding frontier where cash always remained a scarce commodity, traders who had a stock of goods and influence with the Indians quickly scrapped Harris's hope of paying annuities in goods.<sup>15</sup> Rix Robinson, the most influential Owashshinong trader, made sure the money arrived on the Grand River and that the Indians bought from his own stocks. When Schoolcraft called the southern Ottawa to Mackinac for their payment, Robinson informed the Ogemuk that he himself would deliver the annuity. The paymaster at Mackinac, however, would not pay U.S. funds to anyone but the Indians. The Indians did not receive even partial annuity payments until late January, and again these payments were insufficient to procure adequate provisions for the winter hunt or to supply them until the March sugar-making season. Some Ottawa again pressed incoming Americans for credit and charity.<sup>16</sup>

In the end, problems caused by the delay in annuities, crop failure, and poor hunts became the justification for renewed government attempts to induce westward removal. American officials and ordinary

citizens alike complained of dependent Ottawa seeking gifts too often, depleting the stores of supplies required for expanding their own holdings. Although many Ottawa requests for food and clothing resulted from actual shortages, others reflected Ottawa cultural expectations of hospitality and sharing as the basis for interaction between neighbors and kin. Schoolcraft viewed Ottawa requests for provisions as the result of laziness. He reported that the Ojashshinong people had merely given up their usual horticultural and gathering cycle to live from their annuities and the generosity of new settlers. They became, in his view, "emigrants or wanderers. . . now with a few exceptions much addicted to the use of ardent spirits and degraded in their condition."<sup>17</sup> They made themselves a public nuisance and would have to leave the Grand River valley.

On January 10, 1837 the Michigan Legislature petitioned Congress to move the Michigan Indians to lands at the northern reaches of the Mississippi. Harris acted quickly and, on January 27, instructed Schoolcraft that, "continued residence of the Grand River Indians within the limits of the State of Michigan is certainly not in accordance with the general policy of the Government." They should be induced to remove.<sup>18</sup> Schoolcraft knew that the 1836 treaty did not obligate the Ottawa to move west against their will. His response to Harris's order was to appoint his brother James to conduct an exploring party west to let the Indians examine lands there. He hoped this would convince hard-pressed Ottawa to emigrate.<sup>19</sup>

Throughout 1837 Schoolcraft waited patiently for a time when the Indians themselves wished to discuss removal. In the meantime, he

supported their treaty preserved, usufructuary right to remain on any unsold lands in or near their old villages -- at least until the Pere Marquette reservation was surveyed and staffed to provide a more permanent, satisfactory alternative.<sup>20</sup> The Owashshinong Ogemuk who did not join Noaguageshik's band at Ottawa Colony discussed the move to the northern Michigan reservation as early as January 1837, but by 1838, few (if any) had moved there.<sup>21</sup>

By spring 1838 when Ottawa provisions had dipped to their lowest and the tempers of American settlers from whom the Indians sought relief flared most often, neighbors found the wife and children of the settler Ansel D. Glass murdered in their burned-out Ionia County home. They did not discover Mr. Glass's body among the ashes and assumed he had been taken by the Indians. American suspicions turned immediately to the Ottawa, and the federal government quickly launched an investigation. Cobmoosa and other Ogemuk convinced American officials that the Saginaw Chippewa had done the killings. Sheriffs arrested two Chippewa men but soon released them for lack of evidence. The case remained unsolved until 1840 when someone identified Ansel Glass living in Wisconsin, and authorities judged him the real culprit.<sup>22</sup> By the time Glass was found, the case had already resulted in a new round of political maneuvers at Owashshinong.

In March 1838, Grand River citizens clamored for either for Indian removal or a sub-agency in their area headed by one of the old trader residents, whom the Indians trusted, to work as a liaison with their communities. Schoolcraft had reinforced his own opinions about removal. In this time of social tension, he held the upper hand.<sup>23</sup> Schoolcraft

knew that the Ottawa would not move west unless extremely pressed. He believed the Owashshinong Ottawa had now suffered sufficiently to consider moving, and planned another exploring party to convince the Ogemuk of the wisdom of moving west. Schoolcraft chose a route designed to impress the delegates with the rich soil and abundance of game available in western lands and a season that would impress them with the region's mild climate. He ordered James Schoolcraft, who would head the delegation, to make every effort to win a firm commitment for removal. In the end, Schoolcraft hoped, the delegates would return a favorable report and promote emigration among their kinsmen so that the first parties could leave Michigan by early 1839.<sup>24</sup>

The Owashshinong Ottawa realized their political vulnerability when they met Schoolcraft in June 1838. If they did not cooperate, they would be suspected of harboring hostilities against Americans and be blamed for the Glass murders. Schoolcraft had made it clear that the government held not only murderers responsible for a crime, but also their families, kin group leaders, and fellow villagers.<sup>25</sup> Cobmoosa, the respected and politically astute ascending Ogema of Flat River, had quickly patched relations between the Owashshinong Ottawa and the Americans but understood that in times of such intense frontier tension, the situation could be reversed at any moment. The Detroit garrison of the United States Army waited, poised to march into Ottawa villages on short notice, and the citizens at Grand Rapids threatened to form a small band of untrained -- and hence dangerous -- militia.<sup>26</sup> The Ottawa remembered clearly the 1832 Black Hawk War and understood the danger of their position. Even though none of the Ottawa intended to move west of

the Mississippi River, they sent delegates to view the land the government promised them and maintained amicable relations. Noaquageshik had visited these western lands with Isaac McCoy in 1828 and returned unharmed. The Ottawa had nothing to lose and important political advantages to gain from a trip now.

An analysis of Owashshinong delegates on the 1838 exploring party provides some insight into the Ottawa's political intentions. Ogema Muckatosha and his Ogemasi Megisinini, both leaders from the Catholic Bowting village, were the highest ranking delegates.<sup>27</sup> Seven other Owashshinong men joined the party. In 1836 Americans had recognized the delegates Shawgawabano of Cobmoosa's village at Flat River and Moksauba of Meshimnekahning as "second class chiefs," an American title roughly corresponding to the Ottawa leader of an extended family, a smaller unit than the kin group. The Owashshinong Ottawa deemed it important that these two sizable villages be represented if for no other reason than to prove the good will of two well established populations toward Americans. Rix Robinson, who still maintained his trading post near Nawbunegeezhig's home village, may have advised the Indians on this matter. The Glass murders had taken place near Meshimnekahning and Americans, no doubt, expected complete cooperation from the Indians there.

The men from Flat River and Meshimnekahning were clearly not men with decision making power. The reports these representatives filed would be dependable, but any agreements they made en route to the west would make little impact on their larger kin groups. The remaining five Owashshinong delegates never signed an official document between 1820



and 1855, indicating that they held still less status in their villages, and their actions were of little political consequence.<sup>28</sup> Thus, in choosing the delegation, the Ogemuk cooperated with the government because it was politically useful to do so but exposed themselves to as little risk as possible in the process.

Although Schoolcraft used the Grand River situation as the primary justification for promoting this exploring party, he did not exempt the Waganagisi people from the trip. Unlike the Owashshinong, most Waganagisi Ottawa had met their immediate economic needs with proceeds from the 1836 treaty. In addition, the political successes of the northern Ogemuk had left them firmly in control of leadership positions and ready to direct future growth. Thus, in pressing for removal, the Americans invoked not economic pressures but the Ottawa's old relationship with the British.

Schoolcraft and other American officials still resented British influence with Indians living on the United States side of the international boundary. In 1837 the British themselves heightened Schoolcraft's alarm when they proposed forming an Indian colony on Manitoulin Island where the Indians would participate in a development program much like that at Waganagisi. The influential Ottawa Ogema Assiginac had already returned to Manitoulin and often urged the Waganagisi Catholics to join his settlement there, increasing the possibility that some of his kinsmen would indeed emigrate.

In a speech given to the Ottawa by British Superintendent of Indian Affairs Samuel Peters Jarvis and translated by Assiginac during their annual visit to Manitoulin Island in 1837, the British announced their

intention to stop giving gifts to American Ottawa within three years. If, however, the Indians moved to Canada and joined the new colony, they would continue to receive their portion.<sup>29</sup> Schoolcraft had sought the end of British gift giving for many years, but he interpreted this announcement as an effort to congregate large numbers of potentially hostile Indians on the United States boundary. In July 1837, 300 Potawatomi from the Chicago area accepted the British invitation fueling greater American suspicions. Although few if any Michigan Ottawa joined these Illinois and Wisconsin refugees, Schoolcraft suspected that at least some would eventually emigrate.<sup>30</sup>

In August 1837, Schoolcraft reported rumors of hostility brewing in Canada. By spring of 1838, potential trouble again fermented between the United States and its northern neighbor when British officials crushed an attempt at Toronto to end the oligarchical colonial rule that emanated from that city. As small bands of "Patriots" filtered across the United States boundary, they enlisted support from individual Americans for an attack on Upper Canada.<sup>31</sup> The United States House of Representatives called on Commissioner of Indian Affairs Harris for a report of any British "interference" in Michigan, Wisconsin and westward.<sup>32</sup> No evidence indicates that any Ottawa participated, but Apokisigan and Mackatabenese feared that some of their people would join the Canadians in event of a war.

The Ogemuk realized that involvement in the Canadian uprising could well factionalize Waganagisi politics and destroy their harmony, and they knew that when fighting American policy required a show of solidarity and progress in assimilation. To maintain the best possible

relations with the United States, Apokisigan and Mackatabenese asked Schoolcraft to prevent any Ottawa from crossing to Manitoulin for presents.<sup>33</sup> Schoolcraft well knew the ease and regularity with which the Ottawa crossed the international boundary to visit their relatives on Manitoulin Island. He too feared their potential involvement in a frontier uprising and wished to permanently end the threat. Removal west of the Mississippi would accomplish this.

During these turbulent times, the Waganagisi Ogemuk saw the need to take decisive political action to steel themselves and their people against removal. The young leader Augustin Hamlin, Jr., whom they had allowed an influential role in making the 1836 treaty, again became one of their most prominent advisors. Hamlin had returned to Weekwitonsing as a Catholic school teacher after the Washington negotiations. There he counseled his kinsmen about developing their homelands. All of Schoolcraft's efforts to win Hamlin's support for his removal programs failed.

Hamlin continued to work instead with local Metis and traders to establish himself as an official intermediary between the Ottawa and Schoolcraft. To do so Hamlin resurrected the power of attorney statement the Waganagisi Ogemuk had signed in 1835 and asked the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to recognize him as the Indians' agent with authority to manage his kinsmen's affairs. If successful in this bid, Hamlin could then effectively block Schoolcraft's removal attempts.<sup>34</sup> By Hamlin's interpretation of the treaty, the Ottawa still could not be moved west against their will. He and his supporters in the Mackinac community advised the Ogemuk to refuse Schoolcraft's overtures for the

1838 exploring expedition.<sup>35</sup>

It is unlikely that the Ogemuk supported Hamlin's bid to become "Head Chief," but as Schoolcraft soon found, they shared the young leader's opinions about removal. On June 18, 1838 Schoolcraft met the Waganagisi Ogemuk in council at Mackinac Island and recorded the details of the meeting in his private journal. He began the meeting by lighting the ceremonial pipe with which he opened all councils of importance. He then passed it to Apokisigan but the Ogeema refused to smoke, a politically charged act by a leader whose very name, Smoking Mixture, was proof of Ottawa beliefs in the power of pipe ceremonials. The other Ogemuk present followed Apokisigan's lead in this matter. Schoolcraft rightly interpreted this act as refusal even to discuss removal and, thus, a hostile move. He subtly threatened the Ogemuk saying that the rejection would disrupt relations with the United States and that he would tell the President of their decision. The Ogemuk adjourned on that note.

Schoolcraft's intimidation worked. The Ogemuk unwilling to risk alienating government officials during these unstable times. They later sent a message to Schoolcraft asking him to come light a pipe and offered their own to replace the one he had used -- that they would listen but would make their final decision on their own terms. The chosen Ogemagigido apologized for the Ogemuk and their previous unwise refusal to participate in the ceremony. They justified the refusal as a further move toward civilization, the abandoning of a former custom. They then considered Schoolcraft's proposal for an exploring party and in the end agreed to send six delegates. At the close of the council, the Ogemuk

gave Schoolcraft their pipe stem as a reminder of the transaction, saying he could use this pipe to conduct public business with them in the future. This acknowledged their desire to maintain dialogue with the government agent.<sup>36</sup>

As at Owashshinong, the Waganagisi Ogemuk reduced their risk of making improperly obtained agreements with the United States by sending men of secondary rank to join the exploring party. Only one Ogeма' of renown, Kiminichagun, traveled with James Schoolcraft. He had helped found the Catholic community at Weekwitonsing and being Augustin Hamlin, Jr.'s grandfather, he could be trusted to support the best interests of the community.<sup>37</sup> Pendunwan (Scabbarð), the brother of Ogemainini of Ahptuhwaing and nephew of Mackatabenese, also accompanied the delegation. Although he would later be recognized as an Ogemuk, Pendunwan had little influence at the time.<sup>38</sup> None of the other four Ottawa men are represented as Waganagisi leaders in official documents between 1820 and 1855.<sup>39</sup>

Schoolcraft appointed seven trusted Americans to head the delegation of fifteen reluctant Ottawa and nine Chippewa. Besides his brother James, Schoolcraft sent his brothers-in-law George and John Johnston as interpreters, his clerk Chauncy Bush, an American Fur Company employee Charles Oaks, and two other men.<sup>40</sup> The party left Mackinac on June 27, 1838, travelling by steamboat to Chicago, by land to Peru, Illinois, and from there to Westport, Missouri by water, covering 1,000 miles by July 13. At Westport, they met Isaac McCoy who then lived in the western Indian territory and would lead the delegation to lands from which the Michigan Indians could choose their future

residences.<sup>41</sup>

McCoy led the mounted party eighty miles to the headwaters of the Osage River, passing the villages of emigrant Shawnee, Miami, Potawatomi, Peoria, and Ottawa to show the affluence of their communities. The land delegates saw there did not impress them, so McCoy led the party further up the Missouri, travelling a route that would highlight the oak and hickory timber and exaggerate the number of red deer and turkey there. James Schoolcraft reported to his superiors the abundance of catfish, black bass, pickerei, carp, and "garfish" to be had from the Osage River; no doubt he also pointed this out to the Indians. McCoy wanted the company to proceed even further up the river, but a travel weary Megisinini had gone far enough. To end these western wanderings, the Ogema announced that the land he had already seen was better than the Indians had expected and that "we accept it as our own."<sup>42</sup>

McCoy optimistically reported the Indians' pleasure with the western country to Henry Schoolcraft and Carey Harris. He had shown them their chosen plot on a map and explained his reasons for locating them near the Shawnee and Maumee Ottawa. As McCoy said that he did not conceal the country's disadvantages or overrate its advantages, and even so, all but one Indian delegate seemingly agreed to the location; McCoy believed the deal firmly completed.<sup>43</sup> James Schoolcraft, however, had listened more carefully to Megisinini's speech and in his report included one of the Indians' key objections that, "We found the land good but we are disappointed in not seeing the sugar tree." James reported to Harris that:

I am satisfied from my knowledge of the views of Indians that they will attempt to avoid emigrating, and will either seek the lands included in sale of 28 March 1836, not immediately wanted by the Government or will join their brethren, the Chippewa at the north. The latter will undoubtedly be the case.<sup>44</sup>

James Schoolcraft realized that any unfavorable reports about the country from the delegates would end the federal government's hope of Ottawa removal. To prevent defection from the seeming agreement he had achieved, James asked the delegates as "fully empowered to act in behalf of their tribes," to obligate themselves and their people to move to the forks of the Osage "in the event of our emigrating from our present country."<sup>45</sup> In the meantime, he advised Harris to buy Chippewa lands between the Chocolet River, which served as the western boundary of the 1836 cession, and the eastern limits of the 1837 Chippewa Treaty covering northern Wisconsin and part of Minnesota -- the land to which Michigan Indians would likely resort to if crisis arose.

The returning delegates did indeed advise their kinsmen against accepting western lands. The Ogemuk stated reasons of unsuitable climate, poor soil, and sadly lacking forests. They also disapproved of living near the Potawatomi and Maconse's band of Saginaw Chippewa who had traditionally been bad neighbors. They would accept land on the Kanza River but only as a place for their poor and any people who wished to go on their own accord. No Michigan Ottawa ever moved there.<sup>46</sup>

Removal rumors continued to circulate in the Indian and American settlements. The Ogemuk and their advisors knew Schoolcraft well enough to realize that he would not stop his removal plans simply because they refused to cooperate. Indeed, between 1839 and 1841, Ottawa leaders faced the height of removal crisis. Throughout the state they took new

and, in several instances, innovative measures to assure continued residence in their homelands. The work of winning political approval by displaying their visible progress toward incorporating American economic practices and material goods into their cultural repertoire gradually became the centerpiece of statewide Ottawa efforts.

Owashshinong Persistence, The Decentralized Approach

The Owashshinong Ottawa adopted three basic strategies to secure access to their resources and forestall removal pressures. First, those villages lead by Ogemuk well connected with stable local traders and influential local American leaders opted for purchasing land near their settlements and staying in their pre-treaty homes. Second, whole kin groups, or smaller extended families separated from larger settlements to join one of three Protestant mission establishments founded in Allegan and Barry Counties. These were located near the important hunting grounds and sugar groves that several Ottawa groups had used for decades. Although the process is are difficult to document, some other horticultural settlements entirely disbanded, dividing into their constituent extended families which then drifted northward beyond the range of settlement. Several of these small units remained near southern population centers and became examples of the "degraded savages" of the period literature.

Ogemainini, or Joseph Wakazoo of Ahptuhwaing and his followers paved the way for those Owashshinong Ottawa who wished to purchase southern lands outside the auspices of a Christian mission. As early as April 1836, he petitioned Congress for the right to buy land for an



agricultural colony near his traditional winter hunting grounds in Allegan County. Ogemainini enlisted the aid of a newly formed humanitarian aid organization called The Western Michigan Society to Benefit the Indians which maintained an affiliation with the Presbyterian and Congregational denominations. The Ogema may have done so at the suggestion of a Metis relative named in the documents only as Mr. Cowels, a man educated first by Mackinac Protestants and then at Case Western Reserve College.<sup>47</sup>

Encouraged by the United States paymaster at the September annuity payment, the Western Michigan Society petitioned the Office of Indian Affairs on January 9, 1837. They relayed and supported Ogemainini's request to buy land which would allow the Indians to become farmers and citizens subject to United States laws.<sup>48</sup> Ogemainini, himself the nephew of Mackatabenese, maintained his summer base of operations in the north and wintered in the south until 1839 when he finally won permission from United States agents to purchase southern lands. Even then, he continued to visit Ahptuhwaing every summer until his death nearly ten years later.

On May 18, 1839, when some Waganagici Ottawa contemplated moving to Manitoulin Island, Ogemainini and two other leaders left for Kalamazoc.<sup>49</sup> John Kellogg, a member of Western Michigan Society to Benefit the Indians, arranged for the Ogemuk to visit the Ionia land office and matched their annuity savings with \$750.00 from the American Board of Foreign Missions to purchase more than 1,200 acres of excellent farmland on the Black River in Allegan County -- "mostly maple land and of the best quality." The Indians made the purchase in their own names,

held full title to the tract, and paid annual taxes on their holdings.<sup>50</sup> Kellogg assured Schoolcraft that Ogemainini and his followers were not indolent or lazy; they wished to "conform to our laws and feel sure they will be protected as good citizens."<sup>51</sup>

This purchase of land by Indians for as many as 300 of their friends and kinsmen in their own names had great political significance.<sup>52</sup> Heads of such diverse kin groups as Moksauba from Meshimnekahning and the Genereau from Maple River and such highly respected Waganagisi Ogemuk as Nissowaquot and Wabmanido of Ahnumawautikuhmig and Shininkossia of Ahptuhwaing bought land there, though not all moved to the colony.<sup>53</sup> By becoming tax paying land holders these Ottawa adopted the practice of ownership in severalty, a central theme in the American doctrine of civilization. They acquired the rights to use their lands and to protection of their property under United States laws independent from their trust relationship with the federal government. They did not hold citizenship, but when called upon to leave Michigan under treaty stipulations, they could call upon their rights as landowners to prevent forcible eviction. Ogemainini fully understood the political importance of this acquisition and its potential to provide his followers with stability in turbulent times.<sup>54</sup>

Cobmoosa had taken the first political steps toward purchasing land in his Flat River village during the Glass murders investigation. By cooperating with Schoolcraft's representatives, state and county officials, and local settlers, he had enhanced his reputation among Americans as an Ogema they could trust. Then, when he successfully shifted the blame for the killings from the Cwashshinong Ottawa to the

Saginaw Chippewas, Cobmoosa heightened his standing in the eyes of his own people as well.<sup>55</sup> Cobmoosa's influence lost nothing from his family connections. As Antoine Campau's son, Cobmoosa could draw on the influence of his uncle Louis Campau, then one of the wealthiest men at Grand Rapids, and on his kinship with Joseph Campau a large and powerful landholder at Detroit.<sup>56</sup> When sympathetic citizens of Grand Rapids called on Schoolcraft to appoint a Grand River subagent during the height of the Glass murder hysteria in 1838 to assure the Indian's peaceful cooperation and assure them just treatment, they nominated Cobmoosa's father to fill the position. Had Schoolcraft complied Cobmoosa would have had almost free hand for whatever political tack he chose to take. Schoolcraft, however, opposed continued Indian residence on the Grand River and hence would not appoint a sub-agent because that an act which would have signaled government compliance with the Indians' wish to remain in their village.<sup>57</sup> Cobmoosa then sought other avenues to protect his constituents.

In 1839, after Ogemainini received permission to buy land, Cobmoosa tried to gain title to the land on which the village stood by the same method. Cobmoosa's people quarreled with settlers at Flat River as early as spring 1837 when the Indians threatened to pull down the house of a man who squatted on their land. Some local residents believed that Rix Robinson had incited the Indians to the threat, since his brother kept a tavern near their village.<sup>58</sup> In this instance, the Indians successfully intimidated the squatters. In 1839 the government finished surveying the Indian lands and prepared to sell them on the open market. Cobmoosa's people then had few options. They could either purchase land

or move.

Cobmoosa's constituents pooled their annuity cash, and one day before the government sale, they sent a representative named Wahbashagun to buy their village land under United States preemption laws. The General Land Office interpreted Wahbashagun's request as the act of an individual Ottawa attempting to get land for private gain and ruled against his purchase because it would not benefit the other village members. Because of this, effort, however, the land office withdrew the village tract from sale until the matter could be settled. The Americans who selected lands adjoining this parcel did not question the Indians' right to remain in their homes and farm their plots. Indeed, they fully expected that the Indians would later receive title and left Cobmoosa's people to make their livelihoods for the next seven years without interference.<sup>59</sup>

Other Owashshinong Ogemuk also attempted land purchases. By 1839, Muckatosha's and Megisinini's people bought nearly \$1,200.00 worth of land. At the minimum government price of \$1.25 per acre, this amount would have paid for a tract large enough to grow enough food and graze enough livestock to support the seventy-eight people associated with these two leaders in 1839. Unlike Cobmoosa, they pooled their resources and made the purchase through Richard Godfroy, a well established merchant who had long associated with Louis Campau. Godfroy held the land title and arranged to pay taxes. No one questioned Godfroy's right to purchase Megisinini's village which had become public domain, but the Indians would learn later that they had no legal protection from any fraud the speculator Godfroy wished to perpetrate against them.<sup>60</sup>

Nawbuneezhig's village near Rix Robinson's trading establishment remained one of the most secure Owashshinong settlements. It was on the one square mile tract which Robinson had attempted to reserve by the 1836 treaty. When the Washington effort failed, Robinson bought many acres of the land he had requested, perhaps holding some parcels in trust for the Ottawa.<sup>61</sup> Later, when Robert Stuart became head of the Michigan Superintendency, Robinson, who was his former employee, worked to have a government blacksmith stationed near Nawbuneezhig's settlement and to have Antoine Campau appointed interpreter and stationed at the village. Both of these moves by the federal government would have further secured the Indians' position there.<sup>62</sup> Nawbuneezhig's people had developed agriculture at Mouth of the Thornapple village at their own expense and won government approval for their efforts. In 1842, partially as repayment for their diligence, the government placed a blacksmith station there and hired Robinson as interpreter.<sup>63</sup> This village numbered 111 persons in 1839, and many of them remained in the vicinity until 1859.<sup>64</sup>

Two Protestant sects followed Slater's example and founded mission complexes that which Owashshinong people joined. The first began its work at the tract Ogemainini's people had purchased. In 1840 The Western Michigan Society recruited the Congregationalist missionary George Nelson Smith and his wife Amanda to help train the Indians in Christianity and civilization.<sup>65</sup> The Presbyterian preacher James Selkraig founded a second mission named Griswold Colony shortly thereafter.

Griswold Colony began in 1839 when church officials negotiated with

local Ottawa to place a station near Gun Lake in Barry County. That year the church bought 160 acres in the denomination's name.<sup>66</sup> It appears that, by the mid-1840s, the mission served as home base for two or more kin groups totaling sixty-eight persons. They cleared nine acres of new fields and planned to acquire cattle and agricultural tools. Selkrig contributed more money toward another land purchase by 1841. The missionary hoped to expand operations by encouraging Muckatosha and Megisinini to sell their Grand Rapids holdings and join the Protestant denomination. Although Selkrig pointed out that affiliation with his mission would be an important tactic in avoiding removal, the Bowting Ogemuk refused the invitations, on the advice of Louis Campau and other merchants of the thriving town of Grand Rapids.<sup>67</sup>

The remaining Owashshinong Ottawa who refused to relocate to the Manistee reservation had the final option of remaining in place, living on land not sold to American settlers. Although the Ottawa had usufructuary rights this, it was an uncertain form of tenancy, depending on the honesty of settlers and land merchants. The size of villages that adopted this option often dwindled as individual kin groups left their central locations to use resources beyond the line of American settlement or to join more secure settlements.

The process of village fission began soon after the 1836 treaty. For example, a small group of twenty Ottawa -- perhaps one extended family -- sought a home at Ottawa Colony in April 1837.<sup>68</sup> By 1846 the Ogea Wabigake had moved his followers from Kookoosh's village at the mouth of the Maple River further upstream to unsettled northeastern regions.<sup>69</sup> Another small village of Catholic affiliated Ottawa had also

left a larger settlement and established themselves on the Muskegon River near present-day Newaygo.<sup>70</sup> Louis Genereau and family left Maple River village and sought refuge first at Ottawa Colony and then at Old Wing settlement.<sup>71</sup>

At such northern villages as Muskegon, White River, and Pere Marquette, the tactic of claiming usufructuary rights remained a viable economic option until an early pine timber boom during the late 1840s and early 1850s. Although Baraga claimed converts at Muskegon in the early 1830s, he placed no permanent mission there. When Protestant missionaries approached Ogema Misshewatik and Ogemasi Payshoshega about the possibility of establishing a Protestant mission at their village of more than 150 people in 1847, they met staunch opposition from traditionalists who spoke with one voice, a sign of a healthy Ottawa community.<sup>72</sup> These people relied on resources beyond the reach of American settlement and lived unimpeded, exploiting their traditional marshland and mixed conifer/deciduous forested region. Smaller undocumented groups no doubt dispersed to northern hunting regions contributing to the population at these northern villages.

Those who chose to buy land benefited from a national depression between 1839 and 1841. A failure in the world textile markets had lessened English demands for United States cotton which, in turn, cut the nation's gross exports by fifty percent. This limited the once abundant cash flow that the English had, until that time, invested in the water and rail transportation network across the American midwest. President Jackson's monetary policies exacerbated these international factors. Michigan residents had overextended their credit in land boom

speculations and felt the effects of national and international recession. Stable metal currency was scarce at the flush of times on the Michigan frontier, but in these cash poor days, the Ottawa who received annuity payments in silver coin were particularly welcome customers. They could pay cash for the land surrounding their villages while Euroamerican settlers could not.<sup>73</sup>

Although the options chosen by the Owasshinong Ogemuk secured them their villages and access to enough natural resources to guarantee subsistence, each settlement acted more autonomously than did the Waganagisi villages. The Owasshinong villages were geographically more dispersed than the major Waganagisi settlements making it easier for the most distant Ogemuk to act independently. Further, no overarching church bureaucracy bound them; each Protestant institution formed a community unto itself. Even the near neighbors of Ottawa Colony and Griswold Colony seldom made joint political statements. Over time even the uniting factor of mutual trading companies and creditors disappeared in the rush of incoming settlers and merchants to win the business of the ever more isolated villages. Between 1837 and 1842, even though all Owasshinong Ottawa opposed removal, they could not muster sufficient unity to begin political actions to end the threat. This task fell to the less fractious Waganagisi Ottawa.

#### Persistence By Political Unity At Waganagisi

By 1839 Henry Schoolcraft dropped all pretense of supporting Ottawa assimilation, citing the inherent and unchangeable racial inferiority of the Indians to Americans as the single insurmountable obstacle to Indian



advancement in American society. In doing so, he damned the Ottawa to removal southwest of the Missouri River and proposed that the government treat for their remaining usufructuary rights in Michigan abolish all of the Indians legal rights in the state.<sup>74</sup>

From the Ottawa's own perspective, they had actively and successfully pursued the very assimilation policies the American government had promoted. Schoolcraft's failure to accept their accomplishments as a measure of potential for increased participation caused much discontent in Ottawa communities. Fear of removal had been the single most important issue inducing the Ottawa to negotiate the 1836 treaty, and in gaining their approval of the treaty, Schoolcraft had promised that the Ottawa would probably never be removed, certainly not against their will. Thus, in pressing for removal now, he severely damaged his own credibility and became the target of intense political fire.

The Waganagisi Ottawa faced the issue of removal with far greater unity of purpose and method than did their Owashshinong relatives. These Catholic communities acted as a solid political block petitioning the government to settle their grievances and end removal. When joined by Mackinac Metis and merchants, they made a potent force for Schoolcraft to reckon with.

Schoolcraft began facing strong opposition to his overt removal policy from the Waganagisi communities immediately. Like their Owashshinong relatives, the northern Ogemuk first sought to guarantee their continued residence in Michigan by purchasing the land on which they built their villages and farmsteads. For the Waganagisi Ottawa, however, this comprised only one part of a tripartite plan. They also

began petitioning state and federal governments for full citizenship and took an active part in Mackinac politics to help place men who would further their causes in elected and appointed offices. Traders like Samuel Abbott, who had taken over the American Fur Company trade at the Straits, Edward Biddle, and John Drew, all of whom benefited from Ottawa cash and market production, aided and abetted the Indians in these pursuits.

The Waganagisi Ogemuk began planning their strategy as early as the winter of 1839. On January 14, the Ogemuk from all the Waganagisi villages met in council to discuss their dealings with the federal government. Apokisigan, Nissowaquot, Kiminichagun and twenty-three other leaders informed James Schoolcraft, then the keeper of the Mackinac dormitory and de facto Mackinac Indian agent, that Nissowaquot, Mackatabenese, Tagwagane, Pabamatabi and Ogemainini had been appointed to petition the government through the Mackinac Indian office.<sup>75</sup> These representatives complained that Henry Schoolcraft's method of paying annuities by dividing the 1836 cession area into three parts and apportioning per capita payments within them granted the Chippewa along the north shore of Lake Huron more than their share of the available cash. They also requested that the nearly \$80,000 remaining after their just debts were paid in 1836 be placed in their hands.<sup>76</sup>

The "debt fund" issue stirred hostilities in both the Indian and the Mackinac trader communities. To the Indians the remaining debt fund money would pay for many acres at a time when the national recession made real estate a buyer's market. It was also a political matter to them since, by their reading of Article 5 of the 1836 treaty, the

Indians had "with the aid and assistance of their agent" the right to apply "the overplus, if any" to "such other use as they may think proper."<sup>77</sup> Although the supplemental article appended to the treaty after its signing in 1836 granted the government permission to invest these monies in state stocks, the Ottawa did not sanction this contradictory addendum. They wanted what they saw as their rightful access to the cash.

The merchants who had extended the Ottawa credit and provisions during the crop failure and difficult winters of 1835-1836 and 1836-1837 wanted reimbursement for their own expenses. In succeeding months, Henry Schoolcraft declined to act on this matter. He argued that the supplemental article to the 1836 treaty obligated the government to invest the remaining debt fund cash; even if it had not, he said, several claims on the money remained outstanding. The cash, then, could not be distributed until the government settled these. The new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, T. Hartley Crawford, seconded Schoolcraft's opinion about the debt fund and also refused to alter the formula by which the Superintendent calculated per capita payments.<sup>78</sup> The Ogemuk continued oppose Schoolcraft on these matters. As the removal threats increased, they made other and more serious charges against their Superintendent.

By the spring of 1839, rumors that the United States planned to soon load the Michigan Indians on steamboats and forcibly move them west of the Mississippi spread throughout the Waganagisi Ottawa and Grand Traverse Chippewa communities. In May, James Schoolcraft reported to his brother Henry that the Waganagisi Ottawa would soon leave for

Manitoulin to escape this flagrant violation of what they perceived as their treaty rights. Twenty canoes had passed Mackinac by May 18. Reports from the most reliable Waganagisi Ogemuk who remained at their villages said that these emigrants intended to reside in Canada and return to Michigan only to collect their annuities. Two days later James Schoolcraft upped his estimate to thirty canoe loads of emigrants who passed through the straits.<sup>79</sup>

Schoolcraft had little legal means of preventing the Ottawa and Chippewa from crossing the international boundary because as Jay's Treaty of 1796 clearly guaranteed the Ottawa right to do so unimpeded. Schoolcraft could, however, threaten to withhold government services to emigrating Indians and delete any who remained in Canada from the United States annuity rolls. He did so with Crawford's blessing.<sup>80</sup>

Schoolcraft struck some 263 persons from the payroll: 105 from Apokisigan's village, 47 from Kemewan's, 49 from Namouschota's, and 62 from Chingassamo's.<sup>81</sup> Although a small number of Owashshinong people also went to Canada, most returned shortly afterwards dissatisfied with their potential homesite.<sup>82</sup> It is by no means clear how many Waganagisi emigrants really remained at Manitoulin. Kemewan, for example, one year later told Henry Schoolcraft that he had only gone to the British side to work a field he held there and to grieve for his eldest daughter who had died in Canada. Kemewan and many of the others who emigrated that summer expected to receive their shares of the American annuity payment.<sup>83</sup>

Exclusion from the rolls of persons who had crossed the border created yet another issue around which Waganagisi and Mackinac community

opposition organized. The Indians reinforced their threat of further crossings when more than the average number of people visited Manitoulin Island for the annual British gift-giving ceremonies in 1840. The Ogemuk relied on Schoolcraft's fears of a potentially hostile Indian colony on the Canadian border as political leverage for their anti-removal politics. Schoolcraft took the warning seriously.<sup>84</sup>

In July of 1839, Wasson, Assagon, Nissowaquot and others requested that Augustin Hamlin, Jr. draft a petition to Governor Stevens Mason on their behalf. In this document, the Ogemuk followed Ogemainini's lead and volunteered to become citizens, reasoning that:

We have seen Pokagon [a Potawatomi leader] and others near Kalamazoo buying lands from the United States Government. They have been told that by that act they become citizens, and are so acknowledged by the white people. And we hope and understand that the same liberality may be extended to us.<sup>85</sup>

They asked if Indians did indeed have the right to purchase land from the government. If so, they asked, would Indians who held land titles and conformed to state laws be allowed to remain and be recognized as citizens? And lastly, if the Governor answered affirmatively to the above, could they obtain permanent title to land on Little Traverse Bay?

Knowing who wrote this petition is as important to a discussion of Waganagisi politics as the formal request itself. As noted previously, Augustin Hamlin, Jr., had returned to Weekwitonsing village after the 1836 Washington negotiations. While teaching school there, Hamlin carried on a behind the scenes correspondence with federal officials whom he hoped would grant him the status of "head chief" with power of attorney to run Ottawa affairs. In 1837 Hamlin wrote to President Martin Van Buren claiming responsibility for conducting the Ottawa to

Washington to make the 1836 treaty and presenting his claim for federal legitimization. Commissioner Harris had agreed to make Hamlin head chief only if Schoolcraft agreed, but the Superintendent had little sympathy for an upstart trying to carve a role between himself and the Indians under his jurisdiction. On June 16, 1838, Schoolcraft reported that not only was Hamlin not a "chief" he was

a mere youth, the son of a French half breed trader at Point St. Ignace, and not a native even of their district. . . that the President required me to transact the public business with the Indians and not with other persons who made themselves busy in Indian affairs . . . I do not think it is his Forte to rule in their political affairs. At least thus far he has not evinced that foresight in pointing out the present and probable condition, and true policy of the Indians or firmness and consistence in counselling them which are deemed essential . . . and unhappily he has been found opposed to policy of the department in every instance known to me.<sup>86</sup>

Schoolcraft outright rejected Hamlin's claims to be head chief.

By 1839 Hamlin had returned to Mackinac where he apparently helped in his father's trading enterprise.<sup>87</sup> At Mackinac, the center of northern Michigan politics, Hamlin kept abreast of subtle turns in policy and community responses and an eye on Ottawa affairs. He coordinated the efforts of the Indians and local Mackinac interests to help the Waganagisi people meet their goals. In doing so, he earned the continued animosity of Henry Schoolcraft.

Schoolcraft seriously miscalculated his personal standing among both the Ottawa and the Mackinac trader community when he told Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Potts that the locals held, "Some petty misrepresentations against this office, which are not deemed entitled to notice."<sup>88</sup> Schoolcraft angered the Metis and the traders by his stance

toward removal and, especially, by his withholding the debt fund. One of the largest claims against that fund had already gone to Schoolcraft's in-laws, the Johnstons, who still held the greatest proportion of the outstanding claims against the fund. Schoolcraft's withholding payment from the fund until these alleged debts were paid smacked of nepotism and conflict of interest which ran counter to the Ottawas' own needs.<sup>89</sup>

Moreover, some local merchants and community leaders had strong connections with the Whig party and opposed Schoolcraft's staunch Democratic affiliation.<sup>90</sup> Others in these cash-poor times were desperate for government jobs as carpenters, farmers, and interpreters -- salaried positions that Schoolcraft had handed out liberally as patronage favors to his trusted relatives.<sup>91</sup> Catholic missionaries, who maintained schools in Ottawa villages, had received little of the treaty stipulated funds for missions from the Presbyterian Schoolcraft. Together, the Ottawa and their political allies, including traders, Catholic missionaries, job hungry laborers and craftsmen, and Whig party aspirants, all hoped for more under a new Superintendent.

The Waganagisi Ogemuk realized that Article Two of the 1836 treaty gave the government the right to sell their home villages on May 27, 1841. Unless they forced Henry Schoolcraft and other federal officials to take decisive steps in 1840, the Superintendent might succeed in forcing removal. This urgency informed their actions when they sent Hamlin to Washington in February 1840 to by-pass Schoolcraft and to discuss their requests directly with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.<sup>92</sup>

Hamlin was joined by Schoolcraft's brother-in-law, William Johnston, to carry complaints from the Ogemuk to Washington. They arrived on April 1, 1840. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs listened as the representatives lobbied for disbursement of the debt fund. If the petition submitted by the Ogemuk to President Van Buren is any indication of additional charges they discussed with the commissioner, then Hamlin also claimed that Schoolcraft had been inattentive to Indian rights and requests. As proof, Hamlin argued that Schoolcraft had not distributed the funds for education and that the Ottawa's Catholic missionaries had not received any money for their operations. He believed Schoolcraft killed agency cattle without benefiting the Indians and kept the treaty stipulated farmers, carpenters and their assistants on Mackinac Island to do his work, making them useless to the Indians. Further, the interpreters Schoolcraft appointed were women and members of his own household, adding further to the nepotism that characterized his administration. The reservations from the 1836 treaty remained unmarked, Schoolcraft said, because the Ottawa would have to leave them in one or two years. And lastly, the Indians complained that Schoolcraft had removed certain Ottawa from the 1839 payroll without cause. They would provide the names of those deleted and wanted them returned to the list. The best solution, Apokisigan and associated Ogemuk said, was to have Schoolcraft dismissed from office.<sup>93</sup>

The charges leveled by Hamlin and Johnston, along with a letter recently received from Edward Biddle at Mackinac Island, and a petition from the Ogemuk, convinced Crawford that the situation required formal investigation of Schoolcraft's behavior. The Commissioner appointed



Samuel Abbott of Mackinac and General John R. Williams, both influential Whig political opponents, to collect evidence supporting or refuting the charges.<sup>94</sup> The proceedings continued until August 21, 1940, when Crawford found that,

After mature deliberation and a scrutinizing examination of the large mass of evidence submitted, the Department has desired that justice to all concerned does not require the dismissal of the superintendent. The gravest charges are not sustained; in a few instances errors have been discerned which must be corrected, and amendments to be made but nothing sordid or corrupt has been proved against the accused.<sup>95</sup>

Crawford felt compelled to address the charges that challenged Schoolcraft's distribution of treaty stipulated funds and services. In his opinion, Schoolcraft had divided mission and education money equally between five denominations. The arrangement had been beneficial to all groups, and hence, difficult for opponents to challenge. Further, Williams and Abbott could not show that Schoolcraft misused agency cattle, but the Commissioner would reconsider use of funds for farmers, carpenters, and other mechanics to create a more beneficial arrangement. The treaty did call for the investment of the debt fund, but the interest would henceforth be paid annually. Crawford also promised to have the reservations surveyed.

Even though Schoolcraft maintained his position as head of the Michigan Superintendency, his administrative errors had served as the focus around which a strong political opposition had formed. Schoolcraft and his supporters tried to discredit the efforts of Hamlin and Johnston and their relationship with the Waganagisi Ogemuk, but the Indians backed the efforts of their representatives. Schoolcraft's

supporters claimed that the May petition to President Van Buren was drawn by a few Ogemuk and in secret, but at least twenty Waganagisi leaders signed the document, all of whom had signed several other official documents since 1820, giving proof of their respected status in their own communities. The most important signatories included Apokisigan, Namouschota, Nissowaquot, Mackatabenese, Kiminichagun, Pabamatabi, Neogema, Wasson, Kemewan and Assagon.<sup>96</sup> Since these men represented all the Waganagisi villages, their followers soon learned, if they did not already know, the results of the council. The meeting may have been closed, but that seems to mean that non-Indians were excluded.

Schoolcraft recognized the power of the trader/Ottawa union and attempted to limit its effectiveness with the federal government.<sup>97</sup> Samuel Abbott who had received charge of what Schoolcraft denounced as "that odious monopoly of the Lakes, so called the American Fur Company at Mackinac" after Robert Stuart left Mackinac was foremost among this level of political opposition.<sup>98</sup> Schoolcraft protested that Abbott himself had interests in having him fired from office because the two had disagreed about the company's using alcohol in trade and that the trader's commission should be revoked.<sup>99</sup> Edward Biddle and John Drew maintained a large portion of the Lower Peninsula trade throughout the 1840s, controlled Indian credit, and wielded considerable influence throughout Michigan. Biddle had filed the first charges in the suit in December 1839.<sup>100</sup>

Schoolcraft found it difficult to block the opposition of this coalition even after Crawford's investigation exonerated him of wrong-

doing. Schoolcraft returned from the Washington hearings to face further political challenges -- a continuing attempt by Hamlin and his Mackinac backers to establish a formal intermediate position between himself and the Ottawa.

During the Schoolcraft investigation, Hamlin had once again requested that Crawford grant him the title of paramount chief of the Ottawa. Schoolcraft had declined to do so in 1837 and 1838 on the basis of Hamlin's French-Canadian heritage, arguing that he had received pay under Article Nine which stipulated for "half breed" compensation and, hence, could not be recognized as Indian or included on the payroll.<sup>101</sup> Schoolcraft bowed slightly to administrative authority and agreed to put Hamlin's name on the Ottawa payroll and to recognize him as an Indian but only if the Department insisted. He believed it an unsound policy, even though it might "quiet the fears and disturbance of those people [the Waganagisi Ottawa] on designs and policy of the government." To further discredit Hamlin, Schoolcraft added that the Indian Department would not "find another John Ross, in Mr. Hamlin, who is, I am free to say, a young man of correct habits, a plain education and conscientious [sic] feelings, but inheriting the bias of opinion peculiar to the aboriginal races."<sup>102</sup> On one hand, he denied Hamlin official status because he was not an Indian, and on the other he sought to diminish his political ambition with racial stereotypes.

Despite Schoolcraft's objections, Crawford recommended that Hamlin be recognized as head chief of the Ottawa. Three days later, on August 21, Crawford addressed himself directly and officially to Hamlin, outlining the findings of the commission to investigate Schoolcraft, a de

facto, if partial, recognition of his newly enlarged leadership role in Ottawa society.<sup>103</sup> Crawford reported that no legal grounds for Schoolcraft's dismissal had been discovered, hence he would remain in office. Therefore, Schoolcraft remained at Mackinac, his own position diminished, unwilling to bend to the wishes of Hamlin and his political backers, an act he believed would cause the utter collapse of his own authority.

Since Hamlin had counted political coup on Schoolcraft, the Superintendent worked to discredit the young leader among his Ottawa constituents. He called a council on September 19, 1840, where he carefully questioned Apokisigan about the intention of the Ogemuk in the 1835 petition on which Hamlin based his case. According to Schoolcraft, Apokisigan and other Ogemuk who witnessed the petition signing were "surprised and disavowed" having sought Hamlin's appointment as head chief.<sup>104</sup> The likelihood that these Ogemuk were genuinely uninformed of Hamlin's bid for government recognition is slight. News travelled much too quickly between the Straits communities for Hamlin to have kept so large a political secret for five years. Moreover, Apokisigan spoke French and visited Mackinac Island regularly, thus increasing his opportunities to learn of Hamlin's ambitions and activities.<sup>105</sup>

More likely, the Ogemuk used this meeting to force Hamlin to conform to Ottawa leadership standards. When Schoolcraft introduced the matter of Hamlin's parentage and the original omission of his name from the payrolls, Hamlin's Ottawa relatives for the first time publicly classified the young man as a "half breed." Apokisigan offered an economic explanation for doing so, saying that the treaty had drawn a

line between the Indians who lived by "hunting" -- a contemporary American stereotype for most Eastern Woodland peoples, which only partially fit the Ottawa -- and those who did not. Hamlin fit in the second category. Apokisigan said that if all their affinal kin and their descendants, the "mixed-bloods," shared in the treaty provisions, there would be little left to support the Waganagisi villagers. Even though all the Ottawa Ogemuk were politically "most favorable to Hamlin's pretensions among them" and "kindly disposed" to him, they did not regard him as head chief or entitled to pay for his services.

To influence the Commissioner's decision, Schoolcraft then described the role expectations held by the Ottawa for their Ogemuk. Such leaders, he explained, had little formal authority and only local influence and jurisdiction; they were chosen by popular voice and not appointed by written documents granting full authority to make decisions for the entire society. Schoolcraft argued that, if the United States issued a written commission, the Indians would be suspicious. He reasoned that when Ottawa leaders arose with temporarily broader authority and responsibilities to meet the demands of unusual situations, little harm and no permanent results would occur. If the Department formally recognized such an office, however, and if it gave written authorization to the appointee, then it would be difficult to withdraw.<sup>106</sup> The Commissioner of Indian Affairs accepted Schoolcraft's cultural analysis and political logic and did not award Hamlin further official recognition. Crawford then limited Hamlin's access to direct government channels by demanding that he address any official correspondence to Schoolcraft, who would forward it to the capitol.<sup>107</sup>

Schoolcraft had dispatched Hamlin's overt threat to his authority with an insightful reading of Ottawa internal politics and economy. He also believed that the Ottawa threat to cross the international boundary had run its course and no longer remained a viable option. The Canadian rebellion had ended, and the government wished to limit its expenditures on Indian affairs by putting in place a "civilization" policy much like that encouraged under Thomas McKinney's Indian Office administration in the United States. Even though record numbers of Indians had visited Manitoulin in 1840, few stayed. Some Waganagisi Ottawa responded favorably to Assiginac's request to remain on Manitoulin Island and formed the core of the Catholic agricultural settlement of Wikwemikong, but more had already returned to Michigan.<sup>108</sup> The colony's progress was so unorganized that Schoolcraft advised the Commissioner that no action would be required in the near future. Some Ogemuk had even reportedly told Schoolcraft that they did not regard Manitoulin as a suitable permanent habitation, further allaying his fears of mass migration.<sup>109</sup>

Despite reduced political pressures from Hamlin and lessening emigration threats, Schoolcraft did not recover support from the Ogemuk or the Mackinac community. The annual report that he sent to Crawford on September 24, 1840, clearly indicated that he considered removal to land southwest of the Missouri River as the only viable option left for the Michigan Indians. He admitted that Michigan residents remained generally "friendly" to the Ottawa and that many Indians would willingly submit to local, state and federal laws. Still, Schoolcraft said:

I have no confidence, however, that the final result of their purchasing lands at the land office, and remaining in the white settlements, will be a whit more favorable here, than it has been in other pos-

itions where the experiment has been made. There are a thousand causes of latent dislike and disunion between two great stocks of the human race, who are so different in their leading traits, physical and intellectual, as the American Indian and the Teutonic or Celt. And although legislation may commence here, (as it is likely to do.) in kindness and a sincere wish to advance the Indians in civilization, there are deep-seated reasons why it will, within a comparatively short period, develop itself in a form as being strongly adverse to recognize an equality with tribes who may receive, as a boon, what they cannot claim under the constitution of Michigan as a right.<sup>110</sup>

Schoolcraft's reliance on the scientific racism of his day to deny the accomplishments of his charges, who had already gone so far to accommodate the values, technology, and political dictates of the incoming Americans in their own region, angered Ottawa and Metis leaders.<sup>111</sup> Schoolcraft's pro-removal policies convinced the Mackinac and Waganagisi communities that the only way they could assure peace in their region was to force the Superintendent's dismissal from office.

Surveying the reservation remained an important issue with the Ogemuk. The government land surveys had established township lines for the entire Lower Peninsula, but they had not yet subdivided these tracts into salable portions north of the southern shore of Little Traverse Bay. They could not acquire title to the 50,000 acre Waganagisi Reservation on the market with or without the consent of their Commissioner of Indian Affairs or the state.<sup>112</sup> Those Ottawa who built homes, cleared land, and otherwise established homesteads held their plots only at the will of the government. Without the reservation survey they could not even protect themselves against Americans who might settle among them and later claim Indian homes by preemption rights.

Schoolcraft balked on surveying the reservation even after Crawford

decided that the reserves must be marked, if for no other reason than to meet the treaty stipulations. On October 16, 1840, Schoolcraft argued that he had spoken with the regional surveyor from the General Land Office and that the lands could not possibly be surveyed by June 1841, when the Ottawa were to surrender them.<sup>113</sup> Crawford once again instructed Schoolcraft to complete the survey, reminding the Superintendent that the Ottawa had the right to remain on their reserves beyond May 1841 at the pleasure of the President. Because American settlement was pushing northward, made it was necessary for the Ottawa to have a place of refuge. In addition, Crawford well knew that the government had no current plans for removal. By taking a stand against securing the boundaries of the reservation, Schoolcraft alienated even men who had formerly supported his positions.<sup>114</sup>

The 1840 national elections ended the twelve-year reign of the Jacksonian Democrats who had made removal a keystone of their Indian policy. When the new Whig government of William Henry Harrison took office, Hamlin and Johnston once again returned to Washington, D.C., as "agents of the Ottawa and Chippewa tribes of Indians in northern Michigan, duly authorized by them to assume powers of transacting their business with the government."<sup>115</sup> Hamlin and Johnston apparently had difficulty pursuing their mission, for they returned to Michigan and requested permission from Secretary of War John Bell for an Ottawa and Chippewa delegation to Washington to press their claims. To add weight to their proposal they also petitioned Federal Circuit Judge James Doty, also asking permission for the delegation.<sup>116</sup> They maintained their clear purpose. They believed that Crawford had unjustly cleared



Schoolcraft of their 1840 charges. The Superintendent had returned to Michigan and continued to thwart Ottawa interests, and the Indians wanted him fired.

By May 1841, Schoolcraft became a victim of the same patronage and spoils system under which he had so long held his own office.<sup>117</sup> The new Whig administration appointed Robert Stuart, the former supervisor of the American Fur Company at Mackinac, Superintendent of the Michigan Superintendency.<sup>118</sup> Stuart foresaw no immediate dangers for the Ottawa. It was public knowledge throughout Michigan that settlement had slowed greatly with the onset of the national depression. The majority of national settlement shifted to lands from Missouri and westward, territory bordering the intended western home for the Michigan Indians. Stuart and other Whig candidates opposed placing large colonies along the western boundaries of this high growth region. The Ojibwa Ottawa, Stuart believed, would have to leave their Grand River valley villages, but there remained room for them north of the Manistee River.<sup>119</sup> Stuart's enduring ties to Michigan traders and his friends' interests in obtaining cash settlements from funds stipulated in the 1836 treaty made it worth while to work toward keeping the Indians close to home where he, and not more distant lobbyists, could bring the Indians to decide in his favor.<sup>120</sup> In addition, Stuart was familiar enough with the events leading to Schoolcraft's political tribulations to know how to calm the troubled Indian communities; he opposed removal.

#### Summary

It was not easy to defeat the proponents of removal in Michigan.

At Owashshinong villages where the Ottawa felt pressures of American populations most keenly, there were few joint political actions between villages. Indeed, political and economic developments enhanced traditional village autonomy. In some cases villages divided along lines of their component kin groups as each group pursued different natural resources and employed traditional procurement practices. Still, the long Ottawa history of decentralized political authority allowed these groups to function for their own preservation. They would once again unite and join the larger body of their kinsmen when the time came to end, once and for all, the removal issue. Meanwhile, each Ogemuk and his people worked to retain a share of local resources as best they could, and in 1841, few had surety of holding their claims. Leonard Slater's course of purchasing land on the open market served as an example to astute Ogemuk who emulated the practice. Politically well connected Ottawa who lived directly along the line of American settlement continued to buy land throughout the 1840s and 1850s with hopes of securing their property rights with citizenship. Even though Henry Schoolcraft opposed efforts of Owashshinong people to buy land, he never succeeded in forcing their removal either to the Mississippi River or north to the Manistee reservation.

Even though Michigan officials favored continued Ottawa residence in the state, federal authorities had not yet forsaken the useful policy that had cleared much of the eastern United States for American settlement. The political actions that forced the government to take a moderate position on Ottawa removal came primarily from the Waganagisi villages where leaders had achieved remarkable political coherence and

had a clear plan for future development in their traditional homeland. Their foresight in educating young leaders in American academic pursuits and politics paid rich dividends. Augustin Hamlin and others advised the Ogemuk regarding their political options and formed political linkages that by-passed government officials who worked contrary to the Ottawa program of economic expansion in Michigan.

It is important to note that, even though Hamlin enjoyed broad Ottawa support, he did not succeed in creating an institutionalized political position for himself. By preventing the young leader's ascension to political office beyond the culturally defined position of Ogemasi, Waganagisi Ogemuk preserved integrity of their decentralized socio-political.

The successes of Waganagisi leaders does not mean that they had no internal divisions. During the following ten years, kin groups would leave their parent villages as pressures of removal slackened and private interests once again came to the fore. For the crucial years between 1836 and 1841, however, the Waganagisi Ottawa spoke with one voice and acted with strong accord, making them tough opponents for Superintendent Schoolcraft.

The Whig ascension to power in 1841 was a watershed in Ottawa history. Although the threat of removal had not ended, the crisis created by the angry, politically injured Schoolcraft was over and the Ottawa had scored a major victory. In the years to come, removal never again became an immediate threat claiming such a great portion of their time, talents, and political skills. The Ogemuk and their people concentrated on building a place in Michigan society and economy, coupling

their tactic of land purchases to create an ambiguous legal status with the hard work of increasing farmland and producing their traditional products for the American market.

CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL PROMOTION  
AND THE END OF REMOVAL

Even though the most immediate removal danger ended for the Ottawa with Schoolcraft's dismissal from office, the debate on forced westward emigration would not be concluded until the United States officially dismantled removal policy during the 1850s. Many of the maneuvers that terminated removal policy took place in the state and federal governments, beyond the immediate political reach of the Ogemuk. Still, Ottawa leaders employed all their available channels to promote a binding legal agreement that would assure permanent tenure of their homelands. In the end they won that settlement in the 1855 Treaty of Detroit.

This chapter demonstrates the broad range of political relationships Ottawa Ogemuk relied upon to make their needs and desires known in the centers of state and federal power. It also examines the frontier economic conditions that linked diverse Ottawa and American political interests in the fight against removal. By 1841, the Ottawa wage labor and market farmers and fishermen were firmly embedded in the Michigan economy. The Ogemuk no longer threatened to emigrate to Canada to get their way. Instead, they recounted time and again, in high-flown oratory addressed to political figures, clergy, and settlers their progress in the "arts of civilization" and their desire to become citizens. Their public relations presentations, coupled with a full scale, state

wide practice of purchasing land and holding it as private tax paying individuals, went far to secure a land base and control of natural resources in their traditional homeland and a base for their cultural continuity.

#### Politics And The Comforts Of Civilized Life

The Ottawa and their Metis and American friends and relatives hoped for great political and economic advancement under the administration of their War of 1812 adversary, President William Henry Harrison. Still, they faced a difficult task in attempting to sway federal policy. The pro-removal Commissioner of Indian Affairs, T. Hartley Crawford retained his office throughout the Harrison and Tyler administrations. Crawford modified his stance but did not end his efforts to remove the Indians.<sup>1</sup>

Crawford disapproved of all attempts by the Michigan Indians to avoid removal throughout his official tenure and would not condone Ottawa land buying. The 1836 treaty, he argued, firmly bound the Indians to leave the ceded lands, but because of his plans for a new northern reserve near the present Iowa-Missouri Boarder, the Commissioner remained uncertain about the specifics of where and when they would go. By June 15, 1841, Crawford approved sale of the Grand Traverse reservation, the first such disposition of lands reserved by the 1836 treaty, and the end of all such Ottawa reservations appeared imminent.<sup>2</sup> Word of Crawford's action spread quickly through the Indian community creating much anxiety. To calm Ottawa fears, the Commissioner advised the Indians that the government had not yet reached a conclusion about their removal to a northern or southern location in the west.<sup>3</sup>

The Ottawa had faced a similar government stance during the 1836 treaty negotiations and again when the Senate had limited the tenure of their reserves. During that time of political and economic insecurity, Ottawa leaders had made their preference for a northern reservation known to President Jackson. Nothing had come of the plan then because of Commissioner Harris's insistence on moving them to a site southwest of the Missouri River. The Ottawa, now politically and financially well established, opposed all removal efforts but used the time created by Crawford's ambivalence about this northern reserve to advance their political goals.<sup>4</sup>

The Waganagisi Ottawa, with many of their Mackinac neighbors and kinsmen, carried through with the anti-removal initiatives they had begun before Schoolcraft left his office in May 1841. A Protestant missionary from Ohio named Alvan Coe, who hoped to work with the Chippewa living between Mackinac and Sault Ste. Marie, began the most promising action in 1841. Coe first met with Mackinac residents, asking them to unite in support of an effort to preserve the reservations established under the 1836 treaty beyond the stipulated five year limit. He organized a formal committee comprised of local traders, missionaries, and other citizens who, on May 26, 1841, drafted a petition to Congress.<sup>5</sup> Coe then held councils with Waganagisi Ogemuk and their Chippewa counterparts living on Grand Traverse Bay, easily convincing them to back his plan and to contribute well-crafted written statements in support of the Mackinac initiative.<sup>6</sup>

The Harrison administration dismissed Henry Schoolcraft from his office in middle or late May, and the former Superintendent had not yet

left his Mackinac post when he learned of the petition. Schoolcraft opposed preserving the reservations on the grounds that the Indians could already live on any unsold land in the public domain and should not receive further benefits. Given his earlier statements about the necessity of removal, however, clearly other logic colored Schoolcraft's judgments. He promptly wrote Crawford, warning him of the Mackinac petition and saying that he hoped the Commissioner would thwart Coe's efforts. Crawford, however, did not immediately act against the petition. Given the Washington spoils system for filling government offices, Crawford may have feared for his own job should he enforce the removal policy so long criticized by the Whigs. Administration officials pressed Crawford to replace the Democrat Schoolcraft with the influential Whig Robert Stuart. Stuart proved more sympathetic to the Indians' cause. They and the Mackinac residents who knew Stuart well from his long residence at the Strait wasted little time in forming a working relationship with the new Superintendent.

On June 23, 1841, Ruben Turner, who headed the Mackinac citizens' committee, gave their completed petition to Stuart, who in turn sent the document to Secretary of War John Spencer. The statement drafted by Mackinac residents argued that the Indians had worked hard to adopt the "manners and customs of white men" and had "already advanced toward imitation of the whites." They listed the material changes the Ottawa had instituted at their settlements during thirteen years of mission influence, credibly demonstrating Ottawa ability to achieve what Americans believed to be the "civilized" life. Each of the three main Waganagisi villages had well built wooden houses, a church and a school.



Some people could read and write in English, French, and Odawa. Most depended on agricultural production and raising cattle, horses, hogs, and poultry. The Indians had clearly stated their objections to moving west where they would live beside "numerous warlike tribes," and would have to part with the "privileges" they had acquired, including religion. If the government allowed them to remain at their villages, the petitioners reasoned, the Indians would soon be fit citizens. If the government pressed them to move west, they would instead go to Canada.

On June 27, Turner followed up this petition with a letter to President Tyler, once again calling the Indians' problem to his personal attention and asking him to respond either through the citizen's committee or by Superintendent Stuart.<sup>7</sup> Tyler referred the matter to Secretary of War John Bell who, in turn, called for Crawford's comment. The Commissioner answered that he knew of no orders to remove the Michigan Indians in the immediate future. He had not yet decided on the location of their permanent reservation but would not give "positive permission" for them to stay in Michigan permanently.<sup>8</sup> On July 30, Bell replied to the petition, telling the Indians that they would not be removed in "the present year" and that the government contemplated selecting a reservation with resources more suitable to their tastes than the lands they had examined in 1838.<sup>9</sup>

Stuart delivered Bell's message and diffused the immediate tensions at the Straits. He also began an active campaign to keep the Ottawa in Michigan. In his first annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Stuart reaffirmed his earlier statement that the Ottawa would never move southwest of the Missouri. He conceded that the

Owashshinong, Muskegon, White River, and Manistee villages must move northward beyond the line of settlement, but he believed that there remained plenty of land available for them between Grand Traverse Bay and Mackinac -- acreage of sufficiently low quality that it would not be claimed by Americans for another fifteen or twenty years. In Stuart's opinion, many Michigan citizens wanted the Indians to stay and become citizens, and there was no urgent reason for their removal.<sup>10</sup> Stuart's assessment carried weight in Washington, and with his help, the Ottawa won respite.

Stuart was correct in his assessment that many Michigan residents wanted the Ottawa to remain in the state; among the most vocal were the growing number of settlers who traded goods to the Indians on credit. The \$18,000 annuity payment owed to the Ottawa by 1842 totalled only a little over \$8.00 per person, but it provided much needed and heartily pursued currency on the Michigan frontier.

One example of the symbiotic financial relationship between American merchants, settlers, and the Indians occurred at the 1841 Grand Rapids annuity payments. An observer who attended the affair estimated that two traders appeared to serve every Indian, and each bought about two gallons of diluted whiskey to sell for silver coin. As a tongue-in-cheek article in the Grand Rapids Enquirer reported:

The Indians being in a destitute condition both on account of clothing and provisions, in order to keep their waning spirits from spoiling, must be made drunk on the first day of their arrival, and kept so till the day of payment. This will preserve them. Whiskey, you know, will preserve even dead men. In the meantime the traders aforesaid (if it were not for them how the poor creatures would suffer) will be able to mark down in a little memorandum book about eight dollars against the names of each Nich-ee whom they

may 'preserve, protect and defend.'<sup>11</sup>

At the back door of the building where federal agents issued the Grand Rapids payments, creditors besieged the Indians with claims, and according to the report, took money from them by force.

Annuity money remained important enough to the Grand Rapids community that, when Robert Stuart threatened to move the payment to another location unless the whiskey trade stopped, the community raised a local police force to prevent liquor sales to the Indians. Their action insured the Indians' money was spent on legitimate needs at Grand Rapids.<sup>12</sup> Grand Rapids residents disagreed with Superintendent Stuart that the Owashshinong Ottawa should move to northern Michigan. Instead, they once again proposed that a subagency be created on the Grand River and that Antoine Campau head the office. By doing this, the government would make at least a partial, indirect commitment to maintaining the Indians on the Grand River where their treaty cash and services benefited the larger community.

Rix Robinson made a request for an interpreter and blacksmith on the Grand River at the Ottawa's behest after Stuart took office in 1841. He correctly argued that no Owashshinong people had moved to the Manistee reserve during Schoolcraft's administration, and hence, they did not benefit from this treaty stipulated service.<sup>13</sup> Stuart, in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that year, recommended that the Ottawa's request be granted if the government intended to allow them to remain in place, for citizens continually "imposed" on the Indians and they needed an effective mediator.<sup>14</sup> Antoine Campau himself, this time with the backing of Grand Rapids residents, again applied for the

subagent position on December 6, 1841. The citizens proclaimed disgust with the liquor traffic common at the annuity payments and reasoned that only a subagent could keep order. Stuart did not have the authority to comply with their request and could only suggest that they send their petition to their Congressional Representatives in Washington.<sup>15</sup>

In spring of 1842, Crawford informed Stuart that he could not possibly establish a subagency on the Grand River. He could, however, open a blacksmith shop and pay an interpreter at the mouth of the Thornapple River, near Nawbuneegeezhig's village and the Rix Robinson homestead.<sup>16</sup> Antoine Campau would have been the logical choice for an interpreter job at Grand Rapids, but since the station would be far west the city, Stuart recommended his former employee Robinson as "a man of unblemished character and high respectability and who will be found very useful as a mediator between the whites and Indians in that region." Crawford approved Robinson's appointment.<sup>17</sup>

Although annuity payments gave the Ojibwa Ottawa advantages in their efforts to remain in their villages, other treaty funds assured their Waganagisi kinsmen direct political support from Mackinac's most influential Indian traders. These included Samuel Abbott, Edward Biddle, and John Drew who together still retained the greatest share of Indian trade between Manistee and the Straits of Mackinac. First, the original investment and the accrued interest remaining in the 1836 debt fund totaled more than \$105,000. Second, the \$200,000 fund established to pay the Ottawa for their vacated reservations, if the Indians left them, could be released by the federal government after 1855. This money had also been invested and paid \$12,000 in annual interest.

Third, Article 4 of the 1836 treaty stipulated that \$1,000 be put aside annually with the initial investment and interest to be distributed after twenty-one years.<sup>18</sup> These sizable funds were a strong incentive for merchants to extend the Ottawa credit and to keep the Indians near enough to ensure trader access to this money. The long established ties of these Mackinac traders with Robert Stuart, whose former position Abbott then held, increased their political influence and made their voices heard this matter.

Some Waganagisi Ottawa themselves considered pursuing the strategy that had worked for several Owashshinong groups and buying the land on which they had located their homes and fields. Indeed, some Waganagisi Ogemuk did own land at Ogemawinini's Old Wing settlement and claimed the right to remain in Michigan to use their property. Although Commissioner Crawford did not grant the Indians permission to buy their Waganagisi property for several more years, members of Michigan's financial community watched their moves with more than casual interest.

By 1842 Mackinac traders realized that they could keep the Indians within political reach and as consumers and, at the same time, collect on the credit they extended since 1836 by sponsoring Indian efforts to buy land. They knew that the Owashshinong Ottawa had been buying land for three years and that many Michigan residents accepted the general principal that land purchases gave the Indians unimpeded rights to use the property they purchased.<sup>19</sup> The merchants encouraged the Waganagisi Ottawa to acquire the newly surveyed reservation lands on which they had constructed homesteads.<sup>20</sup> This action would certainly lessen the removal threat, and in addition, if the Indians secured title to their

property and were recognized by the state as citizens, the holdings could be taken in court for debts. The threat of attaching Indian property for debts caused concern among some influential Michigianians who, in turn, lobbied to have the funds stipulated by treaty released to end claims based on past charges.<sup>21</sup>

While the anti-removal proponents strengthened their position in Michigan, Congress dashed Crawford's hopes for a northern Indian territory. Partially at the instigation of Isaac McCoy, removal supporters brought a bill before Congress in February 1842 to reserve the requisite northern lands. Michigan legislators strongly opposed the bill, and senators, including William Allen of Ohio and Thomas Benton of Missouri, disapproved of any bill that legislated permanent residence for Indians and refused to vote for the measure.<sup>22</sup> Before the vote, Crawford had confided to Millard Filmore, who then chaired the Ways and Means Committee, that this bill would decide the fate of the Michigan Indians.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the vote against a northern Indian territory and the firm alliance of Indians, businessmen, statesmen, and settlers in Michigan effectively ended the Commissioner's hopes of moving the remaining Great Lakes Indian population west.

The Waganagisi Ottawa continued to pursue the political course they had began in 1841. Neither President Tyler nor Commissioner Crawford answered the petitions sent from Mackinac that year. When a letter on the matter did arrive, it came from Secretary of War John Spencer, who had the mistaken impression that the situation had already been suitably addressed. Ruben Turner wrote another letter to Spencer on February 28, 1842 saying that they had sent their earlier correspondence to the

President in an "orderly and respectful manner," and signed by many of the most prominent Mackinac citizens, as well as by the "chiefs and headmen" of almost every Indian group living in the 1836 treaty cession. They had expected a "prompt and clear reply."<sup>24</sup> Turner asked the Secretary to explain the meaning of his cryptic letter. He added that the Indians already distrusted the government and would continue to have suspicions until he clarified the matter.

Despite the federal government's ambivalent responses to their requests, the Waganagisi Ottawa continued to build houses at their villages, hoping to at least receive preemption rights on their property when their reservation land came on the market. Mackinac Subagent Justin Rice reported in June 1842 that the Indians at Grand Traverse, Weekwitonsing, Ahptuhwaing, Ahnumawautikuhmig, and Cheboygan had so many houses under construction that they made unusual calls on the government carpenter for doors and window sashes. "They do not seem to know," he said, "that they have no claim on government for these improvements, that they are tenants at will. I do not see that they could, especially at Little Traverse (Weekwitonsing), do more in a way of improvements if they had a permanent title to lands."<sup>25</sup>

The northern Ogemuk participated directly in the political initiative by presenting yet another petition to President Tyler. Apokisigan, Nissowaquot, Namouschota, Tagwagane, Wasson, Shomin, and Mackatabenose sponsored the document which thirty-one other Waganagisi residents signed along with sixty-eight Ogemuk and leaders of Ottawa kin groups to their south and several northern Chippewa. They called the President's attention to the upcoming expiration date of May 27, 1842,

on their reservation tenure and said:

That most of us have been laboring for some years past to conform ourselves to the customs and condition of the white men. That we have gathered around us many [of] the comforts and conveniences of civilized life, and that we are in a fair way, should we be permitted to remain on our reservations soon to enjoy most of the advantages which is the lot of our more highly favoured brethren of the white race.<sup>26</sup>

To allow their people "to perfect as far as possible" they asked that their reservations be extended.

Father Francois Pierz helped the Waganagisi Ogemuk connected to his mission gain permanent access to their village lands. On July 21, 1842, Pierz mailed a letter to President Tyler. Since the Ottawa's reservations had not yet been offered for sale on the open market, Pierz requested that the Catholic Ottawa at Waganagisi be given forty or fifty sections of land on the Lake Michigan shore reserved them in the 1836 treaty in lieu of a final cash payment. Pierz had heard that the federal government had recently conferred citizenship on the Stockbridge and Brotherton Indians who lived in the Wisconsin Territory. He asked the President to do as much for his parishioners.

Tyler again sent the request to Crawford. The Commissioner once again cited the treaty stipulation calling for the Ottawa to surrender their reservations in 1841 and stated his belief that the Indians, "may be required by the government to remove at any moment and they are bound to go." Crawford told Pierz, however, that he knew of no government intentions to remove them "immediately or very soon."<sup>27</sup> He deemed it unwise to grant the Indians land titles to the land that they had so recently ceded. On the citizenship issue, Crawford replied that, although the government had granted full privileges to the Stockbridge and



Brotherton Indians, the United States had never granted citizenship to Indians living within the boundaries of the states. Within states, citizenship could only be conferred by the local legislatures.

Father Pierz did not accept Crawford's discouraging answer and, on July 20, 1843, again wrote to President Tyler. He told the President that the Indians heard continual rumors that the government intended to move them west of the Mississippi River and that they "have become most painfully uneasy in regard of their future fate."<sup>28</sup> Stretching the truth, he reported one last time that the British government continued to make "greatest efforts" to lure the Ottawa to Manitoulin Island with "promises of much protection and many favors." Pierz proposed once again that citizenship -- "the same privilege that other tribes of Indians have received" -- be granted to the Ottawa. Since Crawford would not give the Ottawa the land they required for subsistence, Pierz also compromised and asked that they be allowed to buy the forty or fifty sections that he had earlier asked be given to them. As Pierz reasoned:

These good Indians are truly worthy of much favor from the government and President for they are much civilized and industrious, and are well instructed in sciences under the direction of the Catholic missions for 14 years. They are an industrious and diligent people. They work their fields and many have trade. They live in a sober and quiet manner. Their houses are well built and their villages are orderly and neat as every white community testifies. They love our good and just government, and are willing to submit to its good and just laws. They wish to live like whites to cultivate their land altho very sterile and poor yet by their diligence and industry, they raise more than they consume.<sup>29</sup>

Robert Stuart also continued to encourage Ottawa efforts to get land and citizenship. In February 1843, he once again assured the

Ogemuk that they would not be moved west "at present," adding that, since Congress had passed the bill naturalizing the Stockbridge, he could see no reason why the same privilege should not be granted to the Ottawa. In his annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that year, Stuart told Crawford that the Waganagisi Ottawa and Grand Traverse Chippewa "this season urged me most strenuously to use such means in their behalf as may be most likely to induce the President and Congress to receive them as citizens into our great republican family." Stuart advised Crawford to respond favorably since "many of them are highly deserving, and a number are. . . saving their money to purchase farms on the lands they now occupy at will only."<sup>30</sup>

While the Ogemuk were encouraging their people to save their annuity money to buy land at Waganagisi, Commissioner Crawford unilaterally determined that a majority of Indians across the nation regularly squandered their cash and ordered his agents to convince them to accept their annuity payments in government-purchased goods. Stuart obeyed his superior, but some Ottawa insisted that they needed cash to procure land titles. Others, he said, recalled the difficulty Schoolcraft had distributing goods in 1837 and wanted no part in such troublesome business when they could get the merchandise they needed from local traders. The most politically astute insisted that they would not allow any change in terms of the treaty for fear that the government would use the precedent to effect more serious changes which could yet result in forced emigration.<sup>31</sup>

In the spring of 1844, the Ottawa carried off a major political victory when the Michigan Legislature voted to support their bid for

citizenship. On December 4, 1843, Augustin Hamlin had drafted a petition for the Waganagisi Ogemuk to the state representatives. In this document, the Ogemuk again called attention to their, "manners informed by civilization and ameliorated by the influences of Christianity," to their "comfortable dwellings in imitation of white men," and to their "maintaining their families by cultivating the soil." They asked for the right to permanently reside at "the homes of their childhood."<sup>32</sup>

Hamlin and the Waganagisi Ogemuk acted in concert with Mackinac residents to present this petition to the legislature. W. Norman MacLeod, the Mackinac County Prosecuting Attorney, later claimed to have been instrumental in winning the legislators' favorable consideration.<sup>33</sup> Edward Biddle and Samuel Abbott, both of whom Hamlin trusted, threw their political weight squarely behind the request. The cooperative effort won a most favorable result. On March 11, 1844, both state houses resolved to instruct the Michigan Senators and Congressmen at Washington to "exert their influence in obtaining for the Ottawa at L'Arbre Croche the rights and privileges of American citizens."<sup>34</sup> The state legislators, then, had taken the first decisive step in defeating Crawford's greatest objection to granting the Ottawa citizenship.

Despite this welcome gesture from the state legislature, the Indians and their supporters held divided opinions over granting Indians full participation in the American political and judicial systems. Even Augustin Hamlin and Francois Pierz who had both worked hard to end removal and secure the Ottawa rights to hold land at Waganagisi, found themselves at odds. Pierz believed that if Indians took land titles in their own names, traders would soon repossess the land from the un-

sophisticated creditors.<sup>35</sup> He wanted citizenship for the Indians but urged the government to place restrictions on the titles, guaranteeing that they could not be alienated for debts or any other reason for at least some reasonable length of time, if not permanently. Hamlin strained his intimate relationship with the clergy by advocating unrestricted land tenure. He believed that even partially educated Waganagisi Ottawa could manage their own affairs, especially if they obtained full citizenship and access to the courts. Then they would not be politically dominated by the Catholic church or any other interest. It is impossible to know whether Hamlin acted on the wishes of his political supporters Abbott and Drew or whether his personal convictions about Ottawa autonomy only coincidentally coincided with their financial interests. Nevertheless, the traders joined Hamlin and worked diligently for unrestrained land titles and political rights titles, especially after Crawford again in June 1844 denied the traders payment from the debt fund, thus, making repossession of Indian property the most immediate way to collect on debts.<sup>36</sup>

On March 5, 1844, only days before the Michigan Legislature issued their support of Hamlin's petition, Father Pierz had written to Robert Stuart about the document's current status. He wanted to make sure that no move Hamlin took would prevent his faithful followers from obtaining citizenship. Stuart assured the priest that the petition would not hinder his own efforts and advised the clergyman to draft two more similar documents -- one to the Michigan legislature and another to the President and Congress. Stuart promised to collect the petitions at the next annual payment and send them to the government.<sup>37</sup>

Pierz took the Superintendent's advice. The petition he prepared for President Tyler began by recounting the fate of Hamlin's petition, its submission to and approval by the Michigan legislature, and the state's subsequent instructions to its national delegates. The sixty-one signatories from Waganagisi and Grand Traverse Bay asked that Congress decide the request in the current session. Again, they cited the degree of cultural adjustment they had already made as justification for their request. They added the important point that "we are allied, also by the rite of marriage and by consanguinity to many of the citizens of this state," making it clear that by ignoring their request in this election year, the Whigs could alienate Michigan voters who were firmly committed to the Indian cause. The petitioners again recited the limitations of their agricultural lands, saying that they were "not well adapted to the advanced culture of white men, whilst it is all-sufficient for our moderate wants, and will afford us the means of livelihood."<sup>38</sup>

In June 1844, during the height of Waganagisi political activity, Crawford had informed Stuart that the Waganagisi Ottawa and other northern groups could not buy land "consistently with present obligations by treaty by which the Ottawa and Chippewa are to remove west of the Mississippi or among the Chippewa between Lake Superior and the Mississippi," and added, "Besides, it is against policy and practice of the government to permit Indians to buy lands."<sup>39</sup> Stuart supported the new Waganagisi petition as he had those sent previously. Commissioner Crawford reported to the Secretary of War that he had been informed that "not much short of one-half" of the Ottawa were "so far morally and

social" advanced "as to qualify them for being useful members of any community," but Crawford's own opinion about removal had not changed. He informed the Secretary of the steps taken by the Michigan legislature toward granting the Indians citizenship, but stopped short of making recommendations for Congressional approval.<sup>40</sup> Congress did not act on the matter during the session in which Michigan's instructions arrived.

Even though the Ottawa fully believed that American farmers would not rapidly claim their land, woodcutters impinged on other resources daily. This added urgency to their appeals. County Prosecutor MacLeod suggested that the United States allow the Indians to buy land if for no other reason than to protect their current holdings against legal attachment for debt and to guard their access to important resources. MacLeod informed Stuart that woodcutters frequently downed entire maple sugar groves for firewood, sometimes repaying the Indians with whiskey, and sometimes returning nothing. Timbering also threatened important fisheries. Settlers continually interrupted the fishing grounds along the north shore of Lake Michigan between Mackinac and Mille Coquin River and planned sawmills and dams which would destroy one of the Indian's important economic.<sup>41</sup> MacLeod saw allowing Indians to buy land as the only way to protect the Ottawa from economic ruin.

Despite Crawford's injunction against Indian land acquisition at Waganagisi, in October 1844 Pierz collected the cash his Waganagisi people had saved, went to the Ionia land office and bought the acreage around Weekwitonsing, Ahptuhwaing, and Ahnumawautikuhmig. To secure full title, he purchased nearly 1,000 acres and held the deeds in his own name as trustee for the Waganagisi Ottawa.<sup>42</sup> Only a short time

later, other Waganagisi leaders inquired of their agent, Justin Rice, whether their village lands had been opened for sale. If so, they had money and wanted to secure their holdings when they could get to Ionia in the spring. The Indians planned large purchases by entire extended family or kin groups because they asked Rice whether an Indian with \$100 or more should hold the land in his own name or join with others and register it in the name of an Ogema.

The Waganagisi Indians did indeed buy land even without Commissioner Crawford's backing. Stuart thanked Pierz for his personal efforts to procure Indian land titles and promised that his efforts would be rewarded. The Superintendent also told Rice he was pleased that other Indians had also bought land. Since they had done so in their own names instead of placing the tracts in trust, however, the danger that their holdings would be taken for debts remained a valid concern. Stuart promised to come up with a solution before that winter ended to the foreclosure dilemma that faced Indians who bought land in their own names.<sup>43</sup> He noted that public prejudices ran counter to passing "partial laws" in favor of the Indians, but he believed it had to be done in this instance. Until foreclosure could be legally prevented to give the Indians time to learn their responsibilities as landowners in the American system, the best course Stuart could suggest to them was to stop drinking expensive liquor that inflated their debts and increased the possibilities of foreclosure.

Stuart sent the Pierz sponsored Ottawa petition requesting citizenship to Crawford on December 12, 1844, and advocated its passage. Even though the Commissioner had repeatedly voiced his opposition to the

plan, Stuart believed that, at this point in Ottawa history, full suffrage offered the greatest protection of Indian property under the law. The Michigan public so strongly favored Indian citizenship that, although it doubtless galled Crawford to do so, he sent the documents to the House of Representatives' Committee on Indian Affairs for action.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, Stuart urged the Indians to press the Commissioner to release the debt fund and pay past accounts, a move that would lessen the threat of foreclosure.<sup>45</sup> Despite the urgency of these requests, Stuart rightly expected the issues of citizenship and land tenure to remain unresolved for several years.

The Owasshinong Ottawa did not take part in these political maneuvers. As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, they had been purchasing small parcels for nearly five years and had their own set of friends, kinsmen and other allies who carried out their political agenda. Michigan's Democratic Senator Lucius Lyons proved one of the southern Ottawa's stronger proponents. At first he had been indifferent to Ottawa land tenure in the Grand River valley, but as a political man with long experience, he clearly understood the monetary value of placing the proposed Indian Office subagency in his Grand River district. He worked for such an establishment even through 1844. Stuart did not oppose this tacit recognition of a lingering Ottawa community, and nominated Rix Robinson for a promotion from interpreter to subagent and a pay raise.

No Michigan Superintendent of Indian Affairs, no matter how responsive to the needs of the Indians in his jurisdiction and with what care he served the businessmen and settlers, could hold office for four



years without making political enemies. This included even the influential, responsive Robert Stuart. Augustin Hamlin agreed with Stuart's efforts to end removal, but he opposed the Superintendent's attempts to release the debt fund. Hamlin believed that Stuart would dispense the funds liberally to the traders and leave none for the Indians who needed the money to buy land.<sup>46</sup> And, even though Stuart had backed Lucius Lyons' request for a subagency on the Grand River and had even recommended the Democrat Rix Robinson to fill the office, Lyons too turned against Stuart calling him "a strenuous abolitionist. . . an active and zealous Whig partisan of the Old Federal School." For this reason and because he believed Stuart preferred fellow Whigs in dispensing patronage positions, Lyons called for Stuart's dismissal from office.<sup>47</sup> The new Democratic President James K. Polk fired Stuart, just as President Harrison had fired Henry Schoolcraft, and appointed the Democrat William Richmond of Grand Rapids as Michigan Superintendent. Although the new administration did not create a new subagency on the Grand River, Richmond's appointment satisfied Lyons. It provided one of Lyons's constituents with employment and allowed Richmond to maintain his central office at Detroit and commute regularly to Grand Rapids to directly oversee Ojibwa Ottawa affairs and personally satisfying citizens there.

The removal issue quickly dropped from the national consciousness with the beginning of the Mexican American War in the summer of 1846. The flow of westward emigration after the war forever killed any slight chances the federal government nurtured of resettling the Ottawa southwest of the Missouri River. William Richmond, like Stuart before him,

opposed moving the Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomi from Michigan. The Ottawa enjoyed nearly unrestrained rights to pursue their program of buying land. Indeed, the Waganagisi and Owashshinong Ottawa trusted Richmond to act as their attorney, conducting land acquisitions and sales in their names.<sup>48</sup> Because of the integrity with which Richmond conducted their business, the Ottawa continued to call on him for favors even after he left office in 1849.<sup>49</sup>

One significant example of Richmond's approach to abetting Indian development plans occurred in 1846 when a Mr. P. Tracy attempted to make preemption claims on the yet unpurchased Ottawa cornfields and houses at Cobmoosa's Flat River village. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Indians had tried to buy this property in 1840, but the land office supervisor denied permission because a misunderstanding. They had continued to live on the tract without title. Richmond brought Tracy to court, arguing that he had not lived on the tract a sufficient time to make preemption claims nor had he made the requisite physical improvements there. The buildings and fields belonged to the Indians. The local citizenry joined Richmond in supporting the Indians. The Indians' lawyer kept Tracy on the witness stand for six hours. Rix Robinson reported that Tracy was so completely demolished that there was "not a grease spot left of him." The Ottawa people won their first recorded decision in an American court. By helping Cobmoosa's villagers secure the land title that had previously been denied them, Richmond added greatly to his influence among the Owashshinong people.<sup>50</sup>

Because of the changing national attitude toward removal and Richmond's cooperation, the Ottawa launched few political maneuvers

during the new Superintendent's tenure in office. With Ottawa throughout the state regularly acquiring land, however, the debt fund became the first political priority both the Ottawa and the traders who held their notes. With the new Democratic administration in power in Washington, several prominent merchants prepared to renew their own claims on this money. Henry Schoolcraft's brother-in-law William Johnston made sure that his claim, which had already been rejected by the 1836 commission to investigate Ottawa indebtedness, reached Richmond before any others; he mailed a letter to the Superintendent on March 28, 1846.<sup>51</sup> The Owashshinong Ottawa, who had previously refused to sanction the distribution of this money to cover Chippewa bills, met in council on July 27, 1846. This time they "almost unanimously" favored paying the traders so long as their own debts were included. They hoped that enough cash would be left over to pay for a tract of land north of the Grand River, one "more secluded from whites," and perhaps on Grand Traverse Bay where their friend the Chippewa Ogema Aishquagonabe had invited them to settle. The Ogemuk Muckatosha of Bowting, Nawbuneegeezhig of the Mouth of the Thornapple, and Mashco who had replaced Noaquageshik at Ottawa Colony, all of whom held Grand River lands, were the principal signers of the resulting document.<sup>52</sup>

Some segment of the Chippewa community living between Mackinac and Sault Ste. Marie also petitioned for payment of an enormous debt to their traders. This claim prompted the Ottawa's suppliers Samuel Abbott, Biddle and Drew, Lasley and Selbey, as well as other, lesser known goods purveyors, to write to Richmond. They explained the economic circumstances around the famine of 1837 and 1838, the time during

which the Indians had contracted the most debts, and repeated their own claim on a share of the debt fund. They threatened to confiscate Indian property if the government did not meet at least part of their demands. Ogemawinini at Black River immediately joined his Mackinac traders in opposing the move to pay Chippewa debts at Ottawa expense, though the Weekwitonsing and Ahnumawautikuhmig had agreed to be silent and let the northern Indians present their petition.<sup>53</sup>

Richmond sent the petition of the Owashshinong Ottawa and Upper Peninsula Chippewa petition, as well as claims by their traders, to the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William Medill, on January 7, 1847, without making any recommendation on the matter. Medill, however, interpreted the contradictory Article Five and the Supplementary Article of the 1836 treaty as had his predecessors Harris and Crawford, saying that the President and Senate could not release the fund for twenty-one years after the agreement's ratification.<sup>54</sup> In February 1848, the Mackinac community took another approach and wrote to the prominent Michigan political figures Senators Lewis Cass and Alpheus Felch, and also to K. S. Bingham and Robert McClelland, once again explaining the nature of Indian debts and the importance to the Indian communities involved of having the debts paid. Again, there was no result.<sup>55</sup>

The political implications of the debt fund division rocked the political stability of the Waganagisi community as interested parties attempted to usurp Indian control over Ottawa affairs. Most seriously, in 1849 during the arbitration of the debt fund disputes, Pierz attempted to assert his influence against the wishes of Waganagisi people and their Ogemuk and lost the trust and respect of all but his most

devoted followers. First, he attempted to disrupt the local economy by petitioning William Richmond to move annuity payments from Mackinac to Weekwitonsing where the Indians would not be exposed to "alcohol," "disease" and "death."<sup>56</sup> This request alone might have upset no one but Biddle and Drew, the Lasleys, and Samuel Abbott, the parties that benefited most directly from the annuity payments. Pierz, however, went further and attempted to provide Mr. J. A. Theodore Wendell, a Catholic merchant at Mackinac, with power of attorney to settle the Ottawa's affairs.<sup>57</sup> This would by-pass the authority of the Ogemuk and could not be tolerated. Since Wendell himself had claims pending, Mackinac residents and the Ottawa all questioned the propriety of the priest's move.

The Indians acted quickly to make their opposition known.<sup>58</sup> They voiced their anger with the priest not only for his political maneuvers, but also for holding titles to at least some of the lands he had bought with their money in his own name and refusing to provide them with real deeds to property they had purchased. These were serious accusations in a community then concentrating on preserving its land base.<sup>59</sup> Much to Pierz's political disadvantage, William Richmond appointed Augustin Hamlin government interpreter and he soon moved to Weekwitonsing. Hamlin had earlier blocked the priest's moves to maintain control over the Indians' resources and prevent them from full, unchecked participation in the American system, and he continued to do so in this instance.<sup>60</sup>

Hamlin and others made the Waganagisi communities fully aware that, as long as Pierz maintained control over crucial resources, he held strong political authority in their villages. Not even the influential

Catholic Ogemuk who had begun the move toward assimilation held firm control of their own affairs. The elder Ogemuk Nissowaquot, Wasson, Mackatabenese, Kishigobenessi (Day Bird), Petoskey, Neogema, Kiogima, Namouschota and others countered the Pierz and Wendell combination by appointing Abram Wadsworth, the government surveyor from Grand Traverse, as their "friend and advisor so long and no longer as he proves himself true to our interests."<sup>61</sup> The documents do not specify why they expected Wadsworth to help them when their own kinsmen, including Hamlin, could have pursued their interests, but the firm show of opposition to Pierz went far to reassert their authority.

In 1850 frustrated traders throughout Michigan hired the Fort Wayne, Indiana company of Ewing and Chute to use their established political ties in Washington to pursue their debt claims against the Ottawa and Chippewa. The merchants would willingly pay twenty-five percent of the settlement they received as fee for the services.<sup>62</sup> Before they could collect the money, however, Ewing and Chute needed Ottawa cooperation in validating the outstanding debts. They proposed to place the claims before a panel of arbitrators consisting of two men chosen by the Indians and one chosen the traders. The Owashshinong Ottawa and Sault Chippewa, the groups then most concerned about American infringement on their lands, agreed to the proposal. These groups angered the Waganagisi Ottawa, however, by making plans without their consent. The northern Ottawa objected to the whole plan, saying that they could pay their own debts and wanted to conduct their own business.<sup>63</sup>

Despite this protest, the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Luke

Lea, approved Ewing and Chute's project. By January 1851, the arbitrators had finished their examination of claims, awarding \$77,263.76 to Mackinac traders, \$51,962.85 to Grand River traders, and \$14,274.54 for traders at Sault Ste. Marie, excluding the once again rejected Johnston claims. The arbitrators, then awarded a total of \$142,217.91. Although Lea approved the amounts decided upon, the cash left in the debt fund after earlier interest payments to the Indians and installments on other Johnston family claims was only \$105,900.82.<sup>64</sup> Lea infuriated George W. Ewing by insisting that the claimants divide this amount and give receipt for full payment.<sup>65</sup> The Michigan claimants, in the end, settled with little or no complaint.

This settlement ended one financial incentive that had motivated prominent Michigan economic and political figures to keep the Ottawa in Michigan; however, the \$200,000 fund to pay for the Ottawa's Michigan reserves remained intact. The Ogemuk from Ahnumawautikuhmig, Ahptuhwaing, and Weekwitonsing and their new agent directed their attention securing the funds owed them by the federal government upon surrender of their reservations, for their own use. Although the Ogemuk at Cheboygan opposed distribution of this money, they joined the effort to get more land in fee simple without the intervention of local clergymen.<sup>66</sup>

Efforts by traders to obtain these funds were well underway even before the debt fund controversy ended. Augustin Hamlin and the Waganagisi Ottawa attempted to block their efforts with a letter Charles Babcock, the new Superintendent in Michigan.<sup>67</sup> The Superintendent, however, had no authority to unilaterally stop citizen actions that did

not directly disrupt Indian life. The Indians, however, still held the cards. For Michigan residents to win a share of this money, the Ottawa had to surrender all reserved lands, opening them for American settlement. The Waganagisi Ottawa and Grand Traverse Chippewa, who still used their share of the lands, refused to do so willingly. The strongest factor promoting the dissolving of reservations was the desire of the United States Congressmen to halt their obligations to the Ottawa for investing this fund and annually distributing its interest.<sup>58</sup>

The state of Michigan made a seemingly simple solution to the problem of continued reservation tenure. In April 1850, the legislature convened to revise the state constitution. The resulting document granted citizenship to "every civilized male inhabitant of Indian descent, a native of the United States, and not a member of any tribe."<sup>59</sup> This action would finally grant Indians the status their leaders had pressed the state and federal government to bestow on them for nearly ten years. As citizens, they would not need to retain what the state interpreted as special privileges given by their former treaties. On April 7, 1851, the legislators issued a resolution to the United States Congress stating that:

Whereas the constitution of the State of Michigan gives unto all civilized persons of Indian descent equal rights and privileges with the white inhabitants of said state, and whereas by the adoption of said clause in the constitution, the people of this state have evinced a just and humane desire to see the Indians who now inhabit Michigan raised from a state of semi-barbarism to one of enlightenment and have by it removed one great barrier that has hitherto prevented the consummation of this philanthropic object. And whereas the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians residing amongst us are a civil, well disposed, peaceable and orderly people, and have during the past few years made great advancement in the agricultural and mechan-



ics arts, and a large portion of them ardently desire to remain in Michigan to become civilized and share with us in our social political and religious privileges. Therefore be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the State of Michigan that we do hereby request the government of the United States to make such arrangements for said Indians as they may desire for their permanent location in the northern part of this state.<sup>70</sup>

The Governor sent the resolution to the President, the Secretary of the "Home Department," the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and to Michigan's congressional representatives.

Despite the apparent clarity of the constitution and ensuing resolution, the documents did not define the method or criteria by which an Ottawa would be judged "civilized," nor did it establish a guideline for determining membership in a tribe. To claim their citizenship, some Indians swore oaths of allegiance before missionaries, but many others took full advantage of their rights to buy land and to vote without validation by any outside authority.<sup>71</sup> This caused Americans confusion in some localities. Citizenship conferred complete enfranchisement and, hence, the right to vote. In places like Mackinac, Grand Rapids, and St. Joseph, where large Indian populations voting as blocks could change the outcome of local elections, party supporters worked to either win the Indian vote or prevent it, depending on their affiliation. Each party argued the merits of its case on the degree of civilization exhibited by the Ottawa in their locality.

In 1863, disputes over Indian citizenship led Michigan Attorney General Jacob M. Howard to attempt to clarify the rights granted to Indians in the 1850 constitution. In his opinion, the convention members had not intended to give the Ottawa voting rights, but sought to

assure the enfranchisement of members of the large Metis community who had been active party members since the extension of United States sovereignty into Michigan. Although Howard did not wish to now exclude the Indians from voting, he advocated strict compliance with voting rules established by the constitution itself. Indians would have to have resided in a township or ward at least ten days before an election. "To reside" meant that they must have established permanent dwellings and be settled there like Americans, making their livings in the same ways as other local residents by using agriculture and "mechanical arts" not by following a seasonal cycle of hunting and fishing. If the Indians could not meet these criteria, they could not be counted as civilized.<sup>72</sup>

The physical trappings of civilization were easy to find among the Ottawa. Almost every settlement had log houses; all groups raised crops and many kept livestock. The Indians also had to show, however, that they were not members of any tribe. Howard tried to establish rules for determining tribal membership. He did the best he could in light of the limited understanding of his day to define a tribe as, "an independent nation, exercising the modes most agreeable to it the rights and powers of a separate political government," that "To be a member of a tribe is to be subject to its laws, usages, or commands. These generally emanate from a chief." When a Board of Registration or Board of Inspectors of Elections believed that a voter recognized tribal affiliation, it could bar that person from voting.<sup>73</sup>

In a society with decentralized political authority, comprised primarily of units no larger than kin groups who moved frequently, it

was difficult for Americans to assess an individual's "tribal membership" by Howard's definition. Because of the Ottawa's decentralized political authority, so different from their own patterns, most Michigan residents could not accurately identify Ottawa "chiefs." To be sure, Americans could point to "chiefs" who held titles to the many small parcels of land the Indians had purchased throughout the state, but there were many such Ottawa. Moreover, few would call themselves by a term stronger than the traditional Ogema or leader. They were family heads who viewed themselves as little more than the first among equals. The authority they wielded seldom went beyond the bounds of their immediate families, or at most, their home villages. Howard's definition, then did little to clarify the constitution's ambiguity. As a result, many Ottawa received suffrage and a role in the political process that they had successfully resisted for so many years.<sup>74</sup>

In 1851, partly as a result of Michigan residents' willingness to grant the Indians permanent residence in the state and partly because Congress wished to end its obligations to the Ottawa and Chippewa, Commissioner Lea sent Elias Murray to test the feasibility of making a final legal settlement of all financial and political matters with the Ottawa.<sup>75</sup> Elias delegated the responsibility of travelling to the Ottawa settlements to Harvey Murray. Ottawa houses, churches, and fields impressed Murray, as did Ottawa learning in both academic subjects and mechanics and their stated wish for federal recognition of their citizenship.<sup>76</sup> The Murray report, on top of previous events, led to the federal government's decision to end talk of removal.<sup>77</sup>

#### Security In A New Era

The 1855 Treaty of Detroit marked the end of the removal threat in Michigan by legally stipulating the Ottawa's right to remain in their homeland. The negotiations that produced this document brought together the interests of Michigan Indian traders, state and federal officials, and the Indians in mutually beneficial political action for the last time in the nineteenth century. Indeed, Ogemuk from all the Ottawa political divisions would not come together in formal council again for nearly fifty years. The traders who had gotten only partial payment from debt fund money wanted to receive the full amount due them when the Ottawa exchanged their 1836 reservations for and the final \$200,000 settlement.<sup>78</sup> State officials anxiously hoped that the federal government would recognize the Indians' citizenship rights so that Michigan would not become liable for continuing services to the former federal clients.<sup>79</sup> Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny worked in Michigan and elsewhere to conclude federal dealings with Indians who could support themselves, tying together the loose ends of the several earlier Indian office administrations.<sup>80</sup>

Even though all the state and federal political divisions lined up in favor of a new treaty, the United States made only slow progress toward the negotiations. Government bureaucracy required pushes from the new generation of young Ottawa leaders, many of whom had been educated in either Catholic or Protestant mission schools. They believed that continual outside intervention in their affairs now prevented their people from taking full advantage of the opportunities available to them as Michigan citizens. Young English speaking men like Augustin Hamlin,

Jr. and Andrew Blackbird had well developed, clearly articulated plans for carrying through the economic and political agenda of their fathers and grandfathers and spoke against anyone who sought to block the Ottawa's full entry into the American system. Between 1851 and 1854 these men convinced many of the new generation of Ogemuk to do likewise.

Many of the political events leading to the 1855 treaty resulted from an Ottawa attempt to reassert direct control of their internal affairs in the face of increased opposition from Catholic clergy. The Ogemuk and young leaders made the method of education employed by Father Pierz an issue of political importance. In September 1851, Peter Dougherty, the Presbyterian minister to the Grand Traverse Chippewa and long time opponent of Pierz, reported that the priest angered many Weekwitonsing Catholics with his refusal to train their children in academic subjects in English and prepare them for self-sufficiency in American society. The disgruntled Ottawa moved their families to Beedashahgaing (Petoskey), an Ottawa camp at Bear Creek on the south shore of Little Traverse Bay. There they joined a Chippewa Ojema named Daniel Mokewenaw who had formerly lived at the Presbyterian mission at Grand Traverse but moved north for access to more abundant natural resources. When Dougherty visited Mokewenaw's new village, the Ottawa there requested the missionary to establish a Protestant school at their village. Other Ottawa leaders from Cheboygan promised to also abandon their Catholic school if the Presbyterians could promise them instruction.<sup>81</sup> In the face of intense opposition and the threat of their premier mission settlement disintegrating, Bishop Lefevre recalled Pierz, and replaced him with Reverend Eugene Johan.<sup>82</sup> This change in

Catholic personnel did not stop the Presbyterians from sending Andrew Porter, the new Presbyterian teacher to Beedashahgaing on June 22, 1852.<sup>83</sup>

Neither did the ouster of Pierz stem the Catholic defection at Waganagisi. In January 1853, the Ahptuhwaing Ogemuk Neogema and Kiogema, along with the heads of some twenty-four nuclear families that made up their kin group, petitioned for a Presbyterian school at their town. In 1854 Joseph Windigoish and his followers from Cheboygan also petitioned for a school to educate their children in English. Joseph Namouschota, Frances Nissowaquot, Angasters Kemewan, Atel Ogimabenesi, and Thomas, Peter, and Angesters Shomin, all members of the most prominent constituent kin groups at Ahnumawautikuhmig, and sixteen others followed suit.<sup>84</sup> Even though there was a new priest at Weekwitonsing, the young men there, including Louis Petoskey, Michael Petoskey, Panaswa Petoskey, and Andrew Blackbird, wrote a formal request asking the Presbyterians to establish an English school at their village.<sup>85</sup> By September 1854, the Presbyterian missionary J. Turner, with the help of his well-liked interpreter Andrew Blackbird, had established a Protestant mission at Ahptuhwaing, much to the consternation of the Catholics who had regarded the residents there as their own devoted converts.

By 1854 Superintendent Gilbert had discussed the possibility of making new treaties with almost all Michigan Indians who still held land reserves and their home territories and received cash payments under former agreements. He had easily convinced Ottawa leaders at Owashshinong and Waganagisi of the necessity for new negotiations, and

they were anxious to get underway.<sup>86</sup> Their enthusiasm for the project, their desire to control their own political affairs, and the resulting competition between Catholics and Protestants for the Waganagisi mission sites contributed to their decision to send a delegation to Washington, against Gilbert's advice.

At Beedashahgaing missionary Porter requested that Walter Lowrie, who headed the Presbyterian mission board, speak with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to determine whether it would be useful to secretly send a representative to Washington to discuss a new treaty, especially one that might include money for his mission. He proposed sending his interpreter Andrew Blackbird. He noted that, when the resident priests had heard the Protestants intended to establish schools at Weekwitonsing and Ahptuhwaing, they had immediately attempted to develop new educational formats there themselves. The second new priest, Father Van Paemel, also encouraged his Indian supporters to make the journey to Washington.<sup>87</sup> Waganagisi leaders, apparently from both parties, began in March 1854 to coordinate a delegation to be comprised of representatives from their own towns and from Grand Traverse Bay where some Owashshinong and Waganagisi Ottawa had by then joined with Chippewa communities to form a united political block.<sup>88</sup>

The overtures of Weekwitonsing and Ahptuhwaing Ogemuk made met a mixed reception, and most Grand Traverse villages declining to participate. The Ottawa and Chippewa Ogemuk who lived between Mackinac and Grand Traverse met in council in January 1855 and drafted a letter for their representatives to carry to Washington. In the document, they reiterated their frequently made statement to the Commissioner of Indian

Affairs that they had purchased lands in their home territory and did not wish to leave them. They wanted to make arrangements for the government to maintain the \$200,000 fund that had been set aside to pay for their reservations as a trust for their children and to pay the Indians the interest on those monies. They also requested that Manypenny give their delegates correct information about other matters relating to the treaty of 1836. Forty-nine men signed this document including Nissowaquot, Kiminichagun, Mokewenaw, Misgwawak, Mackatabenese, Aishquagonabe, Agosa, Pendunwan (Wakazoo), and Peshabi -- the leading Ogemuk from Weekwitonsing, Beedashahgaing, Ahptuhwaing, and from the Ottawa and Chippewa settlements on Grand Traverse Bay.<sup>89</sup>

The Waganagisi Ogemuk then met with their Owashshinong counterparts on February 7, 1855. In an amazing show of consensus by previously politically fragmented settlements, the Owashshinong Ogemuk stated that they:

with one mind agree with our friends and connexions and desire that this our united request may be granted. We have the consent and names of the chiefs who are absent and all are anxious that our wish may be truly granted to us. Our old men and young men are agreed.<sup>90</sup>

Cobmoosa, Aishkebegosh, and Shakawabana from Flat River led the list of signatories. Thus, it is not surprising that Cobmoosa's uncle, Louis Campau, supported the petition and accompanied the delegates to Washington. The Flat River Ogemuk were not alone in their endeavor, however. Wabigake of Maple River, Mashco of Ottawa Colony, and Nawbuneegeezhig from the mouth of the Thornapple, besides thirty men from other unidentified locations, joined to make the petition.<sup>91</sup>

Unlike the 1836 delegation, this group that went to Washington in



1855 comprised some of the most distinguished Ogemuk. These included Nawbunegeezhig, Chingwash, and Paybame, from Owashshinong. Misgwawak represented Cheboygan. Kiminichagun, represented Waganagisi, and Agosa and Peshabi went from Grand Traverse. The total delegation consisted of sixteen Indians accompanied by Louis Campau, L. Patterson, William Richmond, and Joseph Elliott, a seminary educated Metis from Ottawa Colony. Although influential men chose the delegates, the party was far too small to adequately represent all Ottawa settlements and, hence, could not negotiate a binding settlement. Indeed, some settlements had not been informed of the delegation's purpose and later besieged Gilbert with letters to discredit any political initiative the representatives undertook in Washington.

The delegates met with Commissioner Manypenny in February 1855, presented their request for information, and asked for a settlement of their finances.<sup>92</sup> They did not have to convince Manypenny of the need for a new treaty. Congress had already appropriated \$10,000 for negotiating one in 1854 but had done so too late in the year to make any attempt at council until spring.<sup>93</sup> On February 28, however, the delegates asked that Manypenny schedule the negotiations in Washington instead of in their own settlements. These men knew well that many people hoped for a piece of the settlement and wanted to maintain as much control as possible over the disposal of funds. They knew they could no longer hold a council before all of their constituents and hope for consensus at a gathering where American creditors and relatives could factionalize the Indians in their own interests. They also realized that any appearance of consensus between the widely scattered

villages remained fragile and ripe for political dissension when their situation demanded coherence.<sup>94</sup> They needed to receive a large infusion of cash with which they could buy more lands before Americans already moving northward from Grand Traverse Bay claimed all the best tracts.<sup>95</sup>

Manypenny at first agreed to execute a treaty in Washington and planned for the Indians to return to the capitol in June 1855.<sup>96</sup> Henry Gilbert, however, proposed Detroit as a more appropriate site since he could more easily assemble representatives there and at a lesser cost, an important consideration for the administration considering the small budget allowed by Congress. Detroit would be far enough from Indian communities and their traders to at least limit political interference.<sup>97</sup> On June 6, 1855, Gilbert received orders to prepare for a Detroit based negotiation to take place in July.<sup>98</sup>

The Detroit negotiations began on July 25, 1855. Compared to the 1836 treaty-making session, this meeting suffered from only a minimum of factional competition or intervening interests from outside the Ottawa communities. Each Ottawa community within the boundaries of the 1836 treaty session sent representatives who were fully informed of their peoples' positions and delegated to make a treaty. The delegations chose their Ogemagigido for their eloquence and trustworthiness. Assagon from Cheboygan spoke for Grand Traverse, Waganagisi and Mackinac; Paybamesay for Owashshinong; and Wabojig for the Sault Ste. Marie Chippewa. Augustin Hamlin, Jr., Louis Cadotte, Joseph Elliott, and John Johnston, Jr., all trusted Metis kin, interpreted throughout the proceedings. The leading Ogemuk from each major political division seconded the positions presented by the Ogemagigido on each issue.

Wasson, Namouschota, and other lesser representatives assented or seconded the words of the speakers for the northern Ottawa and Grand Traverse Chippewa. Wabigake did so for the Owashshinong Ottawa, and Oshawwanah for Sault Ste. Marie. Manypenny excluded all Americans who wished to receive a portion of the settlement from the negotiating sessions and only agreed to hear their requests after the Indians had settled their affairs.<sup>99</sup>

This is not to say that negotiators did not address disagreements between various Ottawa and Chippewa communities and between different kin groups. The Chippewa Ogema Wabojig chose to negotiate separately from the Ottawa who had "more hearts and tongues and eyes and minds" than the Chippewa.<sup>100</sup> The disagreements, however, centered on details of distributing the proceeds of the treaty, not on the necessity for making the settlement as they had in 1836. The Owashshinong Ottawa who had as yet purchased little acreage, wished to receive land in return for surrendering their 1836 reservations. At Waganagisi and Grand Traverse, where the Indians owned more than 32,000 acres, they hoped for a cash settlement which would allow them either to buy more territory or invest as they saw fit. Those leaders whose people chose to take a cash settlement disagreed on how the \$200,000 promised for surrender of their reservations should be distributed. One group, which included Assagon, asked that the federal government hold the entire fund in trust and release the interest annually. Another division, with whom Manypenny and Gilbert sided, wished to receive the money as annuities and make final settlement with the federal government for all funds from land sessions.

In the end, the Indians overcame the differences in local positions in the interest of guaranteeing their right to remain in Michigan. The 1855 treaty legally recognized that the Indians could not be forced to move west of the Mississippi River and established a mechanism by which all Ottawa and Chippewa parties to the 1836 Treaty of Washington could obtain land in locations where they could carry out their preferred economic occupations. The Ottawa chose lands at Waganagisi, Grand Traverse Bay, Burt Lake, and in Oceana and Mason counties. From these tracts, each family head would receive eighty acres, and every adult over twenty-one would get forty. These lands could not be taxed or sold for ten years, preventing creditors from immediately attaching them for debts. Although the Waganagisi and Grand Traverse Indians, who together owned many acres before the negotiations began, at first opposed this portion of the settlement. They later acquiesced because of the other economic and political benefits they would receive.<sup>101</sup>

The economic settlement from this treaty totaled \$528,400, an amount exceeding the total \$200,000 due for the reservation lands, the additional \$20,000 for monies invested under the 1836 treaty, and the interest on these sums combined. The largest part of United States' financial liability to the Ottawa and Chippewa within the boundaries of the 1836 cession would end after ten years. Under this treaty, unlike earlier ones, creditors could not receive cash reimbursement. State and federal governments now considered the Indians citizens who could be taken to court if necessary. The Indians would receive \$42,400 for four blacksmith shops, \$75,000 for agricultural and carpenter tools, cattle, etc., and \$80,000 for education. It is important to note that continual

complaints from the Indians about the effectiveness of mission run schools won them some say in deciding how this fund would be administered. They had secured their autonomy not only from the merchants who sought to impose their wishes on the Indians but, to some extent, from the missionaries as well.

As a compromise between those Ottawa who wished to receive all the cash due them as annuities and those who desired a government trust fund, the total remaining fund of \$306,000 would be managed in two ways. First, the Indians would receive payments of \$10,000 and the annual interest on the total remaining fund for ten years. At the end of that time, they could decide whether they wanted the government to retain the remaining \$206,000 and pay only the interest or to pay out that sum in not less than four additional payments. This compromise helped forestall serious disagreements between the delegates and win approval for the document they drafted.

The United States counted 6,911 persons as parties to the 1855 treaty; thus, the cash payment totaled only a little more than \$77.90 per person for no less than fourteen years. The settlement provided no great source of personal financial gain, but coupled with the land the Indians retained, these funds provided a firm economic base to continue their transition to full integration with the American economy. By July 1856, the leading Ojibwa from all Ottawa settlements in Michigan had signed the Treaty of Detroit, in effect acknowledging, that to remain in their homelands, they had or would become "civilized," -- a decision that had faced their people since the War of 1812.

This decision did not mean that the Ottawa who had worked so long

to secure a future for themselves and their children in their traditional homeland wanted to surrender their cultural identity and entirely merge with the Americans who now maintained political control over their homelands. Indeed, the Ottawa who negotiated this document viewed the settlement as a means to regain the political authority taken from them during and after the 1836 treaty negotiations. Reasserting their rights to determine which debts they would pay and gaining control over their education money were only a part of the rights they sought to preserve. As we will see, by freeing themselves from direct intervention by merchants and clergymen, they also lessened the effects of these Americans' disapproval of the Ottawa world view and ethics.

One major step toward political autonomy resulting from the 1855 negotiations was the formal disbanding of the "Ottawa and Chippewa Tribe." As discussed in Chapter Four, Henry Schoolcraft and his negotiators had created this fictitious political unit at the 1836 Washington negotiations to secure at least a partial land cession in Michigan when the Ojibwa people refused to negotiate. In 1855, the Ottawa and Chippewa refused to operate under guise of Schoolcraft's fictitious "nation" any longer. From the first meeting, the Sault Chippewa, under Wabojig, purposefully tried to end the government practice of linking Ottawa and Chippewa interests and insisted that Manypenny negotiate with the two groups separately, a step the Commissioner refused to take during the negotiations. The final treaty, however, included the following provision:

The tribal organization of said Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, except so far as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this agreement, is hereby dissolved; and if at any time

hereafter, further negotiations with the United States, in reference to any matters contained herein, should become necessary no general convention of the Indians shall be called; but such as reside in the vicinity of any usual place of payment, or those only who are immediately interested in the questions involved, may arrange all matters between themselves and the United States, without the concurrence of other portions of their people, and as fully and conclusively, and with the same effect in every respect, as if all were represented.<sup>102</sup>

Rather than merely ending the political fiction of an Ottawa and Chippewa tribe, some later interpreters held that this article ended all government relations with the Ottawa. The Ottawa, however, believed that the clause meant that the United States once again recognized the autonomy of the Ottawa living in each individual location to decide their own issues. Had Lewis Cass done this at the Treaty of Chicago in 1821, Keewaycooshcum could not have ceded Ottawa lands south of the Grand River. Had Schoolcraft done it in 1836, the cession might have been postponed for a longer time. The Indians understood what later government officials did not, that the strength of their decentralized society rested not on its ability to oppose the United States with military force but in its flexibility to incorporate changes over time without fundamentally altering the nature of its culture and socio-political organization.

#### Summary

By the 1840s the Michigan Ottawa had become firmly enmeshed in Michigan frontier society. They maintained political linkages at all levels of American society through marriage and kin ties and the nineteenth century patron/client network which linked far-flung frontier

outposts to the heart of the national politico-economic complex. Their economic interests so intertwined with those of local settlers, merchants, clergymen, and political leaders that government threats to remove the Indians met stiff resistance in Michigan. Many of these financial ties resulted from provisions of the 1836 Treaty of Washington, the same document that federal officials cited in their promotion of removal.

Despite the benefits Ottawa leaders obtained from the structures of frontier politics and economy, they still faced the difficult task of overcoming the racial prejudices that threatened their tenure in Michigan. The task of convincing American officials of their ability to adapt to the market economy and its related cultural complex still belonged primarily to the Ogemuk. The Ogemuk exhorted their people to purchase land and rallied their support to make many requests for citizenship. They exploited their ambiguous positions as landholders in the American system to win not only the right to remain in Michigan but also to become active, direct participants in the political system.

The majority of formative contests that shaped Ottawa and American relations arose as individual Ogemuk seized opportunities created by local, regional, state, and federal politics and economy to meet the needs of their constituents. Although they won the majority of such contests by brandishing their own successes at "civilization," the Ogemuk at the same time worked to promote a degree of political and cultural autonomy for their people. When they had completely ended the threat of the federal removal policy, the young leaders the Ogemuk had educated in previous decades worked to remove dictatorial clergymen from



their villages, formally redefine their political relationship with the federal government, and preserve the egalitarian, decentralized nature of their society. Thus, the Ottawa reasserted jurisdiction over their own affairs.

## CHAPTER 7: CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN OTTAWA CULTURE, 1836-1855

Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, the Ottawa emphasized their desire to become active members of the emerging Michigan society and worked to keep access to their natural resources and to maintain a political role in determining their own destiny. This aim guided the Waganagisi Ogemuk who invited Catholic clergy to their villages during the 1820s and became the best option for all Michigan Ottawa during their fight against removal. By 1850 Ottawa leaders had indeed convinced Americans of their ability to take their place in Michigan society and achieved their goal of remaining in Michigan. Had the Ottawa program of acculturation been as successful as the Waganagisi Ogemuk and many Michigan political personages claimed, however, the Ottawa would have disappeared -- politically, culturally, and genetically lost in the American population.

Despite the elegant rhetoric of the Ogemuk, even by 1855 few Ottawa had molded themselves into images of their American counterparts on the frontier. Indeed, even in the twentieth century, the Ottawa maintain at least an ethnic identity. That they did so even after 175 years of interaction with Americans raises theoretical issues about the degree to which decentralized societies can participate in state level political and economic systems without sacrificing complete autonomy during the process of encapsulation. If partial inclusion in a market economy

signaled the end of vital, autonomous cultures, then the peoples whom anthropologists have studied for more than a century must be viewed as only anomalies of a world economic system or figment of researcher's imaginations.

This chapter argues that the Ottawa maintained a distinct identity based on a core of cultural traits. Following Ortner, the analysis focuses upon the daily activities in which individuals convey and pass on their culture. Ottawa subsistence patterns and political organization remained the most viable and measurable, though not the only, remaining indigenous characteristics. This study has focused upon subsistence cycles and economic activities and the resulting socio-political formations as markers of Ottawa identity from earliest French contact throughout the American period. No matter what political turmoil the Ottawa found themselves in, they retained their horticultural and fishing practices and maintained semi-sedentary villages. These key economic features of Ottawa culture remained so important, even during the American period, that the Ottawa refused to leave their homelands and fought difficult political contests to maintain access to the natural resources they had exploited since before European contact.

Throughout their political struggles during in the early and mid-nineteenth century, Ottawa political organization was based on cooperation and reciprocity among kin and the extension of kin networks through marriage and alliance. The strongest non-Indian supporters in Ottawa dealings with agents from outside their social sphere were those Americans who had married Ottawa women. They and the Mackinac Metis

community wielded considerable influence in shaping opinion and politics in the Indian community. Since the Ottawa practiced a form of market production that employed traditional techniques to exploit familiar natural resources, the cultural emphases on reciprocity along kin lines continued to be the mechanism that guaranteed the material essentials of life to all community members.

Americans noted the degree to which various Ottawa political divisions held to their traditional subsistence, political, and cultural systems. Missionaries and American officials sought to reduce the land base required to support indigenous horticulturalist/gatherers by introducing the benefits of market agricultural production, supported by indoctrination in values that favored individual accumulation of wealth and goods over the benefit of the group. These agents of culture change devoted many pages of official reports to rating the progress of their charges toward the goal of "civilization" -- a state that epitomized the antithesis of Ottawa culture. Critical evaluation of those reports shows the degree to which the various Ottawa communities modified or sustained key cultural features.

#### The Conservative Core

By all contemporary accounts, the Ottawa who lived between Muskegon and Grand Traverse Bay remained the most conservative in lower Michigan. Even in the 1850s, when other Ottawa communities had accepted missionaries as a part of their social milieu, the Muskegon, White River and Pere Marquette villagers had little sustained contact with institutionalized American religion. Friedrich Baraga had baptized the

Muskegon Ottawa in 1833, but his 1835 ouster from the Grand River ended most, if not all, Ottawa contact with the Catholic faith there. In 1847, a delegation of three Methodist missionaries and their interpreters visited the villages at Muskegon River and White River. The Ottawa at White River met the visitors and heard their offer to establish a mission, start a school, and donate resources to expand the villagers' farming operations. During the visit, the Ogemasi Payshoshega (Sun Shines Through a Hole in the Sky), whom William Richmond regarded as "an active and influential" leader, called a council.<sup>1</sup> The young leader "arose, shook hands with us all personally after the old Indian custom, and made a smooth speech declining the white man's school, religion, and mode of farming, preferring to live as his father had, by hunting and fishing, for the present at least."<sup>2</sup>

After Payshoshega's smooth words an elderly White River Ogema delivered a less congenial message. He informed the missionaries that he was older than any of them and that he knew more about the "Great Spirit" and his will for the Indians than any Christian. The material benefits the missionaries offered, he said, would only complete the long process of destroying his people. As a child, the Ogema had travelled with his father throughout the Great Lakes where he had seen French people but no other Europeans anywhere in the region. Every Indian village he remembered had plenty of corn and game until Americans came and bought land for a small price and fought wars in which many Indians and Americans died. American peace had proved still more difficult for the Indians as the newcomers built fences and plowed land without even respecting the graves of the dead, a disregard that revolted the Ogema.

The American fur trade relied heavily on alcohol and had taken many lives. In his concluding statement the Ogema said:

Now I have no taith in you; I don't believe he [Gitchimanido] sent you, for if he wanted us Indians to take your white religion, why did he not send your fathers before you to persuade us, when we were a strong and great people filling all this land with our villages, and our hunting grounds with our camping tents, and all these lakes and rivers with our canoes, and not wait till we are almost all gone . . . No; we shall live and die as our fathers did. We have no ill feelings toward you, but we don't believe you, and shall not take your school or religion.<sup>3</sup>

Despite this firm stand against the intrusion of missionaries, the issue remained a topic of discussion in the community throughout 1847. In 1848, possibly after the death of the old Ogema, Payshoshega determined to invite a missionary to return to his village and requested that William Richmond arrange the visit, a task the Superintendent undertook immediately. Richmond reported that the Ogema Kinwaygeeshik at Muskegon joined in making the request. The agent assessed the joint request for a Methodist church official, saying that the Muskegon Ogema was "not a man of much capacity, but his band is large and would be benefited by a school." Payshoshega, on the other hand, held more potential and would greatly benefit from the school he desired.<sup>4</sup> Even as strong an Ottawa leader Payshoshega could not, however, garner the support of his constituents for a mission. Four years later, in 1852, there was still no mission at the village.<sup>5</sup>

The Ottawa villages between Muskegon and Grand Traverse Bay continued to practice a mixed horticulture, hunting, and fishing subsistence cycle even into the 1850s. When Harvey Murray visited the Ottawa's coastal settlements for Commissioner Lea in 1851, he reported

that those people south of Grand Traverse had just opened their farms, and that they were "industrious and temperate and working their lands with a good weill[sic]."6

Both cultural preference and geographic factors preserved partial economic and political isolation, but the central Ottawa villages maintained regular contact with Americans who held a stake in preserving their previous subsistence patterns. Traders maintained posts in the region to collect the rich furs the Indians trapped along the Muskegon River drainage, and small vessels running along the lakeshore had easy access to coastal villages, but, the reliable road and steamboat region transportation systems that would have encouraged American settlers to move in had not yet been developed.<sup>7</sup>

Given the difficulties of travel and transportation and the resulting lack of markets for surplus crops, it did not pay the Ottawa who lived in the central villages to expand their horticulture. Furthermore, for over a hundred years these central villagers had inhabited the Michigan Ottawa's favored hunting and trapping lands. With competition for the animal resources of this region lessened by Waganagisi Ottawa agricultural development and involvement in the Mackinac market and with Americans slow to occupy the marshy lowlands along the northern river systems, game must have remained a viable cash resource for these villagers. It is little wonder that they did not begin to expand their fields until the 1850s when steamboats first made regular stops at Grand Traverse Bay for provisions and to bring new settlers who also needed Ottawa crops.

The culturally conservative Grand Traverse Chippewa community, as

we will see, played a role in helping Ottawa people maintain their traditional cultural practices. Although their villages were not so isolated as the Ottawa villages on the Muskegon River, White River, and Pere Marquette River, the Grand Traverse Chippewa also enjoyed a geographical isolation that helped to preserve their cultural autonomy. The Presbyterian missionary Peter Dougherty did not begin his settlement on Old Mission Peninsula in the center of Grand Traverse Bay until 1839.<sup>8</sup>

When Dougherty established his mission there, he found a willing convert in the Ogemasi Agosa, but the young leader's uncle Aishquagonabe never fully participated in the mission.<sup>9</sup> The associated villages of Shamagobing on Carp River, Missiggomago on Platte River, and Keewaycoshcum's village on the Manistee River also never maintained strong affiliation with the mission.<sup>10</sup> Not even the Manistee Ogema Keewaycoshcum who favored assimilation and sedentary farming, promoted full-blown culture change like that adopted at Waganagisi and he himself continued to rely heavily on hunting for subsistence.<sup>11</sup> Because most Grand Traverse communities did not accept Dougherty, Agosa's village received most of the benefits from the mission. The missionary's early success there convinced Schoolcraft to move the government farm and blacksmith shop from Manistee to Agosa's village after the Owashshinong Ottawa refused to leave their southern villages in 1840 and 1841, greatly adding to the resources available for any Chippewa who wished to become Christian farmers.<sup>12</sup>

As discussed in Chapter Two, the Ottawa had frequently married into Chippewa families at Grand Traverse Bay, just as they had done with



their other neighbors for centuries. Two generations of Ottawa and Chippewa intermarriage had closely linked these two political groups between 1790 and 1830. Dougherty remarked in 1842 that he could not "with any good degree of accuracy, distinguish between the Ottawa and Chippewa children, as they are very much mixed by marriage."<sup>13</sup>

Despite this intermarriage, the Chippewa remained ethnically separate from the Ottawa. Even though Dougherty could not determine affiliations, the Indians could. Schoolcraft reported on the phenomena in his 1837 Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs saying:

These tribes speak the same generic language, and still occupy the country ceded to the United States by that treaty [1836]. . . Although much mixed and living in alternate villages, a distinction is kept up between them, which is, however, not marked by any strong traits in their habits and condition.<sup>14</sup>

This ethnic distinction remained pronounced even after small Ottawa extended families and larger kin groups from Owashshinong, Black River, and Waganagisi began settling at Grand Traverse in the late 1840s, perhaps because of competition for the resources that Chippewa Ogemuk considered their own. When one immigrant Ottawa group called upon government personnel at the Grand Traverse for services, Agosa and Aishquagonabe both angrily refused to let the farmers do work for the immigrants. They said that the Ottawa had refused to accept farmers when the President offered them at Manistee. The Chippewa had then received the services and regarded them as their own.<sup>15</sup>

The Grand Traverse Chippewa relied on their traditional seasonal cycle of natural resource harvests throughout the 1840s; at the same time they increased the size of their garden plots. Unlike the Protestant missionaries south of the Grand River, Dougherty wisely

observed that, if the Grand Traverse people gave up any part of their seasonal cycle, they would face hardship. On his first visit to Aishquagonabe's village, Dougherty had noted the neat gardens of potatoes, squash and corn. He discussed the good fishing in the bay, the importance of maple sugar, and the Ogema's hunt.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, Dougherty attempted to locate his settlement at a place suited to the local mixed economy. He had little success in convincing the Chippewa to even minimally alter their subsistence practices until 1842 when, after a major crop failure and a winter far more severe than normal, he convinced Agosa's and Aishquagonabe's people to enlarge the size of their garden plots and concentrate their attention on growing storable agricultural produce.<sup>17</sup>

Dougherty reported to Robert Stuart in 1843 saying:

I do not know that any accurate distinction can be made between those who follow the chase and those who follow agricultural or mechanical pursuits. All who have families make gardens, and depend chiefly on what they raise for food, and all hunt more or less in the winter. This distinction, however, may be made: some, after securing their crops in the fall, remove to their hunting grounds and spend the winter there. Others remain here permanently, making two or three hunting excursions during the winter. Of these there are now fourteen families, who have made arrangements for permanent settlement here; others expect to do so.<sup>18</sup>

Fourteen families is a small proportion remaining at the mission considering that in 1839 Schoolcraft recorded 110 heads of households at Agosa's and Aishquagonabe's villages, 41 at Carp River, and 14 at Platte River. Dougherty recorded that he Baptized forty-three persons in June 1842 and began his church, but only thirty-seven Indian members remained by 1850.<sup>19</sup> These data and Dougherty's own observations about

continuity of subsistence practices at Grand Traverse demonstrate the degree to which the Grand Traverse Indians adhered to their earlier patterns.

The Grand Traverse Chippewa did, however, go far in adopting American style houses, fishing techniques, and farming practices, especially at Agosa's village where people fully identified with Dougherty's mission program. Only ten years after Dougherty began his work, the school there maintained an enrollment of about forty students taught in their own language and in English. They built a town of forty white-washed log houses, a church, school, and mechanic shops. They furnished the buildings with "stoves, chairs and tables, beds and other signs of domestic comfort." Indian fields produced sufficient surpluses of corn, potatoes, and other vegetables that by 1849 they sold thousands of bushels annually to passing steamboats and at Mackinac. Indeed, they had many "strong and well made" boats with which to haul their produce. Besides these occupations, the Indians performed wage labor by producing cord wood for steamboats, stock for barrel hoops and staves, and roof shingles; these activities they incorporated into their seasonal rounds of trapping, maple sugar making, and fishing .<sup>20</sup>

The Grand Traverse people in general still maintained cultural practices that many Ottawa at Waganagisi and Owashshinong either hid from American observers or had abandoned in favor of Catholic or Protestant rites. Dougherty observed in 1850 that "The Chippewa are naturally more attached to their own customs and superstitions and less readily adopt those of other people than the Ottawa."<sup>21</sup> Naming feasts and vision quests, were among the continuing practices that Dougherty

listed. The Chippewa also held to their native cosmology, believed in their traditional theories of disease causation, and maintained healing and curing rites which featured shamen empowered in dreams, the Jesshakid and "medicine dances." They also kept menstrual houses and other practices that traditionalists at Waganagisi had also refused to give up in the 1920s.<sup>22</sup>

Even in 1850, Dougherty described the flaws of the traditionalists saying:

the heathen party, still attached to their superstitions, advance slowly, taking little interest in the educations of their children, indulging in intemperance and disposed to retire to the woods. The Indian mind is very superstitious. He believes the Great Spirit has made him distinct from all others. His country, his language, his customs, his religion, his medicine, his appetites, and passions, are all the special bestowment of the Being who made him, and therefore they are the best for the Indians. When want or affliction comes on him, he blindly looks to his medicine bag, and the ceremonies of his religion for relief.<sup>23</sup>

In this brief statement, Dougherty succinctly conveyed the essence of Chippewa ethnicity, describing the cultural features that traditionalists relied on to maintain their autonomy and identity in the face of economic and political pressures for change.

The Grand Traverse communities, with their geographic isolation and cultural conservatism, proved important to traditionalists from Owashshinong and Waganagisi. Before 1845, small extended family groups, perhaps the relatives of women who had moved to Grand Traverse and married Chippewa men, had moved to Grand Traverse Bay.<sup>24</sup> Agosa and Aishquagonabe continually invited these Ottawa immigrants to live on the 1836 Chippewa reservation, but many chose instead to buy tracts of land separately.<sup>25</sup> In 1846 the Grand Traverse Ogemuk sent letters to

the Owashshinong leaders Mashco, Nawbunegeezhig, and Muckatosha requesting that they move their entire villages to Grand Traverse, but southern leaders declined the offer for the time being.<sup>26</sup> The fact that Ottawa people who favored agricultural development could not yet buy highly desirable Grand Traverse reservation land and thereby protect their holdings may have assured that only traditionalists moved to Grand Traverse and kept the numbers of immigrants small.

The first large numbers of Ottawa who moved to Grand Traverse did so in 1849. These migrants came not as small families to meld with the local population but as large extended kin groups that maintained their own political autonomy. Ogemainini's people from Old Wing Colony on Black River came first. As noted in Chapter Six, when the threat of removal was all but over in 1851, the Waganagisi communities lost their coherence and split into kin groupings, with both Catholics and non-Catholics leaving the jurisdiction of Francois Pierz who grew daily more difficult for them to deal with.<sup>27</sup> By 1851, the Owashshinong Ottawa who most keenly felt the pressure of settlers near their villages followed.<sup>28</sup>

#### Cultural Adjustments At Owashshinong

Several villages at Owashshinong also continued their subsistence cycle unaffiliated with any mission or government agency and uninterrupted in their cultural practices. Meshimnekahning residents, for example, did not come under missionary influence until 1847 when Reverend Hickey, on his return from White River, received permission to preach in their village. Shortly thereafter he bought 120 acres in

Danby Township of Ionia County, a short distance from the old Meshimnekahning settlement, on which to place his mission. There is no information about cultural changes that may have been made after the coming of the missionaries, but the Indians did built log homes and supported a church and school until 1856, when they moved north to join the Saginaw Chippewa of Isabella Reservation.<sup>29</sup>

The large village at the mouth of Maple River also remained in place without purchasing land or inviting missionaries to their settlement, but it did split. In 1839 the village was home base for 154 persons headed by Muckataywayquot. By 1855 Wabigake became the Ogema of a new settlement of 110 persons at the northern reaches of the Maple River in Clinton County, beyond the major east and west transportation routes along the Grand River.<sup>30</sup> Wabigake lived in a log home, indicating some permanency at this location, and may have owned the village tract through an American titleholder.

At the new Maple River village, the Ottawa generally continued their traditional practices. When Hickey first visited this site, he witnessed a traditional trial of a man charged with murdering a Saginaw Chippewa Ogema. In his recollections of the hearings, Hickey presented a picture of traditional life in rich detail, describing death payments to bereaved relatives, the role of shamen and Ogemuk in relieving social tensions in the village, a feast, traditional clothing styles, and the decorum of pipe ceremonies. These proceedings and the relocation away from the centers of market trade indicate strong cultural continuity at Wabigake's village.<sup>31</sup>

Other kin groups also left their parent villages in the 1840s.

Another new village formed in an oxbow of the Muskegon River, a few miles downstream from the newly founded town of Newaygo. Hickey visited that group in 1847 and found the inhabitants to be Catholics and contented with their condition. Because these Indians had become so well established, Hickey left them the following day not wishing to establish a mission that would cause dissension at the settlement.<sup>32</sup> It is difficult to positively identify this group's leader; however, the 1855 annuity payroll lists a village of twenty-four persons under the leadership of Ogemuk Opego and the Ogemasi Newaygo, for whom the Americans probably named their nearby town.<sup>33</sup>

Village fission was apparently not a rare event in this period. The 1855 annuity payroll lists fifteen villages of Owashshinong Ottawa totaling some 1,107 people. This represents a decline of 107 persons since 1820, but an increase of six villages. Average village size declined from 134 persons in 1820 to only 73 in 1855, with numbers ranging from seventeen at Maymeshegawday's village to 126 at that of Metayomeig. Nine of the new Ogemuk reached the height of their influence after Henry Schoolcraft left office, and no superintendent who followed him took pains to record village locations of these Ogemuk. Hence, the sites inhabited by Paybame, Shawbequong, Chingwash, Negawbe, Kawgaygawbawne, Maishkeausne, Shawgwawbawno, Metayomeig, and Maymeshegawday remain unknown. The names Chingwash and Metayomeig appear on Schoolcraft's 1839 payroll as members of Muckatosha's village at Bowling, though no other documents attribute the later Ogemuk to that settlement.<sup>34</sup>

These new demographic patterns indicate that American settlement

had affected socio-political organization at Owashshinong. Perhaps the smaller village sizes resulted from increased disputes over the specific changes that would be incorporated into daily lives. Certainly smaller villages such as the one at Newaygo, would have promoted mobility. Thus, smaller villages may represent people who chose to rely on a hunting/horticulture adaptation rather than more sedentary agriculture.

Other Owashshinong Ogemuk chose a greater reliance on horticulture although they stopped short of inviting missionaries to their villages. A few prominent Ogemuk, such as Cobmoosa at Flat River, Nawbuneegeezhig at the mouth of the Thornapple, and Muckatosha at Grand Rapids, purchased land though the plots they held were, with few exceptions, too small to support agricultural production for the American market. Kent County land records show that Cobmoosa, for example, owned about 165 acres and give no indication that any other members of his village held land in their own names.<sup>35</sup> Clifton estimates that the average Chippewa in northern Wisconsin required a .3 acre garden plot to support a nuclear family who also engaged in wild rice production, hunting, and fishing. The Owashshinong people had no wild rice and would have required much larger garden plots. Cobmoosa had about 85 followers which would give each person an average of 1.97 acres.<sup>36</sup> The fertile soil could have provided enough vegetable produce for subsistence, but the holdings would have been much too small to raise large quantities of crops for sale, sustain the required draft animals, or to contain sufficient maple groves for the Indians to survive in the American system.<sup>37</sup> Cobmoosa's Flat River plots could only provide the center for an economy requiring a larger land base.



Nawbunegeezhig's approximately 112 followers had made greater efforts toward opening American style farms than had other non-mission Owashshinong villages.<sup>38</sup> They bought some 220 acres along the Grand River, near Rix Robinson's home and northwest of the town of Ada.<sup>39</sup> At an average of 1.96 acres per individual, this was again more than the minimum amount required for subsistence horticulture but too little to sustain the population by market agriculture.

Noting these small amounts of acreage purchased by the Owashshinong Ottawa and that the Waganagisi Ottawa purchased 1,000 acres on their first trip to the Ionia land office, it appears that the Owashshinong Ottawa took little advantage of their ability to buy land.<sup>40</sup> This in itself indicates an unwillingness to subscribe fully to American concepts and practices of ownership. The villages discussed above all continued to rely on their traditional seasonal cycle with annual rounds of hunting, trapping, and maple sugar making to supplement their horticulture.<sup>41</sup>

The mission sponsored settlements of Ottawa Colony, Griswold, and Old Wing became the show places of Owashshinong Ottawa assimilation. Their progress was cited annually by each Michigan Superintendent, including Schoolcraft, as proof that the Grand River people could someday achieve citizenship. Muckatosha and Megisinini also maintained their village at Grand Rapids and may have continued an affiliation with the Catholic church, but there are no detailed records of special mission activities to these Indians. At the other three settlements, the Owashshinong Ottawa continued to rely on their earlier seasonal cycle of farming and gathering. Despite their greater degree of

incorporation into the American market, these Indians would not yield to missionary pressure to give up entirely what they regarded as essential elements of their culture and assimilate with the Americans who surrounded them.

Ottawa Colony, founded in 1836, had the longest history of mission guidance. Approximately ninety former Bowting residents took their cash settlements from the treaty to buy 830 acres of prime agricultural lands in Barry County, near the site of their Ogema Noaquageshik's winter hunting territory.<sup>42</sup> This amounted to 9.22 acres per person, indicating a firm commitment by the founders to pursue agricultural development to its fullest potential. Noaquageshik and Slater agreed that the abundance of fish in the local lakes, the nearby maple groves, the timber and game in the oak forests, and the natural, easy-to-break prairies made this a most promising location for their settlement.<sup>43</sup> Slater purposely selected a site surrounded by people he judged to be good Christian settlers who would help to civilize his charges.

By 1838 the Ottawa Colony Indians had opened more than 100 acres of new fields, raised a surplus of corn, potatoes, and vegetables, and made several log buildings.<sup>44</sup> Slater touted his parishioners continued agricultural development in 1840 saying that the Ottawa there paid more attention than ever to farming and "mechanical pursuits" for their livelihood. They grew corn, potatoes, pumpkins, and beans in abundance and also produced a small quantity of wheat. Colony residents increased their herd of light Indian horses and broke them to harness for plowing, a technological leap in the process of becoming self-sufficient agriculturists. They also acquired hogs and chickens for meat and

anxiously anticipated owning cows. By 1840, the Ottawa had also added at least six more log houses to their village.<sup>45</sup>

Despite Slater's glowing reports and his hopes of increased sedentism, even the Ottawa Colony people continued their seasonal round. Because they did not raise enough pigs for meat, most families had to hunt in the winter.<sup>46</sup> In the spring they dispersed to their maple sugar camps and, afterwards, returned to their farms to prepare their fields and plant. In 1841 Slater reported that, because of a high demand for coarse, abundant raccoon furs, many families that year spent more time in hunting than in agriculture. A ready market for berries among their American neighbors sent whole families into the woods collecting, keeping children away from school. The "industrious" Indians still managed to sell food crops to their less prosperous American neighbors, but Slater complained that the Ottawa Colony people should have worked harder to better their farms.<sup>47</sup>

By 1844 the Indians had acquired many of the material trappings of American living. That year they asked their government farmer to begin making them furniture for their houses, arguing that they could farm as well as any American but could not yet make all the equipment they wanted for their homes. They had also abandoned many of the rituals that had united their community. Most Ottawa people who had joined Noaquageshik at the settlement's inception had given up the Midewiwin, Jesshakid and other feasting even before they left Bowting. Indeed, the Ottawa who remained at the Rapids all but ostracized Noaquageshik's followers and treated them so badly when they returned to receive annuities that the old Ogema requested his payments be made at their new

location.<sup>48</sup> Slater himself reported that his parishioners had given up the outward signs and rites of native religious beliefs, though he obviously did not understand or monitor their cosmological thinking, nor could he know what practices they participated in on their winter hunts, in sugar camps, or when they visited other villages.<sup>49</sup>

Even though Robert Stuart and William Richmond submitted glowing reports of the cultural advancement at Ottawa Colony, the Indians' achievements never satisfied Leonard Slater. Despite their greater than average participation in market economy, Slater criticized the Ottawa Colony men for every aspect of their hunting and gathering practices, especially those that limited his school term to five weeks between the fall harvest and the beginning of winter hunts and only four more months of instruction between the sugar season and harvest.<sup>50</sup>

Slater also upbraided women saying:

The females have made no change in their mode and habits of life. They pursue the same avocations, and depend upon the same resources as they ever have done--namely, assist in hoeing in the field, dress the skins from the hunt, make their moccasins and garments; also, employ much of their time in making mats from rushes and bark bags, &c.<sup>51</sup>

To speed the women's adoption of the skills of spinning, weaving, and needlework, Slater proposed opening a school to provide them "domestic instruction."

In general, the Ottawa did not readily accept the American cultural traits that Slater described as "refinement." He said:

Notwithstanding our favorable location, and the privileges and advantages they derive from our labors, they are behind that which is desirable in refined taste, improved manners, industrious habits, or in being consistent Christians. Our educated boys and girls are as destitute of a principle of excelling in

good breeding and moral worth, and correct deportment,  
as those who never have received instruction.<sup>52</sup>

What Slater criticizes, in fact, is the Ottawa Colony inhabitants' failure to wholeheartedly adopt Baptist dogma and its prescribed behavioral code, including the Protestant work ethic with its continual striving for individual accumulation of property.

This refusal of Ottawa Colony residents to accept Protestant ideas points to the continuity of traditional political and economic values. The people of this community retained an egalitarian outlook, and while participating in the market economy with their American neighbors, did not strive for individual accumulation to the same extent. When the Ottawa worked to increase their fields and agricultural yields, they did so for the benefit of the entire settlement. Slater repeated his criticism in 1852, adding that the Indians accumulated little surplus wealth for future use but widely distributed the goods they had.<sup>53</sup> He wished to prevent Ottawa parents from passing these values to their children by opening a boarding school where American habits could be inculcated without parental opposition. Parents, however, refused to surrender their children to this enterprise.<sup>54</sup>

Slater viewed his mission operation as a failure. Despite repeated attempts to draw other Ottawa villages to his settlement, none accepted the offer. By 1849 only about 100 people lived at the mission. Some Indian people may have objected to Slater's continual public criticism. He angered others by distributing unregistered land titles to the residents who paid for the land while he held the deeds to the property.<sup>55</sup> As a result, there were strong social tensions at Ottawa Colony settlement by the late 1840s.

By 1849 Noaquageshik had either died or no longer had the mental acumen to function as leader.<sup>56</sup> That year the community recognized the ascendancy of a new Ogema named Mashco.<sup>57</sup> Mashco had shown his capacity for leadership in the same manner as had the Ogemuk before him -- by setting an example of proper behavior, generosity, political skills, and a close relationship with the spiritual world. In 1840 Mashco converted to Christianity, an act which doubtless pleased Noaquageshik and, especially, Slater. The missionary reported that Mashco demonstrated his devotion to spiritual living daily and made "extensive excursions to disclose the truths of the gospel" to other Indians. When Mashco reached age forty, the time at which Ottawa men arrived at political maturity, he began to study at Slater's school to learn reading and writing. At the same time, he fully supported his dependent family. Slater had dreams of sending Mashco to Hamilton Theological Institution and in 1844 asked Robert Stuart for money to do so.<sup>58</sup> There is no evidence that Mashco ever travelled east for education, but he did win considerable favor from the missionary and, by his exemplary behavior, gained influence among his fellow residents.

Out of frustration at the perceived failure of his mission project, Slater, who had opposed removal in 1836, proposed to transplant his mission to Kansas. After the fall harvest in 1849, Mashco and Slater left Ottawa Colony for Washington to make arrangements for joining the Maumee Ottawa in Kansas. The assessment of the Episcopalian Superintendent at neighboring Griswold Colony was that Slater had won Indian support for the trip by promising the Ottawa Colony people more "benefits" than they could ever hope to obtain by the move and that he

had not been completely honest. In Washington, Slater petitioned Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando Brown through Mashco for cash to finance the move and to build a sawmill and frame houses in the west. He requested a government supported farmer, miller, and blacksmith and wanted the annuity of all who would emigrate paid in the west.<sup>59</sup>

On learning the truth about the missionary's actions, the Indians at Ottawa Colony and Griswold Colony united against Slater's plan and immediately wrote to the President Zachary Taylor. Fifteen family heads refused to make any arrangement that would force them to leave land that they had paid for with their own money whether they held the title or not.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, word travelled quickly throughout the region about Slater's actions and the reasons for them. Some locals claimed that Slater boasted that he intended to receive \$7.00 per person for everybody he moved, implying a financial motive. Others knew that the Indians' land would somehow revert to Slater and believed that the missionary wanted to sell the homesteads for personal gain. Many settlers, and even the Superintendent of the Griswold settlement, lobbied against Slater's actions because their many elderly people could not safely make the journey -- that they had comfortable homes, raised good crops, and that part of the band had "improved in habits of civilized life, agriculture, education, and religion."<sup>61</sup>

At Commissioner Brown's request, Michigan Superintendent Charles Babcock investigated the situation at Ottawa Colony and found that the Indians wholeheartedly opposed removal. He recommended that the government take no action in the matter.<sup>62</sup> This incident only shortly preceded the Michigan legislature's constitutional revisions granting

the Ottawa citizenship and ending all local removal. After American and Indian opposition defeated Slater's plan, Mashco apparently was able to shift the responsibility for the unpopular action to the missionary because he continued to act as Ogema of the Ottawa Colony families for many years to come.<sup>63</sup> Slater never succeeded in dictating his economic, cultural, or political wishes at Ottawa Colony; the Ottawa there made their own conscious choices and pursued their own program until the settlement disbanded in 1860.

The economic and cultural adaptation at James Selkirk's Griswold settlement differed from that at Ottawa Colony. In 1841 ninety people left their original Barry County settlement and bought 400 acres in Allegan County.<sup>64</sup> Throughout the 1840s, they maintained as much or more seasonal mobility than did the Ottawa Colony residents. By 1843 they had not yet built any log houses, and although they kept "ponies," they used no animal labor as late as 1844. Nevertheless, they broke and planted more than sixty acres. By 1845 the population had grown to 120, and the land, which the Episcopal Church held in trust, had been subdivided with "neat" houses built on most parcels.<sup>65</sup>

The rapid expansion reported in 1845 had ended by 1847, and the population at Griswold dropped to 109. The population reached equilibrium at that point, and the residents maintained a relatively constant accommodation of seasonal rounds and farming demands. Officials complained of indigenous cultural traits inhibiting school attendance. Mission Superintendent F. H. Cumming said:

The number of children who attend school varies from five to twenty-five. It is exceedingly difficult to secure the attendance of the children to the system of instruction devised for them. For this, various



reasons might be assigned: the principal, however, will be found to be their unwillingness to learn the English language; the indifference of the parents to the subject; the wandering mode of life, to which they are proverbially partial. They must have their seasons for hunting, for making sugar, for attending to payment, and for visiting. When they go forth on any of these expeditions, all the members of each family go; consequently, the operations of the school must be suspended until they return.<sup>66</sup>

The Griswold population, like that at Ottawa Colony, continued to require income from hunting and maple sugar making. As at Waganagisi, the use of English in the Indian community became a hotly contested issue. In the south, however, Ojawa remained the favored language and was a strong identity marker in this increasingly Americanized setting. As for belief systems, the Griswold records note only that, when the Indians resided in the village, they attended church services in Ojawa twice on Sunday. The records also note, however, that the Indians had regular seasons for "visiting." These times may have coincided with major ceremonials at other villages that maintained the same cycle of production and religious instruction.

The Indians found the Episcopalian preacher Selkrig easier to live with than Leonard Slater and few disputes arose at Griswold. By 1847 Nebenese, the Ogemasi at Ottawa Colony, held the appointment of government farmer at Griswold.<sup>67</sup> He worked at both settlements to increase crop yields. The population in the quiet, productive setting at Griswold grew to 138 in 1848 with no recorded official attempts to restrict the seasonal mobility. Seventy-eight Potawatomi joined the mission in 1850, permanently increasing the number at this well adjusted community.<sup>68</sup>

George Nelson Smith's Old Wing Mission on Black River never enjoyed

a degree of the political stability anything like that of Ottawa Colony. The mission bore the marks of competition among kin groups for access to economic resources and never achieved full political, economic, or religious cooperation among its segments. In fact, it is an example of continuing kin group politics and the tendency for decentralized Ottawa villages to form or fission along kin lines. Neither missionaries or government officials exercised enough control over this divided community to dictate to Old Wing residents.

Few, if any of, the Ottawa who moved to Old Wing did so from Christian conviction. Indeed, after seven years, only the elder members of one kin group regularly even attended church.<sup>69</sup> Born of the removal crisis in 1839, this 1,200 acre settlement served primarily as a real estate investment for Ogemuk who sought a way to remain in Michigan.<sup>70</sup> The politically prominent landholders were Ogemainini, his brother Pendunwan, and Nissowaquot, all from Weekwitonsing; Shawganagoshe (Shininkossia) of Ahptuhwaing; Namouschota from Ahnumawautikuhmig; and Moksauba who probably moved from Meshimnekahning. Extended families and kin groups from other large villages joined the mission over time.<sup>71</sup> Ogemainini's kin group formed the socio-political core at the settlement, and he named the village Old Wing for his uncle Negwegon who had always favored adopting American customs.<sup>72\*\*\*</sup>

Old Wing Mission claimed more residents than any other Owashshinong settlement in 1843 with between 210 Ottawa and 300 affiliates. Many of the residents from Waganagisi, however, only wintered at Black River, continuing their custom. In times of severe shortage such as that caused by the 1842 crop failure, even larger numbers had recourse to

this southern land.<sup>73</sup> Buying this tract in the heart of their winter grounds also assured the Waganagisi kin groups who disagreed with the Catholic Ogemuk or the clergy of a place of political refuge. They could continue their pattern of southern winter hunts and spring maple sugaring and then rejoin the larger Waganagisi villages in the summer for the fishing and gardening.

If the Ogemuk had moved to Old Wing to enjoy the bounty of American government, they chose the wrong mission. By the time their settlement began, the United States had already committed the "education" and "civilization" funds from the 1836 treaty to other missions.<sup>74</sup> Smith did not even get draft animals until late in 1841. He reported that year that the mission inhabitants planted about fifty acres of gardens in the standard crop complex of corn, potatoes, beans and pumpkins. If this acreage was to feed only 210 settlement-affiliated Indians, it amounted to only .23 acres per person. This was less than the amount of garden required by nearly full time hunter/gatherers for subsistence, and one half the amount used at Griswold. Without oxen the Indians had not been able to clear the fields of large timber, forcing Smith to adopt the Ottawa's own swidden techniques. This limited crop yields and did not accomplish Smith's objective of presenting a model American farm for the Indians to emulate.<sup>75</sup>

To allow the settlement to survive for the first four years, Smith had to tolerate an active program of Indian hunting and gathering. He kept a daily journal recording the coming and going of hunting parties from the end of harvest in October until maple sugar season in late February or early March. A few Old Wing landowners exploited resources

only in the local vicinity so that their children could attend school, while others left for the entire winter, travelling the Kalamazoo River to hunt for deer and bear. Women gathered rushes and made mats to cover hunting lodges.<sup>76</sup> When the sugar season ended, some inhabitants planted their gardens and returned to their parent villages for a summer of fishing, visiting, and their annuity payments and others planted at their traditional Waganagisi fields. Smith never successfully broke this cycle.

The Ottawa at Old Wing supplemented their incomes by selling passenger pigeons and other wild game.<sup>77</sup> Their location along the bogs and marshes at the mouth of the Black and Kalamazoo rivers also offered them other resources, particularly cranberries then in high demand both locally and at Chicago. On September 26, 1844, Smith reported that the Indians picked great quantities of cranberries and sent six canoes loaded with their harvest to Kalamazoo and St. Joseph to procure cash for flour. Three Ottawa men took the excess to Chicago for sale there. Over time the production for cash came to focus on the berries and the maple sugar which one observer called their "great trade item." In 1845 alone the colony produced 15,000 pounds of maple sugar for a cash income of \$1,200.<sup>78</sup> Maple sugar provided nearly three-fourths as much cash per capita as did the annuity.

Agriculture at Old Wing yielded little surplus until about 1846, and by that time, political battles had already limited the settlement's future.<sup>79</sup> Political instability plagued the settlement and had already threatened to completely close it several times. The majority of Old Wing Ottawa recognized Ogemainini as their leading Ogema, but factional

disputes arose as the kin group lead by Moksauba attempted to reach political ascendancy and control government and mission resources.

Like Mashco, Ogemainini had achieved his leadership by exhibiting the traditional values and traits required of an Ogema. Even Schoolcraft noted that Ogemainini was "a sober, intelligent and worthy chief." Smith characterized the leader as "wise in council, noble in spirit, and upright in life."<sup>80</sup> In 1839 he had demonstrated his ability to act decisively on his people's behalf to secure their Michigan land tenure. Ogemainini also demonstrated his religious and moral leadership in his close attention to Smith's instruction and his own example.<sup>81</sup> Through his close relations with Smith, Ogemainini also maintained the right and ability to dispense goods and services to his people.<sup>82</sup> As a traditional leader he held the respect of his followers and attempted to express their wishes to government officials, even when he alienated Smith and Robert Stuart by doing so. Indeed, Stuart thought Ogemainini a "weak vacillating" man for refusing to dictate the government's wishes for development to his constituents.<sup>83</sup> Backed by a large kin group comprising the extended kin of his own line and that of Pendunwan, Ogemainini remained the presiding Ogema at the settlement until his death.

Moksauba represented the Owashshinong Ottawa who joined the Old Wing settlement. His two sons, Louis (Benasewkezhick) and Francis, and perhaps a third, along with their families, formed the core of Moksauba's group. The sons and their extended kin served as the basis of this elder Ogema's influence.<sup>84</sup> Moksauba's motives for joining the colony are unclear. Since he and Ogemainini had both used the hunting

range in the Kalamazoo drainage, they may have maintained a long term affiliation and with marriages between the groups.<sup>85</sup> Possibly the land around Meshimnekahning could no longer provide adequate subsistence for his kin group, or Meshimnekahning could not offer him the opportunity to satisfy his ambition. More likely, Moksauba, too, hoped to avoid removal by purchasing land.<sup>86</sup> Whatever his initial motivation, he and his sons recruited other family heads who disagreed with actions taken either by Ogemainini or Smith and led united opposition to them on almost every issue.<sup>87</sup>

Ogemainini made few decisions that went unchallenged so examples of factional disputes at Old Wing are abundant. The dispute over Smith's location of the mission compound demonstrates most clearly the nature of the traditional political organization and its continued operation. Smith had originally chosen a site approximately four miles inland from the mouth of Black River, where he judged the land better suited to farming than the less productive sand along Lake Michigan. The inland location, Smith believed, would also help limit the contact of his parishioners with the alcohol bearing traders who travelled along the southern Lake Michigan shore with their wares. Although the government spent little money to aid them, Ogemainini and Smith had cleared fields and built a minimal number of log structures at the mission site.

Tension between Ogemainini and Moksauba was already rife when, in 1840 and 1841, several colonists died and others, including Moksauba himself, became gravely ill. Smith feared that deaths might "discourage" the people who remained, especially when the dead land holders had not transferred their titles to others before they died.<sup>88</sup>

Smith, however, ignored or chose not to record until years later the Indians' retention of beliefs about supernatural causes of disease and the possibility of killing by the exercise of special powers given by spirit helpers. Even the Christian Ogemainini believed that Moksauba "poisoned" him to usurp his leadership position.<sup>89</sup> From an Ottawa perspective, a place where many people had died could be influenced by malevolent power and should be abandoned. The force beliefs could be accelerated by political turmoil and charges and counter charges of witchcraft with each complaint leading to a cycle of accusations and tension in the village.

Political turmoil abounded by 1842 when Moksauba and his followers organized those who refused to live at the mission compound. Ogemainini and Shininkossia had decided in the spring to buy land at the mouth of Black River and enlarge their one acre landing to accommodate their increased commerce. Smith at first thought this a good idea, until some Indians, including Moksauba, moved there from the mission compound.<sup>90</sup>

Shininkossia had ulterior motives in supporting the land purchase at the lake. In late April, Ogemainini discovered that he and Moksauba had invited the Catholic priest from Grand Rapids to build a mission at the landing. By so doing, they could bypass Smith as a direct link between themselves and government officials, establishing a new settlement where they could control their own resources. To prevent this disaffection, Smith called a meeting at which Ogemainini and Pendunwan again reaffirmed their desire to become agriculturists and provide their children with education at Smith's establishment. Moksauba claimed the same goals but wanted his people to learn American

ways without having to adopt Smith's brand of Christianity. Smith could not unite the vying kin groups. Discord intensified between incipient Catholic and established Protestant factions when the Catholic priest from Grand Rapids said mass at the landing in June 1842.<sup>91</sup> Ogemainini further aggravated the situation when he denied Moksauba use of Old Wing Mission's oxen and cart to haul his corn from the mission compound to the lake. Fortunately for Smith, the competing groups left for their summer visits and journeys to Mackinac before the political tensions exploded into violence.<sup>92</sup>

Throughout 1842 mission improvements continued to be hobbled by the lack of United States government support. The material benefits from associating with the mission had always been small, but with political tensions rife in the community, even Ogemainini debated the wisdom of remaining at Old Wing. The leader informed Stuart that he would soon return to Waganagisi because his people were "lonesome" at the mission. Indeed, Mackinac traders offered the Ogema a cash payment if he would return to Weekwitonsing and live nearer his kinsmen and their posts. The Indians' ambivalence to Smith's mission operations angered Robert Stuart who believed that they should be more grateful for the teacher's efforts. Stuart told Smith that, if his charges would not farm, they should by all means return north. He advised Ogemainini to make his decision soon.<sup>93</sup>

Smith called a council in January 1843 and pressed all the Indians who owned Old Wing lands to make a firm, binding commitment to move inland to the mission. Ogemainini was the man most likely to convince his people to do so, but his political position had been so diminished



by internal squabbles that not even his brother Pendunwan would support the Ogema's desire to please Smith and remain at Old Wing if it meant living at the mission compound. Pendunwan would consider staying at the mission in the summer and receiving their annuities there instead of Mackinac, but he wished to live at the landing instead of "dying in the woods in the hot summer." By April, 231 people, including Ogemainini, Pendunwan, Shininkossia, and all the Moksaubas agreed that, if the government supplied them with tools for farming and building, they would consider staying at Old Wing but not otherwise. If they did stay at Old Wing during the summer, they would not live at the mission grounds.<sup>94</sup>

On Stuart's recommendation, the mission received a small but important cash infusion. In 1843 when it appeared that the mission community would finally settle down to a program of agricultural intensification with increased sedentism, Smith made a political blunder that further undercut Ogemainini's authority. He requested that Osmand Goodrich, a personal friend, physician, and Congregationalist from Allegan, be hired as farmer for the settlement against the wishes of the Indians. Smith, with difficulty, convinced Ogemainini to acquiesce, reporting that the Ogema was "displeased but submissive." Moksauba, on the other hand, "abused us shamefully and said he would not come near us." He threatened to persuade the other Indians to boycott the mission. Smith blamed the Catholic clergy for this opposition, but as a result of his own blatant disregard of the Indians' wishes only three families remained near the mission throughout the summer, and these three pitched their camps at the landing. The Old Wing colonists who would return that fall had already determined to build their permanent

settlement on Lake Michigan.<sup>95</sup>

In the fall of 1843, after Smith's and Stuart's threats to completely withdraw mission services, Ogemainini again attempted to persuade those community members who returned to the colony at harvest time to settle at the mission. Shininkossia and even Pendunwan refused to do so, remaining determined to build at the landing. Smith pressed Ogemainini to commit himself to year around occupation of the mission site, but given the attitudes of his followers, Ogemainini knew that the colony would fail altogether if he insisted on doing so. He refused to concede saying that he would live at the lake "to enjoy the fresh breeze in the summer."<sup>96</sup>

Robert Stuart, to stabilize the settlement's political climate, then involved himself directly in the dispute about the mission's location. He informed Smith that he should not restrain the Indians too much and that living on the lake might be better for their health. He could coax the Indians to do his bidding but not let their agenda order his own. When the Indians refused to reach consensus to reside at the mission, Stuart advised the missionary to simply ignore those who wished to live separately and concentrate on those who would move inland. By April 1844, nearly all the Indians had moved to the landing and received regular instruction from the priest from Grand Rapids. When Stuart and Smith complained, Moksauba said that Goodrich should go back to Allegan where he came from, and Pendunwan informed Smith that he would be welcome to move his own mission to the landing but the Indians would not venture inland. If Smith chose not to move, the Ottawa would continue to invite the priest to their village at the lake whenever they

pleased.<sup>97</sup>

Factional disputes disrupted the settlement well into 1845. That year Stuart again threatened to remove all government services if the Indians did not return to their mission. The threat went unheeded, and the Indians, probably on the advice of Louis Campau, continued to entertain the priest at their lakeside village. Moksauba had by that time determined to replace Smith altogether. By March only Ogemainini, his mother, and their immediate family went to the mission for Smith's church services. By April 1845, after three full years of internal feuds, Ogemainini complained that all the Indians had become "ill" and afraid they would die if they stayed at the colony. He announced that they would soon go away.<sup>98</sup>

Smith sought a political solution to the crisis and called an election to determine whether Ogemainini, who continued to patronize the Protestant mission, or the Catholic Moksauba would act as the leading Ogema for the Old Wing landowners. In the end, Ogemainini's influence and stable reputation won the American style election. Only Moksauba's own sons and the oldest son of Ogemainini's sister voted for him. In June, village opinion turned decidedly against Moksauba and settlement residents even threatened to ostracize his entire kin group, exercising the traditional rights of villagers to force conformity to behavioral standards for the benefit of all members.<sup>99</sup>

On October 18, 1845, before Smith could consolidate the village around his political victory, Ogemainini died of "lung disease." His mother died the same day, and the mission lost its two staunchest supporters. Smith clearly realized the implications of the Ogema's

death for his mission. In his journal entry for October 30, 1845, he lamented that "in that grave is buried the hope of our mission."<sup>100</sup>

Old Wing Mission did not close immediately, but the loss of its most influential leader, an ever more disruptive American population surrounding its lands, and decreasing pressures for removal all worked against its permanency. Ogemainini's brother Pendunwan became the Ogema of his large kin group through both popular and missionary support. All agreed that the new Ogema's leadership skills were generally inferior to those of his brother and that he did not share his brother's commitment to mission-sponsored acculturation. Pendunwan's followers still refused to move inland to the mission, and by February 1846, the new Ogema suggested the possibility of moving the entire settlement to a "more healthy location" away from the Catholics who still encouraged Moksauba's pretensions, perhaps north to White River.<sup>101</sup>

In 1847, a community of 1,500 Dutch immigrants bought land near Old Wing. Their many cattle and hogs destroyed Indian fields and thousands of the birch bark troughs the Indians used to carry maple sap. This proved an expensive setback, but worse yet, the Dutch colonists suffered from smallpox for nearly three weeks before their Indian neighbors discovered the danger to their own lives. Fearing that they might already be infected with this disease, all of the Indians left their settlement. Some moved north to the Grand River and others returned directly to Waganagisi.<sup>102</sup> Although Old Wing Colony had survived nearly seven years of internal political division, by December 1847, Smith and the Indian landholders there determined to sell their Black River lands and made plans to find a new home.<sup>103</sup>

The Old Wing Colony inhabitants who moved to Grand Traverse Bay in 1848 were the first Ottawa kin groups to establish themselves as autonomous political entities in this previously Chippewa territory. Ottawa people had lived at Grand Traverse before 1848, but, as noted previously, they had always merged into existing villages and over time became part of the Chippewa community. Pendunwan, the Moksaubas, and others who relocated to Grand Traverse had no intention of combining with the Chippewa. Each Ogema established a separate village for his kin group where they could enjoy the region's benefits without suffering from faction politics. The physical isolation of Grand Traverse greatly appealed to Old Wing residents, and there remained enough natural resources to maintain their familiar, preferred subsistence patterns. They also appreciated the lack of cultural restrictions that resulted from large numbers of European immigrants surrounding Ottawa villages elsewhere. By establishing their independent settlements, these Old Wing immigrants paved the way for other large kin groups from Owashshinong and Waganagisi villages to join them in the enjoyment of these benefits.

Smith recorded the importance of natural resources in the Ottawa's decision to settle at Grand Traverse. In his account of their exploring expedition to locate a suitable tract, he wrote that the Ottawa selected and bought about two miles of shoreline and the adjoining inland lots on the Lake Michigan coastline of the Leelanau Peninsula. He praised the selection as "one of the best situations in which they could settle especially referring to their nautical habits and their disposition for fishing."<sup>104</sup> These Lake Michigan waters had trout and whitefish "said

to be the best of any on the coast." The land they chose had thick stands of maple trees, and Indian corn crops rarely suffered frost. The tract pleased even the conservative White River Ogema Payshoshega, who also agreed to settle there. The Chippewa leader Nagonaby from Manistee and his following and Onamunse and his group -- all religious traditionalists -- also agreed to settle on this tract.<sup>105</sup>

Old Wing Ottawa moved to Grand Traverse in 1849 and immediately began clearing gardens and building homes. They lost little time in forging strong, traditional political alliances with the Chippewa there. For example, Pendunwan's son Matwagonashe married Agosa's daughter Mary Wakazoo in a Protestant ceremony conducted by Peter Dougherty on December 5, 1850. Unfortunately for the migrants, however, the isolation at Grand Traverse would shortly end. Smith recorded that American church members prepared the celebration meal for the wedding.<sup>106</sup>

In the early 1850s, Americans began settling at Grand Traverse Bay in large numbers, rapidly claiming the best lands. Those Chippewa and the few Ottawa people who lived near Dougherty's mission on lands reserved in the 1836 treaty had no title to the tract they had built homes and made farms on because it had not yet been cleared by the General Land Office for sale. To assure their continued land tenure in the region, these people began to buy land off the reservation, primarily on the Leelanau Peninsula near present day Omena. Small extended family groups split from Agosa's and Aishquagonabe's villages, purchased contiguous tracts, and founded new settlements. Dougherty complained that this scattering across the landscape made it difficult, if not impossible, to offer effective education and other services to

the Indians.<sup>107</sup>

The dispersal of the Grand Traverse Chippewa across the Peninsula affected the politics and demographics at Waganagisi as well. As we have already seen, the Presbyterian Chippewa leader Daniel Mokewenaw moved into Catholic Ottawa territory at Beedashahgaing and served as a catalyst for political realignments within Waganagisi villages. The Catholic Ottawa extended families who already lived at Grand Traverse drew together and formed their own settlement on the east shore of the Leelanau Peninsula. In 1853 Peshabi and his kin group, who had been a part of the Ogema Negwegon's group until the old leader's death and had most recently lived at Ahnumawautikuhmig, joined these Catholic Ottawa.<sup>108</sup> Together these groups founded the a new settlement called Eagletown, now known as Peshawbestown.<sup>109</sup> This further extended Ottawa influence in this formerly Chippewa region. By 1855 the Ottawa and Chippewa had bought more than 16,000 acres on Grand Traverse Bay, securing for themselves sufficient natural resources with which to make a living. Within a short time all the kin divisions that had vied with each other at Old Wing, Waganagisi, and other settlements were strongly entrenched and politically unified enough to reach consensus on momentous issues related to the Treaty of Detroit.<sup>110</sup>

#### Renaissance At Waganagisi

Since the 1820s when the Waganagisi Ottawa invited the Catholic church to reestablish its influence in their region, Americans had applauded the ways these Ottawa made their living as being the most civilized in the region. To their earlier achievement, some Ottawa

added new skills and wage labor occupations to further strengthen their claims of being "civilized." For example, in 1846 Francois Pierz financed construction of a sawmill at Weekwitonsing. The Indians then cut their own timber and used their considerable carpentry skills to building elaborate frame houses like those they had earlier constructed on Mackinac Island. They also made "boats and vessels" which rapidly replaced canoes as the primary means of water transportation and fishing. Although the documents do not specify the type of watercraft the Ottawa made, they most likely began their operations by constructing common plank Mackinac boats. The word "vessels" however, more likely applies to masted schooners suitable for hauling freight on Lake Michigan like those Peshabi's people launched from their Grand Traverse settlement in 1854. Indeed, the Ottawa not only made seaworthy vessels, some owned and operated their own freight business.<sup>111</sup> This new technology would have been especially important to continued intensification of the fishing industry for market production.

By 1843 most Waganagisi Ottawa had already increased the sizes of the small gardens they had maintained when the Americans first came to Mackinac to plots as large as four acres per family.<sup>112</sup> Indeed, in 1855 Agent Henry Gilbert estimated that the Waganagisi Ottawa owned more than 16,000 acres of land for their combined population. In 1855 the village at Ahptuhwaing headed by Neogema, for example, numbered 185 persons and owned at least 800 acres. This provided an average of 5.79 acres per person, nearly four times the amount held by Cobmoosa's villagers in the south.<sup>113</sup> Since Ahptuhwaing's population represented only slightly less than one fourth of the Waganagisi total and their acreage is only one



twentieth of the 16,000 Indian held acres there, other villages held even larger per capita amounts of land.

There is no accurate census for all the Waganagisi villages in 1855 so it is impossible to determine the average number of acres available per person for the entire region.<sup>114</sup> In 1855, Beedashahgaing, the site of the Presbyterian operated Bear Creek Mission which served Daniel Mokewenaw's followers and the Ottawa who opposed the policies of Father Pierz, listed a population of 103 persons.<sup>115</sup> The old Ogema Apokisigan had died by 1855, and Weekwitonsing under the leadership of Alexander Nissowaquot numbered 267 residents. Namouschota still headed Ahnumawautikuhmig, a thriving settlement of 254 persons. With the 185 people at Ahptuhwaing, the population at Waganagisi totals 809 persons. In 1855, then, each resident would have had access to an average of 19.77 acres of Ottawa owned land, a much greater holding than Ottawa in any other portion of the state.

As the Waganagisi Ogema had indicated during the 1849 division of debt fund monies, the natural resources on their lands, coupled with those of public property not yet sold on the market and those of Lake Michigan, offered them a more than adequate subsistence.<sup>116</sup> They had invested much of their disposable income in financing the technological developments of animal powered agriculture and their labor reaped dividends. In 1855 alone they sold more than 5,000 bushels of surplus potatoes in addition to wheat and corn. By the end of the Michigan treaty era, the average population at the four major Waganagisi villages was 201 persons, slightly less than double the average settlement size on the Grand, Muskegon, and White rivers.<sup>117</sup> The continued large size

and stability of villages throughout this period of political and economic uncertainty indicates the success of the Waganagisi Ogemuk and their tactics of adapting their horticulture, fishing, trapping and maple sugaring to a place in the American system. By becoming the most "civilized" and economically and politically stable Ottawa in Michigan, they completed the cultural renaissance their Ogemuk had anticipated in the 1820s.

Economic development at Waganagisi was sufficient and the Indians' living conditions similar enough to those of other American frontier dwellers, it is difficult to prove cultural continuity in terms of the persistence of traditional subsistence activities alone. Throughout the removal years, few reports from Waganagisi discussed people who refused to affiliate with Catholic institutions, an act which would have indicated continued dedication to a traditional world view. Instead, political cohesion led the Waganagisi Ottawa and Mackinac residents alike to focus on those people who maintained strong affiliation with church centered communities in all of their official councils and correspondence. Traditionalists no doubt still strongly opposed Catholic dogma and practiced their own rituals and economic pursuits despite injunctions from the clergy. In 1843 Francois Pierz admitted that the "very few" pagans who remained at Waganagisi hunted in the winter, while the Christians lived primarily by fishing and their crops.<sup>118</sup> Bishop Peter Lefevre of Detroit boasted as late as 1848 that he had recently added 300 "pagans" to the Catholic church.<sup>119</sup> Even discounting the Bishop's tendency toward exaggeration, his statement acknowledges that not all community members had accepted even the

minimal Catholic rite of baptism. He also reported in 1849 that "this year a great number of pagan Indians have embraced the Catholic religion" implying that an even larger number of Waganagisi Ottawa remained traditional in their cultural beliefs.<sup>120</sup>

Despite the glowing accounts of the priests, the traditionalists and some Catholic kin groups in the Waganagisi communities had become dissatisfied with the actions of Catholic clergy and their followers. Nowhere is this more evident than in the immigration of several prominent kin groups from Weekwitonsing, Cheboygan, and Ahptuhwaing to the Protestant community that formed at Bear Creek (or Beedahsahgaing) on the south shore of Little Traverse Bay in the late 1840s. This process of political fission, described in Chapter Six, indicates a continuation of the basic Waganagisi village structure and the operation of traditional Ottawa political organization, with kin groups remaining the central unit on which society had rested since the days of the fur trade. Values of solidarity among kinsmen continued to strengthen biological bonds and broaden social position.

Missionaries, as the Ottawa at Owashshinong, Old Wing, and elsewhere had learned years earlier, tended to usurp political authority in return for the goods they gave and the influence they wielded with outside communities. Further, no denomination allowed Indians to become full-fledged clergymen in their own communities, robbing the Ogemuk of institutionalized recognition, an essential traditional support of their own authority. The Waganagisi Ogemuk had early on incorporated the Catholic church into their cultural patterns, and the Ottawa leaders had taken the initiative in learning and spreading the new rituals as a

means to enhance their own power. By the 1850s, however, the Catholic clergy at Waganagisi became bold in their security and assumed an air of authority, attempting to dictate their decisions and prescriptions to the Ogemuk and their followers. The Indians themselves did not approve of these actions. By exerting their influence to end the tenure of Francois Pierz, the Waganagisi leadership took back the authority they had gradually relinquished.

As it had in the south, speaking the Odawa language became an important political issue at Waganagisi. At Waganagisi, however, learning English became a symbol of Ottawa independence from mission supervision and of their competence to maintain their own communities without outside political intervention. This did not mean they wanted to abandon Odawa. Ottawa leaders had long been bilingual and some spoke three languages, but a growing number of people wanted to learn English so they could not be excluded from full participation in their own government and politically isolated in the middle of a growing English speaking American society.<sup>121</sup>

The actions taken by the Waganagisi Ogemuk demonstrate that their continued political vitality was the most important remaining element of their traditional culture. The pattern of kin group support of prominent, time-tested leaders reflect the same socio-political vitality the Ogemuk exhibited at the opening of the new mission period at Waganagisi. Further, the process of village fission in the face of unreconcilable differences on important issues within a community continued a long standing method of conflict resolution in Ottawa society. The new factor of privately owned, non-movable property in the

large Ottawa communities may have slowed the rate of village fission and helped maintain the large, stable populations at Ahnumawautikuhmig, Ahptuhwaing, and Weekwitonsing. The course chosen by Apokisigan, Mackatabenese, Wasson and others of the old Ogemuk of adopting economic development to preserve political autonomy prevented the kind of political fragmentation that took place at Owashshinong. It also precluded the disintegration experienced by other native American societies in the face of American expansion and preserved for the Waganagisi Ottawa a high degree of political autonomy in their homelands.

#### Summary

Several continuing patterns characterized Ottawa culture even after nearly thirty years of internally and externally generated acculturation efforts. First, the Ottawa maintained a decentralized political organization, which allowed fission of extended families or larger kin groups from the main body of their villages to better exploit natural resources or to resolve political tensions. At the same time, these groups could come together for a unified stand on political issues that jointly affected them. Second, all Ottawa communities throughout Michigan maintained an economic adaptation of seasonal production from natural resources, which preserved kin group cooperation as a meaningful component in their seasonal cycle and an essential feature of their culture. Third, Ottawa socio-political organization and economic pursuits had always rested upon an ethic of reciprocity between kinsmen. The continued bolstering and recognition of the kin ties that bound

group members helped prevent the Ottawa from fragmenting and scattering when the Americans first began exerting political and economic pressure for assimilation.

American missionaries and other authorities between 1821 and 1825 spoke of these three distinguishing cultural features in their discussions of Ottawa "habits of economy." The Americans encouraged the Ottawa to form nuclear families that would accumulate wealth for the benefit of that small domestic unit only. Indeed, they often judged the degree of "civilization" by the amount and type of furnishings, or other "temporal comforts" found in an Ottawa home.<sup>122</sup> The behavior they encouraged, allowing some families to accumulate wealth at the expense of others, ran counter to an ethic that encouraged disbursing wealth widely and rewarded the person who gave rather than the one who hoarded.

The Ottawa did not, however, live in an idyllic world of peaceful coexistence. As the discussion of factions at Old Wing Mission shows, the Ottawa sometimes quarreled bitterly over access to material goods. Even so, as Peter Dougherty noted during the winter of 1843, which followed one of the most devastating crop failures of the nineteenth century, "It is a custom among them to give to those who come from a distance, food, if the families visited have any. This has drained the families who have remained at the station of almost their entire supply."<sup>123</sup> Missionary after missionary from Ottawa Colony to Ahnumawautikumig commented that, despite the level of involvement in sanctioned economic activity, they had not defeated the Indians' ethic of quickly distributing wealth.<sup>124</sup> Indeed, as long as the possibility of food shortages from crop failure, poor fishing or hunting, or failure

of maple sugar remained a danger, the ethic continued as a viable and important economic adaptation. The Ottawa expected the missionaries to learn this ethic if they were to win converts in Indian communities. For example, in 1853 dwindling school attendance compelled the Beedashahgaing missionary Andrew Porter to offer students a daily lunch of bread and molasses.<sup>125</sup> The issue was probably not economic need for the Ottawa raised more than enough food to meet their own needs. The lunch did, however, include the missionary in expected network of sharing.

The political momentum generated by the Ogemuk and Ogemasi to reassert their own authority by playing Protestant against Catholic interests at Waganagisi provided the impetus to push for final settlement with the United States government. Their cultural vitality allowed the various divisions in Ottawa society to come together once more in a demonstration of consensus to end the threat of removal once and for all with the 1855 Treaty of Detroit. In the end, the Ottawa became known as the "Citizen Indians" of Michigan.

## CONCLUSIONS

At the end of the Michigan treaty era in 1855, the Ottawa had achieved a feat rivaled by few native peoples in the eastern United States. Unlike those who had moved westward to avoid pressures of Euro-american expansion or others who had tried to accommodate the newcomers and failed, the Ottawa successfully adapted to a market economy. By so doing, they created political conditions that allowed them to continue occupying their pre-contact village sites. This study has attempted to examine the processes by which the Ottawa, faced with economic and political odds that defeated even their near neighbors, created this position for themselves on the Michigan frontier.

The theoretical framework of this analysis of Ottawa history does not challenge the appropriateness of the global perspective used by many scholars who have recognized its power to account for asymmetrical political and economic relations over time. It does, however, attempt to analyze factors that relate specifically to mode of production centered theories like those of Wolf and White to understand in greater detail the mechanisms that account for the differential inclusion of indigenous populations into a single world system. This study, then, began with an historical examination of the Ottawa mode of production.

The analysis relied heavily upon Wolf's theoretical position that mode of production included "a specific, historically occurring set of social relations through which labor is deployed to wrest energy from



nature by means of tools, skills, organization, and knowledge."<sup>1</sup> Hence, the discussion first focused on material and socio-political aspects of Ottawa adaptation. It showed that by the time the Americans arrived in Michigan, the Indians had long participated in a globally linked fur trade economy. Unlike northern peoples who produced furs as their primary marketable commodities, the Ottawa first conducted trade within indigenous networks of exchange. They transported furs from their northwestern sources to French commercial centers along the St. Lawrence River, receiving both material wealth and prestige as reward for their efforts. During the seventeenth century greater numbers of incoming Europeans usurped the Ottawa's middleman role so they could control all aspects of the fur commerce that was formed the economic basis of the French North American empire.

The Ottawa's strategic location at the Straits of Mackinac, through which fur brigades continued to pass until the early nineteenth century, allowed them to develop new political and economic relations with the Europeans after their role as middlemen declined. With their traditional fishing and horticulture skills they produced enough provision the permanent Euroamerican communities first at Michilimackinac and then at Detroit. They also produced canoes, snowshoes, and tools for the trade. Increased local fur trapping and a greater military role in North American extensions of European conflicts offset the Ottawa's loss of middleman status.

The continuation of traditional Ottawa social relations clearly demonstrates the success of their participation in the fur trade system. Throughout their history, the Ottawa maintained large, semi-permanent

villages with year-around core populations, supported primarily by the storable resources of corn and fish. The flexibility of Ottawa socio-political organization based on kinship rights and obligations allowed them to freely associate with other groups and form meaningful relationships with these groups by marriage alliances. They interacted with other native peoples, the French, the British, and eventually the Americans as kinsmen, maintaining cultural norms of reciprocity between kin group members, their primary idiom of exchange.

Changes in the traditional Ottawa mode of production, including the degree of reliance on various natural resources, the division of labor and techniques of production, and the social relations of exchange were central issues throughout this analysis. As White has discussed, Indian peoples faced with Euroamerican infringement on their local adaptations had three basic options. First, they could attempt to maintain their original subsistence techniques, often moving beyond the frontier to do so. Second, with enough time, they could adjust their lifeways to conform to expectations of the powerful newcomers. Third, in times of great cultural stress, they could adopt an internally generated program to quickly transform the economic and social structures of their society to perpetuate a degree of political autonomy.<sup>2</sup>

Until the beginning of the removal period, the Ottawa had taken the second approach in dealing with Euroamericans. Since the Ottawa had adjusted their traditional mode of production to fit in with Euroamerican economic pursuits for nearly two hundred years before the American frontier reached their land, their leaders fully believed that they could meet even the harshest demands of the American economic sys-

tem by increasing of agricultural production on a decreased land base and intensifying fishing for the American market. United States government policy at first encourage this adjustment. The Ottawa at various locations began the slow process of acquiring the tools, draft animals, and the social reordering of labor required to intensify their production. Removal policy, however, forced leaders to speed up and redefine their efforts at intensification as moving toward the American concept of "civilization" to maintain political hold over the material resources for their own subsistence and future financial support. The political stress imposed by the American system, then, compelled the Ottawa to take their third option.

In their attempt to preserve their identity and their homelands in the face of the demands of the American politico-economic complex, the Ottawa had two major goals. First, they had to maintain access to the natural resources they had traditionally used for subsistence and continue to use them productively. Second, they had to integrate into the American market system without losing their social and cultural integrity. The nature of interaction between decentralized Ottawa socio-political structures and the socio-political structures of American society prevented the domination of the former by the latter and aided the Indians in achieving their goals.

Given the Ottawa's long-standing dependence on corn horticulture and fishing, it is not surprising that Indian leaders worked hard to preserve their traditional villages and fishing grounds during all their political contests with Americans. In so doing, the Ottawa demonstrated the importance of this subsistence mode to their economic, political and

cultural well-being. As we have seen, local Ottawa leaders often called on United States Indian agents to help them preserve access to key natural resources in the face of American competition. When other avenues failed, Ottawa leaders bucked the considerable opposition of Commissioners of Indian Affairs Harris and Crawford and their agent Schoolcraft to secure access to resources by purchasing ceded lands with their annuities.

Maintaining access to natural resources was important to Ottawa continuation in Michigan, but it became secondary to the broader task of adapting their native skills to the American market. This required hard fought contests between Ottawa leaders and Euroamericans. To interpret their actions, the analysis moved beyond a study of natural resources and social structures to examine the culturally prescribed motives of human agents in effecting accommodation and change. Understanding of these motives required a method for examining the diverse values and political and economic interests that guided individuals in each social group.

Key Ottawa and American actors formulated and responded to a continual series of frontier tensions and contentions. These, in turn, shaped the nature of broader structural accommodation in regional modes of production. For example, had it not been for the transformational leadership of Apokisigan, Mackatabenese, and Noaquageshik who began the process of purposeful production for the American market, the Ottawa might have been forced to emigrate from their homelands. The intransigence of Schoolcraft and Crawford about removal threatened to undo Ottawa advances although many other Michigan residents favored their

continued residence in the state.

On this level, Ortner's "practice" analysis became a most useful theoretical tool. By highlighting the role of individuals in constructing socio-political structures, practice analysis suggested a means to derive a realistic view of American society on the Michigan frontier. This detailed local analysis clarified understanding about the political options and advantages individuals pursued. The model's focus on symbolic cultural meanings and variables also offered insights into the range of restrictions that ideologies placed on Ottawa and American agents. Methodological emphasis upon daily human activities as the enactment of fundamental "notions of temporal, spatial, and social ordering that underlie and organize the system as a whole" provided the rationale for examining activities of kin-based production as an important element of Ottawa cultural continuity.<sup>3</sup>

The factors that affected the process of Ottawa incorporation into the market economy are found in the chronology of the interests and actions of the Ottawa leaders themselves. The Indian leaders first worked to build support among their followers for a program of economic change. Early in the 1820s, leaders at Waganagisi and Owashshinong undertook the long, difficult process of exhorting their people toward a consensus on the prospect of productive change. Such consensus could only be achieved by careful manipulation of cultural symbols and values.

Participation in the American economic system challenged the Ottawa's core values about the division of labor, reciprocity among kinsmen, and the accumulation of wealth. The Waganagisi leaders carefully defined their act of inviting Catholic clergy to their villages as

invoking a cultural renaissance and restoring the people to their former position; this made the act acceptable to their followers. Village factionalism always rested near the surface of Ottawa politics, and fission would have destroyed the coalition with which Indian leaders faced American officials and put a halt to their efforts. Even though their resident priests demanded change in ritual practices, the leaders reinterpreted Catholic ceremonies in terms of Ottawa cosmology which made them acceptable to a significant number of their constituents. The internally generated program of development won enough supporters to offset potential factionalism between Catholics and traditionalists who objected to modifying Ottawa ritual life.

The significance of internally generated, culturally acceptable development programs is shown by contrasting the experience of the Owashshinong Ottawa with that of the Waganagisi Ottawa. The southern Ottawa lived nearest the line of American settlement and experienced the most intense American efforts at forced acculturation. United States negotiators for the 1821 Treaty of Chicago forced the Ottawa to capitulate to their terms in a way the Indians considered fraudulent. Without full consensus from all Ottawa communities affected, they made a treaty that stipulated for a mission on the Grand River -- something that most Owashshinong Ottawa did not want. When it became clear that rejecting the mission would not halt expansion into their southern hunting range, the Ottawa accepted government-sponsored mission services only to find them inadequate to meet their needs. The discord caused by the treaty negotiations, furor over the mission's location, and the Protestant missionaries' practice of dispensing government services only

to their followers created tensions among villages and among kin groups within villages and caused political rifts that never fully healed. This stands in sharp contrast to the relative political coherence, newly built towns, and developing industries of the Waganagisi Ottawa at the time of the 1855 treaty.

This difference in the cultural redefinition to meet demands of market production carried serious implications. The initiative in almost all anti-removal political activities originated in the more politically coherent north. This included the practice of non-mission Ottawa buying lands to prevent losing access to important natural resources. As we have seen, Ogemainini and Shininkossia from Waganagisi were the first to purchase a portion of their traditional hunting, sugaring, and berrying regions.

The force of symbolic culture in guiding and limiting political activities is also seen in the American responses to Ottawa land purchases. Even by 1855, many Ottawa communities did not wholeheartedly pursue agricultural intensification, and not even the most advanced producers rejected the culturally defined practice of reciprocal giving among kinsmen to become profit-maximizing capitalists. Even so, many other Michigan residents accepted the Indians' assertions that they were "civilized" and included them among Michigan's citizens by the state's 1850 constitution. The Michigan residents based their assessment of the Indians' advancement, in large measure, on their acceptance of American landownership practices. As taxpaying, landholding Michigan residents, the Ottawa had the same right to live on and work their property without government interference as did any citizen. With treaty stipulated cash

payments and reservation tenure at an end, Michigan residents prevented the Indian's removal at least partially because of their own cultural symbols.

Access to capital was a second key factor in the Ottawa's ability to become market producers. This became evident to the Waganagisi leaders in the 1830s, shortly after they invited Catholic clergy to their home villages to foster and guide development. Even the most firm commitment to economic development within the Indian community could not be carried through without a reliable source of cash to buy the draft animals and tools necessary to intensify their horticulture or to procure large, lake-going vessels to compete in a market fishery. The need for continued blacksmith services at the Straits of Mackinac to maintain metal tools led Ottawa leaders first to call on old promises made at the 1795 Treaty of Greenville and then to propose a cession of Upper Peninsula lands -- the move which led to the 1836 Treaty of Washington. Ottawa leaders signed this unpopular and heavily altered treaty on the basis of stipulations for continued access to their traditional resources and to receive an immediate infusion of much needed cash. This was especially true of the Owashshinong Ottawa who had greater immediate need because they suffered from American competition for resources and the aftermath of smallpox.

The cash proceeds of the 1836 treaty amounted to less than ten dollars per capita and did not meet the Ottawa's economic requirements. The rate of American settlement the degree of the settlers' reliance on Ottawa-produced foodstuffs while they built their own farms significantly affected the cash flow in a particular region. There was a mar-



ket at Mackinac early in Ottawa history, and it expanded during the early American period. The Owashshinong Ottawa had fewer opportunities to sell their goods until the mid to late 1830s, and the Grand Traverse peoples did not have a place to sell until the 1850s.

This difference in market availability had cultural and political ramifications. Culturally, those groups farthest from American communities maintained a greater degree of latitude in the rate and direction of changes in their modes of production. The central Ottawa villages at Muskegon, White River and Pere Marquette, along with the Grand Traverse Chippewa, experienced the least cultural change during the years of this study. The Owashshinong Ottawa shared in an economic boom from the first days of the American period until the early 1830s by increasing their fur production and providing natural and cultivated foods to newcomers. By the late 1830s, however, American settlers themselves produced food surpluses and had limited need for Indian agricultural produce. As we have seen, even the most "civilized" Owashshinong Ottawa earned a large portion of their cash income by processing natural crops of maple sugar and berries. Because they could not form a lasting link between their mode of production and the American economy, the Owashshinong Ottawa had few opportunities to exercise the political symbols of "civilization." Although they comprised half of the Michigan Ottawa population, their greatest political influences on United States policy came when they acted with the Waganagisi Ottawa. Only at Mackinac, where the traditional Ottawa participation in the local market went unchallenged, did the Indians achieve a semblance of full participation in the American political

system.

The political ramifications of differential market inclusion, then, are complexly related to cultural values and links to the neighboring American communities. In general, those Ottawa who were the least involved in the American market had the least political influence in dealings with the United States government. Leaders from the central Ottawa villages, for example, never begin political contests that secured access to resources or rights to exploit them. Their conservative attempts to maintain a pre-American status quo eventually drew migrant Cwashshinong Ottawa, who were tired of coping directly with Americans, to the Grand Traverse region. The central Ottawa territory may have served as an outlet for potential factionalism in the south, but beyond this, the central Ottawa had little political effect. In almost all high stakes political contests with the United States, the Waganagisi Ottawa lead the way.

The interconnectedness of Ottawa and American capital was readily apparent as early as 1837. Those Indians who did not make an adequate living from farming, fishing, trapping, or harvesting wild plant foods relied heavily on credit offered by merchants who saw treaty stipulated trust funds as guarantees for future payment. Indeed, traders encouraged this system of debt with hopes of tapping large funds created by the 1836 treaty. At annuity time, the Ottawa were some of the few who had cash in many parts of Michigan. The techniques some Americans developed for separating the Indians from their silver shows the important contribution Indian cash made to the Americans' own capital improvements.

Cash became especially critical to the Ottawa and their American neighbors during the 1837 American recession. This national economic crisis slowed Michigan land sales to Americans and, in part, allowed the Indians to begin purchasing acreage they had formerly ceded to the United States. Virtually every Ottawa political division in Michigan adopted the practice of buying land. To do so, they and their leaders contended with the federal government for access to their funds and with local traders to maintain control over their cash. Their political contests for the debt fund demonstrated their leaders' skill, resolve, and the importance of this money to their projects.

Another factor that helped the Ottawa preserve their right to remain in Michigan during the removal era was their ties with American citizens. Michigan's frontier population after 1825 may be viewed as, at minimum, a two tiered class structure. At the top of this structure were the American territorial officials -- state officials after 1837 -- Protestant preachers, merchants, tradesmen, and farmers. The leading political figures often came from the east coast and obtained their positions through prominent family members or well placed friends in the nation's capitol. This was true for Edward Biddle, Henry Schoolcraft, Lucius Lyons and many other men who appear in this analysis. All Americans with a goal of extending American jurisdiction in this region supported the common merchants, tradesmen, and farmers who would develop the local economic potential. They especially welcomed soldiers and other specialists who received federal pay checks.

Euroamericans of French or British extraction, especially those Metis of Indian descent, fell into a second and lower tier of frontier

society. At Mackinac these persons wielded considerable economic and political clout at the beginning of the American period. In several instances, they continued to operate the Indian trade until the American Fur Company established a monopoly in the region about 1820. At Detroit, families like the Campaus and Godfroys controlled large amounts of valuable real estate, considerable wealth, and political power on both sides of the international boundary. Some people from this social level married into American families early and consolidated their influence under the new regime. Families like the Johnstons, the children of Madeline La Frambois, and the Mitchells had significant influence in local affairs for many years. Many Metis people affiliated with the Catholic Church and drew upon its political resources. Those at Mackinac did so to help the Waganagisi Ottawa.

The closest links between the Ottawa and the various American social levels were those formed in the traditional Ottawa manner -- by marriage. Most often Ottawa women married frontier traders although on occasion they wedded local administrators and even federal agents. The political power of these ties became most evident at the time of the 1836 treaty. The Ottawa relied on their American kinsmen as political and financial advisors. Although these people stood to benefit from a land cession and, indeed, believed this course inevitable, they helped their in-laws win the best possible financial settlement. The continuing economic relationship between Indians and merchants added incentive to maintain the firm bonds. When Schoolcraft tried to force removal, a combination of trader and Indian resistance thwarted his attempt. Even though time and interaction in the American market no doubt altered the

intensity of the kinship idiom associated with exchange, men like Rix Robinson, Edward Biddle, and John Drew retained a large share of trade even in the face of intense competition from new merchants.

Ottawa leaders also formed intense political relationships with missionaries and other humanitarian minded immigrants to their homes. With the exception of Isaac McCoy, missionaries to the Ottawa favored training the Indians to become good citizens, remaining in Michigan and supporting themselves by agriculture and practicing the Christian religion, rather than removing them to the west. Individual missionaries tried hard to dominate Ottawa politics and demanded ritual reform. The demands of the Protestants were the most stringent, and their missions almost unilaterally failed. During the years of most intense removal pressure, when the support of Catholic clergy helped bolster Indian ability to adapt to American customs, the Ottawa at Waganagisi accepted mission activity as a way of life. When the pressures decreased, however, they took back authority, which the clergy had usurped, over their political affairs.

When viewed as individuals, the American public themselves do not appear as the "land hungry" ogres of popular American myth. Private citizens at Allegan, for example, helped Ogemainini buy his Black River lands. They bought Ottawa produce, provided material aid in times of crop failure and economic distress, and most importantly, during the 1840s and 1850s they pressured their state representatives to end the threat of removal. This study has not attempted to determine the rate of intermarriage between American immigrants and Michigan Ottawa before 1855. The increase in Anglicized personal names and surnames in docu-

ments reflects the fact missions assigned them to students and that their elders adopted them as symbols of civilization, but certainly, it also shows a continuation of the Ottawa's traditional pattern of extending political influence by marriage alliances.

Given the intensely personal political, economic, and cultural interactions characterized Ottawa and American relations, what then of the political structure factor addressed in this study? What political benefits did the decentralized structure of Ottawa society confer upon its constituents in political interactions with a nation-state? As Lewis Cass found during the negotiation of the 1821 Treaty of Chicago, as Schoolcraft learned in 1836, and as George Smith discovered at Old Wing Mission, the lack of centralized political authority precluded the dictating of unpopular decisions through indirect rule by petty chiefs. The values and structure of Ottawa society forced important issues that affected the whole Ottawa people into formal open councils for the often tried for but rarely achieved consensus decisions.

The Ottawa position on political elaboration came into sharp focus in the analysis of the political actions of a second generation of American-educated young leaders, represented by Augustin Hamlin, Jr. though there were many other less notable Ogemasi. The political actions of these men made their intentions clear. They wanted control of Indian finances with which to buy land and a political agreement with the Americans that stipulated the Ottawa's continued access to the natural resources required to make a living. At home they pressed their kinsmen for more complete revisions of ritual practices and more intense participation in market farming and fishing. By seeking to remove the

last physical vestiges of native religion, they expanded on the practice of their elders in demonstrating sincerity in their effort to live as their Metis and non-Indian neighbors, thus winning greater support from local Americans. The young leaders worked to provide their kinsmen with the benefits of American education so that they could assume full financial and political control over their own affairs. They did not believe a classical education presented in Odawa or French a fair substitute for bookkeeping in English and said so many times between 1845 and 1855.

Augustin Hamlin, Jr. sought power of attorney over Ottawa affairs. By setting himself up as a middleman between American officials and the Indians, Hamlin sought to more effectively block efforts of individual Americans either to press for removal or to control Ottawa finances for their own benefit. As Hamlin learned, unilaterally defined, purposeful change of Ottawa political structures was impossible. Although the established Ottawa leaders appreciated the articulate political presentations of the young men, they would not support their efforts at directed political reforms that abridged the rights of individuals, kin groups, or villages to control their own destinies. In Hamlin's case, the lesson cost political embarrassment and called his entire relationship to his Indian kinsmen into question.

Ottawa refusal to delegate political authority to an agent with full decision making rights does not mean that no political changes occurred in Ottawa society. The leaders of those communities that were most successful in attracting American praise for their civilization efforts had delegated to clergy or civil officials a portion of their former control over the distribution of goods to their followers. By so

doing, they gradually lost part of their ability to influence their constituents toward consensus decisions. So long as removal dangers continued, they tolerated this intervention in their political, economic, and religious affairs. When removal pressures subsided, however, village fission intensified even at Waganagisi. Local leaders then quickly moved to reassert their full authority in the context of kin group support.

What was true of individual autonomy also applied to villages. Each village continued to have a political identity and authority to control its own internal and external affairs. While the Waganagisi villages fostered intense cooperation, especially during the removal threat, those on the Grand River remained relatively isolated in their political dealings with Americans. To make binding agreements, the American government faced the nearly impossible task of promoting consensus among all the Ottawa settlements, not to mention the affiliated Chippewa. This could only be done to meet momentous needs like that created by the expiration of 1836 treaty benefits and the 1855 opportunity to legally end the danger of removal.

Other Native American societies attempted to meet the dangers of removal by "modernizing" their cultures in much the same way as did the Ottawa. Most notably, the Cherokee of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia launched a similar campaign of internal development by which they rapidly intensified their crop raising and husbandry, and educated their children after the manner of Americans. The Choctaw of Mississippi did the same. The United States forcibly moved both of these large tribal societies west of the Mississippi River. One must ask why the Ottawa



succeeded when these societies failed.<sup>4</sup>

Decentralized socio-political organization may have allowed the Ottawa to succeed in their program where more tightly organized native societies failed. Unlike the Cherokee and Choctaw, the scattered Ottawa villages appeared to offer no threat to American officials. Even, along the line of most dense American settlement, the large number of Owasshinong villages gave an appearance of political weakness. Each village formed its own links with local officials and made the best possible economic adaptations in their region, and these most often complimented, not competed with, American endeavors.

The Ottawa did not form a governing hierarchy, such as those developed by the Cherokee and the Choctaw, which would contradict American claims of political jurisdiction. Few Americans could identify the centers of authority within the Ottawa society. As we noted, even the framers of the Michigan constitution could not form adequate criteria for determining when the Ottawa ceased to be a part of their native political units. The Ottawa could interpret American citizenship as an enhancement of their political rights within the American system rather than as a threat to their cultural identity. In the end, they won the security in their homelands that other Indians who proved a larger threat to the expanding American system could not.

The factors that were so important to the Ottawa cannot necessarily form a general model to explain all successful cases of articulation of decentralized societies into the market economy. As we have seen in the analysis, several region specific variables and the timely effects of global political and economic trends intervened on the Ottawa's behalf.

The Ottawa's location on the geographical margin of productive agricultural lands limited the desirability of their northern homelands for American settlement. This gave the central and northern villages in particular time to make cultural adaptation without duress like that experienced at Owashshinong.

The Ottawa's location on the international boundary between the U.S. and Canada gave Ottawa leaders political leverage when they needed it. When faced with the most intense American pressure for removal, the Ottawa threatened to join their kinsmen on Manitoulin and Walpole Islands. The Americans who feared the affects of large, potentially hostile Indian settlements along their unprotected frontier boundaries took the Indian threat seriously throughout the removal years. Even Henry Schoolcraft moderated his pro-removal stance to limit Ottawa emigration.

We have already discussed the impact of a national recession upon Ottawa politics and economy. Other historical events also contributed to their ability to remain in their own home territories. For example, the preference of American farmers for lands in Missouri and the resulting immigrations to that region made removal of large Indian populations to lands west of that state's boundaries politically impractical. Following the years of the Mexican-American War, American migrations to lands west of the Mississippi increased so drastically that the federal policy of western removal for Indians languished in disuse and could not be implemented.

In conclusion, we may address the most important contributions that analysis from the actor-oriented perspective of practice analysis made

to understanding the process of Ottawa development. This study has clearly demonstrated that without the detailed information generated in person-centered practice analysis, the historical actions outlined would have remained open only for broad level interpretation that would distort the motives and intentions of the persons who participated in them. Most importantly, this study included the voices and perspectives of the indigenous peoples themselves rather than relying entirely on the perspective of the "dominant" society.

To limit attention to socio-political structures imposes subtle analytical constraints. For example, from this perspective, an examination of the 1855 Treaty of Detroit, which the Indians believed preserved their traditional political autonomy, could be read as a political defeat for the Ottawa. After all, it secured them no reservations; it granted only land held in severalty; and it appeared to restrict their access to offices of the federal government. Given the treaty language and the degree of change in Ottawa culture during the early nineteenth century, it would appear that the Ottawa became victims of American negotiations. When read from a perspective of Indian actors working toward culturally defined goals, however, the picture changes greatly to restore the dignity of intelligence to native leaders.

The emphasis of practice theory on the events of daily life as the indicators of cultural meanings offered the key to understanding the long-range goals that made the diverse actions of Ottawa leaders intelligible. Unlike the world system approach of Wolf, for example, practice analysis elevates culture to a variable in the formation of social structures and political interaction that is on an equal footing with

other aspects of mode of production. This articulation of culture and politico-economic structures makes a significant contribution to world system theory and understanding asymmetrical relations.

This work also followed Ortner's lead in viewing daily activities in the mode of production as a medium of cultural continuity. The analysis in Chapter Seven demonstrated the degree to which the Ottawa not only continued using the natural resources of their traditional subsistence cycle, but in many instances continued their seasonal cycle for exploiting a large range of wild plants, fish, and animals as a cultural preference. So long as they did so, their traditional values associated with the pre-American mode of production remained viable and gave them a basis for continued cultural identity within the developing Michigan society. Again, this approach moved beyond many world system studies by demonstrating the value attributed by "dominated" peoples to continuing practices that, from the perspective of Euro-centered analysis appear as an externally enforced asymmetry.

The primary emphasis of this work, then, has been to demonstrate the factors that allow human actors engaged in unequal political and economic relations to shape their destinies and achieve culturally satisfying roles in the context of the world economy. Its case study analysis shows ways in which the Michigan Ottawa used all political and economic means at their disposal to defeat United States removal policies, effectively altering the structure of Ottawa and American political and economic relations on the Michigan frontier.

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4. Sherry Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1984).
5. Smith, "Local History in Global Context," 194.

### CHAPTER 1: TRADERS OF THE WESTERN GREAT LAKES

1. H. P. Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel du Champlain, 7 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1929-1936), 3:43-44, 96-97.
2. George M. Wrong, ed., Sagard's Long Journey to the Hurons (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1939), 66.
3. Charles E. Cleland, Prehistoric Animal Ecology and Ethnozoology of the Upper Great Lakes Region, Anthropological Papers, no. 29, Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 42-43, 73-74; Leo Waisberg, "The Ottawa: Traders of the Upper Great Lakes," Master's thesis, McMaster University, 1977, 174-180.
4. Ruben G. Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, 73 vols. (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company, 1896-1901) [Hereafter JR], 51:261.
5. Biggar, The Works of Samuel du Champlain, 3:97-99.
6. Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic, 2 vols. (Montreal: McGill--Queen's University Press, 1976), 34-37.

7. W. Vernon Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1940), 236; Cleland, Prehistoric Animal Ecology, 73-74.
8. James E. Fitting, The Archaeology of Michigan: A Guide to the Prehistory of the Great Lakes Region (Bloomfield Hills: Cranbrook Institute of Science, 1975), 195.
9. Friederich Baraga, A Dictionary of the Otchipwe Language (Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, Inc., 1973); Gary A. Wright, "Some Aspects of Early and Mid-seventeenth Century Exchange Networks in the Western Great Lakes," in Michigan Archaeologist, (Ann Arbor, 1967), 13(4):181-97.
10. Bruce G. Trigger, The Huron: Farmers of the North (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 38-39; Wright, "Early and Mid-seventeenth Century Exchange Networks," 181-97.
11. Johanna E. Feest and Christian Feest, "Ottawa," in Handbook of North American Indians, Bruce G. Trigger, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1978), 772; Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 246- 248.
12. James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomie Indian Culture, 1665-1965 (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 15.
13. Milo M. Quaife, ed., The Western Country in the 17th Century: The Memoirs of Lamothe Cadillac and Pierre Liette (Chicago: Lakeside Press, R. R. Donnelley and Sons, 1947), 10.
14. Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1972:246.
15. This trend began with Kinietz, 246-248. It was further developed by Charles Callender in, Social Organization of the Central Algonkian Indians, Milwaukee Public Museum Publications in Anthropology (Milwaukee, 1962), 7:64-66, 105-106. The concept of the autonomous band/clan was articulated for the Chippewa by Harold Hickerson, "The Genesis of Bilaterality Among Two Divisions of Chippewa" in American Anthropologist (Washington, D.C., 1966), 68(1):2-9. It has also been accepted by Fitting, Archaeology of Michigan, 195, and Clifton, Prairie People, 10.

A third conceptual construct, the non-unilineal or cognatic descent group, is also used in anthropological literature. Cognatic groups are formed of relatives joined by genealogical ties but without emphasis on either matriline or patriline, Ernest L. Schuskey, Manual for Kinship Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), 74. In matters of property inheritance, status, or other rights, a person chooses an affiliation based on descent from only one ancestral line, Paul Bohannan, Social Anthropology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

Inc., 1963), 130-131. This least restrictive form of organization has never been suggested for North America and is not useful for this study.

16. The Handbook of North American Indians describes all known groups of the Great Lakes-riverine region. The following groups are ascribed unilineal descent groups: Shawnee pp. 623-624, 226-228; Fox pp. 639-640; Sauk pp. 649-451; Kickapoo pp. 660-661; Illinois p. 676; Miami p. 684; Winnebago pp. 694-695; Menominee pp. 712-714; Potawatomi pp. 729-730; Southwest Chippewa p.753.

The Kickapoo are represented as having unilineal clans (p. 660), but no other information is given concerning their political organization. Documentation for the Miami is also thin and inconclusive, but clans are presented as patrilineal, corporate units. Data is also inconclusive for the Menominee but corporate, patrilineal clans are assumed. Only Rogers declines to describe the Southeastern Chippewa in terms of lineages and clan affiliation, saying that the information is inadequate and the society was undergoing rapid change.

17. This social organization is described for the Chippewa in Hickerson, "Genesis of Bilaterality," 7-14, and in Harold Hickerson, The Chippewa and Their Neighbors: A Study in Ethnohistory (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 42-50.

18. These generalizations are developed in Callender, Social Organization, 105-107; Elman R. Service, Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective (New York: Random House, 1971), 37-40, 51-65, 72-80, 97-117; and in Marshall Sahlins, Tribesmen (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968), 11-123, 14-24, 49-56.

19. For discussions of descent groups see Service, 19-20; Primitive Social Organization, and Meyer Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order: The Legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, Co., 1969), 277, 287.

20. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde, eds., African Systems of Kinship and Marriage (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 314; Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order, 294; and Jean La Fontaine, "Descent in New Guinea: An Africanist View", in The Character of Kinship, Jack Goody, ed., (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 32-36. This functionalist view of corporate groups was directly applied to the Great Lakes region by Callender, in Social Organization, 105-106.

21. Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order, 290.

22. Meyer Fortes, "Descent, Filiation and Affinity: A Rejoinder to Dr. Leach," in Man (New York, 1959), 208.

23. Callender, Social Organization, 105-106; Service, 73-76; Hickerson, "Genesis of Bilaterality," and Chippewa and Their Neighbors, 43; Edward S. Rogers, The Round Lake Ojibwa, Occasional Paper 5, Art and Archaeology division, Royal Ontario Museum, Ottawa, 1962, p.38; Wolf, 171.

24. La Fontaine, 35-50; Fredrik Barth, "Descent and Marriage Reconsidered," in The Character of Kinship, Jack Goody, ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 3-19; David Schneider, A Critique of the Study of Kinship (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 3-6, 196-201.
25. Meyer Fortes, "The Structure of Unilineal Descent Groups," in American Anthropologist (Washington, D.C., 1953); Fortes, "Descent Filiation and Affinity," 193-197, 206-212; Fortes, Kinship and Social Order, 254-255, 277.
26. Fortes as in La Fontaine, 32-36; Fortes, "Descent Filiation and Affinity," 211; Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order, 286-287.
27. Fortes, "Descent, Filiation and Affinity," 206-207; Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order, 253-256.
28. Fortes, "Descent, Filiation and Affinity," 208; Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order, 255-256.
29. Fortes, "Descent, Filiation and Affinity," 208; Kinship and the Social Order, 290.
30. Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order, 267-268. This implication regarding the appropriateness of applying the term "descent group" to non-unilineal, bilateral, or ambilateral groups is also discussed in Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order, 276-310. See especially pages 303-310. Fortes's underlying premise can be briefly summarized. He believed that in societies without unilineal descent groups, kin relations from the parent/child bond are critical in all domains, filial and juro-political. In the case of unilineal descent groups, a portion of the rights based in the minimal kin group are transferred to the corporate group, which is itself vested with personhood. However, in the absence of this elaboration in the juro-political domain, the minimal kin group retains all social functions.
31. Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order, 267-269, 309.
32. Waisberg, "The Ottawa," 166-168; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 772-774.
33. Waisberg, "The Ottawa," 131.
34. Quaife, The Western Country, 39; Waisberg, "The Ottawa," 131.
35. Andrew J. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan (Ypsilanti: Ypsilanti Job Printing House, 1887), 80, believed the Ottawa counted their genealogy matrilineally. This source, however, more likely reflects nineteenth century folklore than historical fact. See footnote 49 for a discussion of patrilateral totemic inheritance.



36. Callender, Social Organization; Charles Callender, "Great Lakes-Riverine Sociopolitical Organization," in Handbook of North American Indians, Bruce G. Trigger, ed. (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian, 1978), 610, 619-620; James Smith, "Kindred, Clan, and Conflict," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1974; Waisberg, 137; Callender, "Great Lakes-Riverine Sociopolitical Organization," 619, cites only Morgan's 1871 collection of Ottawa kin terms as basis for his findings on Ottawa cross-cousin marriage. This is inadequate evidence for reconstructions of Ottawa seventeenth century social organization.
37. Callender, Social Organization," 105-106 and "Great Lakes-Riverine Sociopolitical Organization," 610, 619-620.
38. Quaife, The Western Country, 12.
39. Biggar, The Works of Samuel du Champlain, (3):97-98; Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 273; Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections [Hereafter MPHIC], 40 vols. (Lansing, 1877-1929), 33:112-451, lists more than ten Ottawa Ogemuk from at least three of the four Ottawa named groups with whom Cadillac dealt during his stay at Detroit.
40. Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 273.
41. Ibid., 244-245.
42. Ibid., 270-273.
43. Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 64-65, 214.
44. Emma Blair, The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and the Region of the Great Lakes, 2 vols. (Cleveland: A. H. Clark, Co.), 1:80-81; MPHIC, 33:321; Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 271-274.
45. There is only one seventeenth century record of such a council, JR, 50:297. However, the pattern was well established among the Huron, Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 54-59. It was also common for the Ottawa during the eighteenth century. See for example the discussion on pages 43-47.
46. Blair, Indian Tribes, 1:186-190.
47. Callender, Social Organization, 64.
48. Three additional sources indicate Ottawa's use of totems. Isaac McCoy mentioned totems in connection with drawings carved on grave posts on the Grand River. He noted that all graves depicted the deceased person and an animal, "the name of which was a prevailing name in the family." He believed the animal signified was a part of the individual's name and that the members of a family all used the same animal much like a European surname, Isaac McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions (New York: Johnston Reprint Corporation, 1970), 195.

The second document is Nisawakwat et al. to All Whom it May Concern, May 3, 1835, National Archives Microcopy M234, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs--Letters Received, Record Group 75 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Microfilms) [Hereafter NAM M234], reel 424, frame 88-89. This document is a petition that is signed with totemic symbols. The signatures are grouped by village affiliation, yet it is difficult to match most symbols to known persons who lived in Ottawa and Chippewa communities. It is also difficult to determine with certainty the animals that the marks represent. All that can be stated about totem use among the Ottawa from this document is that several different symbols were used to identify persons living in the same village. In one instance there is resemblance between the totem signed by an Ottawa and a Chippewa on this document, and that is the symbol of the snake signed by the Ottawa Nisawakwat (Fork of a Tree) and the Chippewa Mikinak. This could reflect an articulation between Ottawa and Chippewa totemic identification systems. However, because the Grand Traverse Chippewa regularly married into Ottawa kin groups, there is no reason to believe that Mikinak may not have been an Ottawa residing in a Chippewa village.

A third document showing totems is found in Annales De L'Association De La Propagation De La Foi Lyon (Lyon) [Hereafter Annales], 4(1831):544, also shows totem signatures. However, these are renditions transcribed to a printed page. In the instances when the names match those on the document described above, the symbols have little resemblance to those on the previous document.

Other accounts which detail the workings of totemic inheritance among the Ottawa do so for people living among the Chippewa and are full of contradictions. John Tanner, provides the most detailed descriptions of totems and how they regulated interpersonal relationships in A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner During Thirty Years' Residence Among the Indians in the Interior of North America, Edwin James, ed. (Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, 1956), 161-164). Tanner gives the totem of the Ottawa man Mukkuddabenasa (Mackatabenese or Black Hawk) as being the Pepegwizains, Sparrow Hawk. Ogemahweninne (Ogemainini or Leader Man) the son of Wahkezhee (Wakazoo) who is the brother of Mackatabenese, is listed in the same text as a Kakaik or Henhawk. Assuming that the term brother was used by Tanner to indicate siblings by the same genitor, they would have held the same totem of the Sparrow Hawk which would have, in turn been passed through the same patriline.

In another instance recorded by Tanner, Wa-me-gon-a-biew who was the son of the Ottawa woman, Netnokwa, by a Chippewa man is assigned two totems, the rattlesnake and the beaver. (Tanner, 23,165, 314) There is no known basis for the identification of the rattlesnake. The identification of the beaver, however, is contrary to patrilateral totem inheritance, since it was Netnokwa's totemic symbol.

Tanner's biographer gives a generic statement concerning the workings of the "Algonquin" totemic system, saying that it: "differs not from our

institution of surnames, except that the obligations of friendship and hospitality, and the restraint upon intermarriage, which it imposes are scrupulously regarded. They profess to consider it highly criminal for a man to marry a woman whose totem is the same as his own; and they relate instances where young men, for a violation of this rule, have been put to death by their nearest relatives. They say, also that those having the same totem are bound, under whatever circumstances, as they meet, even though they should be of different and hostile bands, to treat each other not only as friends, but as brethren, sisters, and relatives of the same family," Tanner, Captivity and Adventures, 313. However, this statement makes no distinction between the Ottawa and Chippewa and may exaggerate the importance of the eponym in marriage by confusing kin based proscriptions with those of the more marginal "totemic clan."

49. Annales, 4(1831):545.

50. William A. Haviland, Anthropology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978), 650; Marvin Harris, Culture, People, Nature: An Introduction to General Anthropology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1975), 660.

51. The source most often cited concerning Chippewa totemic mythology is William W. Warren, History of the Ojibway People, (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1984), 41-53.

52. As noted on page 26, the totemic affiliation of two of the four Ottawa named groups of the seventeenth century are unknown. One of these may have been a Moose. It is interesting to note, however, that both sources which speak of the Moose totem, Tanner, 314, and Blackbird, 80, have strong ties to the Chippewa of western Wisconsin, Minnesota, and even Manitoba. Tanner spent much of his early life in territory between Lake Winnipeg and Red River. Blackbird's father Mackatabenese and Uncle Wakazoo who may have taught him the Moose legend also spent long years in the west, Tanner, Captivity and Adventures, 156-171. Warrar, History of the Ojibway, 50-52, accounts the Chippewa tale of decimation of the Moose clan by the Martins. Both of these men may have learned about the Moose totem from the Chippewa.

53. Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 1976; George T. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940).

54. James A. Clifton, "The Remergent Wyandot: A Study in Ethnogenesis on the Detroit River Borderland, 1747," Essex County Historical Society and the Western District Council, Commercial Printing, Co., Windsor, 1983, pp. 4-7, identifies Ontario remnants as Huron and Petuns.

55. Blair, Indian Tribes, (1):157.

56. Accounts of Ottawa migrations are found in Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 772-773; Waisberg, "The Ottawa," 59-69; Blair, Indian Tribes,

(1):148-70.

57. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 772.

58. Waisberg, "The Ottawa," 66; JR, 42:219-225; MHPC, 33:321.

59. Blair, Indian Tribes, (1):164-165.

60. Ibid., (1):165-166.

61. Ibid., (1):169-170.

62. Ibid., (1):148-70; Waisberg, 66-67.

63. Ibid., (1):52-53.

64. Ibid., (1):186-190.

65. Menard reported in 1661, that "corn and bread are entirely unknown in this country," JR, 48:117-121. Perhaps this reference to "corn" refers to European wheat, for Allouez in JR, 50:273, reported in 1665 that the Ottawa raised corn and "have a settled life."

66. The year-around habitation of the Chequamegon village is illustrated by the case of the Kiskakons. Following their affiliation with the Catholics, they were invited by Allouez to settle near his chapel for the winter to be instructed in the religion. They accepted this invitation, indicating that they had no difficulty missing the kind of winter hunts which characterize Chippewa subsistence, JR, 54:181.

67. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 772; John G. Shea, Catholic Missions Among the Indian Tribes of the United States (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1855), 361.

68. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 772-773.

69. The following brigades of men and cargo are recorded landing at Quebec between 1656 and 1684: in 1656, 50 or 60 canoes with 250 Ottawas and Saulteur Chippewas; In 1658, only 9 canoes landed due to threat of Iroquois raids; In 1659, 60 canoes containing 300 Ottawa men; 1660, 300 men of unspecified tribal identity; 1663, 35 canoes with 150 Ottawa; 1664, 220 Ottawa and 80 Kiristinon; 1665, 100 canoes with 400 Ottawa and "various nations" and 60 Nipissing; 1667, and unspecified number of men and canoes of unknown tribe accompanied Allouez; 1670, 90 canoes with 400 Ottawas and some Nipissing (Waisberg says alternate figures place the number at 900 Ottawa); and in 1684, 50 canoes of Ottawa and 25-30 canoes of French arrived in port, JR, 41:77; Blair, Indian Tribes, (1):157 and JR, 42:225-33; JR, 44:111; JR, 45:163; JR, 46; JR, 47:302; JR, 48:237; JR, 49:163 and JR, 50:177; Blair, (1):210-1; Baron de Lahontan, New Voyages to North America, Ruben G. Thwaites, ed., 2 vols. (New York: Burt Franklin, 1905), 92-95, as in Waisberg, "The Ottawa," 1978:85.

70. Blair, Indian Tribes, (1):188.
71. Shea, Catholic Missions, 103-106; Harold Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956), 43.
72. Clifton, Prairie People, 40-41, 45-46, 51-53.
73. JR, 51:21.
74. Waisberg, "The Ottawa," 88; Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 52. See also JR, 63:281. The source of error in these statements is the French tendency to identify all Algonquin fur carriers as Ottawa. However, considering the Ottawa practice of making broad networks of affinal kin, peoples of other tribes who used the Ottawa River route may well have been considered family members by the Ottawa.
75. JR, 55:159.
76. MPHC, 33:138.
77. Quaife, The Western Country, 12; Thwaites, Baron de Lahontan, 147-148.
78. Blair, Indian Tribes, (1):276-277, 281-282.
79. JR, 1:34; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 774; Waisberg, "The Ottawa," 133.
80. Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 52.
81. Blair, Indian Tribes, (1):282-283.
82. Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine- Atherton, 1972), 185-230.
83. JR, 432:219-223; 45:161-163; 46:119-121; 48:257-277.
84. The identification of Le Brochet as Sable was made in Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 772.
85. JR, 48:117, 127.
86. Ibid., 48:127-137.
87. Ibid., 50:249-255.
88. Ibid., 50:257, 273.
89. Ibid., 50:259-261, 271, 275.
90. Ibid., 50:299; JR, 51:21.

91. Ibid., 50:279.
92. Ibid., 52:205-207.
93. Ibid., 54:171-175.
94. Bruce A. Rubenstein and Lawrence E. Ziewacz, Michigan: A History of the Great Lakes State (St. Louis, Missouri: Forum Press, 1981), 21.
95. MPHC, 33: 42-43, 96-100, 168-169.
96. Ibid., 33:145.
97. Rubenstein and Ziewacz, Michigan, 3-24; MPHC, 33:182-184, 198-209.
98. MPHC, 33:122.
99. Ibid., 33:133, 163, 268, 271.
100. Ibid., 33:160.
101. Ibid., 33:159.
102. MPHC, 33:128, 331, 360, 363. The identification of Le Blanc as Sable is made from reference MPHC, 33:360. There both Le Blanc and Le Pesant are referred to as "of the same flesh" as Kinouge who is identified as Sable. This is supported by the fact that a consolidated group of Kiskakon and Sinago Ogema, with no apparent aid from the Sables, were responsible for surrender of Le Pesant to Cadillac in 1706. Le Pesant is also identified as Sable in, New York State Historical Society Collections, 35 vols., (New York: New York State Historical Society), 9:723.
103. MPHC, 33:321.
104. Ibid., 33:268, 271, 335, 362.
105. Ibid., 33:335, 347, 363.
106. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 773.
107. MPHC, 33:268, 347, 350, 447, 557.
108. Ibid., 33:262-263, 265, 306-307.
109. Ibid., 33:289.
110. Ibid., 33:261, 275-276.
111. Ibid., 33:282, 307, 332.

112. Ibid., 33:324-325.
113. Ibid., 33:333-336.
114. Ibid., 33:336, 362.
115. Ibid., 33:335.
116. Ibid., 33:342, 354, 356, 364-365.
117. Ibid., 33:332, 337, 346-348, 351, 355.
118. Ibid., 33:355.
119. Ibid., 33:324-325, 330, 337, 404, 556.
120. Callender, "Great Lakes-Riverine Sociopolitical Organization," 643-44; Ives Goddard, "Mascouten" in Handbook of North American Indians, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1979), 669-70; Rubenstein and Ziewacz, Michigan, 32-33.
121. William J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1853-1760 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983), 132-145.
122. Claud T. Hamilton, "Western Michigan History," in Michigan History Magazine (Lansing: Michigan Historical Commission), 13(1929), 208-226; Claud T. Hamilton, "Western Michigan History, Colonial Period" (Des Moines: Merchants Life Insurance, Co., 1940).
123. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 149.
124. Clifton, Prairie People, 289; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 773-774.
125. MPHC, 9:376-377; Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 156-162; Robert Allen, "The British Indian Department and the Frontier in North America, 1755-1830," in Canadian Historic Sites, Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History, Research Division, National Historic Parks and Sites, Branch, Parks Canada, Ottawa, 14(1975):9-11; Hamilton, "Western Michigan History," 212.
126. MPHC, 9:376-77.
127. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 155-156.
128. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 1975:9.
129. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 159.
130. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 156-162; Allen, "The British Indian Department," 9-11.
131. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 164; Allen, "The British Indian

Department," 11.

132. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 168-171; Clifton, Prairie People, 98-100.

133. Hamilton, "Western Michigan History," 212.

134. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 157-185.

135. Ibid., 186.

136. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 186; Ruben G. Thwaites, ed., Alexander Henry's Travels and Adventures in the Years, 1760-1776 (Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1921), 54-55.

137. Thwaites, Alexander Henry's Travels, 143; Fitting, 195- 197.

138. Callender, Social Organization, 65-66; Truman Michelson, "Note on the Gentes of the Ottawa," in American Anthropologist (Washington, D.C., 1911), 13:338; Warren, History of the Ojibway, 44- 45; Tanner, Captivity and Adventures.

139. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 777-778.

140. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 14-17; Rubenstein and Ziewacz, Michigan, 39-41; Clifton, Prairie People, 131-132.

141. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 16; John Leslie and Ron Maguire, eds., The Historical Development of the Indian Act (Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Indian and Northern Affairs, Canada, 1978), 5-6; Clifton, Prairie People, 135.

142. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 18; Rubenstein and Ziewacz, Michigan, 45.

143. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 20-21; Rubenstein and Ziewacz, Michigan, 41-48.

144. MPHC, 9:376-377.

145. MPHC, 9:395-397; 20:38.

146. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 26-29.

147. James A. Clifton, A Place of Refuge For All Times: The Migration of the Potawatomi into Upper Canada, 1835-1845 (Ottawa: Mercury Series, National Museum of Man, 1971) 141; Allen, 32-33.

148. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 34.

149. Allen, 50-52; Clifton, Prairie People, 140-147; Henry R.



Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs of a Residence of Thirty Years with the Indian Tribes on the American Frontiers: With Brief Notices of Passing, Events, Facts, and Opinions, A.D. 1812 to A.D. 1842 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, 1851), 478.

150. Charles J. Kappler, comp., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 5 vols. (New York: AMS Press, 1972), 39-45.

151. MPHC, 11:493-495.

152. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 55; Rubenstein and Ziewacz, Michigan, 50-51.

153. John Leslie, The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, 1794-1796 (Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Center, Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1979), 6.

154. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 67-70.

155. Allen, "The British Indian Department," 68-73; Clifton, Prairie People, 191-202.

156. Allen, 76-77; Clifton, Prairie People, 140-147, 210-211; MPHC, 10:158-162; Henry R. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, 1851), 478.

## CHAPTER 2: PRELUDE TO CIVILIZATION

1. Alec R. Gilpin, The Territory of Michigan, 1805-1837 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970), 63.

2. Francis P. Prucha, Lewis Cass and American Indian Policy, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967); Lewis Cass to John Calhoun, 24 October 1821, National Archives Microcopy M1, Records of the Michigan Superintendency, 1814-1851, Record Group 75 (Washington D.C.: National Archives Microfilms) [hereafter NAM M1], 4:323-332.

3. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 114-119.

4. Willis Frederick Dunbar, Michigan: A History of the Wolverine State (Grand Rapids: Erdmans Publishing Company, 1965), 235-236; Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 69-78.

5. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 69-78, 116-128; L. Cass to J. Calhoun, 24 October 1821, NAM M1 4:323-332; Kappler Laws and Treaties, vol. 2.

6. Cass outlined his perception of past U.S. expansion and forecasted future results in L. Cass to J. Calhoun, 24 October 1821, NAM M1, 4:323-332; Gilpin, Territory of Michigan 16-128.

7. Kappler, 2:186-189, 200, 294; Francis P. Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians, 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 1:140-141.

The General Convention of the Baptist Denomination in the United States made special effort to thank Cass for "his deserving and honorable endeavors to promote the reform of the Aborigines of our country," Brown, Meehan, and Staughton to L. Cass, 15 February 1824, NAM M1, 14:83.

8. For accounts of this evolution see Annie H. Able, "The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1906, (Washington D.C., 1906); Prucha, Great Father, 1:29-231.

9. Prucha, Great Father, 1:264-265, 302-303.

10. See for example Kawgayosh et al. to President of the United States, 14 July 1836, NAM M234, 402:236 and H. Hartley Crawford to John Bell, 27 July 1841, NAM M234, 425:231.

11. George A. Schultz, An Indian Canaan: Isaac McCoy and the Vision of an Indian State (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), 61-62, 79.

12. Lewis Cass, Considerations on the Present State of the Indians and their Removal to the West of the Mississippi (New York: Arno Press), 4.

13. Dunbar, Michigan, 238, 251-252.

14. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 19, 80; Dunbar, Michigan, 249 gives the total population as 8,765.

15. Dunbar, Michigan, 242-243, 247.

16. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 91.

17. Dunbar, Michigan, 242 gives the total population as 31,640.

18. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 153.

19. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 153; Dunbar, Michigan, 250 gives the total as 87,278.

20. Dunbar, Michigan, 250.

21. Dunbar, Michigan, 45-247; Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 136-137.

22. Dunbar, Michigan, 250-253.

23. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 483; Ermine Wheeler-Voegelin,

Anthropological Report on the Indian Occupancy of Royce Area 117 in Michigan and Indiana ceded by the 'Ottawa, Chippewa, and Pottawatomie Nations' under the treaty held at Chicago on August 29, 1821, microfiche, 222 pp., Indian Claims Commission Report, (New York: Clearwater Publishing Co., 1973), 148; James A. Clifton, Prairie People, 289.

Although there are no recorded instances of the Ottawa of the Maumee and Michigan maintaining close political relations, there is some evidence that the Little Traverse Bay people continued to recognize kin ties to peoples in Illinois. See Blackbird, 26-27; Journal, 6 July 1854, George N. Smith Diaries, 1842-1845, Ms. AA. Aa 1509, 4507, 4572, Ann Arbor, Michigan Historical Collections [Hereafter GNS].

24. Collections of the Wisconsin State Historical Society, 31 vols. (Madison, 1855-1931) [Hereafter WHSC], 20, 50.

25. For a more thorough discussion of this eighteenth century pattern see Wheeler-Voegelin, Anthropological Report, Area 117, 137-144. Although Wheeler-Voegelin's discussion errs in both the size of the Ottawa population and in the earliest date for permanent Ottawa settlement in the Grand River, the pattern of the southern migration of Little Traverse Bay Indians continued well into the 1840s and was a major factor in the 1839 founding of the Black River community near present day Holland, MI.

26. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 15, relates the story of the Ottawa first allowing the Chippewa to live at Grand Traverse. Aishquagonabe was known as the "Old Chief" of the settlement and the most influential Ogema in the region in 1836, George Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 26 May 1840, NAM M1, 48:36, and Kappler, 455. It is not known when Aishquagonabe moved to Grand Traverse or whether there were Chippewa villages there earlier. It is known that Aishquagonabe's father maintained his primary village on Round Island, a site which was not abandoned until mainland Fort Michilimackinac was moved to Mackinac Island in the 1780s. It is, then, possible that he, and not his son, was the original Chippewa leader to live at Grand Traverse. According to G. Johnston to Schoolcraft, 16 October 1840, NAM M1, 49:387, Aishquagonabe's nephew, Gosa, headed a second 1830s village at Grand Traverse. In 1836 the Americans recognized Gosa as "a second class chief," Kappler, 455.

27. P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 24 June 1845, American Indian Correspondence: The Presbyterian Historical Society Collection of Missionaries' Letters, 1833-1893, microfilm, 35 reels, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc) [Hereafter PHSC], Box 7, vol. 1, frame 117.

21. These identifications are made from the following sources:

Fort Village: John Farmer, "An Improved Map of the Surveyed Part of the Territory of Michigan by John Farmer" (New York: N. Balach and S. Stiles, Engravers, 1831); Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778; Ottawa Payroll 1838, Henry R. Schoolcraft Papers, 1806-1875, 69 reels (Washington D.C.:

Library of Congress) [Hereafter HRSP] 8:2849; Ottawa and Chippewa Payrolls 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

Muckatosha or Blackskin's Village: The first American references place this band south of Noaquageshik's village at Bowting. These include MPHC, 35:153; Frederic Baraga to George Porter, 5 November 1833, NAM M1, 33:481. Farmer 1831 places the village near present-day Grandville, and Schoolcraft reported that the band was moving back to their former location about five miles south of the rapids in 1836, Schoolcraft to Anon., 22 July 1836, HRSP, 26:14407.

Bowting or the Rapids: Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778; F. Baraga to G. Porter, n.d., 1833, NAM M1, 33:493; Farmer "Improved Map."

Prairie Village: Farmer, "An Improved Map"; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778; Ottawa Payroll 1838, HRSP, 8:2849; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

Nongee's Village or Forks of the Thornapple River: Farmer, An Improved Map; Feest and Feest, 778; Ottawa Payroll 1838, HRSP, 8:2849; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828. The last known reference to the Ogema Nongee is in, Agreement made with H. Connor for the Superintendent of Indian Affairs G. Porter, 27 September 1831, HRSP, 20:11331. After that time the village was represented by Nawbunageezhig who signed both the 1836 and 1855 treaties, Kappler, 2:450, 730. By 1839 the village was known by the second name.

Thornapple River or Middle Village: W. G. Trygg, "Composite Map of U.S. Surveyor's Original Plats and Field Notes, Michigan Series," (Ely, MN, 1964), map 4; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778; Ottawa Payroll 1838, HRSP, 8:2849; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828. This village corresponds to site number 39 in Feest and Feest. There is confusion in Feest and Feest because they misidentify the location of site number 22 or Meshinmekons (Apple Place) on the Thornapple River, MPHC 4:23.

Keewaycooshcum's Village or Flat River: Farmer, "Improved Map"; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778; Ottawa Payroll 1838, HRSP, 8:2849; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828. Although this village was the residence of Keewaycooshcum, he had lost his authority to represent the band for his signing of the Chicago Treaty of 1821, McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 191-193; Henry Connor to L. Cass, NAM M234, 422:18; He moved to Bowting in 1829 to be nearer Baptist mission, Kewyquoscome to L. Cass, NAM M1, 27:519. His former village was then commonly known as Flat River Village or Cobmoosa's Village for the new leader there.

Maple River: Farmer, "Improved Map"; Trygg, "Composite Map," map 4; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778; Ottawa Payroll 1838, HRSP, 8:2849; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

Meshinnehahning (Apple Place): MPHC, 4:23. Trygg, "Composite Map," 5, refers to this village as Chigamarshkin, a variant spelling of the

original. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778, mistakenly place this village in the Thornapple River drainage as site number 22.

29. References identifying these villages as Ottawa include:

Moskego: Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778: Ottawa Payroll 1838, HRSP, 8:2849; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

White River or Clay Banks: GNS, Journal 1846, 20 February 1846; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828, 1839; Ottawa Payroll 1838, HRSP 8:2849.

Pierre Marquette: Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828, 1839.

30. Wheeler-Voegelin, Anthropological Report, Area 117, 159-60.

31. Wheeler-Voegelin, Anthropological Report, Area 117, 83; Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 78.

32. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP 66:41828, 1839.

33. Feest and Feest, 778; Shea, 386; Blackbird, "History of the Ottawa and Chippewa"; HRSP, 47:30537; H. Schoolcraft to Carey A. Harris, 16 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:50.

34. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 788; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll, 1839, HRSP, 66:41828; Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, (New York: AMS Press, 1976) [Hereafter ARCOIA], 1838:453-54.

35. This village was under the leadership of Chingassamo or Big Sail during the opening of the American period, Richard White, "Ethnohistorical Report on the Grand Traverse Ottawas," Unpublished Manuscript for the Native American Rights Fund, n.d., 1-2.

36. The treaty does not distinguish between the "Chiefs and Warriors of the Chippewa Nation of Indians." Ottawa Ogemuk were identified by a comparison to Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828, 1839, and from Farmer, "Improved Map." The Ottawa included Wawubegeqauk and Kookoosh (Pig) who were associated with the Maple River Village, Moksauba (Submerged Beaver) and Mawmawkens from Meshimnekahning Village (Apple Place), Nowkeshuc (Noaquageshik or Noonday) from Bowting (Rapids of the Grand), Meckseonne (Megisinini or Shell [Megis] Man) from Muckatosha's Village (Blackskin's village), and Kawgeshequm (Keewaycooshcum) of Flat River. Three other Ottawa from the Red Cedar River, Okemans (Okemos or Little Chief), Shingwalk (Pine), and Maneleugobwawaa [Manitocorbway]. However Ermine Wheeler-Voegelin, "An Anthropological Report on Indian Use and Occupancy of Northern Michigan," in Chippewa Indians V, David Agee Horr, ed., (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1974), 29-30, believes these Ottawa were of mixed Chippewa parentage and identified themselves with the Saginaw

Chippewa rather than with the Grand River people as evidenced by their failure to sign or benefit from the 1836 treaty.

37. Ida A. Johnson, The Michigan Fur Trade (Grand Rapids: The Black Letter Press, 1971), 127-136; MPHC, 30:186.
38. Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade, 117-126; MPHC, 30:183.
39. Edwin C. Wood. Historic Mackinac: The Historical Picturesque and Legendary Features of the Mackinac Country, 2 vols., (New York: Macmillan Company, 1918), 2:166; Mead C. Williams, Early Mackinac (St. Louis: Buschart Brothers, 1901), 116.
40. Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade, 129-131.
41. *Ibid.*, 129-135.
42. Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade, 146; John D. Haeger, The Investment Frontier: New York Businessmen and the Economic Development of the Old Northwest (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), 62.
43. See Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade; Haeger, Investment Frontier; Dunbar, Michigan, 1965:257; James Clayton, "The Growth and Economic Significance of the American Fur Trade, 1790-1890," in Minnesota History (Minneapolis, 1966), 40(Winter):210-220.
44. Haeger, Investment Frontier, 62; Clayton, "Economic Significance of the American Fur Trade," 213.
45. Johnson, Investment Frontier, 127-153.
46. Dunbar, Michigan, 225-233; Haeger, Investment Frontier, 62.
47. Rhonda Gilman, "The Fur Trade in the Upper Mississippi Valley, 1830--1850," in Wisconsin Magazine of History (Madison, 1974), 58(1):124; Haeger, Investment Frontier, 62.
48. Haeger, Investment Frontier, 59-127.
49. Daniel Campbell, "Prosperity and Power: The Success and Failure of Potawatomi Leadership in Michigan," in The Michigan Archaeologist, (East Lansing, 1985), 30 (3-4):132- 33.
50. MPHC, 186.
51. Haeger, Investment Frontier, 80.
52. Gilman, "Fur Trade," 2-18, 123-140; Clayton, "Economic Significance of the American Fur Trade," 210-220; Warren, 380-386.
53. Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade, 152; Williams, Early Mackinac, 93-97; Rev. J. A. Van Fleet, Old and New Mackinac, (Grand Rapids: "The Lever"

Book and Job Office, 1880), 124-125.

54. Robert F. Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions and American Indian Response, 1787-1862 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965), 1-15.

55. For instance, Robert Stuart who succeeded Schoolcraft as head of the Michigan Superintendency submitted a census in 1842. He added the statement that the count "is as perfect as it can be made, without much expense and trouble in travelling from village to village, and even then there would be no certainty of its perfect accuracy; for the Indians are extremely ignorant as to ages etc: --I venture to say however, that it is sufficiently near the truth for your purpose, and perhaps as much so, as any of such magnitude which you will receive." Robert Stuart to H. Hartley Crawford, 10 November 1842, NAM M1, 38-40.

56. The most important omissions in the text were those persons who emigrated to Canada between 1838 and 1840, Augustin Hamlin, Jr. and William Johnston to Joel Poinsett, 19 August 1840, NAM M1, 49:173. These people were primarily from Little Traverse Bay and will be discussed in the text about that region. The Indians in any given region were more prone to inflate their numbers to receive a larger share of the annuities than they were to make omissions of those entitled to the division.

57. Henry R. Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Conditions, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States, 6 vols., (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, 1852-1857), III:616.

58. No other such detailed census exists by which Schoolcraft's 1839 tabulations may be tested. In Schoolcraft's 1838 report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, ARCOIA, 1838:453, he gave a rough estimate of the total population of Michigan Indians. Of these, 121 Ottawa lived at Cheboygan, 1,043 at Little Traverse Bay, and 1,197 in the Grand River Valley making an estimated population of 2,361. In this estimate, Schoolcraft seems to omit the people on the Muskegon, White, and Pere Marquette Rivers. If their 1839 total of 317 persons is added to the total, the estimated Ottawa population would number 2,678 or roughly the same as the following year.

In 1838 Schoolcraft compiled a detailed census of the Little Traverse Bay region, H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 16 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:507. Even though the total population is given as 1,200 and roughly equivalent to that of the 1839 census, the village divisions employed make the data difficult to use comparatively. The population at New L'Arbre Croche or Weekwitonsing is not listed at all, and seems to have been combined with that of Little Traverse or Agaming for a total of 497 residents. This number is larger than the average or the median size for an Ottawa village. Middle Village or Ahptuhwaing shows 314 residents, roughly three times the number of 102 reported in 1839. Since the only example of large scale fission at this village occurred in

1829, it seems more likely that independently identified bands living within the region of Middle Village were away at the time of the count or were counted separately in 1839. For instance, the 1839 census has a "Band or Village of the Late Wing" comprised of 75 persons who can not be located at a larger village site. The Cheboygan or Burt Lake Village may also be included in this number. Cross Village or Ahnumawautikuhmig is listed as having 225 residents, again a substantial number more than the following year. This is despite the fact that Kemewan or Rain's Band of Ahnumawautikuhmig is also listed and said to include 164 persons. The discrepancy between the actual population given in 1839 and the 1838 estimate may also represent the inclusion of more isolated groups such as Drummond Island or emigration to Canada.

A second population estimate of 1,040 was given to Bela Hubbard by Father Dejean, Journal 29 June 1838, Bela Hubbard Notebooks, 1814-1896, Michigan Historical Collections, ms.AA 3485, Ann Arbor [Hereafter BEHP]. While this number falls within the ballpark figure for both the 1838 and 1839 Schoolcraft census, it too employs divisions which make their comparison to the 1839 census impossible.

59. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

60. No count of Bowting Village is available before their move to Ottawa Colony near Gull Lake in Barry County in 1836. The census of Ottawa Colony is substituted to account for this discrepancy. Another discrepancy in this later count is an unidentified village named "Prairie Village" which had a population of 50 persons. If this population is included, the population on the Grand River averages 126 persons living in ten villages, H. Schoolcraft to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 30 September 1839, NAM M234 403:130-140. All totals included in this paragraph are taken from Schoolcraft's summary of the 1839 census.

61. These five villages include what Schoolcraft calls "Wing's Village" in H. Schoolcraft to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 30 September 1839, NAM M234, 403:130, and as "The Band or Village of the Late Wing" in Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, NAM M1, 66:41828. This band numbered only 75 persons and is not listed separately in any other sources.

62. A. Hamlin, Jr. and W. Johnston to J. Poinsett, 19 August 1840, NAM M1, 49:173. This document identifies the emigrants by the name of the band's leader rather than by village. The association of leader's names and their place of residence was made from the following documents:

Apokisigan's band: Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 46; Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:450; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

Kemewan's Band: Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 450.

Namouschota's Band: Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828; Schoolcraft Historical and Statistical Information, 3:615.



Kechenawkawsemonown's Band: Kechenawkawsemonown is translated as Big Sail by H. Schoolcraft in HRSP, 25:182-44. Chingassamo, or Big Sail is identified as Ogema of the Cheboygan Indians in White, "Ethnohistorical Report," n.d., 3, from his signing of the supplemental article of the Treaty of Washington of 28 March 1836 in Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 450.

63. L. Cass to John Calhoun, 1 February 1822, NAM M1, 4:378.

### CHAPTER 3: CONTESTS ON THE FRONTIER

1. The following analysis rests on the assumption that culture change is a process in which persons select from options available to them within sociopolitical, economic, and cultural constraints to achieve their culturally defined goals. It also assumes that the peoples' values are reflected in the actions of the leaders who take political stances based upon the values held by their constituents and who then set examples for and sponsor the requisite adjustments in social and even cultural configurations. The theoretical underpinnings of this analysis are found primarily in the works of James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1978), 422-44.

2. Patron/client relationships, as manifested in nineteenth century American life, linked persons with unequal power and wealth. The intellectual underpinnings are discussed by Anthony F. C. Wallace in, Rockdale: The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 55-56. The same model has been used by James A. Clifton to discuss reciprocal exploitation between the Potawatomi and various agents of the French, British, and American societies in Prairie People.

3. This status was recognized by American officials in the 1836 Treaty of Washington which lists the leaders of every village included in the cession. Leaders were divided into three classes based upon their relative status in Ottawa society, Kappler 1971:455.

4. Only one source deals with Ottawa cosmology and beliefs in any detail. That is Annales, 4(1830):481-6.

5. I use term "superhuman" in this text rather than the more familiar "supernatural." As A. Irving Hallowell said, the latter term presupposes a concept of nature which was not present in Ojibwa thought, "Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View," in Teachings From the American Earth: Indian Religion and Philosophy, Dennis Tedlock and Barbara Tedlock, eds., (New York: Liveright, 1975), 151.

6. Hallowell, "Ojibwa Ontology," 141-178; Edward S. Rogers, The Round Lake Ojibwa (Ottawa: Occasional Paper 5, Art and Archaeology Division, Royal Ontario Museum, 1962), D1-D45.

7. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 477-478.
8. Hickerson, Chippewa and Their Neighbors, 52-63; W. J. Hoffman, "The Midewiwin or 'Grand Medicine Society' of the Ojibwa," in Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington, D.C., 1891), 149-300.
9. Clifton, Prairie People, 477-478.
10. L. Cass to John Calhoun, 1 February 1822, NAM M1, 4:378; MPHC, 12:594. Translation from Wilbert B. Hinsdale, Archaeological Atlas of Michigan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1931), 9.
11. Lewis Cass to John Calhoun, 1 February 1822, NAM M1, 4:378; Schultz, An Indian Canaan, 54.
12. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:200.
13. Schultz, An Indian Canaan, 61.
14. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 145-146.
15. Schultz, An Indian Canaan, 64-65.
16. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 193; Schultz, An Indian Canaan, 63.
17. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 76; McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 153.
18. No mention is made in government documents concerning the leader of the village chosen by Trowbridge. This identification is made from McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 250 where he states that he chose a site "thirty or forty" miles lower than the site selected by the government commissioner. McCoy had chosen Bowting Village at present day Grand Rapids Michigan. Thirty miles above this site was the mouth of the Flat River where Keewaycooshcum was Ogema. There were no major village sites forty miles north of the rapids.
19. L. Cass to I. McCoy, 27 May 1823, NAM M1, 5:154; I. McCoy to L. Cass, 12 July 1823, NAM M1, 12:420; I. McCoy to L. Cass, 28 October 1823, NAM M1, 15:303; McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 193; Henry Connor to L. Cass, 8 February 1836, NAM M234, 422:18; Anon., History of Kent County Michigan (Chicago: Chas. C. Chapman and Company, 1881), 154- 55.
20. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 193.
21. Ibid., 197.
22. Ibid., 205, 250.
23. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 206, states that White

Sparrow was "chief" of the Ottawa on the Kalamazoo River. However, the location of permanent Ottawa villages on the Kalamazoo River is problematic. No Ogema of this name appears in contemporary government documents. McCoy may have mistaken the ethnic affiliation of this band, or may have named a small village associated with one of the larger Ottawa settlements in Barry County or on the Grand River.

24. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 207.
25. Ibid., 214.
26. Ibid., 227.
27. Ibid., 233.
28. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 249; I. McCoy to L. Cass, 9 December 1824, NAM M1, 15:347.
29. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 251-252.
30. Ibid., 250.
31. I. McCoy to L. Cass, 9 December 1824, NAM M1, 15:347; L. Cass to I. McCoy, 4 January 1825, NAM M234, 419:146.
32. I. McCoy to L. Cass, 9 December 1829, NAM M1, 15:347; I. McCoy to L. Cass, 25 December 1824, NAM M1, 15:377.
33. MPHC, 158-162; Public Archives Canada, Record Group 10, Indian Affairs, Red Series, Eastern Canada, Ottawa, [Hereafter PAC], 35:198153.
34. Noaquageshik is reported to have died at age 98 in 1855 or 1856, MPHC, 35:145-147. However, he was replaced by Mashco as leader of the Ottawa Colony Indians in 1849, Sha-bee-quo-un et al. to Hon. President, 20 November 1849, NAM M234, 403:470. This supports an alternate report that Noaquageshik died that year, Anon., 796. It is impossible to tell Noaquageshik's exact age when McCoy first came to Grand River, but he may have been over sixty years old.
35. Noaquageshik's signature appears on the 1815 Treaty of Springwells as Nowgeshick; on the 1817 Treaty at the Foot of the Rapids as Nowkesick; and on the 1819 Treaty of Saginaw as Nowkeshuc, Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:119, 152, 187.
36. Refer to Chapter 2, footnote 38 for a discussion of Ottawa signatories to this treaty.
37. Contemporary documentation does not indicate, Sagina's kin links to Ottawa villages on the Grand River. However, he and Noaquageshik signed petitions together and were often in each other's village. See for example Kenatekenong et al. to Anon., [Henry Schoclcrafft], 13 September 1833, HRSP, 21:11973. When Sagina's son Mucutaottawa seriously wounded

a French trader, it was Noaquageshik and the headmen of his village who assumed responsibility for any expenses which occurred, Chiefs and Headmen Ottawa Grand River, agreement made with H. Connor for Supt. of Indian Affairs G. Porter, 27 September 1831, HRSP 20:11331. Noaquageshik made his winter hunt in the vicinity of Gun Lake. Indeed, Noaquageshik requested McCoy to visit him at his winter village at Gun Lake, McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 249. Further, Sagina received payments under the 1836 treaty, Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455.

38. Kewyquoscom to L. Cass, 24 December 1829 [sic], NAM M1, 27:519; Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 455; H. Connor to L. Cass, 8 February 1836, NAM M234, 422:18.

39. MPHC, 147.

40. Anon., History of Kent County, 156-158.

41. MPHC, 16:677.

42. Name translation taken from MPHC, 30:181.

43. Noaquageshik et al. to L. Cass, 20 April 1829, NAM M1, 24:133; Noaquageshik et al. to L. Cass, 1829, NAM M1, 24:151; Noaquageshik et al. to L. Cass, 13 July 1830, NAM M1, 26:331; An Agreement made with H. Connor for Superintendent of Indian Affairs G. Porter, 27 September 1831, HRSP, 20:11331.

44. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455.

45. I. McCoy to L. Cass, 9 December 1824, NAM M1, 15:347; I. McCoy to L. Cass, 25 December 1824, NAM M1, 15:377.

46. I. McCoy to L. Cass, 9 December 1824, NAM M1, 15:34; Kewyquoscome to L. Cass, 2 July 1827, NAM M1, 21:1; L. Slater to L. Cass, 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:414.

47. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 250-251.

48. Ibid., 258-262.

49. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 274; Schultz, An Indian Canaan, 91.

50. I. McCoy to L. Cass, 30 September 1825, NAM M1, 17:167.

51. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 298-99.

52. Ibid., 308.

53. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 297; I. McCoy to L. Cass, 30 June 1827, NAM M1, 20:857. Schoolcraft's 1839 census counted

42 children living at Ottawa Colony and 52 at the Rapids of the Grand, the two villages which made up the 1827 population at the rapids, Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll, HRSP, 66:41828. Since the villages had already moved from their original locations by 1839 and had lost populations to other settlements, the original number of children may have been larger.

54. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 329.
55. Ibid., 276.
56. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 332; Schultz, An Indian Canaan, 91, 128.
57. William J. Etten, A Citizens' History of Grand Rapids Michigan (Grand Rapids: A. P. Johnson Company, 1926), 13.
58. L. Slater to G. Porter, 27 July 1832, NAM M1, 31:93; Gosa and Leonard Slater to G. Porter, 1 February 1833; HRSP, 21:11777; Kunnoteenishkunk et al. to G. Porter, 17 May 1833, HRSP, 21:11832.
59. William Belcher to L. Cass, 14 July 1828, NAM M1, 23:207; Gosa et al. to Johnston Lykins, 5 February 1829, NAM M234, 420:645; Noaquageshik et al. to L. Cass, 20 April 1829, NAM M1, 24:133; L. Slater to G. Porter, 27 July 1832, NAM M1, 31:93; Gosa and L. Slater to G. Porter, 1 February 1833, HRSP, 21:11777.
60. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 391.
61. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 333; Schultz, An Indian Canaan, 103.
62. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 333-34.
63. Ibid., 259, 390-391, 299.
64. Journal of Indian Affairs at Drummond Island between the 25th day of June and the 24th day of September 1817, PAC, 35:20207.
65. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 348.
66. L. Slater to L. Cass, 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:416; McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 388, 396-97.
67. Noaquageshik et al. to L. Cass, 22 April 1829, NAM M1, 24:151.
68. Kintzing Pritcnett to Sevens Mason, n.d. 1836, NAM M1, 41:51.
69. L. Slater to G. Porter, 27 July 1832, NAM M1, 31:93; Gosa and L. Slater to G. Porter, 1 February 1833, HRSP, 21:11777; Kunnoteenishkunk et al. to G. Porter, 17 May 1833, HRSP, 21:11832.
70. E. Henry to G. Porter, 9 April 1833, National Archives Microcopy

M21, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, 1824-1881, Record Group 75, (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Microfilms) [Hereafter NAM M21], 10:223-4; Noaquageshik et al. to Anon., [Henry Schoolcraft], 6 September 1833, HRSP, 21:11968.

71. Etten, A Citizen's History, 14.

72. Noaquageshik et al. to Anon., [Henry Schoolcraft], 6 September 1833, HRSP, 21:11968.

73. Daniel Kurtz to G. Porter, 22 August 1833, NAM M1, 33:229; D. Kurtz to Spencer H. Cone, 22 August 1833, NAM M21, 11:118.

74. L. Slater to L. Cass, 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:414.

75. Kewyquoscome to Cass, 24 December 1829, NAM M1, 27:519.

76. Noaquageshik et al. to G. Porter, 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461.

77. Shea, Catholic Missions, 389; Frederic Baraga to G. Porter, 5 November 1833, NAM M1, 3:493; F. Baraga to The Leopoldine Foundation, 20 February 1835, Friedrich Baraga Papers, Clarke Historical Library, Mt. Pleasant [Hereafter FBP], ALF.XIV, VI, #37, pp.1-4, BBC. MF.66-2; F.33-6; Noaquageshik et al. to [G. Porter], 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461.

78. E. Henry to Able Pepper, 6 March 1833, NAM M21, 10:97; E. Henry to G. Porter, 9 April 1833, NAM M.21, 10:223-24; F. Baraga to the Leopoldine Foundation, 7 March 1834, FBP, ALF. XIV. VI., # 34, pp.1-4, BBC MF 66-2; 25-28; F. Baraga to the Leopoldine Foundation, 26 June 1834, FBP, ALF. XIV. VI, 35; pp.1-4, BBC.MF. 66-2, 29-32.

79. Noaquageshik et al. to [G. Porter], 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; F. Baraga to The Leopoldine Foundation, 7 March 1834, FBP, ALF. XIV, VI, #34, pp. 1-4, BBC.Mf. 66-2, 25-28; F. Baraga to The Leopoldine Foundation, FBP, ALF. XIV, VI, #37, pp. 1-4, BBC Mf. 66-2, F. 33-6.

80. F. Baraga to The Leopoldine Foundation, 1 December 1833, FBP, ALF. XIV, VI, 30, pp. 1-6, BBC. Mf.66-2, F. 12-16.

81. The Protestant Ottawa sent two letters in 1833, L. Slater to L. Cass, 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:416, and Noaquageshik et al. to G. Porter, 29 October 1833, NAM M1 33:461. In these documents Slater compiled statements of support from the villages at Flat River, Shingobeeng or Sagina's village on the Thornapple River, and Noaquageshik's village at Bowting. At the Bowting some sixteen men signed, representing their various extended families.

The first two villages were not directly embroiled in disputes at the Grand Rapids mission. A comparison of these early documents to the 1839 annuity payroll shows that none of the signers of this document who did not originally live at Bowting actually accompanied Slater to Ottawa Colony, Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll, HRSP, 66:41828. This may well

indicate that their interests were more closely linked to the division of treaty goods than to other aspects of the Slater program. Sheengo-beeng village maintained special ties to Noaquageshik in that their two leaders were close associates and that Noaquageshik conducted his winter hunts in the vicinity of this village, perhaps indicating that the leaders of this village were merely supporting their friends in time of crisis. See footnote 37. The Flat River village never adopted a Christian affiliation and were known as the "Pagans" even after their settlement on reservations in the 1850s and 1860s.

82. Noaquageshik, the undisputed leader of the Baptist Ottawas at Bowting, was the first signatory on both documents referenced in footnote 84. Gosa was second. Two signatories were transcribed so illegibly that they can not be compared to signatures on other documents. One more signature, that of a man named Black Skin (Muckatosha), appears to be affiliated with both the Baptists and the Catholics. Since the name appears on the 1839 payroll both at the Baptist Ottawa Colony and at the Rapids of the Grand, it is clear that two men held this name and that the influential leader named Black Skin was affiliated with the Catholics, Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828. Of the remaining eleven signatures, ten men signed a number of petitions before or after 1833, indicating that their status as family or lineage heads was legitimate and exercised over time.

Toneboh: seen also on 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; 13 May 1834, NAM M1, 34:264; 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146; 29 March 1837, NAM M1, 42:291; 1 January 1838, NAM M1, 37:400; 20 November 1849, NAM M234, 403:470.

Shechoboos: (Big Rabbit or Deer), 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:411; 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; 13 May 1834, NAM M1, 34:264; 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146; 1 January 1838, NAM M1, 37:400; 29 March 1837, NAM M1, 42:291; 8 May 1840, NAM M1, 48:321.

Wabwatum: 17 May 1833, HRSP, 21:11832; 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:411; 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; 13 May 1834, NAM M1, 34:264.

Keomohbenasen (Leader Bird): 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:411; 1 January 1835, NAM M1, 37:400; 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146.

Minetowee: 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:411; 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; 13 May 1834, NAM M1, 34:264.

Shounequome: 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:411; 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; 16 May 1834, NAM M1, 34:264; 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146; 1 January 1838, NAM M1, 37:400; 29 March 1837, NAM M1, 42:291.

Wohwossam: 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:411; October 29, 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146; 29 March 1837, NAM M1, 42:291.

Wasobequome: 13 May 1833, NAM M1, 34:264; 22 October 1833, NAM M1,

421:411; 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 3:461; 1 January 1838, NAM M1, 37:400; 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146.

Kemohbenah: 22 October 1833, NAM M1, 421:411; 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; 13 May 1834, NAM M1, 34:264; 1 January 1835, NAM M1, 37:400.

Pamwimetunk: 27 July 1832, NAM M1, 31:93; 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:411; 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461; 13 May 1834, NAM M1, 34:264; 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146.

Kishcondunk 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:411; 29 October 1833, NAM M1, 33:461.

Not all signatories of the October 29, 1833 petition can be positively associated with the Bowting Village. Coo-coo-coo, Mobrckewun, Pewosh, Shonegheshick, and Pewawheshe did not sign the earlier letter as Bowting filial group heads.

83. For data used in compiling population estimate see Chapter 2, footnotes 58-62.

Toneboh, Shechoboose, Keomohbenabesen, Maketaze, Shounequom, Wabsquome, Wohwossam were so attached to the Baptist mission that they accompanied Slater to Ottawa Colony. Four of these men were paid as lineage heads there in 1839. These four men were signed as Oshcawboose, Ogemawpenasee, Muckataywosshay, and Sawwawbequome. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

84. The Catholic Ottawa came primarily from Muckatosha's village. Shortly after Slater sent his petitions from Bowting, Baraga requested permission from Governor Porter to establish his mission beside that of the Baptists. In his request he listed the "Catholic Indians in the mission of Grand River," F. Baraga to G. Porter, 5 November 1833 NAM M1, 33:485." At the top of his list was the sixty year old Lewis Mekatewaji, or Muckatosha, the Ogema of the village, Dennis Odachidowan, and the thirty-five year old Francis Megisinini who was then an Ogemasi. The count made by Baraga placed the number of Catholic Ottawa at fifty-three, ranging from seventy years to one month old. Baraga provided a total of fifty-three Christian names, none of which identify individual members of the community as kin. Of these fifty-three persons only five were males over the age of eighteen who could have acted as male family heads, though it is unlikely that the youngest of these would have done so. There were an additional eight women ranging in age from nineteen to fifty three, any of whom could have been the head of a large nuclear family.

It seems, then, that the Baptist Ottawa accurately stated the number of their Catholic neighbors only if "five families" refers to an extended family, for 10.6 persons per family is larger than the regional average nuclear family. The Catholic group, too, formed a relatively stable political entity. When the Baptist Ottawa left Bowting in 1836, this group remained in the vicinity of Grand Rapids. Megisinini, Muckatosha,



and Tushshetowon continued to be leaders. The population of the band grew from 53 to 78 between 1833 and 1839, with 11 adult males, 15 adult females, and 52 children, HRSP, n.d. 1839, 66:41828. This increase in adult males can be accounted for in maturation of adolescents, and by recruitment from the Baptist affiliated group when the majority of their members moved to Ottawa Colony. Matured males included Job Tchingwachi, John Baptist Makateokwad, and George Eioniwaching and perhaps others who were teenagers in 1833. The only real evidence of recruitment is in the case of Wawwasom, HRSP, n.d. 1939, 66:41828.

85. L. Slater to G. Porter, 13 May 1838, NAM M1, 34:266.
86. Noaquageshik et al. to G. Porter, 13 May 1834, NAM M1 34:264.
87. Etten, A Citizen's History, 14-16, 21, 36-41.
88. Shea, Catholic Missions, 389.
89. K. Pritchett to S. Mason, n.d. 1836, NAM M1, 41:51.
90. Ibid.
91. Van Fleet, Old and New Mackinac, 124.
92. Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade, 108, 129-133; Elizabeth Therese Baird, "Reminiscences of Early Days of Mackinac Island," In Wisconsin Historical Society Collections, 14:38.
93. Baird, "Reminiscences," 38-43.
94. Ibid., 34-35, 44-45.
95. Baird, "Reminiscences," 28-34; G. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 9 October 1832, NAM M1, 68:518; R. Stuart to L. Cass, 3 December 1832, NAM M234, 402:54; G. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 20 June 1833, NAM M1 71:60.
96. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 1851:524; Annales 1826:131.
97. There are many descriptions of the "civilized" Ottawa. For examples see: annales 1836:293-297, 307-309; ARCOIA 1837:531- 535; ARCOIA 1841:345-348; Anna Brownell Jameson, Winter Studies and Summer Rambles in Canada: Selections, Clara Thomas, ed., (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965), 112.
98. Annales 1826:102-103.
99. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 118-120.
100. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 491.
101. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 49.

102. Williams, Early Mackinac, 130; Baird, "Reminiscences," 46.
103. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 471, 505-506.
104. The Ottawa name for this village was provided by an Odawa speaker Interview in March 1986. Before the establishment of the Catholic mission at Middle Village, the settlement was known to the Americans as L'Arbre Croche, as was the entire territory between the Straits of Mackinac and Little Traverse Bay.
105. Annales 1826:133; 1830:483.
106. Annales 1826:102, 103, 135; 1829:302-303.
107. Annales 1826:102. The name is signed Epevier or Sparrow Hawk. It is translated in Shea, Catholic Missions, 384, as simply Hawk. By the end of 1826 his name was regularly written as Magati Pinsingo which was glossed as l'Oiseau-Noir or Blackbird. This corroborates the story of his son who relates the original meaning as Black Hawk and the erroneous translation as Blackbird, an appellation which continued in common usage throughout the next two generations, Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 27; Tanner, Captivity and Adventures, 160-64.
108. Blackbird, Captivity and Adventures, 46.
109. Annales 1826:103; Shea, Catholic Missions, 384.
110. The French rendered several phonetic spellings of the name Apokisigan. The earliest is in Annales 1826:125 transcribed as Paponas, which only slightly resembles the English rendition. In Annales 1831:544 the name Leon Apangossigan is linked to the French Lapapoix which closely resembles the earlier spelling.
- The translation of the name Apokisigan was given in, H. Schoolcraft to G. Porter, 1 September 1832, NAM M1, 31:259. Literally translated it refers to a smoking mixture made with the inner bark of the red-osier dogwood tree, Interview with Little Traverse Ottawa, March, 1986.
111. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 46.
112. Annales 1826:123; Shea, Catholic Missions, 384.
113. Shea, Catholic Missions, 385; Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 47. Place names from Interview with Little Traverse Ottawa, March 1986.
114. The identity of Assiginac as the brother of Mackatabenese is drawn from two documents. Badin calls him the brother of the Grand Chief at L'Arbre Croche, meaning the region of Waganagisi. While he could be the brother of Apokisigan, he is most certainly the brother of Mackatabenese whose son, Andrew Blackbird, calls Assiginac "my uncle," Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 47. Translation of the name As-

siginac is drawn from J. Russell Harper, Paul Kane's Frontier (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), and Jameson, Winter Studies, 146.

115. Annales 1826:130; 1829:344

116. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 47; Annales 1829:321.

117. Jameson, Winter Studies, 146, 150; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 483; Harper, Paul Kane's Frontier.

118. Makate Pinetchi (l'Oiseau-Noir) to M. Richard, September 1825, Annales 1826:131.

119. Annales 1826:133

120. Ibid., 1829:321,344.

121. M. Dejean to M. l'Abbe R. in Bordeaux, 10 January 1829, Annales 1830.

122. Annales 1829:477.

123. Leon Lapapoix et al. to Father Edward Fenwick, 9 September 1828, Annales 1829:476. Five names can not be matched with other spellings due to the quality of French transcriptions. The identity and translation of Pamocsiga is found in Jameson, Winter Studies, 146. The translation of Namouschota, Kiminichagun, and Sagitandawe are found in NAM M1, 31:259, Schoolcraft to Porter, 1 September 1832, NAM M1, 31:259. The remaining identifiable names also appear in Nisawakwat et al. To Whom it May Concern, 3 May 1835, NAM M234, 424:88.

124. The date of this council is unclear in the Annales. Although it is recounted in the 1829 edition, it is included along with several letters relating to the priest's 1828 missionary trip.

125. Annales 1830:482.

126. Rogers, Round Lake Ojibwa, D21-D35, E6-E7; R. W. Dunning, Social and Economic Change Among the Northern Ojibwa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).

127. Annales 1830:481-6.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 47 says the move from Seven Mile Point to Wekwitonsing was made in 1827. However, Dejean in Annales 1829:465 (translated in Shea, Catholic Missions, 386) said that he urged the Christians to cabin apart in 1829 because the pagans

were showing much opposition. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 71, states that he is nearly seventy years old. At maximum, then, he was 9 years old in 1829 and his memory of the date of this event is perhaps in error concerning this event. Dejean's relation probably presents a more accurate date.

131. Interview with Little Traverse Ottawa, March 1986.
132. L. Cass to George Boyd, 20 May 1829, NAM M1, 24:205; T. McKinney to L. Cass, 31 August 1829, NAM M21, 6:78.
133. Schoolcraft Personal Memoirs, 491; Van Fleet, Old and New Mackinac, 129-130.
134. Annales 1830:486-9. For the steps in determining this population estimate see Chapter 2.
135. Leon Apangossigan et al. to the Council Central du Midi, 25 October 1829, Annales 1830:544.
136. For Blackbird's age see footnote 129.
137. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 48; Annales 1830:491-493.
138. Blackbird History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 33, 47, 53.
139. Dejean to anon., 29 October 1829, Annales 1830:496.
140. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 35-6, 42-43.
141. Shea, Catholic Missions, 387; Nisawakwat et al. To All Whom It May Concern, 3 May 1835, NAM M234, 424:88; H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 29 September 1840, NAM M1, 38:360; LLC-WLCL Box Petitions, Indian Claims. Louis Hamlin and Others, Claim Twenty per Treaty July 29, 1837.
142. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 35-36.
143. Annales 1836:307.
144. H. Schoolcraft to G. Porter, 1 September 1832, NAM M1, 31:307.
145. Annales 1836:308; 1833:150.
146. Dejean to M., 29 October 1829, Annales 1830:491; Annales 1833:150; 1836:293.
147. Gabriel Richard to Lapapouas et al., n.d. [1826?], Annales 1829:332; M. Badin to M., 28 March 1829, Annales 1830:470; Fenwick to anon., August 1829, Annales 1830:490; Dejean to M., 29 October 1829, Annales 1830:494; M. J. de Bruyn to the Editor of the Annale, 8 June 1835, Annales 1836:299.

148. Annales 1836:309.
149. Annales 1836:293; 1833:150.
150. Annales 1830:475: Dejean to M., 29 October 1829, Annales 1830:493.
151. T. McKinney to L. Cass, 31 August 1829, NAM M1, 25:193; G. Boyd to L. Cass, 17 April 1830, NAM M1, 26:141; H. Schoolcraft to G. Porter, 1 September 1832, NAM M1, 31:259; Annales 1833:151.
152. H. Schoolcraft to G. Porter, 1 September 1832, NAM M1, 31:259.
153. Ibid.
154. H. Schoolcraft to G. Porter, 1 September 1832, NAM M1, 31:259; Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 538.
155. Annales 1833:197; Shea, Catholic Missions, 398; Blackbird History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 49.
156. Gertrude Kurath, J. Ettawageshik, and F. Ettawageshik, "Religious Customs of Modern Michigan Algonquins," Unpublished Field Report prepared for the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1955, Chapter 2, p.1-3.
157. R. Stuart to L. Cass, 3 December 1832, NAM M234, 402:54.
158. H. Schoolcraft to E. Herring, 7 June 1833, NAM M234, 61:66.
159. G. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 20 June 1833, NAM M1, 71:60; G. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 21 June 1833, NAM M1, 71.
160. E. Herring to H. Schoolcraft, 27 June 1833, NAM M1, 71:68.
161. H. Schoolcraft to G. Porter, 21 November 1833, NAM M1, 69:21.

#### CHAPTER 4: NEGOTIATION FOR CHANGE

1. Bela Hubbard Notebooks, 1814-1896, ms.AA3485, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor [Hereafter BEHP]; ARCOIA, n.d. 1838; Jameson, 112-113.
2. Annales, 1830:491; Rev. J. Bruyn to H. Schoolcraft, 30 October 1835, NAM M1, 72:291; Annales, 1836:293.
3. Property held in common by the Ottawa and Chippewa as appraised by Messrs McDonnell and Clark, Commissioners, 1836, NAM M1, 47.
4. BEHP 1838; ARCOIA, 1838.

5. For an example of the impact see R. Stuart to H. Schoolcraft, 12 March 1834, HRSP, 6:2077.
6. E. Herring to G. Porter, 16 April 1834, NAM M1, 34:227.
7. Speech of Pabaumtabi of L'Arbre Croche, 18 August 1834, NAM M1, 69:79.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Schoolcraft counts twenty-two "Chiefs of Upper and Lower L'Arbre Croche." One of these, Waishkee, is a Chippewa who resided near Sault Ste. Marie. This lowers the maximum number under this heading to 21. Chingassamo of Cheboygan and Chusco who formerly resided at Waganagisi must be added to this number. Schoolcraft identified these people as Chippewa despite their known Ottawa identity. For a discussion of Cheboygan Band affiliation see Chapter 2. That Chusco was Ottawa and formerly lived at Waganagisi is discussed in, Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 510.
10. References for residences of Apokisigan and Mackatabenese are given in Chapter 3. Identification of other residences are:  
  
Sagitanawe: Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455; Pamoosiga: Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455; Nissowaquot: Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455. Kemewan: Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455 and Ottawa to Presbyterian Board of Missions, n.d., 1854, PHSC, box 78, Fr. 85; Namuschota: Schoolcraft, Statistical and Historical Information, III:615, and NAM M234, 424:88, Nissowaquot et al. to all Whom it May Concern, 3 May 1835, and Mitchell Nawemascotta to W. Richmond, 21 October 1848, William Richmond Papers, ms. R2BE11, R.3, Michigan Room Collections, Grand Rapids Public Library, Grand Rapids, Michigan [Hereafter WRP]; Niscajinini: Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455; Chemokoman: Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455.
11. R. Stuart to H. Schoolcraft, 12 March 1834, HRSP, 6:2077.
12. H. Schoolcraft to G. Porter, 5 June 1834, NAM M1, 34:306.
13. Private Journal of Indian Affairs, A., Henry Schoolcraft, May 27, 1833-September 30, 1837, 5 February 1834, HRSP, 47:30591.
14. R. Stuart to H. Schoolcraft, 12 March 1834, HRSP, 6:2077.
15. E. Herring to G. Porter, 16 April 1834, NAM M1, 34:227.
16. H. Schoolcraft to S. Mason, 18 August 1834, NAM M1, 69:51.
17. The date of Hamlin's return from Rome is estimated. He lived in and conducted business from Weekwitonsing prior to 3 November 1834, Augustin Hamlin, Jr. to Anon., 3 November 1834, NAM M1, 71:571.

18. As the son of a French/Ottawa Metis it is assumed that he spoke French. He also spoke Ottawa and English. Catholic clerical teaching of the day was conducted in Latin. Hamlin may also have learned some Italian during his three year stay in that country. Hamlin's teaching position at Weekwitonsing is verified in, Rev. J. Bruyn to Schoolcraft, 30 October 1835, NAM M1, 72:291.
19. James M. McClurken, "Augustin Hamlin, Jr.: Ottawa Identity and the Politics of Persistence," in Being and Becoming Indian, James A. Clifton, ed. (Chicago: Dorson Press, in press).
20. W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 24 November 1835, NAM M1, 72:332; John Clitz to H. Schoolcraft, 26 November 1835, NAM M1, 69:149; A. Hamlin to L. Cass, 5 December 1835, NAM M234, 421:723.
21. Nisawakwat et al. to A. Hamlin, 3 May 1835, NAM M234, 424:88.
22. Ibid.
23. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 16 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:507.
24. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 522.
25. H. Schoolcraft to E. Herring, 20 June 1835, NAM M1, 69:114; E. Herring to H. Schoolcraft, 29 August 1835, NAM M1, 72:217.
26. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 522; H. Schoolcraft to S. Mason, 17 September 1835, NAM M1, 69:120.-
27. Frederic Rese to John Norvell, 18 November 1835, NAM M234, 421:768; H. Schoolcraft to E. Herring, 3 November 1835, NAM M1, 69:140.
28. H. Schoolcraft to E. Herring, 3 November 1835, NAM M1, 69:140.
29. D. Kurtz to John Horner, 2 November 1835, NAM M1, 36:280; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 524.
30. H. Schoolcraft to G. Porter, 21 November 1833, NAM M1, 33:511; Private Journal of Indian Affairs, A, Henry Schoolcraft, 27 May 1833 to 30 September 1837, 5 February 1834, HRSP, 47:30591; Speech of Fabaumtabi of L'Arbre Croche, 18 August 1834, NAM M1, 69:79; H. Schoolcraft to E. Herring, 25 October 1834, NAM M1, 69:78; H. Schoolcraft to S. Mason, 17 September 1835, NAM M1, 36:218.
31. H. Schoolcraft to E. Herring, 30 October 1835, NAM M1, 69:137; R. Robinson to C. Trowbridge, 1 February 1836, NAM M1, 72:410.
32. Frederic Rese to John Norvell, November 1835, NAM M234, 421:768.
33. A. Hamlin to L. Cass, 5 December 1835, NAM M234, 421:723.

34. H. Schoolcraft to C. Trowbridge, 13 January 1836, HRSP, 7:2302.
35. H. Schoolcraft to Jane Schoolcraft, 29 December 1835, HRSP, 7:2298.
36. H. Schoolcraft to John Clitz, 24 December 1835, NAM M1, 72:346; Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 90.
37. H. Schoolcraft to J. Clitz, 28 December 1835, NAM M1, 72:348.
38. H. Schoolcraft to C. Trowbridge, 13 January 1836, HRSP, 7:2302.
39. R. Crooks to Gabriel Franchere, 2 January 1836, American Fur Company Records, Steere Special Collection, Bayliss Public Library, Sault Ste. Marie, [Hereafter AFRC] ms. Aa-61: box 1, folder 3.
40. H. Schoolcraft to C. Trowbridge, 13 January 1836, HRSP, 7:2302.
41. C. Trowbridge to H. Schoolcraft, 25 January 1836, NAM M1, 72:388.
42. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:453.
43. There are no mentions in the text of Drew's operating for the American Fur Company. However, there is only one which states that he was an independent. R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 15 May 1836, American Fur Company Papers, 1834-1845, microfilm, 35 reels (New York: New York Historical Society, 1952) [Hereafter AFPC], 23:1603.
44. Journal of the Ottawa-Chippewa Treaty of Washington 1836, HRSP, 25:13930.
45. H. Schoolcraft to C. Trowbridge, 13 January 1836, HRSP, 7:2302.
46. Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade, 129, 130-135; R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 15 May 1836, AFPC, 23:1603.
47. Report of Schoolcraft, Edmonds, and Whiting under Treaty March 1836 with the Ottawa and Chippewa, National Archives Microcopy M574, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs -- Special Files, 1807-1904, Record Group 75, (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Microfilms) [Hereafter NAM M574], reel 30, file 147:330, 315; Report of Schoolcraft, Edmonds, and Whiting under Treaty March 1836 with the Ottawa and Chippewa, NAM M574, reel 30, file 156:1272.
48. R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 15 February 1836, AFPC, 23[?]:1275; R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 15 February 1836, AFPC, 23:1411.
49. H. Schoolcraft to C. Trowbridge, 25 January 1836, NAM M1, 72:388.
50. C. Trowbridge to H. Schoolcraft, 25 January 1836, NAM M1, 72:388.
51. Samuel Lasley to H. Schoolcraft, 11 February 1836, NAM M1, 72:426; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 16 February 1836, HRSP, 25:13853.



52. W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 16 February 1836, HRSP, 25:13853.
53. R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 15 February 1836, AFCP, 23:1275; Haegar, 76, 81-86, 89, 174-179.
54. R. Robinson to H. Schoolcraft, 13 January 1836, NAM M1, 72:380; Noagwageshik et al. to A. Jackson, 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146; R. Robinson to C. Trowbridge, 1 February 1836, NAM M1, 72:410.
55. Noagwageshik et al. to A. Jackson, 27 January 1836, NAM M234, 422:146.
56. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 494.
57. Henry Connor to L. Cass, 8 February 1836, NAM M234, 422:18. Indeed, Ottawa still angry at Keewaycooshcum's unilateral treaty making in 1821 killed the discredited Ogema during the 1836 negotiations, Anon., History of Kent County, 154-155.
58. McCoy, 494; Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2.
59. Mary Holiday to R. Crooks, 5 March 1836, AFCP, 23:1350.
60. William Brewster to R. Crooks, 23 February 1836, AFCP, 23:1304.
61. W. Brewster to R. Crooks, 23 February 1836, AFCP, 23:1304.
62. M. Holiday to R. Crooks, 11 March 1836, AFCP, 23:1866.
63. H. Schoolcraft to J. Schoolcraft, 18 March 1836, HRSP, 25:13925; McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 494-495; M. Holiday to R. Crooks, 22 March 1836, AFCP, 23:1398.
64. M. Holiday to R. Crooks, 5 March 1836, AFCP, 23:1350; Journal of Ottawa-Chippewa Treaty, Washington 1836, HRSP, 25:13930; McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 494.
65. These included: John Holiday, John A. Drew, Rix Robinson, Leonard Slater, Louis Moran, Henry A. Levake, William Lasley, George W. Woodward, and C. O. Ermatinger.
66. See Chapter 3, pages 154-156 for a discussion of these operations.
67. S. Smith to L. Lyons, 11 September 1836, LLC, box: April-September 1836; S. Smith to L. Lyons, 18 September 1836, LLC, box: April-September 1836.
68. Journal of Ottawa-Chippewa Treaty, Washington 1836, HRSP, 25:13930; L. Cass to H. Schoolcraft, 14 March 1836, NAM M234, 427:179-180.
69. Journal of Ottawa-Chippewa Treaty, Washington 1836, HRSP, 25:13930;

- H. Schoolcraft to J. Schoolcraft, 18 March 1836, HRSP, 25:13925; R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 22 March 1836, AFCP, 23:1411.
70. R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 22 March 1836, AFCP, 23:1411; Journal of Ottawa-Chippewa Treaty, Washington 1836, HRSP, 25:13930.
71. Journal of Ottawa-Chippewa Treaty, Washington 1836, HRSP, 25:13930.
72. R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 22 March 1836, AFCP, 23:1411.
73. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:452.
74. Ibid.
75. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 538.
76. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:451.
77. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 498-499.
78. McCoy, History of Baptist Indian Missions, 498-499; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 535, 538; Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:453.
79. Gilpin, Territory of Michigan, 173-194.
80. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 535, 538; Original memorandum of the Committee of Indian Affairs in the United States Senate while the treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa of March 28, 1836 was under consideration. Made by General Tipton, n.d., 1836, NAM M1, 72:470; Resolution of Senate of the United States, May 20, 1836, NAM M1, 72:478.
81. W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 10 May 1836, HRSP, 25:14187.
82. James Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, 29 June 1836, HRSP, 26:14323.
83. R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 15 February 1836, AFCP, 23:1275.
84. R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 15 May 1836, AFCP, 23:1603; BEHP, Peninsula Coast Survey Detroit to Chicago, 19 May to 24 July 1838.
85. J. W. Anderson to Schoolcraft, 10 May 1836, NAM M1, 41:428; Thomas Fitzgerald to John Tipton, 13 January 1837, NAM M234, 422:780.
86. L. Cass to H. White, 1 July 1836, NAM M21, 19:111-113.
87. H. Schoolcraft to R. Robinson, 16 June 1836, NAM M1, 69:172.
88. Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information, IV:188.
89. R. Robinson to H. Schoolcraft, 21 July 1836, NAM M1, 41:91.
90. H. Schoolcraft to L. Cass, 18 July 1836, NAM M1, 437:3.

91. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 27 February 1837, NAM M1, 37:168.
92. H. Schoolcraft to L. Cass, 18 July 1836, HRSP, 26:144:14439; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 541.
93. R. Robinson to H. Schoolcraft, 21 July 1836, NAM M1, 41:91; H. Schoolcraft to Anon., 22 July 1836, HRSP, 26:14407.

## CHAPTER 5: POLITICS OF PERSISTENCE

1. Leonard Slater to H. Schoolcraft, 28 December 1836, NAM M1, 41:562; L. Slater to H. Schoolcraft, 18 January 1837, NAM M1, 37:143; S. Smith to L. Lyons, 13 February 1837, LLC, box: February-August 1837; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 27 February 1837, NAM M1 R.37:168.
2. For a discussion of preemption laws see Paul Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), 219-247; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 13 January 1837, NAM M1, 37:134; L. Slater to H. Schoolcraft, 18 January 1837, NAM M1, 37:143.
3. S. Smith to L. Lyons, 11 September 1836, LLC, box: April-September, 1836; S. Smith to L. Lyons, 11 September 1836, LLC, box April-September, 1836; S. Smith to L. Lyons, 13 February 1837, LLC, box: February-August, 1837.
4. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 27 February 1837, NAM M234, 422:632; H. Schoolcraft to D. A. Lyman, A. D. Rathbone and A. H. Fenning, 27 February 1837, NAM M1, 37:171; A. Butler to J. Poinsett, 20 April 1837, NAM M236, 36:12.
5. L. Slater to Schoolcraft, 28 December 1836, NAM M1, 41:562; John McDonell and John Clark, 8 June 1837, HRSP, 27:15505; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 56:41828.
6. BEHP, Peninsula Coast Survey Detroit to Chicago. 19 May to 29 July 1838.
7. J. W. Anderson to H. Schoolcraft, 10 November 1836, NAM M1, 41:428; Thomas Fitzgerald to John Tipton, 13 January 1837, NAM M234, 422:790; Affidavit of Daniel Wilson, 2 August 1837, NAM M574, reel 32, file 156:1021.
8. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 8 July 1837, NAM M1, 37:240.
9. Extract from the report of Henry Schoolcraft, ARCOIA, 1838:451; N. H. Finney to Harris, 1 March 1838, NAM M1, 44:127; Camp and Shurway to Schoolcraft, 6 March 1838, NAM M1, 44:143.

10. Citizens of Michigan to Lewis Cass, Alpheus Felch, K. S. Bingham, Robert McClelland and Charles Stuart, 15 February 1848, AFRC, box 1847-49.

11. Schoolcraft noted this general trend in ARCOIA, 1837:574- 575. Other indicators of this trend is the appearance of new merchants such as Camp and Shumway in, Camp and Shumway to Schoolcraft, 6 March 1838, NAM M1, 44:143 and A. Roberts and Son and Thomas Fitzgerald in, Thomas Fitzgerald to John Tipton, 13 January 1837, NAM M234, 422:780 and Daniel Wilson in, Affidavit of Daniel Wilson, 2 August 1837, NAM M574, reel 32, file 156:1021.

By 1841 the problems of unethical trade by men with no permanent ties to the Ottawa community grew so acute on the Grand River that the federal government considered withdrawing the payments from the village. See "Indian Payment--Grab Game," Grand Rapids Enquirer, microfilm, reel 230-27, 2 November 1841 and R. Stuart to Antoine Campau, 27 November 1841, NAM M1, 38:622.

12. John Garland to C. Harris, 24 September 1837, NAM M234, 402:315; H. Schoolcraft to Harris, 30 March 1838, NAM M1, 37:446; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 4 April 1838, NAM M234, 423:143.

13. H. Schoolcraft to Slater, 17 September 1836, NAM M1, 37:30; H. Schoolcraft to Edmonds, 29 September 1836, NAM M1, 37:39; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 8 January 1837, NAM M1, 37:400.

14. C. Harris to H. Schoolcraft, 23 June 1837, NAM M1, 42:473.

15. John Garland to C. Harris, 24 September 1837, NAM M234, 402:315.

16. N. H. Finney to C. Harris, 1 March 1838, NAM M1, 44:127; Camp and Shumway to Schoolcraft, 6 March 1838, NAM M1, 44:143; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 13 March 1838, NAM M1, 37:435.

17. ARCOIA, 1837:531-535.

18. Memorial of the State of Michigan in relation to Indians living within the limits of said State, 24th Congress, 2 Sess, 10 January 1837, National Archives Microcopy M200 (Washington D.C.: National Archives Microfilms), 6:1003; C. Harris to Schoolcraft, 27 January 1837, NAM M21, 20:499.

19. C. Harris to H. Schoolcraft, 11 May 1837, NAM M21, 24.

20. C. Harris to H. Schoolcraft, 11 November 1836, NAM M21, 20:116; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 27 February 1837, NAM M1, 37:168; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 8 April 1837, HRSP, 7:2418.

21. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 13 January 1834, NAM M1, 37:134; P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, n.d:1838, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:14; On 9 June 1838, only 47 people lived at Manistee, less than the total number of

the band before the treaty, L. Garey to H. Schoolcraft, 9 June 1838, NAM M1, 44:383.

22. H. Schoolcraft to General Hugh Brady, 6 April 1838, NAM M1, 37:453; H. Schoolcraft to L. Lyon, 6 April 1838, NAM M1, 37:452; Adam L. Roof et al. to President of the United States, 19 April 1838, NAM M234, 402:706; L. Slater to H. Schoolcraft, 20 April 1838, NAM M1, 44:237; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 12 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:494; H. Schoolcraft to H. Connor, 15 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:504; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 15 June 1838, NAM M234, 745:239; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 591.

23. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 1 March 1838, NAM M1, 37:422; Private Journal of Indian Affairs, continuation of A, Commenced at Mackinac October 1, 1837, Entry 5 June 1838, HRSP, 47:30641.

24. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 1 March 1838, NAM M1, 37:422.

25. H. Schoolcraft to Gen. H. Brady, 6 April 1838, NAM M1, 37:453.

26. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 1 May 1838, NAM M234, 423:149; A. Roof et al. to the President of the United States, 19 April 1838, NAM M234, 402:706.

27. The list of delegates was drawn from, James Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 26 June 1838, NAM M234, 415:624. Identities of individuals drawn from, Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

Muckatosha and Megisinini had originally asked Schoolcraft's permission to reoccupy their old village site north of the hamlet of Grandville, but there is no evidence that they ever left their Bowting location permanently. In 1839 they again received annuities under the name "Band or Village of Grand Rapids."

28. Moksauba was listed as the father of 6 children in 1839 and Shaw-ga-wabano had 4, Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828. The remaining delegates were Amick-on-inne, Pegon, Kesiwaby, Wa-wa-sam and Kan-a-ge-qua-bay. Only Pegon is listed on the 1839 payroll, and he is a member of the Flat River village.

29. John Leslie, Commissions of Inquiry into Indian Affairs in the Canadas, 1828-1858, (Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 1985), 37-47, 53; Jameson, 146.

30. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 10 July 1837, NAM M1, 37:245; C. Harris to H. Schoolcraft, 28 July 1837, NAM M1, 42:625.

31. James A. Clifton, A Place of Refuge For All Times: The Migration of the Potawatomi into Upper Canada, 1835-1845 (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1975), 69.

32. C. Harris to H. Schoolcraft, 4 May 1838, NAM M1, 44:281.

33. L. Apakosigan and Gabriel Meakatebinesse to H. Schoolcraft, 17 July 1838, NAM M1, 45:43.
34. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 16 June 1838, NAM M234, 402:335; H. Schoolcraft to Potts, 24 February 1840, NAM M1, 38:224; C. Harris to John Norvell, 29 May 1838, NAM M21, 24:143; C. Harris to H. Schoolcraft, 2 June 1838, NAM M1, 44:343.
35. A. Hamlin to L. Cass, 5 December 1835, NAM M234, 421:723; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 16 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:507; Petition to His Excellency S. Mason, Governor of the State of Michigan, 2 July 1839, State of Michigan RG 44:B157, F6; Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 35-37; McClurken, "Augustin Hamlin," 6-28.
36. Private Journal of Indian Affairs, continuation of A, commenced at Mackinac October 1, 1837, Entry 18 June 1838, HRSP, 47:30641.
37. See footnote 123 in Chapter 3.
38. Name translation from, Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:455; Village location from, Ottawa and Chippewa 1839, HRSP, 66:41828; Relationship to Ogemawinini in, William Richmond to Peter Wakazoo, 31 December 1845, NAM M1, 40:64.
39. J. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 26 June 1838, NAM M234, 415:624.
40. J. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 26 June 1838, NAM M234, 415:624.
41. H. Schoolcraft to I. McCoy, 23 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:515; J. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 29 August 1838, NAM M234, 415:636.
42. I. McCoy to H. Schoolcraft, 27 July 1838, NAM M1, 45:47; I. McCoy to C. Harris, 28 July 1838, NAM M1, 45:139.
43. I. McCoy to H. Schoolcraft, 27 July 1838, NAM M1, 45:47; I. McCoy to Harris, 28 July 1838, NAM M1, 45:139.
44. J. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 29 August 1838, NAM M234, 415:636.
45. Memorandum of an Agreement, 23 August 1838, NAM M234, 415.
46. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 29 September 1838, NAM M234, 402:889.
47. J. S. Gallagher to R. Stuart, 9 June 1841, NAM M1, 50:503.
48. Harvey Clark to B. Butler, 9 January 1837, NAM M234, 422:416; H. Schoolcraft to J. Schoolcraft, 20 May 1839, NAM M1, 37:684; John R. Kellogg to H. Schoolcraft, 28 May 1839, NAM M1, 46:409.
49. J. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, 18 May 1839, NAM M1, 46:375.

50. J. R. Kellogg to H. Schoolcraft, 28 May 1839, NAM M1, 46:409; WRP, William Richmond, a note, 15 September 1847; WRP, M. Nawemascotta to W. Richmond, 21 October 1848; WRP, Joseph Otagamekee to Anon., 21 October 1848; WRP, Chegwajawmuk to Anon., 23 October 1848; WRP, John Baptist Wabimanido to Anon., 25 October 1848; GNS, Journals, 18 October 1840, 4 December 1841, 3 January 1842, 26 April 1843.

51. J. Kellogg to H. Schoolcraft, 28 May 1839, NAM M1, 46:409; ARCOIA, 1839:513-515.

52. This number is most likely inflated to win financial support from eastern congregations, J. S. Gallagher to R. Stuart, 9 June 1841, NAM M1, 50:503.

53. Identification of Meshimnekahning as Moksauba's home village is made from, Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828, in which the village is referred to as "Forks of the Grand" village. The family's presence and role in the new mission is detailed in Smith's journals with the first entry on reel 1, entry 24 August 1841. For Genereaux's home village see, Johnson, 146. Louis the son of Louis Genereaux who ran the Maple River trading post, moved first to Ottawa Colony and then requested a permanent home at the Black River establishment, GNS, Journal 1846, 30 January 1846; WRP, M. Nawemascotta to W. Richmond, 21 October 1848; WRP, Che-gwa-jaw-muk to Anon., 23 October 1848; WRP, J. B. Wabmanido to Anon., 25 October 1848.

54. Rev. Isaac S. Ketchum to Crawford, 28 September 1839, NAM M234, 427:306.

55. A. Roof et al. to President of the U.S., 19 April 1838, NAM M234, 402:706; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 1 May 1838, NAM M234, 423:149; Commissioner of Indian Affairs to H. Schoolcraft, 16 May 1838, NAM M21, 26; Lieutenant Sibley to C. Harris, 29 May 1838, NAM M234, 745:282; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris 15 June 1838, NAM M234, 745:289; H. Schoolcraft to H. Connor 15 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:504; H. Schoolcraft to H. Connor, 15 June 1839, NAM M1, 46:111.

56. There are no contemporary accounts which verify Cobmoosa's kin ties to the Campaus. However, in Cobmoosa's obituary, William Richmond wrote that the Ogema's father was named Antoine but did not indicate a surname or family identity. Traditions still in circulation among Cobmoosa's descendants indicate their common knowledge of their kin ties to the Campaus, Lenore P. Williams, "Indian Migration," in Mason Memories, Mason County Historical Society and Rose Hawley Museum, 14(1):5-7, and Personal Interview with Betty Dubois, a Grand River Bands Ottawa, April 1976. These family recollections are supported by documents in which some members of the generation immediately succeeding Cobmoosa's used both surnames Campau and Cobmoosa together. See for example, Minne Campau Cobmoosa et al. to Honorable Secretary of the Interior, 17 June 1893, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, RG75 1893-23036, National Archives, Washington, D.C. A. Campau was an "old Indian trader" a position which often required cohabiting with an Indian woman. He was

also a fluent Odawa speaker, indicating a long sustained contact which would facilitate forming family ties, Citizens of Grand Rapids to H. Schoolcraft, 13 March 1838, NAM M1, 44:155.

57. Citizens of Grand Rapids to H. Schoolcraft, 13 March 1838, NAM M1, 44:155; Henry Bridge to R. Stuart, 5 June 1841, NAM M1, 50:445; R. Robinson to R. Stuart, 9 August 1841, NAM M1, 51:139.

58. S. Smith to L. Lyons, 13 February 1837, LLC, box: February-August 1837.

59. W. Richmond to James Shields, 1 May 1846, NAM M1, 40:97; J. Shields to W. Richmond, 9 May 1846, NAM M1, 60:169; R. Robinson to W. Richmond, 30 June 1846, NAM M1, 60:245.

60. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828; W. Richmond to R. Stuart, 24 January 1842, NAM M1, 52:37; R. Robinson to R. Stuart, 26 February 1842, NAM M1, 52:113; John Hulbert to R. Robinson, 7 March 1842, NAM M1, 38:649.

61. S. Smith to L. Lyons, 13 February 1837, LLC, box: February-August 1837; Albert Baxter, History of Grand Rapids Michigan (New York: Munsell & Company, Publishers, 1891), 29.

62. R. Robinson to R. Stuart, 9 August 1841, NAM M1, 51:139.

63. R. Stuart to H. Crawford, 26 April 1842, NAM M1, 38:662; H. Crawford to R. Stuart, 11 May 1842, NAM M1, 52:331.

64. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

65. MPHC 30:190-212.

66. ARCOIA, 1839:513-515. It is impossible to distinguish between this leader "Sah-ge-naw" who was listed as the Ogema at Gun Lake and "Sack-qua-naw" presented in the 1839 roll as "Chief of the Thorn Apple River Band," Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

67. ARCOIA, 1840:386-389; L. Campau and Charles Shepard to H. Schoolcraft, 24 February 1841, NAM M1, 50:83; H. Schoolcraft to L. Campau and Dr. Charles Shepard, 2 March 1841, NAM M1, 38:478.

68. H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 8 April 1837, HRSP, 7:2418.

69. Feest and Feest, "Ottawa," 778.

70. Trygg, "Composite Map," map 8; MPHC, 4:18.

71. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828; MPHC, 4:14-15.

72. GNS, Journal 1846, 30 January 1846.



73. Peter Fremin, The Jacksonian Economy (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969), 22-102; Haegar, The Investment Frontier, 40-41.
74. ARCOIA, 340-350.
75. L. Apakesigan et al. to J. Schoolcraft, 17 February 1839, NAM M1, 46:91.
76. Muccatapenace to J. Schoolcraft, 20 February 1839, NAM M1, 46:183.
77. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:452.
78. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 23 April 1839, NAM M1, 37:658; H. Crawford to Schoolcraft, 11 June 1839, NAM M1, 46:505.
79. J. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, 10 May 1839, HRSP, 30:16856; J. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, 18 May 1839, NAM M1, 46:367; H. Schoolcraft to J. Schoolcraft, 20 May 1839, NAM M1, 37:684; H. Schoolcraft to Crawford, 26 June 1839, NAM M1, 37:718.
80. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 20 May 1839, NAM M1, 37:682; J. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, 25 May 1839, NAM M1, 46:401; H. Crawford to H. Schoolcraft, 8 June 1839, NAM M21, 26:192; H. Crawford to A. Hamlin and W. Johnston, 2 September 1840, NAM M1, 49:167.
81. A. Hamlin and W. Johnston to Joel Poinsett, 19 August 1840, NAM M1, 49:173.
82. L. Slater to H. Schoolcraft, 25 July 1840, NAM M1, 48:495.
83. Keemewan to H. Schoolcraft, 23 July 1839, NAM M1, 47:35. At least sixty Waganagisi Ottawa remained on Manitoulin Island for that number returned after Schoolcraft was removed from office. These reported that others were also unhappy at Manitoulin and would return to Michigan if they received assurances that the government would not coerce them to move west of the Mississippi, R. Stuart to H. Crawford, 1841, ARCOIA, 1841:345-348 and W. Richmond to H. Crawford, 20 October 1845, ARCOIA, 1845:498-501.
84. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 4 April 1840, NAM M1, 38:241; J. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, 6 July 1840, HRSP, 32:18061; H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 15 July 1840, NAM M1, 38:296; J. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, 13 August 1840, NAM M1, 48:339; ARCOIA, 1840:340-350.
85. Louis Wasson et al. to His Excellency S. Mason, 2 July 1839, State Archives of Michigan, Records of the Executive Office, RG 44:B 157 F6. All out going correspondence from the Governors of Michigan to Indian tribes was destroyed by fire. No reply to this petition is available.
86. A. Hamlin to M. Van Buren, 28 June 1837, NAM M234, 402:335; COIA to J. Norvell, 29 May 1837, NAM M21, 25; A. Hamlin to M. Van Buren, 29 July 1837, NAM M234, 402:338; H. Schoolcraft to C. Harris, 16 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:507.

87. H. Schoolcraft to L. Cass, 16 June 1838, NAM M1, 37:507; Richard M. Smith to Charles E. Mix, 9 June 1862, NAM M234, 407:155-159.
88. H. Schoolcraft to Potts, 24 February 1840, NAM M1, 38:224.
89. R. Robinson to R. Crooks, 22 March 1836, AFCP, 23:1411; Half Breeds Residing at Ance to L. Lyons, 29 July 1839, LLC, box: Petitions, Indian Claims; ASL to Thomas Ewing, 9 October 1849, NAM M234, 426:428; T. Erring to A. S. Lougherty, 11 October 1849, NAM M234, 426:483; W. Johnston to Secretary of the Home Department, 19 January 1850, NAM M234, 403:529; W. Johnston to Alpheus Felch, 4 March 1850, Alpheus Felch Papers, 1794-1894, ms. Ac Aa/2 2671, Michigan Historical Collections. Dentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor [Hereafter AFP]; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 4 August 1850, HRSP, 40:23815; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 27 November 1850, HRSP, 40:23891; G. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 31 January 1851, HRSP, 41:23949; Ewing and Chute to P. Barbeau, 18 April 1851, Peter B. Barbeau Papers, 1834-1889, ms. Bb-28, Steer Special Collection, Bayliss Public Library, Sault Ste. Marie [Hereafter PBP], box 2, folder 6; G. W. Ewing to C.E. Mix, 16 July 1851, NAM M234, 593:6.
90. R. D. Turner to M. Van Buren, 8 June 1840, HRSP, 32:17960.
91. A. Hamlin and W. Johnston to Hon. J. Doty, 13 March 1841, NAM M234, 424:703; J. Schoolcraft to R. Stuart, 11 October 1841, NAM M1, 51:393.
92. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 24 February 1840, NAM M1, 38:225; H. Schoolcraft to Potts, 24 February 1840, NAM M1, 38:224.
93. Apakosigan et al. to the President of the U. S., 23 May, 1840, NAM M234, 424:50.
94. R. Turner to M. Van Buren, 8 June 1840, HRSP, 32:17960; Apakosigan et al. to the President of the U. S., 23 May 1840, NAM M234, 424:50.
95. H. Crawford to A. Hamlin, 21 August 1840, NAM M21, 21:166.
96. Other Ottawa leaders represented included: Miskwawak, Kaginwakose, Shomin, Migisimang, Menitowach, Okitanakwas, Pipgwen, Knochameg, Matchikikabe, and Minanakwat. Apakosigan et al. to The President of the U. S., 23 May 1840, NAM M234, 424:50.
97. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 15 July 1840, NAM M1, 38:296.
98. H. Crawford to J. Poinsett, 18 August 1840, NAM M1, 49:83.
99. H. Schoolcraft to J. Norvell and J. E. Crary, 22 July 1840, NAM M1, 38:304; P. Dougherty to Daniel Wells, 19 March 1841, PHSC, box 7, 3:51.
100. R. Turner to M. Van Buren, 8 June 1840, HRSP, 32:17960; H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 11 September 1840, NAM M1, 38:343.

101. McClurken, "Augustin Hamlin."
102. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 29 July 1840, NAM M1, 38:312.
103. H. Crawford to A. Hamlin, Jr., 12 August 1840, NAM M21, 21:166.
104. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 29 September 1840, NAM M1, 38:360.
105. Annales 1826:124-126, 130.
106. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 29 September 1840, NAM M1, 38:360.
107. H. Crawford to H. Schoolcraft, 5 September 1840, NAM M1, 49:165;  
H. Crawford to H. Schoolcraft, 15 October 1840, NAM M1, 49:379.
108. Robert J. Surtees, "Indian Reserve Policy in Upper Canada, 1830-1845," Master's thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1966, p.601;  
Robert J. Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario, 1763-1862: The Evolution of a System," Ph.D. dissertation, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1983, p.259.
109. ARCOIA, 1840:340-350.
110. ARCOIA, 1840:340-350.
111. For a summary of American "scientific racism" see Robert E. Bieder, "Scientific Attitudes Toward Indian Mixed-Bloods in Early Nineteenth Century America," in Journal of Ethnic Studies (Bellingham, Wash., college of Ethnic Studies, Western Washington State College, 1980). 30, and Reginald Horsemann, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
112. ARCOIA, 1840:340-350.
113. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 16 October 1840, NAM M1, 38:400; H. Crawford to H. Schoolcraft, 4 November 1840, NAM M1, 29:359.
114. P. Dougherty to Daniel Wells, 26 May 1841, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:55.
115. W. Johnston to A. Hamlin to John Bell, 30 April 1841, NAM M234, 424:705.
116. A. Hamlin and W. Johnston to Hon. J. Doty, 13 March 1841, NAM M234, 424:703.
117. H. Schoolcraft to John McLean, 16 September, 1841, NAM M234, 424:881.
118. A. Hamlin and W. Johnston to Hon. J. Doty, 13 March 1841, NAM M234, 424:703.

119. P. Dougherty to D. Wells, 19 March 1841, PHSC, box 7, vol 3:51; ARCOIA, 1841:345-348.

120. R. Stuart to H. Crawford, 26 November 1842, NAM M234,425:213; W. Johnston to R. Stuart, 28 October 1843, NAM M1, 55:529; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 2 March 1845, HRSP, 10:3564.

CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL PROMOTION AND THE END OF REMOVAL

1. Robert M. Kvasnicka and Herman J. Viola, The Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1824-1977 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 23-27.

2. Walter Lowrie to R. Stuart, 15 June 1841, NAM M1, 50:539.

3. H. Crawford to H. Schoolcraft, 15 June 1841, NAM M1, 50:531.

4. Ottawa and Chippewa to the President, 14 July 1836, HRSP, 7:2355.

5. J. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 27 May 1841, NAM M234, 424:810; H. Crawford to H. Schoolcraft, 15 June 1841, NAM M1, 50:531; R. Turner to R. Stuart, 23 June 1841, NAM M1, 50:601; Justin Rice to R. Stuart, 30 June 1842, NAM M1, 52:489.

6. P. Dougherty to D. Wells, 26 May 1841, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:55.

7. R. Turner to R. Stuart, 23 June 1841, NAM M1, 50:601; R. Turner to John Tyler, 25 June 1841, NAM 234, 424:763.

8. H. Crawford to J. Bell, 27 July 1841, NAM M234, 425:251.

9. J. Bell to R. Stuart, 30 July 1841, NAM M1, 50:125.

10. ARCOIA, 1841:345-348.

11. "Indian Payment," Grand Rapids Enquirer, reel 230-27, 2 November 1841.

12. Antoine Campau to R. Stuart, 6 December 1841, NAM M1, 51:643; R. Stuart to A. Campau, 14 December 1841, NAM M1, 38:633; S. M. Johnston to R. Stuart, 27 December 1841, NAM M1, 51:719; R. Stuart to R. Robinson, 9 October 1843, NAM M1, 39:319; R. Stuart to R. Robinson, 17 October 1843, NAM M1, 39:330.

13. R. Robinson to R. Stuart, 9 August 1841, NAM M1, 51:139.

14. ARCOIA, 1841:345-348.

15. A. Campau to R. Stuart, 6 December 1841, NAM M1, 51:643.

16. R. Stuart to H. Crawford, 26 April 1842, NAM M1, 38:662; H.

Crawford to R. Stuart, 11 May 1842, NAM M1, 52:313.

17. R. Stuart to H. Crawford, 20 July 1842, NAM M1, 38:683; H. Crawford to R. Stuart, 28 July 1842, NAM M1, 53:93; R. Stuart to R. Robinson, 18 August 1842, NAM M1, 38:697.

18. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:451-452; ARCOIA, 1842:396; R. Stuart to Ottawa and Chippewa Chiefs, 14 February 1845, NAM M1, 39:570.

19. Harvey Hyde to R. Stuart, 8 January 1842, NAM M234, 425:72; H. Crawford to Rev. F. Pierz, September 1842, NAM M21, 30; The Michigan state Legislature codified this position in the 1850 constitution, and an opinion of the upheld by Attorney General Jacob Howard in 1863, D. C. Leach to W. P. Dole, 9 July 1863, NAM M234, 407:296-299.

20. P. Dougherty to D. Wells, 19 March 1841, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:51; P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 31 January 1842, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:68; R. Stuart to H. Crawford, 26 November 1842, NAM M234, 425:213.

21. P. Dougherty to Anon., 31 January 1842, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:68; R. Stuart to H. Crawford, 26 November 1842, NAM M234, 425:213; J. Rice to R. Stuart, 12 November 1844, NAM M1, 57:168; R. Stuart to J. Rice, 25 November 1844, NAM M1, 39:524.

22. H. Crawford to Millard Filmore, 2 February 1842, National Archives Microcopy M348, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs -- Report Books, Record Group 75, (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Microfilms) [Name after NAM M348], 3:96.

23. Schultz, 194-195.

24. R. Turner to J. Spencer, 28 February 1842, NAM M234, 425:220.

25. J. Rice to R. Stuart, 30 June 1842, NAM M1, 52:489.

26. L. Apakosigan et al. to His Excellency John Tyler, President of the United States, 20 May 1842, NAM M234, 424:765-769.

27. H. Crawford to Rev. F. Pierz, September 1842, NAM M21, 34.

28. F. Pierz to the President of the United States, 20 July 1843, NAM M234, 425:292.

29. R. Stuart to F. Pierz, 27 February 1843, NAM M1, 39:89.

30. ARCOIA, 1843:425-429.

31. H. Crawford to R. Stuart, 25 July 1843, NAM M1, 55:159; ARCOIA, 1843:425-429.

32. Ottawa to Legislature of the State of Michigan, 4 December 1843, PHSC, box 7, vol.3:103.

33. W. Norman MacLeod to R. Stuart, 16 September 1844, NAM M1, 57:270.
34. Ottawa to Legislature of the State of Michigan, 4 December 1843, PHSC, box 7, vol.3:103.
35. W. MacLeod to R. Stuart, 16 September 1844, NAM M1, 57:270; NAM M1, 39:527. R. Stuart to F. Pierz, 30 November 1844.
36. H. Crawford to R. Stuart, 15 June 1844, NAM M1, 56:53; J. Rice to R. Stuart, 12 November 1844, NAM M1, 57:168; R. Stuart to J. Rice, 25 November 1844, NAM M1, 39:524.
37. R. Stuart to F. Pierz, 15 April 1844, NAM M1, 39:422.
38. ARCOIA, 1844:481-482.
39. H. Crawford to R. Stuart, 15 June 1844, NAM M1, 56:53.
40. ARCOIA 1844:311.
41. W. MacLeod to R. Stuart, 12 November 1844, NAM M1, 57:172.
42. J. Rice to R. Stuart, 12 November 1844, NAM M1, 57:168.
43. R. Stuart to F. Pierz, 30 November 1844, NAM M1, 39:527; R. Stuart to J. Rice, 25 November 1844, NAM M1, 39:524.
44. H. Crawford to R. Stuart. 28 December 1844, NAM M1, 57:32.
45. W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 2 March 1845, HRSP, 10:3564.
46. Ibid.
47. L. Lyons et al. to the President of the U. S., April 12, 1845, NAM M234, 425:706.
48. WRP, T. H. Stevens, a receipt, 1 October 1845; WRP, John Ball, a receipt, 27 February 1846; WRP, T. H. Stevens to Richmond, 2 July 1846; WRP, W. Richmond, a note, 15 September 1847; WRP, M. Nawemascotta to W. Richmond, 21 October 1848.
49. W. Richmond to L. Lea, 15 July 1851, NAM M234, 403:603.
50. W. Richmond to James Shields, 1 May 1846, NAM M1, 40:97; R. Robinson to W. Richmond, 30 June 1846, NAM M1, 60:245.
51. W. Johnston to W. Richmond, 28 March 1846, NAM M1, 60:119; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 5 June 1849, NAM M234, 403:459; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 1 October 1849, HRSP, 40:23493; ASL to T. Ewing, 9 October 1849, NAM M234, 426:428; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 19 January 1850, HRSP, 40:23645; AFP, W. Johnston to A. Felch, 4 March 1850; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 22 April 1850, HRSP, 40:23716; W.

- Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 4 August 1850, HRSP, 40:23815; W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 27 November 1850, HRSP, 40:23891.
52. Nosah et al. to W. Richmond, 27 July 1846, NAM M1, 60:281.
53. Samuel Abbott et al. to W. Richmond, 10 October 1846, NAM M234, 426:176; W. Johnston to W. Richmond, 10 October 1846, NAM M1, 60:389.
54. W. Richmond to W. Medill, 7 January 1847, NAM M234, 426:169; W. Medill to W. Richmond, 26 January 1847, NAM M1, 61:1847.
55. AFP, box 1847-1849, Citizens of Michigan to L. Cass, A. Felch, K. S. Bingham, R. McClelland, and C. Stuart, 15 February 1848.
56. J. Wendell to W. Richmond, 3 February 1849, NAM M1, 62:1849; J. A. Theodore Wendell to Hon. R. Bingham, 5 February 1849, NAM M234, 426:371.
57. A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 2 March 1855, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:150.
58. F. Pierz to W. Richmond, 10 February 1849, NAM M1, 62:439; J. Wendell to W. Richmond, 1 March 1849, NAM M1, 62:451; W. Medill to W. Richmond, 8 March 1849, NAM M1, 62:459.
59. W. Johnston to W. Richmond, 2 March 1849, NAM M1, 62:455.
60. W. MacLeod to R. Stuart, 16 September 1844, NAM M1, 57:270; C. Babcock to A. Hamlin, 3 December 1849, NAM M1, 40:399.
61. Nissah-qah-quad et al. to C. Babcock, 20 September 1850, NAM M1, 64:391.
62. W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 4 August 1850, HRSP, 40:23815.
63. W. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 27 November 1850, HRSP, 40:23891; Chiefs of Village of Little Traverse Bay, Village of Laborcroch, Village of the Cross to Great Father Millard Filmore, n.d. 1851, NAM M234, 403:585.
64. G. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 10 January 1851, HRSP, 41:23948; G. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 31 January 1851, HRSP, 41:23949; L. Lea, Opinion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on the Award Between the Ottawa and Chippewa and Their Creditors, 24 May 1851, NAM M234, 426:751.
65. George W. Ewing to C. E. Mix, 16 July 1851, NAM M234, 598:6.
66. W. Johnston to O. Brown, 1 June 1850, NAM M234, 426:660; GNS, Journal 1850, 30 August 1850; A. Hamlin to Charles Babcock, 9 September 1850, NAM M1, 64:367.
67. A. Hamlin to C. Babcock, 9 September 1850, NAM M1, 64:367.

68. ARCOIA, 1851:6.
69. D. C. Leach to W. P. Dole, 9 July 1863, NAM M234, 407:296-299.
70. P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 4 June 1851, NAM M234, 598:16.
71. GNS, Journal 1853, 18 August 1853.
72. D. Leach to W. Dole, 9 July 1863, NAM M234, 407:296-299.
73. Ibid.
74. ARCOIA, 1851:310-312; ARCOIA, 1853:38-41.
75. ARCOIA, 1851:310-312.
76. Elias Murray to L. Lea, 2 September 1851, NAM M234, 598:41; Harvey Murray to E. Murray, 4 September 1851, NAM M234, 598:43.
77. Resolution in the Senate of the United States, 6 April 1852, NAM M234, 403:703.
78. A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 30 May 1854, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:119; Journal of Negotiations of the Treaty of Detroit, 1855, National Archives Microcopy, T494, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs--Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Indian Tribes, 1801-1869, (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Microfilms) [Hereafter NAM T494].
79. Henry Gilbert to George Manypenny, 6 March 1854, NAM M234, 404:369; H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, n.d. 1855, ARCOIA, 1855; G. Smith to G. Manypenny, 14 March 1854, NAM M234, 404:516-519.
80. Journal of Negotiations of the Treaty of Detroit, 1855, NAM T494.
81. P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 13 September 1851, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:18; P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 22 November 1851, PHSC, box 7, vol.1:23.
82. Shea, Catholic Missions, 391.
83. P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 17 February 1852, PHSC, box 7, vol.1:29; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 22 June 1852, PHSC, box 7, vol.1:40.
84. A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 25 January 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:54; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 4 February 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:28; P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 5 February 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol 1:55; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 3 March 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:58; Naogemah et al. to Presbyterian Board, 23 May 1853, PHSC, box 7. vol. 1:69; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 7 June 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol.1:52; ARCOIA, 1853:287-288; Report of Reverend Thomas Childs, 12 September 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:93; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 17 December 1853, PHSC, box 7,



vol. 1:104; Joseph Weendegowish to Presbyterian Board of Missions, n.d. 1854, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:86; Joseph Nawimoshgose et al. to Presbyterian Board of Missions, n.d. 1854, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:87; Angistar Nisawayoint et al to Presbyterian Board of Indian Missions, n.d. 1854, PHSC, box 7, vol 1:85.

85. J. Turner to W. Lowrie, 25 September 1854, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:137; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 1 November 1854, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:142; J. Turner to W. Lowrie, 1 January 1855, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:146; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 2 January 1855, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:147; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 2 March 1855, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:150.

86. H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, 6 March 1854, NAM M234, 404:369.

87. A Porter to W. Lowrie, 30 May 1854, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:119; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 2 January 1855, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:147; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 5 January 1855, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:148.

88. GNS, Journal 1854, 7 March 1854; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 10 March 1854, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:116; GNS, Journal 1854, 7 April 1854; PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:119, A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 30 May 1854.

89. Na-bun-e-gezhick et al. to Our Father the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 27 February 1855, NAM M234, 404:557-566.

90. Na-bun-e-gezhick et al. to Our Father the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 27 February 1855, NAM M234, 404:557-566.

91. H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, 1 March 1855, NAM M234, 404:594. Identities of these leaders is drawn from, Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41823 and L. Slater to L. Cass, 22 October 1833, NAM M234, 421:414.

92. Na-bun-e-ge-zhick et al. to Our Father the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 27 February 1855, NAM M234, 404:577-566; H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, 1 March 1855, NAM M234, 404:594; Shaquanon et al. to Hon. R. McClelland, 7 June 1855, NAM M234, 404:663-667. For the identity of Joseph Elliott see, L. Slater to H. Schoolcraft, 24 May 1837, NAM M1, 37:221; Now-qua-ge-shick et al. to H. Schoolcraft, 8 May 1840, NAM M1, 48:321.

93. ARCOIA, 1854.

94. H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, 1 March 1855, NAM M234, 404:594.

95. Kowise et al. to Our Father the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 28 February 1855, NAM M234, 404:553-556; H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, 12 April 1855, NAM M234, 404:625-627.

96. A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 26 March 1855, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:154.

97. H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, 12 April 1855, NAM M234, 404:625-627.

98. G. Manypenny to H. Gilbert, 6 June 1855, NAM M21, 51:485- 486; G. Manypenny to H. Gilbert, 19 June 1855, NAM M21, 52.
99. Journal of Negotiations of the Treaty of Detroit, 1855, NAM T494.
100. Journal of Negotiations of the Treaty of Detroit, 1855, NAM T494.
101. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:726; H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, n.d., ARCOIA, 1855.
102. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:725-731.

#### CHAPTER 7: CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN OTTAWA CULTURE

1. W. Richmond to Rev. A. Fitch, 13 May 1848, NAM M1, 40:220.
2. MPHC, 4:546.
3. MPHC, 4:546-547.
4. W. Richmond to Payshosegay and Kinwaygeeshick, 13 May 1848, NAM M1, 40:223; W. Richmond to Rev. A. Fitch, 13 May 1848, NAM M1, 40:220.
5. GNS, Journal 1852, 11 September 1852.
6. H. Murray to E. Murray, 4 September 1851, NAM M234, 598:43.
7. In 1843 and again in 1845 the Muskegon River, White River, and Pere Marquette River people requested that their annuities be paid at the mouth of the Grand River instead of at Bowting which had formerly the central gathering place for Owashshinong people. They reasoned that it was difficult for them to reach Grand Rapids. By canoe they had to paddle forty miles against a strong current, and the cost of riding steamboats up the river remained prohibitive. If the central Ottawa made the trip to Grand Rapids where they had historically conducted their affairs with difficulty, the journey to Mackinac where they maintained far fewer ties must have been more so. The nearly 100 miles from Pere Marquette to Grand Rapids along the Lake Michigan shoreline and up the Grand River offers relatively unhampered travel close to the shoreline when compared to the 170 miles to Mackinac along a much broken shoreline. William Lee to R. Stuart, 27 November 1834, NAM M234, 403:322; Sagima et al. to W. Richmond, 10 June 1845, NAM M234, 725:717.
8. William J. Gribb, "The Grand Traverse Band's Land Base: A Cultural Historical Study of Land Transfer in Michigan," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1981, pp.4, 70; P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, n.d., 1838, PHSC, box 7, vol.3:14.
9. P. Dougherty to R. Stuart, 26 April 1842, NAM M1, 52:289; R. Stuart

to John Campbell, 25 March 1843, NAM M1, 39:129.

10. These villages are identified in, Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

11. Lucius Garey to H. Schoolcraft, 20 September 1838, NAM M1, 45:285; Peter Dougherty Papers, 1838-1870, ms. Aa Microcopy 606, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Diary, 1838-1842, entry August 8, 1838.

12. Gribb, "Grand Traverse Band's Land Base" 71; P. Dougherty to R. Stuart, 1 February 1842, NAM M1, 52:77; ARCOIA, 1842:411-413; R. Stuart to John Campbell, 25 March 1843, NAM M1, 39:129; ARCOIA, 1844:487.

13. ARCOIA, 1842:475; P. Dougherty to Dear Brother, n.d., 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:12.

14. ARCOIA, 1837:531-535.

15. Ashquagonabe and Ahgosa to C. Babcock, 15 October 1849, NAM M1, 63:313.

16. P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, n.d., 1838, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:14; P. Dougherty to Brother Wells, n.d., 1839, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:52; P. Dougherty to H. Schoolcraft, n.d. 1839.

17. Joseph Dame to R. Stuart, 30 June 1842, NAM M1, 52:493; J. Rice to Stuart, 4 March 1843, NAM M1, 54:165; P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 27 March 1843, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:43; P. Dougherty to R. Stuart, 12 May 1843, NAM M1, 54:511; ARCOIA, 1843:320-321.

18. ARCOIA, 1843:320-321.

19. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828; P. Dougherty to Dear Brother, n.d., 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:12.

20. P. Dougherty to Charles Babcock, 12 September 1849, ARCOIA, 1849; P. Dougherty to Dear Brother, n.d., 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:12.

21. P. Dougherty to Dear Brother, n.d., 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:12; P. Dougherty to C. Babcock, 12 September 1849, ARCOIA, 1849.

22. P. Dougherty to Dear Brother, n.d., 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol.1:12; P. Dougherty to D. Wells, n.d., 1841, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:54; P. Dougherty to D. Wells, 19 April 1842, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:70; P. Dougherty to Daniel Wells, 18 January 1843, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:80; P. Dougherty to the War Department, 21 January 1848, HRSP, 38:22136.

23. P. Dougherty to Charles Babcock, 12 September 1849, ARCOIA, 1849.

24. P. Dougherty to R. Stuart, n.d., 1844, NAM M1, 56:323.

25. G. Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, 21 January, 1845, HRSP, 10:3528.
26. Nosah et al. to W. Richmond, 27 July 1848, NAM M1, 60:281.
27. G. Smith to C. Babcock, 28 August 1849, NAM M1, 63:211; P. Dougherty to Dear Brother, n.d., 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:12; P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 13 September 1851, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:18.
28. H. Murray to E. Murray, 4 September 1851, NAM M234, 598:43.
29. John S. Schenck, History of Ionia and Montcalm Counties Michigan, with Illustrations and Biographical sketches of their Prominent Men and Pioneers (Philadelphia: D. W. Ensign & Co., 1881), 217-218.
30. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828; RG75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annuity Rolls 1855- 1868.
31. MPHC, 4:552-556.
32. MPHC, 4:548-549.
33. RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annuity payrolls, 1855-1868.
34. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828, n.d. 1839; RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, annuity payrolls, 1855-1868.
35. Data on Indian Deeds, 1985. Michigan Room Collections, Grand Rapids Public Library, Grand Rapids, MI.
36. RG75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Annuity rolls, 1855-1868.
37. James A. Clifton, "Lac Court Oreilles Band of Chippewa and the Treaties of 1837, 1842, and 1854: A Research Report, Manuscript for Wisconsin Judicare, Wausau, Wisconsin, 1980, pp.50-65.
38. RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1855- 1868; R. Stuart to H. Crawford, 13 June 1843, NAM M1, 39:204.
39. Data on Indian Deeds, 1985. Michigan Room Collections, Grand Rapids Public Library, Grand Rapids, MI.
40. C. Hill to W. Richmond, 4 August 1848, NAM M1, 62:273.
41. R. Robinson to R. Stuart, 9 January 1844, NAM M1, 56:666; R. Robinson to R. Stuart, 14 September 1844, NAM M1, 57:276.
42. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll, 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.
43. ARCOIA, 1846:323-335.

44. L. Slater to H. Schoolcraft, 5 December 1838, NAM M1, 45:411.
45. L. Slater to H. Schoolcraft, 15 September, 1840, NAM M1, 49:253.
46. ARCOIA, 1852-221-222.
47. ARCOIA, 1841:308-309; ARCOIA, 1842:477-478. Robert A. Trennert, Indian Traders on the Middle Border: The House of Ewing, 1827-1854 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 59-89.
48. Ogema-me-ninna et al. to H. Schoolcraft, 8 May 1840, NAM M1, 48:321.
49. ARCOIA, 1844:410-411.
50. ARCOIA 1848:556-557; L. Slater to C. Babcock, 1 October 1849, ARCOIA 1849.
51. ARCOIA, 1844:410-411.
52. ARCOIA, 1844:410-411.
53. ARCOIA, 1846:333-335; ARCOIA, 1852:221-222.
54. ARCOIA, 1842:477-478; ARCOIA, 1851:331-314.
55. H. H. Cumming to A. S. Loughing, 26 November 1849, NAM M234, 403:487.
56. MPHC, 35:146-147, records that Noaquageshik died in 1855 or 1856 at the age of 98. Given his advanced age at the time McCoy founded the Baptist mission at Bowting Noaquageshik may have lived into his ninth decade. However, the above source is uncertain on the exact year of the Ogema's death and there is no other corroborating evidence.
57. Sah-bee-guo-un et al. to the Honorable President, 20 November 1849, NAM M234, 403:470; H. H. Cumming to A. S. Loughing, 26 November 1849, NAM M234, 403:487.
58. ARCOIA, 1844:410-411.
59. Mashco to the Great Father, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 22 November 1849, NAM M234, 403:467.
60. Sah-bee-guo-un et al. to the Honorable President, 20 November 1849, NAM M234, 403:470.
61. H. H. Cumming to A. S. Loughing, 26 November 1849, NAM M234, 403:487.
62. C. Babcock to O. Brown, 13 February 1850, NAM M234, 403:494.
63. Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:731; Mash-kah et al. to G. Manypenny, 16 February 1857, NAM M234, 405:738; Caubmosay et al. to A. Fitch, 3

November 1858, NAM M234, 406:456.

64. Samuel McCoskey to R. Stuart, 5 November 1841, NAM M1, 51:549.

65. ARCOIA, 1843:430.

66. ARCOIA, 1847:906-907.

67. W. Richmond to W. Medill, 24 November 1847, NAM M1, 40:325; Ne-be-neh-see to W. Richmond, 10 July 1848, NAM M1, 62:247; Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 2:730; RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annuity Payrolls, 1855-1862.

68. ARCOIA, 1848:557-558.

69. GNS, Journal 1845, 2 March 1845.

70. H. Hyde to R. Stuart, 8 January 1842, NAM M234, 425:72.

71. J. Kellogg to H. Schoolcraft, 28 May 1839, NAM M1, 46:409; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 523; Joseph Wakazoo to R. Stuart, 11 January 1842, NAM M234:68; GNS, Journal 1844, 25 May 1844; Henry Penoyer to W. Richmond, 7 July 1845, NAM M1, 59:12; WRP, M. Nawemascotta to W. Richmond, 21 October 1848; Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41822.

72. The kin relationship between Negwegon and Ogemainini is determined from, Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 26-27, when he says that Negwegon and Wakazoo were his father's brothers. Ogemainini was the son of Wakazoo and also went by the name Joseph Wakazoo.

73. Thomas Fitzgerald to John Tipton, 13 January 1837, NAM M234, 422:780; Affidavit of Daniel Wilson, 2 August 1837, National Archives Microcopy M574, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Special Files, 1807-1904, (Washington D.C.: National Archives Microfilms), reel 32, file 136:1021; H. Hyde to R. Stuart, 8 January 1842, NAM M234, 425:72; J. Rice to R. Stuart, 4 March 1843, NAM M1, 54:165; Ermine Wheeler-Voegelin, "An Anthropological Report on Indian Use and Occupancy of Northern Michigan," in Chippewa Indians, V (New York: Garland Publishing Company, 1974).

74. H. Hyde to R. Stuart, 8 January 1842, NAM M234, 425:72.

75. ARCOIA, 1841:309-310.

76. GNS, Journal 1841, 24 October 1841; GNS, Journal 1841, 4 December 1841; GNS, Journal 1842, 17 October 1842; GNS, Journal 1843, 11 January 1843.

77. GNS, Journal 1842, 30 March 1842.

78. GNS, Journal 1844, 26 September 1844; Francis Miller to W.

Richmond, 30 June 1845, NAM M1, 58:1.

79. ARCOIA, 1846:335-337.

80. H. Schoolcraft to H. Crawford, 23 April 1839, NAM M1, 37:658; ARCOIA, 1846:335-337.

81. GNS, Journal 1845, 2 March 1845; ARCOIA, 1846:335-337.

82. H. Penoyer to W. Richmond, 7 July 1845, NAM M1, 59:12; GNS, Journal 1842, 7 June 1842.

83. R. Stuart to Rev. G. Smith, 5 November 1842, NAM M1, 39:34.

84. H. Penoyer to W. Richmond, 7 July 1845, NAM M1, 59:12; GNS, Journal 1841, 24 August 1841; GNS, Journal 1842, 16 October 1841; G. Smith to W. Richmond, 10 June 1845, NAM M1, 58:49.

85. GNS, Journal 1841, 24 October 1841.

86. GNS, Journal 1841, 15 September 1841.

87. G. Smith to C. Babcock, 9 October 1850, NAM M1, 64:413, indicates that the elder Moksaua died before the settlement purchased lands on Grand Traverse. I have, then, placed his death before 1848 when Pendunwan made plans for the move.

88. GNS, Journal 1840, 18 October 1840; GNS, Journal 1841, 25 April 1841; GNS, Journal 1840, 24 August 1840; GNS, Journal 1841, 16 October 1840; GNS, Journal 1841, 24 October 1841.

89. G. Smith to C. Babcock, 9 October 1850, NAM M1, 64:413.

90. GNS, Journal 1842, 29 March 1842; GNS, Journal 1842, 30 March 1842.

91. GNS, Journal 1842, 1 May 1842; GNS, Journal 1842, 6 June 1842.

92. GNS, Journal 1842, 7 June 1842; GNS, Journal 1842, 14 June 1842; GNS, Journal 1842, 17 June 1842.

93. R. Stuart to Rev. G. Smith, 5 November 1842, NAM M1, 39:34; GNS, Journal 1842, 10 December 1842.

94. Ogamah-o-ninee et al. to R. Stuart, n.d. 1843, NAM M1, 54:555; GNS, Journal 1843, 11 January 1843; GNS, Journal 1843, 26 April 1843.

95. GNS, Journal 1843, 12 July 1843; GNS, Journal 1843, 13 July 1843; G. Smith to R. Stuart, 18 August 1843, NAM M1, 55:291; ARCOIA, 1843:430.

96. GNS, Journal 1843, 14 November 1843; GNS, Journal 1843, 18 November 1843; GNS, Journal 1843, 21 November 1843; J. Wakazoo to R. Stuart, 23 December 1843, NAM M1, 55:627; Osman Goodrich to R. Stuart, 30 December

1843, NAM M1, 55:643.

97. R. Stuart to O. Goodrich, 3 January 1844, NAM M1, 39:359; R. Stuart to O. Goodrich, 13 January 1844, NAM M1, 39:367; GNS, Journal 1844, 10 April 1844; GNS, Journal 1844, 25 May 1844.

98. GNS, Journal 1845, 7 January 1845; GNS, Journal 1845, 8 January 1845; GNS, Journal 1845, 9 January 1845; GNS, Journal 1845, 2 March 1845; GNS, Journal 1845, 26 April 1845; G. Smith to R. Stuart, 15 May 1845, NAM M1, 58:91.

99. GNS, Journal 1845, 13 May 1845; C. Smith to R. Stuart, 15 May 1845, NAM M1, 58:91; G. Smith to W. Richmond, 10 June 1845, NAM M1, 58:49; GNS, Journal 1845, 10 June 1845.

100. ARCOIA, 1845:573-574; Francis Miller to W. Richmond, 30 June 1845, NAM M1, 58:1; H. Penoyer to W. Richmond, 7 July 1845, NAM M1, 59:1; GNS, Journal 1845, 30 October 1845.

101. G. Smith to W. Richmond, 1 November 1845, NAM M1, 59:364; GNS, Journal 1846, 20 February 1846; GNS, Journal 1846, 2 March 1846; ARCOIA, 1846:335-337; G. Smith and Isaac Fairbanks to W. Richmond, 28 April 1847, NAM M1, 61:133.

102. G. Smith to W. Richmond, 24 July 1847, NAM M1, 61:211; ARCOIA, 1847:909-910; W. Richmond, a note, 15 September 1847, WRP, R2BE11; G. Smith to W. Richmond, 27 January 1848, NAM M1, 62:45; GNS, Journal, 1848, 22 January 1848; GNS, Journal 1848, 24 January 1848.

103. G. Smith to W. Richmond, 6 December 1847, NAM M1, 61:355.

104. G. Smith to W. Richmond, 16 July 1848, NAM M1, 62:241.

105. GNS, Journal, 1848, 26 January 1848; GNS, Journal 1850, 28 June 1850; G. Smith to W. Richmond, 16 July 1848, NAM M1, 62:241; GNS, Journal 1850, 13 July 1850. White, "Ethnohistorical Report on Grand Traverse," n.d., 9. lists Shawbwahsun's village near present day Leland as an Ottawa settlement. However, the Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828, n.d., 1839, lists this head of a kin group as a member of the Chippewa leader Ahgonna's constituency. I have counted Shawbwahsun as Chippewa. White also noted the potential that Nagonabe who joined Smith's mission was also Ottawa. I have no evidence of this being so and continue to count him as Chippewa. The evidence for the Chippewa affiliation of the Camp River people with the Chippewa is discussed in Chapter 2.

106. GNS, Journal, 1850, 5 December 1850.

107. P. Dougherty to Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, 1 May 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 2:109; P. Dougherty to C. Babcock, 14 October 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:8; J. M. Pratt to H. L. Murray, 11 August 1851, NAM M234, 598:55; P. Dougherty to C. Babcock, 14 October 1850,



PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:8.

108. Ottawa and Chippewa Payroll 1839, HRSP, 66:41828.

109. White, "Ethnohistorical Report on Grand Traverse," n.d., 12-18; P. Dougherty to Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, 1 May 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 2:109; GNS, Journal 1850, 22 May 1850: P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 4 September 1850, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:7; RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annuities 1855-1868.

110. H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, n.d., 1855, ARCOIA, 1855.

111. ARCOIA, 1846:261-263; H. Gilbert to G. Manypenny, n.d., 1855, ARCOIA, 1855.

112. ARCOIA, 1843:322-323.

113. Report of Rev. Thomas Childs, 12 September 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:93; RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annuity Payrolls 1855-1868.

114. Population estimates below are drawn from, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annuity Payrolls 1855- 1868. It is unlikely that the Ottawa population actually decreased during this period. The apparent decline can be attributed to the fact that available records do not enumerate the Cheboygan village at Burt Lake, nor does it count the Ottawa people who had settled permanently at Mackinac. The enumerator also did not distinguish Waganagisi Ottawa settlements on the Leelanau settlements from those of the Owashshinong people, making an accurate count difficult if not impossible.

115. P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 13 September 1851, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:18; A. Porter to W. Lowrie, 17 December 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:104.

116. J. Rice to R. Stuart, 12 November 1844, NAM M1, 57:168; Citizens of Michigan to L. Cass, A. Felch, K. S. Bingham, R. McClelland, and Charles Stuart, 15 February 1848, AFP, box 1847-49; ARCOIA, 1848:552-554; J. A. Theodore Wendell to Hon R. Bingham, 5 February 1849, NAM M234, 426:371; ARCOIA, 1851:316-319; ARCOIA, 1853:287-288; Gilbert to G. Manypenny, n.d. 1855, ARCOIA 1853:287-288.

117. RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annuity Payrolls, 1855.

118. ARCOIA, 1843:322-323.

119. ARCOIA, 1848:552-554.

120. Peter Lefevre to C. Babcock, 25 September 1849, ARCOIA, 1849.

121. ARCOIA, 1851:316-319; P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 13 September 1851, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:18.

122. ARCOIA, 1843:322-323; ARCOIA, 1845:576.
123. P. Dougherty to W. Lowrie, 27 March 1843, PHSC, box 7, vol. 3:83.
124. ARCOIA, 1843:322-323; ARCOIA, 1845:576; ARCOIA, 1846:333- 335; James Selkrig to W. Richmond, 10 February 1848, NAM M1, 62:61; P. Dougherty to C. Babcock, 12 September 1849, ARCOIA, 1849; ARCOIA, 1852:221-222.
125. Andrew Porter to W. Lowrie, 4 February 1853, PHSC, box 7, vol. 1:28.

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 74.
2. White, Roots of Dependency, 320-321.
3. Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology," 154.
4. Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1932); Grant Foreman, The Last Trek of the Indians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); Arthur H. De Rosier, The Removal of the Choctaw Indians (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, -1970); Arthur H. De Rosier, "Myths and Realities in Indian Westward Removal: The Choctaw Example," in Four Centuries of Southern Indians, Charles M. Hudson, ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1975); White, Roots of Dependency.

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